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ABSTRACT 
This work provides a critical overview of the land use and environmental planning (Planning) 
system in the wider context of the social and institutional transformation that is necessary to create a 
sustainable society. I theorize why and how ecologically-damaging decisions concerning public 
resource allocation are made, and suggest how the decision-making system can be reformed. To do 
this, I articulate and further develop a new social paradigm, ecofeminism, as an analytical framework 
for de/reconstructing the Planning system. 
Planning, the 'visible hand' of government, is the resource allocation arena that has the potential 
to prevent destructive conflict over resources. It can provide the long-term, rational, ethics-based 
and participatory decision-making process that is required for sustainable resource allocation. The 
other public decision-making systems, in particular, the market and political arenas, by their very 
nature, lack one or more of these characteristics. Private markets can create diverse commodities and 
opportunities for investments and 'consumer choices', but cut off more basic social choices in the 
long term. Unlike Planning, they cannot protect the environment, despite the claims of economic 
rationalists. 
As currently designed and conceived, however, Planning has also proven incapable of expanding 
social choice, protecting the environment, and ensuring sustainable development. Planning has been 
criticized as ineffectual by both sides of the political spectrum: those calling for more planning and 
those calling for less. This failure, I suggest, is because it has been geared toward mitigating the 
consequences of 'unplanned' and often irreversible decisions in the political and market arenas. 
When seen as an institution, the present Planning system could be said to be inherently biased 
against environmental preservation. I argue that this is due to the power-based institutions 
(Patriarchy) and intellectual framework (Power Paradigm) in which Planning theory and practice 
evolved. 
Because the existing Planning system is structured on Patriarchal premises, structures, and 
concepts, it cannot address the underlying causes of environmental conflict. A new decision-making 
system that is capable of fostering a truly ecological ethic cannot be created within the reforms being 
offered either by progressive planners or mainstream greens. This is because their problem analyses 
do not go deep enough; a total rethink is necessary. This work is intended to contribute to this 
rethink. Its main purpose is to lay the groundwork for the kind of preventative Planning system that 
is necessary to create a sustainable society. 
A proposal to guide the redesign of the system of environmental governance is offered to generate 
public debate. Because Planning theory and practice reflects and reinforces the Patriarchal society at 
large, however, institutional reform cannot be achieved in isolation from fundamental social change. 
I argue that ecofeminism also provides a comprehensive framework for the development of strategies 
for social transformation more generally. 
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SYNOPSIS AND OBJECTIVES 
This work provides a critical overview of the land use and environmental planning 
(Planning) system in the wider context of the social and institutional transformation that is 
necessary to create a sustainable society. I theorize why and how ecologically-damaging 
decisions concerning public resource allocation are made, and suggest how the decision-
making system can be reformed. To do this, I articulate and further develop a new social 
paradigm, ecofeminism, as an analytical framework for de/reconstructing the Planning system. 
A proposal to guide the design of a system of environmental governance is offered to generate 
public debate. Because Planning theory and practice reflects and reinforces the Patriarchal 
society at large, however, institutional reform cannot be achieved in isolation from social 
change. I argue that ecofeminism also provides a comprehensive framework for the 
development of strategies for social transformation more generally. 
Institutional change 
Planning, the 'visible hand' of government, is the resource allocation arena that has the 
potential to prevent destructive social conflict over resources. It can provide the long-term, 
rational, ethics-based and participatory decision-making process that is required for sustainable 
resource allocation. The other public decision-making systems, in particular, the market and 
political arenas, by their very nature, lack one or more of these characteristics. Private markets 
can create diverse commodities, opportunities for investments, and 'consumer choices', but cut 
off basic 'social choices' in the long term. Unlike Planning, they cannot protect the 
environment, despite the claims of economic rationalists. 
As currently designed and conceived, however, Planning has also proven incapable of 
expanding social choice, protecting the environment, and ensuring sustainable development. 
Planning has been criticized as ineffectual by both sides of the political spectrum: those calling 
for more planning and those calling for less. This failure, I suggest, is because it has been 
geared toward mitigating the consequences of 'unplanned' and often irreversible decisions in 
the political and market arenas. When seen as an institution, the present Planning system could 
be said to be inherently biased against environmental preservation. I argue that this is due to 
the power-basedi institutions (Patriarchy) and intellectual framework (Power Paradigm) in 
which Planning theory and practice evolved. 
1 The term 'power-based' includes both dominance and hierarchy. When applied to institutions, it means shaped 
by power relations and/or favouring the powerful. 
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Because the existing Planning system is structured on Patriarchal premises, structures, and 
concepts, it cannot address the underlying causes of environmental conflict. A new decision-
making system that is capable of fostering a truly ecological ethic cannot be created within the 
reforms being offered either by progressive planners or mainstream greens. This is because 
their problem analyses do not go deep enough; a total rethink is necessary. This work is 
intended to contribute to this rethink. Its main purpose is to lay the groundwork for the kind of 
preventative Planning system that is necessary to create a sustainable society. 
Among other things, this institutional reconstruction requires: 
(1) A redefinition of the environmental problem. For practical purposes, I contend that the 
crux of the environmental problem can most usefully be understood in terms of the abase of 
power. That is, if one thing can be said to link environmental destruction and the pathological 
'isms' that contribute to it (consumerism, industrialism, racism, capitalism, sexism, 
colonialism) - it is the abuse of power. Power seeking is fundamentally linked to the 
environmental crisis as obtained through the control, exploitation, and consumption of social 
and natural resources (money and status being means to obtain 'power'). The evolution of 
power relationships has led to the transfer of resources from public to corporate interests (at 
below real cost). This in turn leads to a spiral of environmental destruction, social injustice, 
and conflict. 
Such a problem definition has markedly different consequences to the conventional 
treatment of environmental problems as 'the need to balance competing interests' in resource 
management and allociation. It is also significantly different to the 'radical' green position 
which calls for 'extending the ethics of egalitarianism to include nature'. 
An ecofeminist paradigm helps to expose how false dualisms conceal hierarchical power 
relationships in the resource allocation system to the advantage of the powerful. For ekample, 
one reason for Planning failure is the ideological bias wherein Planning ('command') has been 
defined as the polar opposite of the market ('freedom'). Them versus us' thinking conceals 
the actual relationship between the two spheres, disguises the hierarchical nature of the modern 
corporatist state, and blocks creative alternatives to, or combinations of, the two systems of 
social choice. (I show that this conventional dualistic model of resource allocation is reinforced 
and legitimized by Patriarchal ideology; specifically, hierarchical dualism and the androcentric 
model of Man.) 
(2) A realignment of the major public decision-making institutions for resource allocation - 
the political. legal. market and Planning arenas ('superstructure'.  One antidote of the 
manipulation of the market/Planning dichotomy is to demonstrate that alternative models of 
government exist which could be easily implemented given the political will. I propose a 
modification that would bring the structure of government closer in substance to the original 
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democratic intent. The new tri-partite structure of environmental governance proposed would 
allow us to address environmental (ethical) as well as social (distributional) issues. The model 
is primarily designed to constrain the potential for the abuse of power. In a sense, it 
'rationalizes' the social decision-making system by re-aligning 'rights', 'wants', and 'needs' 
with the appropriate decision-making forum - democracy, market, and Planning respectively 
(with the law, as now, determining legal and jurisdictional disputes). The model exposes the 
need to redesign all these institutions so that they better correspond to their logical functions 
within the resource allocation system. This work, however, focuses on Planning. 
(3) A reconstruction of the Planning system itself ('structure'.  Next, I address the actual 
present functions of planning, as an institution, and suggest more appropriate ones. Planning 
is often attacked as constraining development, yet it subsidizes development and promotes 
inappropriate growth in many ways. This paradox is partly explained by the fact that economic 
planners who are involved in facilitating growth or production , are associated in the public 
imagination with physical planners who are primarily involved in regulating consumption. I 
propose to amalgamate these two systems so that the costs of subsidies and the distribution of 
externalities could be linked directly to environmental impacts and thus made more 'visible' to 
the general public. Production would thus be linked to conservation in a more rational manner. 
(4) A redesign of the methods and processes of Planning practice (Infrastructure). I 
examine how (even progressive) planners have adopted paradigms and concepts that derive 
from business administration and economics. The result is a Planning method that resembles a 
'cost-benefit analysis' system writ large. That is, it is designed for 'balancing' and 'choosing' 
among development proposals. This is biased, ultimately, against keeping social options open 
and preserving the natural environment. Redefining the purpose of Planning as, say, 
'designing a sustainable society' would result in different Planning methods than one based on 
maldng decisions. That latter prioritizes (Masculine) decisiveness over the precautionary 
principle. Such a purpose as creating a sustainable future would require an ethics-based 
decision-making system, rather than a rights-based one. It means that Planning methods 
themselves would be based on ethical/ecological principles - in contrast to new policies or 
techniques being implemented within the existing decision-making paradigm. 
(5) A feminist analysis of mainstream planning theory. Because of the androcentric 
interpretation of society and human nature, both conservative and radical Planning theories 
focus on what is deemed to be 'rational' (read Masculine) behaviour. Even the politics of 
planning is analyzed as a 'rational' (read self-interested) struggle among competing sectional 
interests (classes or interest groups), to achieve a desired policy or plan, or to obtain the power 
to implement it. Their analyses therefore largely ignore the personal and psycho-sexual 
dimension which reproduce power relationships. This explains why Planning theories only 
deal with means of providing for physical needs and goals. Plans and policies fail to address 
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emotional needs that are just as 'real' (but for the Patriarchal prism). Thus, Planning has 
tended to reinforce the sense of alienation and loss of connection between individuals, the 
community, and the environment. 
Social change 
Even if such 'radical' but simple institutional reforms were instituted, however, they would 
come to nought in a Patriarchal society. This is because sustainability - which requires 
environmental protection, social justice, and peace - ultimately necessitates creating a society 
that is beyond power. In Patriarchal society, dominance relationships are seen as necessary to 
maintain social order, or, at least an inevitable result of human (read Male) behaviour. Thus 
Patriarchal ideology legitimizes power seeking and hence the abuse of power. (A non-
Patriarchal culture could theoretically have led to an environmental crisis stemming from other 
imbalances or cultural pathologies such as, perhaps, tribalism or religious views that are not 
compatible with environmental sustainability. However, in present times, the belief systems 
that militate against nature are integral to Patriarchal cosmology.) Fundamental social 
transformation is therefore necessary. This entails, among other things: 
(5) New analyses of the causes of the abuse of power 
If we want to find the causes and cures for the abuse of power, we must turn to feminism, 
especially ecofeminism, as it is the only political analysis that looks squarely at power.. 
Ecofeminists call for 'power to' or empowerment, as opposed to 'power over' or dominance. 
Other theories (liberalism, socialism, and so on) are concerned in the main with redistributing 
power and thus fail to address many 'blind spots' in the culture that conceal the operation and 
maintenance of power relations. Gender-blindess is power-blindness. For example, 
Mainstream theories fail to look deeply enough at the links between the psychological and 
structural or what motivates the abuse of power. 
How does a feminist analysis account for the abuse of power? I suggest that the abuse of 
power relates to repressed and unfulfilled emotional needs (love, sex, belonging) that have 
been systematically denied in our androcentric (male-centred) culture. When such powerful 
emotional needs are unfulfilled, there is a tendency to compensate indirectly for what is 
wanting through an unselfconscious drive for power and other behavioural pathologies. This 
'displacement' through power seeking (by acquiring money, status and influence) reinforces 
dominance relationships and hence the abuse of power at the social level as well. 
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(6) New strategies for social transformation.  
A paradigm is only as useful as the strategies it suggests for social change. I argue that the 
efforts of Manstreaml greens have largely failed (relative to the increasing speed and scale of 
destruction) because of the gender-blindness and androcentrism in environmental theory and 
practice. Since humanity - being conceived of as Male - is by definition rational and self-
interested , greens tend to describe the human behaviour that underlies environmental 
destruction as misguided self-interest. Thus, they tend to focus on 'human chauvinism' or 
'greed' as the primary culprits (these being, of course, 'rational' or self-interested motives). 
Green strategies for social transformation thus fail to look at the non-rational motivations that 
cause people - particularly the powerful - to change their power-seeking behaviour (let alone to 
abuse power in the first place). Manstream greens tend to assume that people can be either 
persuaded to alter their values, institutions, and behaviours through argument and reason, or be 
motivated to change by appeals to self-interest ("to harm the earth is to harm oneself). But 
rational or spiritual forms of persuasion do not address what really motivates people. People 
are motivated to act, I would suggest, through emotional needs, not reason. I must point out 
that the irony of using reason to argue that this approach is misguided has not escaped me. 
However, in order to argue that there is a flaw in someone's logic, it is necessary to use that 
same form of logic to do so. 
Green strategies have also failed because they depend upon building a movement to bring 
about social change. This is because many greens remain trapped in the liberal, androcentric 
interpretation of 'Man' and society (though many eschew liberalism). Consequently, they 
conceive of the environmental crisis as one of competing values. To many greens, the politics 
of saving the planet means engaging in an intellectual or spiritual competition for the hearts, 
minds, or votes of the general public. As a direct result of mainstream green politics, • 
'activism' - by which I mean unpaid volunteers, campaigners, and people engaging in direct 
action - has declined dramatically of late. 
In contrast, an ecofeminist praxis does not depend on the 'conversion' of others to a 
particular world view or ideology. It does not require building the biggest movement by 
winning arguments, winning converts, or winning power - all of which generate countervailing 
forces. Instead, it suggests we look at how to both expose and heal the repressed emotional 
needs in Patriarchal society, the denial and displacement of which has contributed to an 
excessive need for physical gratification and power. 
1 I use the term 'Manstreams, as distinct from mainstream, to refer to non-feminist radical green theories. 
Mainstream refers simply to non-radical theories. 'Manstream' indicates that non-feminist radical green thought has 
retained certain androcentric premises and biases found in mainstream thought. 
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Conclusion 
Whether or not the particular ideas that emerge from this initial exploration prove useful, 
they should hopefully generate debate on what I consider to be some of the present blind spots 
and taboos in our culture that are blocking our understanding of environmental problems and 
solutions. The subtext of this work is that feminist approaches are not marginal, irrational, 
and insubstantial, contrary to the way they are still portrayed. Adding feminist analysis to an 
ecological perspective ('ecofeminism') cannot narrow that perspective. Rather, it broadens and 
deepens our analysis and strategy where Manstream theories have apparently come to a dead 
end. Part II tests the utility of ecofeminism for suggesting new concepts for institutional 
reform. Part III tests the utility of ecofeminism for suggesting new strategies for social 
transformation. 
Objectives 
Although the analysis and proposals may appear 'radical', I believe they come closer than 
the present institutional system to a framework that can foster the 'conservative', or liberal 
ideals of individual freedom and choice, as well as revive the notion of 'community' as a 
constitutive element of society. In fact, an ecofeminist analysis of Planning leads to a 
constitutional framework designed to provide checks and balances to prevent the abuse of 
power. The central difference between my proposal and that of other constitutional 
democracies is that it takes into account the natural environment, as well as people and society. 
I do not, of course, claim that the model could in fact solve the environmental crisis - let alone 
that it would ever be implemented. The objectives of this project are far more humble. 
(a) The dramatic social changes that are needed cannot come about unless it is widely 
recognized that our intellectual and institutional constructs are fundamentally flawed. The 
project makes the case for fundamental social reform - a Western 'perestroika'. 
(b) Planning is essential to the preservation of the natural environment and for that matter, 
human survival. This project draws attention to the need for a new type of Planning that will 
allow us to create a safe, secure future. 
(c) It is not enough to provide a future vision. To develop strategies for social action, it is 
also important to understand a problem in context and with an awareness of cultural and 
institutional constraints. This project attempts to provide a comprehensive picture of the 
parameters of institutional reform while showing the reasoning that led to the proposed 
alternative. 
(d) The roots of the environmental problem cannot be meaningfully addressed without an 
analysis of militarism, as militarism can nullify any planning for sustainable development This 
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project therefore develops an ecofeminist perspective that integrates both the military and 
industrial roots of the environmental crisis. 
(e) By definition, a paradigm is neither incorrect or correct, but is measured by its 
instrumental value. Non-feminist paradigms, however, fail to expose certain blind spots in 
contemporary culture that are crucial impediments to resolving the environmental problems. 
(f) Egalitarianism between humans, future generations and nature is the dominant approach 
to the resolution of the environment crisis in ecophilosophy. Egalitarianism as a paradigm 
(rather than as a value) is inadequate, because it leads to methodologies that involve interest 
balancing, or a trade off between human and non-human interests. 
(g) There is a need to cross-pollinate environmental theory and activism in order to facilitate 
social transformation. This project seeks to draw from academic theory what is useful for 
environmental activism and to draw from my experience, as both an activist and professional, 
what is useful to theory. 
(h) There is little, if any, discussion in the wider green movement of the need for 
substantive Planning reform, let alone broader institutional reform. The emphasis has been on 
appropriate policies. This project tries to encourage such a debate by establishing an approach 
that links analysis, principles, and reform. 
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PART I: SCOPE, NATURE AND 
INTENT OF THE PROJECT 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Premises 
Feminists have long recognized that 'objectivity' is a false concept, as "those of us with 
bodies must always occupy a particular position in terms of class, colour, sexuality, or any 
number of social and historical variables". 1 Therefore, it is fitting that I begin by explaining 
where I am 'coming from'. Before moving to Tasmania, I worked as an architect, city planner 
and attorney in San Francisco, California. During the 1970s, I was involved in several areas 
related to environmental planning, including land use planning, urban design, planning law, 
advocacy planning, major project evaluation, and environmental mediation. I was interested in 
exploring these areas because it seemed obvious that some form of environmental planning was 
essential to prevent the adverse cumulative impacts of inappropriate development. However, I 
gradually came to realize that the land use and environmental planning (Planning) system - as 
presently conceived - could at best only retard the eventual despoliation of the 'natural' world. 2 
My experience as a planner convinced me that there was a fundamental misfit between the 
environmental problem and the inherent nature of the Planning system, in both theory and 
practice. I still believe that Planning is the form of resource allocation that has the potential to 
prevent (negative) conflict over resources - but only if the institutional framework within which 
planners operate is redesigned 'from scratch'. This project explores means of designing a 
Planning system that would have greater potential to protect the natural environment and 
improve our quality of life. 
I take as self-evident that wilderness and human well being are inseparable. The underlying 
premise of this work is encapsulated in Henry Thoreau's famous words: "In wilderness is the 
preservation of the world". I do not buy into the current debate (in some circles) over whether 
'wilderness' itself is a valid concept. It may be true that the very idea of wilderness is a 
construct of Western culture which can be construed as racist, elitist and tending to reinforce 
the nature/culture duality. However, over-intellectualizing wilderness to the point that we fail 
to preserve it on ideological grounds is also highly idealist, if not stupid. The debate itself is a 
1 Greta Gaard, 1992, as yet unpublished book review of both Eckersley, 1992, Environmentalism and Political 
Theory and Rensenbrink, 1992, The Greens and the Politics of Transformation. 
2 For the pedantic, I acknowledge that there is no 'natural' environment now, in the sense that everything has the 
imprint of industrial processes upon it (even the Antartic is polluted). Likewise, I realize that humans are 
inextricably a part of nature so that arguably anything - even global destruction - can be termed 'natural'. For 
purposes of this work, however, I use the terms 'nature' and 'natural' in their everyday meaning; that is, not Man-
made. 
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'red herring'. It is enough to preserve what remnants of the relatively 'natural' environment are 
left simply on the grounds that it is there. 
I am of the conviction that nothing short of a radical transformation of our civilization is 
needed to prevent the current mass extinction rate of flora and fauna, including humans. In 
many respects, then, my position coincides with that of 'greens', a term which encompasses 
the diverse perspectives of those who consider nature to have intrinsic value, and see social 
justice, peace, environmental quality and non-violence as inseparable issues. 1 Greens consider 
the heart of the environmental problem to be a crisis of both character and culture. Thus, a 
sustainable society cannot be developed without fundamental personal and social 
transformation. This transformation involves a reconsideration of our relationship with each 
other, nature and the cosmos, and cultivating new ways of thinking, relating and acting. While 
I am a green, however, I challenge certain aspects of the dominant (non-feminist) position in 
green theory, and suggest that green strategy has been impeded by vestiges of Manstream 
thought. In fact, central to my position is that green theory that is not informed by feminist 
thought is merely part of the problem. 
In this work, I concentrate upon Planning (primarily at the regional level) in relation to 
'substantively irrational' social policies. As we are largely concerned with 'rationality', we 
need to understand what it means. My starting point is that individual and community well 
being requires personal, social, and ecological sustainability (which logically entails peace, 
social justice, and environmental quality). Sustainability is therefore a rational, as well as a 
subjective, social goal. Humans cannot survive independently of the environment, and other 
life forms are constituent elements of the ecosystem. We need them. It follows from this that 
social decisions or decision-making systems that are (unnecessarily) destructive of the ecology 
or ecosystems or other species can be considered 'irrational', as they are inherently 
unsustainable. This is true even if we adhere to an anthropocentric (or human-centred, as 
opposed to biocentric) value system, as to harm nature is to harm ourselves. 
Since individual well being depends upon a viable community and ecology, I equate 
'substantive' rationality (legitimate ends) with social/ecological sustainability. This is in 
keeping with traditional lay and academic conceptions of rationality, both of which are 
generally based on self-interest (eg. if given the choice, it is 'rational' to choose a dollar over a 
penny, as one is better off with a dollar). It is also in keeping with the conventional moral 
implication of the human capacity for reason: the obligation to exercise 'reasonableness' 
towards others, which surely includes other species. 
1 I distinguish the political arm ('Greens) from the broader movement (greens) by capitalizing the former. 
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The equation of rationality and sustainability that I make here is applicable to institutions as 
well as individuals. If an institutional system or the policies it implements militate against a 
sustainable society and ecosphere, then that institution should also be considered an irrational 
one (as well as corrupted). The proposition that our social decision-making system is as a 
whole 'irrational' is reasonable when we consider the exponential growth in environmental 
problems. Nonsustainable practices can hardly be in our collective self-interest - even in the 
short term. The collapse of the global life support system may even occur within the life span 
of most people that are alive today. It is clear, for example, that forest practices are 
unsustainable. Native forests are still being allocated to production, and native forests cannot 
be logged 'sustainably'. At present logging rates, most native forests will be gone within my 
lifetime. 1 In fact, at current rates, the world's tropical rainforests will have all but disappeared 
in 25 years,2 and here in Tasmania, scientists have warned that the local native forests are being 
felled at the same rates as those in the Amazon. 3 Yet, as we charge toward the precipice, we 
cling to the myth of Rational Man4: a myth which has played a part in bringing us to such a 
pass. 
Planning is generally conceived of as a rational form of decision-making with regard to the 
future. In fact, planning and rationality are often defined in nearly identical terms. But if 
anything is irrational, it is surely a decision-making institution that is an integral part of a 
nonsustainable social system. I therefore allocate little discussion to Planning structures and 
practices which (arguably) conform to the textbook ideal of 'procedural rationality'. Those, to 
the extent they exist in reality, are already comprehensively theorized in Planning literature. 
The continued destruction of our public health, safety, and life support system on the faith 
that the invisible hand of technology and the market (or perhaps divine intervention) will save 
us at the brink is, quite foolhardy in terms of 'procedural' rationality (legitimate means) as well. 
There can only be disagreement over what is causing humanity's stampede toward ecosystem 
collapse and what kind of fundamental changes are in order, It is hoped that this work will 
make a contribution to the debate on these two questions. 
1 "Over the last 30 years in Australia, the timber industry has nearly doubled the amount of timber it extracts. 
In that same period, the timber industry has nearly halved the number of people it employs. If woodchipping 
continues at its present rate, our unprotected native forests could be destroyed in 20 years." Howard Stringer, 
1992, "Chip chip: you tell a Little Lie...." Wilderness News 128 (June/July) pp. 20-21. 
2 For a recent list of social and environmental disasters, see Paul Ekins, Mayer Hillman, and Robert 
Hutchinson, 1992, Wealth Beyond Measure: An Atlas of New Economics (London: Gala. Books) chapter 1; and 
Frank Barnaby, ed., 1988, The Gaia Peace Atlas: Survival into the Third Millennium (London: Gaia Books). 
3 See generally James B. Kirkpatrick, ed., 1991, Tasmanian Native Bush: A Management Handbook (Hobart: 
Tasmania Environment Centre), and MacIlroy, ed., 1990, The Ecofiaure of Australian Forests (Melbourne: ACF). 
4 Man is capitalized herein to refer to the dominant culture, rather than sex per se. 
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Qualifying remarks 
As this work violates academic norms and traditions, I offer some qualifying remarks. To 
begin with, this work is in the area of ecophilosophy, a field concerned with articulating 
insights into the hidden assumptions of our culture that have led to the destruction of the 
nonhuman environment. It is also concerned with developing positive means of bringing about 
a sustainable society, or one that is in harmony with the 'natural' world. Thus, it is centred on 
the normative, rather than the descriptive. In this sense, then, the project is not 'academic', or 
ostensibly non-partisan, because it is necessarily written from an advocacy perspective. Put 
another way, the very nature of the task requires an academically unorthodox approach and the 
rejection of any pretence of 'objectivity'. The nature of the environmental crisis suggests that 
subjectivity may be far more rational than traditional concepts of objectivity. 
This project analyzes Planning in the context of the larger decision-making apparatus for the 
allocation or preservation of natural resources and values. I am concerned with the entire 
institutional and intellectual framework within which society makes its (largely irreversible) 
decisions about the natural environment. This broad scope is necessary. If one is serious 
about Planning reform, one must step well outside the traditional parameters of Planning. This 
creates difficulties in terms of meeting academic standards, which favour narrow topics. 
However to use a narrow framework in this case would be to disregard the very nature of the 
environmental problem, which is complex and multi-dimensional. 
This attempt at presenting a comprehensive perspective is in response to the need to expose 
the political nature of the existing paradigm and to unravel the perceptual and systemic bias that 
exists at all levels of the institution of Planning. Separating-out patterns from a complex, 
interconnected system is a messy task, which may explain why a comprehensive analysis of 
Planning as an institution in society has seldom been attempted. This entails organizational 
difficulties which I resolve by approaching the subject in a (horizontal) 'spiral', rather tban a 
linear way. This, however, is in keeping with the ecofeminist approach that I am using. 1 
To reframe the issues in a comprehensive way, it is necessary to map out a unified theory of 
environmental and land use Planning and new model of environmental governance. This could 
be considered somewhat ambitious or even arrogant, however, it is intended to serve as a 
scaffolding to be filled in by further work Unfortunately, the comprehensive scope requires 
discerning patterns that may seem over-generalized to some. Generalizations are easy to attack 
from a specialist or academic standpoint, because a counter-argument can focus on a specific 
1 Patsy Hallen, 1987, "Making Peace with Nature: Why Ecology Needs Feminism", The Trumpeter 4 (3) pp. 
3-14, at p. 3. 
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case or detail. My response, however, would be that the exception proves the rule. I have also 
tried to make the work comprehensive and directed toward non-specialist readers, because the 
environmental problem requires just this sort of broad perspective. If such a holistic approach 
is inconsistent with academic norms, then perhaps it is academic norms that have something to 
answer for. 
Similarly, a major impediment to the acceptance of ecofeminist ideas and literature is that 
ecofeminism is often not seen as authoritative, because it cannot be grounded in past ideas. 
Aristotle said that all knowledge comes from past knowledge. 1 This is a precept we have 
followed to our peril. There is no path where we are going, so there is no point trying to 
legitimize ecofeminism by maintaining that Patriarchs thought of it in the past. They did not. 
I also draw heavily upon personal experience, in addition to a wide cross-section of 
literature both in and outside of the traditional planning and decision-making fields. This 
approach is based on the conviction that theory and practice should be, in a reciprocal 
relationship. Each must inform the other if the results are to be relevant to real life problems. 
Thus, for example, I would suggest that first-hand knowledge of the views and experience of, 
say, a dozen environmental activists (unpaid workers) should be as valid as an academic 
book.2 While this might be a departure from conventional academic form, it is consistent with 
the ecofeminist paradigm I am using (as it holds theory and activism to be inseparable). To 
devalue personal experience in this case would therefore, paradoxically, be a breach of 
theoretical consistency. 
When I refer to my experience, it is the experience of a straight, white, middle-aged, human 
professional of European descent and middle class, American upbringing now living in 
Tasmania. I am attempting a critical understanding of the anti-environmental bias of this 
cultural heritage, and cannot adequately represent the perspectives of those whose cultures have 
been colonized, such as aboriginal peoples. The understanding of my own culture has, 
however, been informed by first-hand experience working among groups representing 
differing standpoints. 3 
A theory is merely a simplified picture of reality, and therefore I could be accused of 
reductionism or the elimination of that which is deemed relatively unimportant. In the present 
case, I reduce the environmental problem, for practical purposes, to the abuse of power (on 
1 Edward de Bono, 1990, Jam Right—You are Wrong. From this to the New Renaissance (NY: Viking 
Penguin) at p. 181. 
2 The views of workers, especially women workers, in green organizations have generally not been documented, but a 
good deal of collective wisdom and experience has developed. 
3 In this regard, I subscribe to the view expressed in Sandra Harding, 1991, Whose Science? Whose Kiwwlege? 
Thinking From Women's Lives (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press). In particular, see Chapter 11. 
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personal and political levels). This conforms with my own observations as a practitioner, and 
life experience, and coincides with the recently emerging ecofeminist paradigm, which I have 
therefore appropriated. Some reductionism is inherent in theory construction, but it is only a 
problem if the 'blind spots' of previous theories are perpetuated in the process, as these 
reinforce existing biases over time. For example, Marx helped to expose the fact that class 
stratification is not natural and inevitable, as had been implicitly assumed. By explaining social 
relations in terms of production, he undermined the social construction that prevented people 
from questioning the ideological underpinnings of class-based oppression. However, Marx 
failed to uncover certain other blind spots (such as male-centredness and gendered hierarchy) 
that make dominance relationships seem natural. Today, certain aspects of reality are 
consistently ignored in Manstream theory (eg. gender, sex, and Masculine identification) which 
can be linked to a systemic bias against environmental protection. Ecofeminists are challenging 
the idea that power-based ways of thinking, relating, and acting are natural and inevitable. This 
is not reductionism, then, but an attempt to focus on crucial blind spots in our Patriarchal 
culture for the express purpose of bringing about change. 
If we seek to address irrational decision making, we must hypothesize the origins of that 
behaviour. Having said that the underlying pathology in our culture and institutions should 
(for practical purposes) be diagnosed as the abuse of power, some form of power drive is 
implied. This is a tricky proposition, to say the least. The issue is another 'red herring'. This 
is because, while some feminists have engaged vast amounts of time and energy arguing that 
aggression is a result of socialization and can therefore be changed, Patriarchs simply ignore 
them or respond that the problem is biology and cannot be changed. Whether the origins of 
this drive are to be found in biology and/or culture can only be a matter of speculation. (It 
could, for example, possibly be traced back to the behaviour of our pre-human ancestors. In 
many species, for example, males instinctively seek dominance in order to obtain control of the 
sexual and generative resource. Nonetheless, even if it is biology, it is not destiny.) 
Dominance relationships and aggression are not a necessary condition of human existence. 
They only appear to be pre-ordained when we define Man as aggressive and competitive by 
nature, and this is what Patriarchal society does. 
Some have suggested that, for academic credibility, I disguise any feminist theory and 
terminology, as hints of feminism tends to close people's minds. However, it is important to 
use gender-based terminology, because we must affirm the Feminine in order to heal the 
deeply rooted imbalance in society associated with Male supremacy. Patriarchal consciousness 
is too entrenched in the psyche to be simply transcended. Societal-wide psychological 
problems cannot be resolved by denial or avoidance any more than in the case of individual 
problems. Thus, I use terms like 'Masculine' to refer to characteristics generally attributed to 
men and which create a model to which men generally aspire in Western Patriarchal society. Of 
course, I am not suggesting that the so-called Masculine traits are inherent qualities of men. 
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Concepts of Masculine and Feminine are social constructions and should not be confused 
with sexual biology. There are several sexes but we are all creatures of a Patriarchal cultures. 
Thus Patriarchal conceptions of Masculinity and its misogynist ideology create pressures on 
both men and women. For instance, the separation of a public/powerful sphere from a 
private/menial sphere has meant that women who want active lives often become Masculine-
identified and internalize a Masculine mode of behaviour (albeit unconsciously) in order to 
succeed in the public arena, let alone to be accepted by their professional peers. 
Ecofeminism, in my view, provides a logic of consistency for theorizing the abuse of power 
on personal and political levels, and the relations between self, society and nature. It is thus an 
appropriate paradigm to both study problems of environmental Planning and decision maldng 
and to guide its reform. Of course, ecofeminism is a new and evolving paradigm; therefore, I 
am using the basic logic of ecofeminism and perhaps developing it further as required for the 
redesign of the Planning system. Needless to say, I am not attempting to develop a definitive 
ecological paradigm, as social constructions should evolve to meet ever changing 
circumstances. Also, a paradigm is not a truth: it is a conceptual and instrumental framework 
that establishes which concepts and relationships are considered important and which methods 
and techniques are considered valid. Therefore, it can be judged only by its usefulness in 
generating new insights or strategies. 
The locus 
The project makes reference primarily to Planning in Australia and America, although many 
observations would apply to other capitalist democracies as well. To give such a wide topic 
some specificity, however, I have used the island state of Tasmania, Australia, as a laboratory 
for the study. Tasmania also provides a rich source of examples to illustrate the planning 
issues that are taken up herein. Moreover, Tasmania is in many respects at the forefront of 
green politics and social change, having had the world's first green party and five green 
independents in state Parliament (out of 35 total) since 1989. 1 Because it is geographically 
self-contained, Tasmania is an appropriate test tube for basic institutional reform, should such a 
thing become politically feasible. There is, after all, occasional talk here of secession from 
Australia, from the political right. 
Some would be skeptical using a particular place, and Tasmania may seem remote or 
'different' to the uninitiated. However, I believe it to be a microcosm of process and people 
problems found everywhere. In fact, it seems to cartoon the decision-making processes found 
on other land masses. Being place-specific enables us to consider the content and context 
1 This is in part due to a very democratic preferential voting system called the 'Hare Clark system. 
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within which planning occurs. Moreover, drawing examples at random would make it too easy 
to be selective. With regard to the possibility of over-generalizing from specific cases, John 
Forester offers this observation: 
Too often before, we have paid the steeper price exacted by a narrow 
empiricism whose results have distracted us not only from widely 
shared political problems, but also from taking seriously a whole set of 
more general normative and ethical problems of democratic social 
organization (imagining and conceptualizing, for example 'justice', 
respect for difference, 'rights', and 'equality', to name only a few). 1 
The selection of the state as the administrative level for reform begs explanation because a 
policy of decentralized local decision making is generally regarded as a basic doctrine of green 
philosophy. But, of course, the island's environmental problems are not contained within its 
coastline. Also, many of its economic problems originate offshore. The state is greatly 
dependent upon forest industries, and corporate interests in Japan and Canada seem to have a 
disproportionate influence on important aspects of government policy. Thus, state boundaries 
constitute an administrative jurisdiction that is at once both too large and too small. 
There are several reasons for choosing to begin at the state level, however. First, the state is 
the centre of most planning-related controversy in Tasmania. State governments in Australia 
exercise more power in relation to environmental planning decisions than do their counterparts 
in America. Tasmanian governments have retained direct control over resource decisions 
through the absence of an institutional structure for comprehensive planning, and the conviction 
that major planning decisions should be made by Cabinet (a framework that has encouraged 
the 'brown paper bag' form of lobbying).2 Further, it is state land use functions, such as 
forestry, hydro-electric power generation and mining, rather than local development control, 
that have been the focus of most social conflict in Tasmania. 
Second, reform on a national level may be less feasible than at the state level. Attempts at 
constitutional reform in Australia during the 1980s were decidedly unsuccessful, despite 
support from the political party holding power. As the United States experience shows, it is 
difficult to enact radical nation-wide administrative reform until the burden of conflicting state 
structures and regulations outweighs the inertia against change. Further, under the Australian 
Constitution, the States have retained authority over land use issues, and most institutional 
restructuring that has occurred has been at the State level. The problem is that such 	• 
experiments have been organizational (reminiscent of 'musical chairs') rather than fundamental, 
or have simply transposed ideas already proven inadequate elsewhere. 
1 John Forester, 1990, "Reply to my Critics", Planning Theory/Newsletter 21, at p. 45. 
2 There is a State Planning Commission, but it is largely restricted to approving local planning schemes. 
Presently, a new Commission is being proposed in draft legislation; however, it would be primarily only 
advisory to Cabinet, not the general public. 
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Another reason for the focus on State level reform is the widely-recognized need for a 
comprehensive State Planning system in Tasmania. Although several attempts at legislative 
reform failed (in 1975, 1980 and 1987), the latter two legislative efforts allowed me to observe 
at first hand the problems of implementing reform. During the last year of my work on this 
project (1991), another major reform of the land use and environmental planning system was 
conducted by the Tasmania Labor Government. This draft legislation would have, at least, 
brought the Tasmanian system into the 1970s. Unfortunately, while introducing concepts 
already in place elsewhere, neither the efficacy of these systems in their broader context, nor 
the assumptions upon which they were based, were seriously questioned. At present, in any 
case, a Liberal (conservative) Government has come to power and altered the nature of the draft 
legislation to further entrench Cabinet discretionary power over major developments, and to 
legitimize fast-track processes (which expedite development by circumventing standard 
processes and controls). Thus, efforts to stimulate debate on the necessity of Planning reform 
in Tasmania may well remain timely for decades to come. 
Finally, a State level administrative system might seem inconsistent with an ecofeminist 
paradigm, because the ultimate end 'state' generally sought by radical greens is along the lines 
of anarchical-socialist, or a confederation of small self-sufficient units conforming to 
bioregions. However, such an ideal is simply impossible to achieve in a Patriarchal society, 
due to the corrupting influence of the socially-sanctioned power drive and tendency toward 
dominance relationships at the personal level. Moreover, personal, social and institutional 
change are in a reciprocal, dialectic relationship. Therefore, even assuming an 'anarchical' 
system is ultimately feasible, institutions which can assist us in the transformation towards self-
governance are necessary. 
Research base and case study 
As noted above, much of the primary research for the project is based on experience in 
community affairs and environmental activism, as well as in professional planning. This is 
partly because I am trying to develop an analysis that is relevant to the 'real' world of 
environmental decision-making, which is far less 'rational' than generally assumed. The 
capsule history of environmental conflict in Tasmania (Appendix 1) is an attempt to convey that 
'reality'. This work, in a sense, retraces my efforts to find an analysis that could adequately 
theorize the nature of resource allocation in Tasmania. This is rather different from the more 
common approach in policy analysis which tests one or more abstract models against an actual 
case history.' No history can be objective. For example, if we examine environmental 
1 J. E. Anderson, 1975, Public Policy-Making (London: Nelson) pp. 164-5. A relevant example of this 
process is D. McEachern, 1990, "Business Politics and the Wesley Vale Pulp Mill", in Ken Dyer and John 
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decision making through a prism which presupposes value-neutral decision-making structures 
and decision makers, then we cannot be objective. That is, if we presuppose objectivity we are 
biased, because that prism itself screens out real problems of human relationships and 
communication that prevent objectivity. 
This case study serves several purposes. First, it should show that the problems relating to 
environmental decision making cannot be understood in isolation from either the structural or 
cultural context. The case study stands in stark contrast to the world examined by existing 
establishment and radical theories. Although recognizing that policy making deviates from 
rational choice models, these approaches nonetheless persist in interpreting such 'deviations' 
through (at least implicitly) rationalist models of decision-maldng and governance. In other 
words, we have been trained to interpret government processes through mechanistic models 
which assume rationality. A reluctance to discuss the psychological motivation of decision 
makers in academia reflects certain gender-based taboos in our society (and taboos usually 
support existing power relations). The idea that decision making could be affected by non-
rational factors such as personal (perhaps even hormonal or instinctive) power drives or sexual 
identity is off limits in public debate, even though most people have experienced such personal 
politics in their own workplace. This is partly why non-feminist academic theory has been 
unable to make the connection between the personal and political, or psychological and 
structural pressures upon the actors. The case study serves to illustrate why environmental 
decision making cannot be explained by 'rational' motivations. 
I must make clear that I do not attempt any hypothesis on the influences of hormones, 
gender-related brain differences, or instincts in decision making. I deal only with cultural 
factors here. My point is that the non-rational power drive is treated as practically nonexistent 
in decision-making theory despite its importance in everyday experience. This is, of course, 
partly because the influence of personal motivations cannot be measured or tested. Also, the 
political implications of the idea that behaviour could have biological causes is scary. 
(However, while speculation about such things can be dangerous, denial is equally dangerous 
as it creates a fundamental paradigmatic bias.) 
A second reason for the case study is to show that environmental decision making cannot 
accurately be called substantively rational (as defined earlier). The decision makers know what 
they are doing is non-sustainable, yet persist in the same course of action. For example, 
Tasmanian politicians could not have failed to hear the argument that the price the companies 
pay for the forests in terms of royalties do not cover the government subsidies. Nor could they 
Young, eds., Changing Directions: The Proceedings of the Conference Ecopolitics IV (Adelaide: University of 
Adelaide) pp. 63-70. 
not have heard the contention that the Tasmanian Government, via the Forestry Commission 
alone, has created a A$450 million debt, more than one-third the total State debt, for which the 
interest payments are currently over A$80 million per year (in a population of less than half a 
million). 1 If the public can be said to 'own' the forests, they are not receiving an adequate 
return. Corporate interests are therefore receiving benefits out of proportion to their reciprocal 
contribution to the public, especially in view of the lost opportunity for alternative investment 
This is not 'rational' decision making, or even a matter of genuine but conflicting values. 
Rather, I argue that this should be seen as systemic Corruption (Chapter 5)• 2 
A third reason for the case study is to suggest the need for radical change. The conventional 
wisdom was and still is that institutional reform only requires more democratic and/or scientific 
means of policy development and implementation within the existing institutional and 
intellectual framework. In fact, the underlying system of governance is almost sacrosanct, as it 
is associated on an unconscious or emotional level with democracy itself. Thus reform 
proposals, from the Brundtland Report on the international plane to the recent legislative reform 
proposal in Tasmania, only address superficial policy and organizational issues within the 
dominant power-based decision-making structures. (By power-based, I mean that an 
institutional or cultural system evolved through the interplay of powerful interests rather than 
through constitutional design or democratic processes.) 
Moreover, actual decision-making structures and processes often bear little relation to 
theory. As the Tasmanian case illustrates, for example, the Planning system has evolved into a 
'corporatist' one. (Corporatist decision making is where governments negotiate policies and 
their implementation in a closed process with peak organizations which have a monopoly of 
representation over certain categories of interests.) This has contributed to a situation where a 
few benefit while the general public bears the escalating cost of pollution and resource 
depletion. This corporatist system is not, however, 'democratic' in the sense that Tasmanians 
understand the term. It does not conform to the Constitution for decision making (which sets 
up the system of government), nor was it ever voted upon. The decision-making system itself 
has been, in a sense, corrupted by the dynamics of power relationships. In short, the position 
that the existing institutional system needs only minor adjustments simply does not speak to the 
realities of power relationships that operate both internally and externally upon decision. 
makers. 
1 See Hugh Saddler, 1991, Forestry as if Economics mattered: A Study of the Economics of the Tanzanian 
Forestry Industry (Hobart, TAS: Goshawk Publications). The problem of course is broader than this. According 
to the Australian Conservation Foundation, the accumulated timber industry debt in Australia is nearly $5 billion, 
which costs taxpayers $400 million annually to service. 
2 In Chapter 5, I explain why we need a broader conception of corruption (than the usual sense of money 
passing under the table) as a characteristic of systems and not just people. Hence, corruption is capitalized. 
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The fourth reason for the case study is to provide a background for my discussion of 
problems in green strategy. The story shows that while greens have had reason and common 
sense on their side, to the extent they have been successful, it would appear due to 
perseverance and luck. Of late, luck appears to be running out. To develop better strategies, 
an analysis is needed that can account for the lack of reason and common sense in public 
decision making. My observation is that greens consider public decision making to be. 
irrational only because it has not taken the environment into account, and not because of a 
fundamentally biased structure. The focus remains on using, rather than transforming, the 
existing legislative or electoral process. It is, of course, well understood that "there is still no 
adequate policy-making mechanism to protect the environment at either state or federal level". 1 
Nonetheless, many non-feminist greens persist in rational argumentation over policy upon the 
assumption that decision makers are rational, goal-oriented individuals and hence will want to 
do the right thing. As a result, they give credence to - and hence empower - those who are in 
their view irrationally destructive of the environment. This is in part because most greens share 
with their adversaries the androcentric model of Rational Man, discussed in Chapter 11. 
Similarly, green strategy is impeded by the acceptance (both in and outside the movement), 
of the idea that environmental conflict is one of competing 'values' - despite the patent 
irrationality of giving resources to special interests at below real cost. Because of this general 
perception of environmental conflict being one of values, greens are accused of taking the 'high 
moral ground' and being intolerant of other's values. Representative of this view is the 
following: 
When one side of the debate asserts the absolute priority of their values, 
the stage is set for social conflict, not for social progress. 
Environmental causes are important because they buy time while we 
untangle the worst from the best of our achievements. But if they 
recriminate those of good will, such causes will only waste that 
precious time.2 
This interpretation of the green movement is inaccurate, but understandable, considering 
how greens are put across in the media. The general public is still not 'hearing' what greens are 
on about, and greens have failed to take this into account in strategy. In relying upon rational 
arguments for changing values, greens forget that those who are capable of responding to 
reason have long since been 'converted'. An ecofeminist approach, I argue, begins to 
overcome these strategical problems, because it does not rely on the conversion of people by 
spiritual or rational means of persuasion. Also, greens rely heavily on countering the points 
1 Nicholas M. Economou, 1990, "The Politics of Pulp Mills: An Analysis of the Wesley Vale Pulp Mill 
dispute", in Ken Dyer and John Young, eds., above pp. 53-62, at p. 60. 
2 Jonathon Stone, on Ockham's Razor, ABC radio, 19 April, 1992. 
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made by opposition 'experts', while missing important issues that they consider peripheral, 
such as matters of process. 
Glossary of special concepts 
In this work, I found it necessary to modify the conventional meanings of certain terms for 
my own purposes, as language in common usage is limited when it comes to expressing green 
and feminist concepts. (Where I use terms in a special way, I capitalize them to distinguish 
them from other meanings.) Hopefully, the presentation of these concepts at the beginning will 
make the work more 'reader friendly', albeit more circuitous. 
Ecofeminism 
As an in depth discussion of ecofeminism is presented in Part III, I provide only a capsule 
definition here. This is my own definition and I do not pretend to speak for all ecofeminists. 
Put simply, ecofeminism comprehends the environmental crisis as a function of the abuse of 
power on both the personal and political level. This problem definition stands in marked 
contrast to the conventional treatment of environmental problems as 'the need to balance 
competing interests' in resource management, or the more radical view of the problem as 'the 
need to extend the ethics of egalitarianism to include nature'. One advantage of an analysis 
centring on the abuse of power is that it encompasses militarism, racism, and classism - major 
sources of environmental destruction that are often marginalized (or even ignored) in 
ecophilosophy. That is, many branches of ecophilosophy are concerned primarily with Man's 
relationship with nature and do not adequately theorize the structures of domination that make 
possible the exploitation of nature. Others ignore the personal dimension of dominance 
relationships that support those power structures. Non-feminist paradigms in ecophilosophy 
fail to provide a truly comprehensive alternative to the dominant paradigm because they retain 
some of the vestiges of androcentrism that underwrite the inherent bias of mainstream thought 
against environmental protection. 
Planning 
Planning (when capitalized) is short hand for those fields called land use, environmental, 
natural resource or development planning. (Planning is not capitalized when referring to the 
activity of planning.) It encompasses the two traditional divisions within the profession: 
advance/strategic and implementation/statutory planning. My focus is on the area of regional 
planning, as more work has been done with regard to regulating development in urban areas. It 
is important to see Planning in very broad terms, as most Planning decisions which affect 
public health, life quality and the natural environment are made outside the formal Planning 
process. Thus, for example, administrative and financial arrangements which encourage land 
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clearing and energy consumption need to be considered within the general ambit of Planning 
decisions. Moreover, many problems ostensibly within the narrow responsibility of the 
Planning profession are often well beyond its present sphere of influence, including the supply 
and location of regional land uses (Chapter 5). 
This work is concerned with patterns of decision-making theory and practice that are 
ecologically unsustainable, rather than planning as an ideal. Mainstream theory and analysis, 
which models decision maldng in the abstract, has already adequately described any decision 
making which may correspond to traditional Planning norms. While planners readily 
acknowledge that Planning decisions are often made without regard to explicit goals or 
policies, this is seen as a mere departure from the norm. For the purposes of this project, 
however, planning as an activity includes 'non-planning' and ad hoc (even arbitrary) decision 
making where there is no comprehensive policy or mandated procedural safeguards. 
In this work, Planning and resource allocation systems are analyzed as institutions in a 
public decision-making system. I use the term 'institution' in the broadest sense to encompass 
all aspects of the decision-making process, the universe of discourse(s) as well. The legislative 
and administrative frameworks (such as rules, code of ethics, and bureaucratic structures) 
represent only the formal aspect of institutions. Decision making within these institutions is 
also affected by the organizational cultures, ideologies, methods and so on. For our purposes 
therefore, 'institution' includes both the structures and processes for decision making, and the 
underlying concepts for interpreting, organizing and communicating information. Rather than 
making a sharp separation between institutional and social structures, they are regarded as 
mutually reinforcing. 
In my view, Planning has not been adequately analyzed in relation to its wider cultural and 
institutional context, and this is particularly the case with regard to the environmental crisis. In 
my attempt to fill this gap, I argue that Planning favours powerful interests in resource 
exploitation at the expense of the general public (at least over the long term), because it has 
evolved within a power-based social order and ethic. (The term 'power-based' includes both 
dominance and hierarchy. When applied to institutions, it means shaped by power relations 
and/or favouring the powerful.) The abuse of power follows almost inevitably from the logic 
of Patriarchy. As I regard Patriarchal consciousness and power structures as central to the 
environmental problem, I must explain these terms before we begin our discussions on 
Planning. 
Power 
Power is a concept which everyone understands until they are asked to define it. Many 
books have been written on the subject - albeit surprisingly few considering its ubiquitous 
35 
nature - and many of these do not defme power. 1 In the most general use of the term, I refer 
simply to 'the ability to get one's way'. Power, in this sense at least, is obtained by the control 
of social and/or natural resources which makes it a fundamental factor in the environmental 
crisis. The objective of ecofeminism is to move 'beyond power'. 
The concept of power has been broken down into different categories, such as its • 
psychological, systemic, and structural dimensions.2 I adhere to the ecofeminist distinction 
between two types of personal power: one is a positive quality, 'power to', while the other is 
negative, 'power over'.3 This is a conceptual distinction which refers to an attitude or 
disposition, of course, as it would be almost impossible to determine empirically. 
Broadly speaking, I would define 'personal power' in its negative sense (or power over) as 
being in a position to take undue advantage of others in a non reciprocal way. That is, the 
concept encompasses both domination and hierarchy. Structural power is, loosely speaking, 
being in a position where one does not have to listen to those being disadvantaged by the 
system which provides that position. Systemic power is where structures of oppression and 
dominance (not just hierarchy) are built in to the institutions and culture itself. I refer to power 
as 'ability or being in a position' because abuse, oppression and structural inequalities may be 
coercive even where that power is not exercised. For example, in many cases a husband may 
not be violent or psychologically abusive, but the wife will still understand that if she asserts 
her rights as an equal, society will judge her harshly. 
Where does the power drive originate? One source of the power drive could be instinct, as 
power over the female of the species has been a means of insuring both sex and reproduction 
among many animals. However, this is necessarily speculative and beyond the subject area of 
this thesis. Whatever the origins, little in life's experience is more basic: the power drive is 
deeply rooted in the psyche and culture. It seems to be stronger where it is denied, or where 
other means of satisfaction and meaning are missing in one's life. Thus, since men in Western 
culture tend to be out of touch with their emotions, it is not surprising that a relatively high 
proportion of men obsessively seek power. 
The term 'power-based' includes both dominance and hierarchy. By 'power-based 
institution', I mean one shaped by power relations and/or favouring the powerful. In a 
1 For example, John Forester, 1989, Planning in the Face of Power (Berkeley: University of California Press). 
2 See Kenneth E.Boulding, 1989, Three Faces of Power (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications); Steven 
Lulces, 1974, Power: A Radical View (London: MacMillan); David C. McClelland, 1975, Power: The Inner 
Experience (N.Y.: John Wiley and Son). Linda D. Molm, 1986, "Gender, Power and Legitimation: A Test of 
Three Theories", American Journal of Sociology 91 (6) pp. 1356-86; Hubert M. Blabock, Jr., 1989, Power and 
Conflict: Toward a General Theory (Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications). 
3 See Marilyn French, 1986, Beyond Power: Women, Men and Morals (London: Jonathon Cape). 
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capitalist context, representative democracy and the market have thus become power-based 
systems, just as much as bureaucracies. I argue that this is because these institutions have 
evolved through the interplay of powerful interests rather than being built upon an 'ethics-
based' constitution. 
Patriarchy 
In academia, the term Patriarchy is often used narrowly to refer to social arrangements that 
sustain male domination. In the feminist vernacular, however, Patriarchy refers not only to 
male-dominated family and state institutions, but their underlying perceptual framework and 
value as well. 1 Among activist feminists, the term is even broader: Patriarchy has come to be 
understood in its broader meaning as an umbrella term which stands for the logic of oppression 
contained within the dominant cosmology, ideology and structures of modernity. This broader 
conception of Patriarchy is the one used here. 
Patriarchal consciousness has been explained by ecofeminists in terms of two related 
concepts: androcentrism (male-centredness) and 'hierarchical dualism'. 2 (Patriarchy should be 
distinguished from mere 'hierarchy', which refers to relationships of command and obedience 
enforced by Patriarchal social structures and institutions. 3) My definition of Patriarchy 
encompasses the concepts of 'hierarchy', 'dualism' and 'androcentrism'. These, I suggest, are 
the key elements of Patriarchal consciousness and power structures. Thus Patriarchy is a 
broader concept than that of 'hierarchy' (anarchical theory) or 'domination' (critical theory). 
Let us take the hierarchical component of the later concept first. 
Hierarchy 
In Patriarchal society, a Man's personal worth tends to be measured by 'power over'. 
Therefore, many seek to obtain their emotional needs (security, acceptance, love) through the 
acquisition and exercise of power at the personal and/or political level. 'Power over', 
however, is obtained through the control, exploitation or consumption of (social and natural) 
resources. Therefore power-seeking is necessarily competitive and zero sum. Moreover, in a 
1 Scholars use Patriarchy in a variety of senses. For a discussion of the different meanings of 'Patriarchy' see 
Carol Pateman, 1988, "Patriarchal Confusions", International Journal of Moral and Social Studies 3, pp. 127- 
143. Gerda Lerner defines Patriarchy as "the manifestation and institutionalization of male dominance over 
women and children in the family and the extension of male dominance over women in society in general (Gerda 
Lerner, 1986, The Creation of Patriarchy [Oxford: Oxford University Press] at p. 239). The use of the term 
Patriarchy creates hostile reactions and is a barometer of male-chauvinism. 
2 For a discussion of hierarchical dualism, see Karen J. Warren, 1990, "The Power and the Promise of Ecological 
Feminism", Environmental Ethics 12(2) pp. 125-146. 
3 The links between hierarchy and Patriarchy are examined in many works, including Elizabeth Dodson Gray, 
1982, Green Paradise Lost (MA: Roundtable Press) and Dorothy Dinnerstein, 1976, The Mermaid and the 
Minotaur: Sexual Arrangements and the Human Malaise (NY: Harper and Row). 
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Patriarchal social context that legitimizes hierarchies at the structural level and dominance 
relationships at the personal level, power will inevitably be abused by some. The abuse of 
power is common to all forms of environmentally-damaging 'isms', such as militarism, 
capitalism, racism, classism, consumerism and sexism. Patriarchy is a social structure that 
leads to exploitation and abuse. The abuse of power is therefore incompatible with 
sustainability. 
Dualism 
The dualistic component of hierarchical dualism refers to the polarization of the Masculine 
and Feminine in Patriarchal consciousness and cultures. (Of course, the terms Masculine and 
Feminine are used as metaphorical icons for systems of value to which people of any sex can 
subscribe.) Patriarchal cultures are those which dichotomize what they identify as the 
Masculine and Feminine, and devalue the latter. Also, attributes associated with the Feminine 
(eg. nurturing, caring, intuitive, accommodating) are seen as belonging to the private (family) 
sphere while those that are associated with the Masculine (eg. competitive, aggressive, 'rational, 
autonomous) are seen as characterizing actors in the public sphere. 
To establish their Masculine identity, in such a culture, men are under pressure to be as 
different from women as they can be, and therefore to deny the validity of feeling, intuition, 
and altruism. As women are defined in negative terms as emotional, irrational, dependent, and 
weak, to be 'a man' is therefore to be in control, rational, and independent. Because 
Masculinity is associated with 'power over', those who have less power, or are associated with 
nature (as are women and indigenous peoples in Patriarchal cosmology), are seen as inferiors. 
In Western metaphysics generally, the Masculine has been associated with reason, mind, god, 
power, and sky, and elevated above the Feminine, emotion, body, weakness and earth. 1 And, 
because 'weakness' (being female) is despised, relationships of dependence and dominance are 
seen as justifiable. Gendered dualism and power-based social relationships are therefore 
mutually reinforcing. 
Androcentrism 
Due perhaps to the historic male monopoly over political, cultural and intellectual 
institutions, virtually all non-feminist theories of society have been premised upon an 
androcentric model of Man. 'Androcentrism' refers to the fact that humanity is implicitly 
visualized as male. As already mentioned, Maleness is defined in Western society by such 
adjectives as competitive, self-interested, autonomous, rational, and freedom seeking (from 
social and natural constraints). These so-called Masculine traits were reified as ideals by the 
philosophy of the Enlightenment which underlies much of modern academic theory, whether 
1 See generally, Marilyn French, 1985, above. 
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conservative, liberal, or progressive. Because the dominant tradition in Western thought takes 
these (Masculine) attributes as synonymous with 'human nature', their gendered and one-
dimensional character is concealed. 
Due to the universalization of men's experience, concerns, interests, and values, those of 
women have been disregarded. They have not, therefore, been factored into either social theory 
or public policy. Just as women have been marginalized from the public sphere, qualities 
associated with the Feminine have been deemed unsubstantiated, if not unreal. Androcentrism 
permitted the objectification of nature and of non-white, non-male humans that facilitated the 
industrial revolution. It also laid the groundwork for the technological and economic 
determinism that is complicit in the modern crisis. For simplicity, I refer to this androcentric 
and hierarchical/dualistic way of thinldng, relating and acting as the Power Paradigm. Let us 
first clarify what we mean by paradigm. 
Paradigm 
Technically speaking, a paradigm is a conceptual and instrumental framework which guides 
research and analysis. 1 It determines the concepts and relationships that are seen as important 
and the methods and techniques considered to be valid. A paradigm is not concerned with 
facts, but how they are to be interpreted. It cannot, therefore, be tested or proven. Instead, its 
worth is measured by its usefulness as an aid to discovering new insights and new solutions to 
old problems, or the identification of new ones. In its popular usage, a paradigm refers more 
broadly to the prism through which individuals perceive reality. In this sense, it is almost 
synonymous with 'world view'. In this work, the term paradigm is used in this broader sense, 
but ecofeminism serves as a paradigm in the strict, technical sense as well. In both cases, a 
paradigm is an artefact of the mind, yet is often seen as coterminous with reality itself, or not 
consciously recognized as being a construct The most relevant example of this is the fact that 
most people still see the hierarchical dualistic portrayal of reality as 'natural'. 
Power Paradigm 
In Western Patriarchal culture; what I choose to call the Power Paradigm has been 
internalized in our minds, embodied in our institutions, and played out in social relations in our 
daily lives and upon the world stage. While often not conscious, this constellation of ideas and 
values is more ubiquitous than most realize. For example, the devaluing of the feminine is 
reflected in all areas of our male-dominant institutions, including those that impact most directly 
on the environment, such as science and economics. These fields reveal an obsession with 
abstract, empirical and quantifiable methods. Feelings and subjectivity (being Feminine) are 
1 See Gary Cutting, ed., 1980, Paradigms and Revolutions: Appraisals and Applications of Thomas Kuhn's 
Philosophy of Science (IN: U. of Notre Dame Press). 
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considered less valid. One problem is that these technocratic norms and practices create the 
dangerous illusions of rationality, objectivity, and the idea that we can or should control life 
itself. This explains the familiar tendency to monitor and record environmental crises, rather 
than to find social solutions. Critical theorists and feminists have shown that these 
methodologies are not value-neutra1. 1 The Power Paradigm creates a bias against the 
preservation of such meaningful aspects of life as community and nature, or what some call the 
Feminine Principle. 
Feminine Principle 
The term 'Feminine principle' is short hand for that constellation of qualities and values 
associated with the Feminine in Patriarchal cultures (due perhaps to women's traditional care-
taking role and their exclusion from the centres of power). For some ecofeminists, this concept 
has a spiritual meaning but not as used here. 2 Again, I take no position on whether traits 
generally attributed to women have cultural, genetic or hormonal origins (eg. being more 
concerned with relationships than ego and power, being less violent and so on). 3 In Chapter 
10,1 present an ecofeminist analysis of the origins and evolution of Patriarchy. The 
nature/nurture debate has no bearing on my argument, however, as social change is the 
objective, and men are capable of taking on these Feminine attributes and vice versa, regardless 
of where they start from. 4 I use the term simply because most people hold a common definition 
of which attributes are regarded as Feminine in Western society. In Patriarchy, the systemic 
devaluation of the Feminine principle has been a fundamental basis of domination, and the 
recognition of this fact would in itself assist the process of social change. 
Manstream theory 
The importance of looking at the repercussions of the dichotomy between so-called 
Masculine and Feminine values in Patriarchal cultures is this: power cannot be adequately 
theorized from a gender-blind perspective. In fact, gender-blindness is power-blindness. The 
debate over how to bring about social change, however, has occurred largely within a 
Patriarchal universe of discourse that ignores the connection between personal and political 
1 See Evelyn Reed, 1978, Sexism and Science (NY: Pathfinder); Sandra Harding, 1991, Whose Science? 
Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women's Lives (NY: Cornell University Press); Londa Schiebinger, 1989, 
The Mind has no Sex? Women in the Origins of Modern Science (MA: Harvard University Press). 
2 For the latter view, see Vandana Shiva, 1989, Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Development. (London: 
Zed Books) pp. 38-42. 
3 See generally Carol Gilligan, 1982, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development 
(MA: Harvard University Press). See also Time Magazine (Australia) 7 (3), 20 January 1992, pp. 30-37. 
4 There are now many men's self-help groups directed towards overcoming Patriarchal conditioning, and other 
groups seeking a redefinition of Masculinity. See Erica Simmons, 1992, "New Age Patriarchs", New 
Internationalist 227 (January) pp. 29-30. 
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power relations. Many 'radical' green thinkers and activists, or those who believe that 
fundamental social change is prerequisite to saving the planet, have failed to come to terms with 
some of the fundamental roots of human oppression and environmental exploitation. Their 
theories are still - despite prodding from feminists - largely gender-blind, tapped in an 
androcentric prism and impeded by the myth of Masculine rationality. Hence I define such 
green theories as 'Manstream'. 
Ecofeminism exposes and challenges the underlying premises that Manstream theories 
share, to varying extents, with mainstream theory. It is therefore crucial to social change. I go 
further, however, and argue that, to the extent green theorists ignore feminist theory, and green 
campaigners ignore feminist practice, they are actually supporting the status quo and impeding 
social transformation. To this end, I discuss some ways in which Patriarchal consciousness 
still impedes the different schools of green theory and strategy in terms of the content and 
process of social transformation. However, I concentrate on the orientation in green thought 
that centres on human chauvinism. As a reference point, I use the literature of deep ecology, 
which sees anthropocentrism (or human-centredness) as the crucial barrier to social 
transformation. 
Ethics 
One of the main sources of bias created by the (post-Enlightenment) Patriarchal conception 
of Man is in the conception of ethics. The term ethics itself therefore requires some discussion. 
For our purposes, environmental ethics ('Ethics'), is distinguished from rights-based 
conceptions of ethics. Traditional rights-based ethics derive from an atomistic, androcentric 
conception of Man and are often referred to in terms of distributional justice, or egalitarianism 
(among people and other living beings). This conception of ethics is not adequate for 
addressing problems concerning the relations between individual, collective, and non-human 
needs and values. The problem is that rights-based (that is, power-based) concepts of ethics, 
such as inter-generational or inter-species equity, by their inherent logic, lead to trade offs or 
'interest balancing'. Due to the realities of power, this ethic invariably results in incremental 
trade-offs of the environment in the interests of present needs and wants, which at best simply 
slow down the destruction of wilderness. 
If we continually 'balance' the rights of humans against those of other species, the rights of 
indigenous peoples against those of the dominant culture, 1 the needs of future generations 
against those of the living, or the environment against present interests in development, we will 
1 Land rights is a misnomer, as the idea that humans are separate from nature is a construct of Western culture. 
Many aboriginal cultures see humans as belonging to the land, rather than the land belonging to humans. For a 
brief introduction to Aboriginal views toward the land, see Ngapare K. Hopa, 1990, 'Papatuanuku"Spaceship 
Earth', in Ken Dyer and John Young, eds., above pp. 574-580. 
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eventually lose the politically weaker half of each pair. Thus, while a rights-based ethic is 
arguably an appropriate basis for mediating social relationships and conflicts that have limited 
environmental impacts, the implications of this traditional approach are problematic when 
applied to environmental issues. To create a sustainable society, we need an Ethic grounded in 
our moral responsibility. 
In contrast, Ethics in this work refers to fundamental ecologically-based principles (as 
opposed to rules) guiding interactions with other people, society as a whole, and the rest of 
nature. But such an Ethic can only exist in a society where a sense of interconnectedness, 
empathy, and responsibility is affirmed. 
Androcentric premise 
To summarize, I call_these implicit assumptions about the nature of Man, society and nature 
the 'Androcentric Premise'. The key elements of this Premise are: 
a) the polarization of Masculine and Feminine archetypes and the elevation of Masculine 
traits and values (hierarchical dualism); 
b) the deep association of women, nature, earth, and matter, which are seen as existing to 
serve Man's 'higher' purposes (instrumentalism); 
c) the Masculine ideal of autonomy and independence (from nature and community), which 
has underwritten the alienation and anthropocentrism of Western society; 
d) the universalization of that ideal (independence) as a goal to which humanity as a whole 
is naturally and subjectively meant to strive (though this often excludes women). This 
underwrites the ideal of progress. 
e) the association of Masculinity and 'power over' which, combined with the above, give 
licence to create dependency and dominance relationships as being pre-ordained by god or 
nature. 
While non-feminist thinkers may reject certain of the above elements, these remain part of 
the backcloth that influences our way of thinking, relating and acting in Patriarchal society. In 
Part II, we see that Planning theory reflects these premises and assumptions as well. 
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PART II: DECONSTRUCTION OF THE PLANNING 
SYSTEM 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART II 
The first half of this work, Part II, uses an ecofeminist paradigm to deconstruct the resource 
allocation and Planning system. It examines the institutional functions of the existing Planning 
system, in relation to the environmental crisis, within its broader socio-political context. 
Basically, it questions the capacity of Planning to achieve its broader ethical/ecological 
imperatives. The purpose of this deconstruction is to develop the parameters of an alternative 
Planning system that could potentially help to overcome the problems inherent in the present 
system. Among other things, we look at: 
(a) why crucial, irreversible decisions affecting sustainability are often 'unplanned' and/or 
beyond the influence of public planners and, more generally, why we, as a society, have 
developed no plans for living within our means; 
(b) how the dominant meta-paradigm in planning thought shapes our definitions of the 
environmental problem, resource allocation and Planning, and how these definitions distort and 
misdirect our approach to environmental planning and problem solving generally; 
(c) how the resource allocation system (of which planning is one decision-making arena), 
as well as the theories, structures and processes within Planning itself, contribute to the 
increasing trend toward nonsustainability, with its attendant social conflict 
(d) how the market and Planning systems have been falsely dichotomized in the collective 
imagination when, in reality, they have been merging in form and substance - and what this 
portends for the natural environment. 
Using an ecofeminist paradigm, I then canvas some systemic biases which ultimately 
generate environmental problems and conflict, reconceptualize and/or uncover Planning 
problems presently overlooked by mainstream Planning paradigms, and develop an outline for 
the reconstruction of the resource allocation and Planning system. For convenience, I break 
down the analysis into four layers: 
(a) the conventional (liberal) problem definition (Chapter 2), which I argue conceals the 
transfer of public resources to special interests at below cost, and obscures the role of the 
Planning and resource allocation system in that conversion process. (A problem description 
suggested by an ecofeminist paradigm is set out in Chapter 3). 
(b) the 'superstructure' level (Chapter 4), or problems created by the discrepancy between 
the perceived and actual relationship between the four major social decision-making arenas 
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concerned with resource allocation: representative politics, the market, government Planning 
and the law. 
(c) the 'structure' level (Chapter 5), or problems created by the Planning system itself as an 
institution in society. In particular, we look at Planning as a system which transfers 
environmental resources and amenities between public and private interests, in order to fulfil a 
conflict management function. 
(d) the 'infrastructure' level (Chapter 6) or the theories, ideologies, paradigms, methods 
and techniques within the institution of Planning itself, or problems created by the inherent bias 
of the 'framework of thinking' into which planners are inculcated. 
On each of these four levels, we see that the decision-making system for resource allocation 
and Planning reflects Patriarchy and the Power Paradigm which characterizes the larger society 
within which it functions. I then show that, as a consequence of this Patriarchal bias, the 
system is inherently conflict generating because, among other things, it reinforces the power 
relationships that led to the economic and ethical problems of modernity in the first place. That 
is, the system is biased in favour of powerful development interests, despite the fact that 
Planning is commonly regarded as an 'impediment' to development. 
I then use an ecofeminist paradigm to develop alternative models for resource allocation and 
Planning at each of the above levels. The basic objective of institutional redesign is to prevent 
(to the extent possible) the abuse of power, and to encourage public consideration of the 
substantive ethical issues that lie at the heart of environmental issues. While such fundamental 
institutional change sounds radical, the changes to decision-making structures, methods, and 
processes would be simple to implement. In my opinion, they would be more in keeping with 
the original spirit and intent of the (United States, Australian and Canadian) Constitution. In 
other words, these changes would bring the public decision-making process closer to the 
original liberal/conservative ideal, while expanding it to encompass the third dimension (the 
environment). 
In Chapter 8, we look at the problems which beset attempts at Planning reform, and how 
these impediments to reform reflect key features of the Patriarchal culture. Institutional reform 
has been blocked by the same perceptual barriers that have impeded positive social change in 
Patriarchal society generally: reasons which I categorize under (a) dominance relationships, (b) 
dualistic thinking, and (c) the Masculine model of (rational) Man. 
I then go further to argue that adequate institutional change cannot occur within a Patriarchal 
cosmology and social order. With regard to social change generally, traditional approaches 
(left and liberal/conservative) have tended to rely on either individual or structural change to the 
exclusion of the other. The same generalization can be made for Manstream green orientations. 
To achieve a sustainable society, both institutional and social transformation must be 
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undertaken concurrently, as they are in a complex 'chicken and egg' relationship. A new 
framework of analysis is needed to comprehend both the psychological and structural factors 
that impede social change. In my view, the ecofeminist paradigm best achieves this synthesis. 
Part III therefore takes up ecofeminism in detail as a paradigm for revealing the ideological 
distortions of Patriarchal consciousness, and for guiding social change generally. 
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CHAPTER 2: PROBLEM DEFINITION 
The importance of problem definitions 
I have suggested that the crux of the environmental crisis today is, for practical purposes, 
the abuse of power on personal and political levels and, in particular, the transfer of public 
resources to special interests at below cost and the externalization of the private costs of 
development. 1 There has been a tendency,to assume that Planning's redistributive function 
operates in the opposite direction. For example, in 1972, the federal Labor government in 
Australia won office and set up the Department of Urban and Regional development (DURD) 
with the explicit intention of redistributing wealth in favour of the disadvantaged. While this 
attempt at redistribution was short lived, equity was its intention. However, equity was seen as 
a function of location, access to jobs and so on, rather than a function of, say, ownership of the 
means of production. Its policies therefore centred on promoting development in 
disadvantaged regions. Thus, the objective was nominally redistributive, but the means could 
not achieve the ends. This suggests the importance of how a problem is defined. 
We begin by looking at how problem definitions are controlled and maintained by the 
powerful. Given a society built upon power relationships, problem definitions and the theories, 
that support them will persist over time only if they serve the interests of the powerful: "the 
distribution of power determines whose ideology, interests, and information will be 
dominant". 2 This means that, in any power structure, institutions and methods will eventually 
be corrupted to serve those in a position to select and propagate ideologies that suit their 
interests. As evidence of this, let us consider the 'selectivity' through which certain theoretical 
concepts achieve prominence. 
For example, Western societies adopted Bentham's utilitarian calculus in economic and 
political theory, but not his broader ethical intent. 3 Bentham's ethic was based on maximising 
"happiness", but he envisaged that we would learn to take pleasure in the happiness of others, 
even of animals. The positivist approach had been tailored to the problem in its contemporary 
1 Planning has, of course, been described as a wealth transfer system by others. See Hugh Stretton, 1970, Ideas 
for Australian Cities (Adelaide: Orphan Books) at p. 310. These analyses have generally been within an 
anthropocentric framework, however, and thus are 2-dimensional. 
2 Carol H. Weiss, 1983, "Ideology, Interests, and Information: The Basis of Policy Positions", in Daniel 
Callahan and Bruce Jennings, eds., Ethics, the Social Sciences and Policy Analysis (NY: Plenum Press) pp. 213- 
270, at p. 239. 
3 See generally Helen Mary Warnock, 1979, Utilitarianism (London: Fount Paperbacks). 
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social context - the Corruption of the natural justice system. Put differently, his reforms were 
inspired to correct the injustices and absurdities created by rigidification of certain religious-
based doctrines that had been co-opted into the service of elites. 
Modern economists replaced this idea of happiness with that of maximizing consumers' 
preferences, or 'utility', as measured by their 'willingness' to pay.' 'Willingness' has, 
however, been measured by what people in reality must pay, not by how they 'feel' about 
paying. Further, this has in reality been a measure of the 'ability to pay'. The poor are given 
fewer 'votes' or consumer preferences. This is substantively different from the happiness 
people actually obtain as a consequence of paying, which is ignored perhaps because 
happiness, being subjective, cannot be measured. For example, we may be willing to pay for 
status symbols because of the pressure to conform, but they do not necessarily bring us 
happiness because (in a Patriarchal, power-based culture) we 'need' ever more status. 
Nonetheless, willingness (read 'ability') to pay has been somehow substituted for the 
happiness derived from the material goods we have obtained by trading away our time. There 
may be cheaper ways of buying social acceptance and respect, but these are not recognized by 
the market. Also, there is little real consumer choice for those who would like to live 
ecologically by, for example, using efficient public transport. 
Another example of the 'natural selection' process by which theories that benefit the 
powerful attain prominence is revealed in the way Adam Smith's The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments was forgotten. In this work, Smith wrote that a system of justice was necessary to 
hold self-interest in check. This would have put his more famous theory, as propounded in 
The Wealth of Nations, into a more balanced perspective. 
Examples of more direct relevance are found in the present trend toward adopting 'interest 
balancing' concepts. In the 1800s, government regulation of land in the United States was 
rather rigid. A balancing test was introduced by the courts in 1922 which was designed to 
restrict government interference in private property rights. 2 The test involved weighing the 
value of the regulation to the public against the loss in property value to the owner. Thus, this 
new decision rule, interest balancing, operated to increase the rights of private developers to 
impose externalities (nuisances) upon others. 
1 See generally Mark Sagoff, 1988, Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law and the Environment (NY: 
Cambridge University Press). 
2 In the United States, a balancing test was instituted in 1922 for determining whether a land use regulation 
amounts to an unconstitutional 'taking' and was hence subject to just compensation under the US Constitution 
(Pennsylvania Coal C. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 [1922]). The power of government to regulate private land 
use was thus constrained, by linking it to the concept of eminent domain (Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass, 368, 19 
N.E. 390 [1889]). 
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The point is that while the legal system had historically protected property rights against 
nuisances, it came to be used to protect developers from preservation interests. Originally, one 
could not destroy the use of another's land through, say, pollution, without paying the value of 
that land as determined by the owner. But the potential was there to stop economic growth, as 
a growing number of people began to value nature, the home, the family farm and lifestyle 
more than money. The dominant rights-based decision rule was therefore abandoned for an 
interest-balancing concept, where a third party decides what the land is worth to the owner. 
(As the interests that are considered tend to be 'rights', it perhaps should be called a 'rights-
balancing' concept.) 
Thus, decision-making concepts in the law (deriving from the U.S.) are increasingly 
designed to "balance the interests" in development and preservation. In practice, this means 
that developments can go ahead even if they destroy adjacent property rights, so long as the 
interests in development are deemed to outweigh the interests of those opposing it. Property 
law concepts sufficed when they protected the powerful, but today the powerful are no longer 
the propertied gentry, so the concepts upon which justice is determined have changed. 
Similarly, environmental impact assessment (EIA), and its economic parallel, cost-benefit 
analysisl have become major tools of decision making in Planning. This often means that, as a 
practical matter at least, the present benefits of development simply need to outweigh the 
present costs, regardless of their effect on less tangible and quantitative factors such as that of 
holding future options open. Although the EIA process was an advance because it forced 
decision makers to consider the costs of development, the costs are, in fact, never fully' 
calculated (Chapter 6). 
These are just a few illustrations of how the way a problem is framed can assure that the 
interests of the powerful are protected. We now look at descriptive theory in Planning; in 
particular, how the environmental problem is defined in Planning theory. We will see that this 
problem definition reflects an androcentric interpretation of Man and society which, in turn, 
generates or at least impedes the resolution of environmental conflict. In the following chapter, 
I define the environmental problem from an ecofeminist perspective, and proceed to analyze the 
bias of the resource allocation system accordingly. 
1 See Steven Kelman, 1981,What Price Incentives? Economists and the Environment (Boston: Auburn House). 
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The political paradigm in Planningl 
In the remainder of this chapter I explain why a system capable of giving expression to the 
new ecological Ethic cannot be created within the reformist paradigm in planning thought. This 
is because the environmental problem has been defined in order to fit the solution: a liberal 
conception of social justice or 'egalitarianism' has simply been transposed onto the 
environment problem. This paradigm, although it has inspired attempts at institutional reform, 
is based on an androcentric interpretation of nature, society and humanity and, as such, is 
inadequate to address problems of power relationships in resource allocation. The paradigm 
creates a bias against environmental protection because it is designed to deal with only two 
dimensions: Man and society. The paradigm misfit has thus arisen, I believe, because 
environmental lawyers and planners have uncritically accepted concepts pertinent to social 
reform as being adequate for dealing with the third dimension: the environment. This largely 
applies to progressive planners as well. 
As a result of the reformist paradigm, Planning reforms have been procedural in character. 
They have been designed to make the 'rules of the game' more equitable, by opening decision 
making to a broader representation of values and interests, and by improving communication 
between the stakeholders. The solution to the environmental problem has often been, 
therefore, to simply include representatives of environmental interests within more open, 
balanced and democratic processes. Given the paradigm underlying liberalism, the procedural 
orientation is almost inevitable. 
I call this the 'Pluralist paradigm' because it interprets society in terms of competing pluralist 
(inter-personal or group) interests. Pluralist is capitalized to distinguish the term from the 
traditional pluralist theory of Planning (discussed later) that mirrors liberal ideology. Although 
the use of pluralism and Pluralism is confusing, it conveys the idea that progressive Planning 
has not broken away from its liberal underpinnings. Instead, the term Pluralism here refers to a 
deep and largely unconscious view about how society is meant to function, in which liberal 
ideology is embedded. Liberalism "idealizes a society in which autonomous individuals are 
provided maximal freedom to pursue their own interests in competition".2 It is based on a 
Masculine interpretation of human nature, which takes competitive, individualistic social 
interaction to be natural and appropriate. This framework is also implicit in many left-wing 
approaches, as they see group struggle as the primary means to social change. That is, while 
1 A significant portion of this material in this chapter was first published in J. Birkeland-Corro, 1988, 
"Redefining the Environmental Problem", Environmental and Planning Law Journal 5, pp. 109-133. 
2 Karen J. Warren, 1989, "Feminism and Ecology: Making the Connections", Environmental Ethics 9(1) pp. 
3-20 at p. 8. 
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planning theorists often juxtapose pluralist and progressive planning, I would argue that they 
share the same Pluralist assumptions. 
The Rationalist paradigm and its Pluralist critique embody fundamental premises of the 
Patriarchal culture that have contributed to environmental problems. While progressive theories 
criticize the dominant Rationalist paradigm of Planning in favour of a more populist and 
participatory approach, they remain confined within the assumptions of the broader 
paradigmatic construct, thereby protecting the status quo they propose to reform. False choices 
deflect attention from problems common to both alternatives and impede deeper insights. The 
typology I use is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Typology of Planning orientations 
Actor- 
oriented 
Structure-
oriented 
Rationalists 
\ Methodological orientation 
Techiques for 
decision making 
Systems 
thinking 
Pluralists 
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Pluralist 
politics 
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politics 
Given a construction of society as a collective of individual and group interests, the problem 
facing public policy makers is the need to satisfy many conflicting demands. As a logical 
outcome of this framework, the implicit goal of any public decision-making system is to 
achieve a 'balance' between competing interests. This holds for institutions concerned with 
resource allocation and planning as well. Thus, resource exploitation and conservation are 
generally portrayed as conflicting but equal values to be reconciled through some kind of 
compromise. Because this interpretation of environmental conflict is founded upon basic 
precepts about the nature of Man and society, it is found in both right and left political 
ideologies. 
When social inequities or imbalances result from resource allocation decisions, they are 
assumed to be a result of a departure from due process. Reforms, therefore, are directed at 
bringing the process closer to that Pluralist ideal, by altering the rules so that competition over 
environmental resources and amenity will be more fair, and outcomes therefore more 
"balanced". This Pluralist framework is, arguably, quite useful for dealing with issues of inter- 
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personal (and perhaps even intergenerational) equity. In fact, Pluralist concepts have guided 
many improvements to the decision-making process in the last twenty-five years. However, 
Pluralist reforms such as 'due process', advocacy, third party appeals, environmental 
mediation, conflict resolution methods and the like, while important in creating a just forum for 
contesting individual cases and controversies, have little application to determining the broader 
Ethical issues at stake in environmental issues. The Pluralist paradigm cannot wrap itself 
around the ecological dimension: it does not speak to the basic realities of diminishing natural 
and social resources and increasing population on a finite planet 
The trouble is that Pluralism centres the environmental debate around distributional issues: 
the rate of consumption and relative distribution of benefits and burdens. Long-term problems 
are inevitable in a system that is structured for maldng (consumer) choices among present 
Options. The solution to environmental conflict in this social order requires the consumption of 
land and resources. This means that there will be a growing loss of real social choices as 
resources are consumed. As a consequence of this diminishing choice and opportunity, social 
conflict will inevitably increase. Moreover, Pluralist reforms to the allocation and Planning 
system will be inadequate to confine competition over these dwindling resources to formal 
channels. People who sense the system is hopelessly biased toward consumption have begun 
to resort to extramural forms of activism. 
Another problem is that, while Pluralist theory and reform has contributed to improved 
decision-making and dispute-management processes, it has obscured the power relationships 
underlying environmental problems. Because it interprets environmental conflict as competition 
among groups or individuals, it obscures the underlying conflict between special interests and 
the general public which planners should address. Because the Pluralist paradigm limits the 
repertoire of legislative concepts to procedural - rather than systemic - issues, the competitive 
and hierarchical social structure is legitimized and even reinforced. 
Procedural reforms might be adequate for distributional issues if power relationships were 
indeed pluralist. This, however, is certainly not the case. Development interests are becoming 
more centralized and powerful, while the pace of resource exploitation, population growth and 
disparities in wealth is accelerating, yet the Planning system is constructed as if private interests 
in environmental protection can represent the environment I suggest that environmental 
conflict should instead be conceived of as being increasingly a function of a system which 
allows the diversion of undervalued public resources to special interests and externalizes the 
private costs of development 
Pluralism in Planning, although intended to provide for social justice and equality of 
opportunity works against human development, freedom and equality in the long term. While 
an ecofeminist paradigm is not a necessary prerequisite to this analysis, ecofeminism explains 
the centrality and tenacity of the Pluralist interpretation of society (based as it is on the 
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Masculine model of Man). Thus, it shows that alternatives to the rights-based, distributive, 
decision-making systems are possible. To resolve social conflict, a Planning system is needed 
that can address the Ethical issues inherent in resource allocation decisions. 
Were we to plan, in the sense of problem solving or preparing for a safe, secure future - 
rather than merely to contain land use disputes by mediating conflicting demands - we would 
expand the range, supply and substantive choice of natural and social resources to meet both 
present and future needs. This necessarily entails the restoration and/or preservation of any 
relatively undisturbed ecosystems. Regrettably, we have not begun to plan for how to live 
within our means. We will apparently not begin to plan until virtually all natural habitats have 
been destroyed. 1 This is not just the fault of consumers and voters, or bureaucrats and 
politicians who do not value the natural environment It is also the fault of environmental 
planners as a profession who, though 'concerned' about sustainability, remain wedded to the 
dominant paradigm which provides them economic advantages without the burden of 
responsibility. 
Pluralism 
I have suggested that conservative and progressive Planning are both embedded in the 
dominant paradigm and hence conceive of Planning issues as a matter of fair distribution rather 
than Ethics. To substantiate this, it is necessary to take a quick excursion into the bowels of 
Planning theory. In anticipation of the argument that there are several conflicting paradigms in 
Planning, I must first establish that there is one dominant Planning paradigm. There are, of 
course, numerous models of decision making and implementation; it could even be said that 
each theorist has their own. I suggest, however, that these models can be subsumed under two 
main orientations which share the same foundation, 'the androcentric premise'. 
The social science disciplines tend to divide into two paradigms. One has tended to 
dominate, with the other serving as the 'critique', or opposition. The dominant paradigm could 
be called scientism. The critique could be called humanism; it is more concerned with the 
implementation of social values. In legal theory, these two orientations have been called the 
positivist and natural justice traditions. In public policy, these have been called actor-oriented 
and structural theory: 
The first approach emphasizes decision-making and rationality whereas 
the second focuses on institutions, procedures, role patterns, rules, 
myths and resources. Although the first research strategy has hitherto 
1 A wilderness area must be of a sufficient area to conserve biological resources or a 'gene pool' to be 
sustainable. Hence, national parks for museum specimens of natural habitats are nonsustainable. Recently, for 
example, one half of Yellowstone National Park in the United States burned in one fire. 
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been the dominant mode in policy analysis, the relevance of 
organizational theory to the interpretation of policy processes is 
increasing. The methodological bridge between an actor approach and 
a structural framework has always been considered so large as to be 
unbridgeable . 1 (emphasis added) 
Along similar lines, there are generally considered to be two competing strands of Planning 
thought that date back to the scientific management and social reform traditions. For brevity, I 
call these Rationalism (the mainstream) and Pluralism (the critique). 
Rationalism in Planning could be considered a subset of scientism: the belief that science 
alone produces valid knowledge. Scientism seeks laws of cause and effect, generally with the 
goal of prediction. Knowledge is seen as being objectively-based and cumulative, and the -3 
scientific method is seen as applicable to all human problems. 2 Thus, it is held that true 
knowledge in the social sciences can be found by applying modes of thought and methods of 
research from the 'hard' (mathematics and natural) sciences. 3 Rationalist Planning has 
therefore emphasized scientific method, prediction and modelling. Its implicit values are (cost) 
efficiency and control. 
While Rationalist Planning has focussed on the individual decision maker, or actor, Pluralist 
Planning, in contrast, has emphasized the socio-political process, which is envisaged as interest 
groups or individuals competing for political influence. Again, its central concern has been 
distributional justice or 'equity', as distinguished from Ethics as I use the term (defined in 
Chapter 1). As the above quote suggests, these paradigms are generally regarded as 
dichotomous. Rationalists have sought an ideal calculus or form of technical method based on 
the assumptions that lie behind engineering and economics. Pluralists have sought an ideal 
form of politics, based on the assumption that the democratic process will promote the common 
good. 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, however, these Planning paradigms share underlying 
premises. They merely focus on different aspects of decision making within the same meta-
ethic. That is, Rationalists are concerned with the 'scientific' techniques upon which experts 
base their selection of alternative plans or actions. Pluralists, on the other hand, are concerned 
with plan adoption and implementation - the 'politics' by which alternative plans or actions are 
chosen. This chapter focuses on Pluralism because we are exploring the social context and 
1 Jan-Erik Lane, 1990, Institutional Reform: A Public Policy Perspective (Aldershot: Dartmouth) at p.2. 
2 Auguste Comte (1798-1857) was an early exponent of positivism in the humanities. Along with St. Simon, 
he was credited with inventing sociology, the 'science' of society. 
3 Mathematics and natural sciences are 'hard', in that they seek knowledge; humanities (eg. philosophy) are 
'soft', and seek wisdom. 
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political aspects of Planning theory first. Later, when discussing Planning methods, we look 
more closely at Rationalism. 
When these orientations are seen as concerned with different stages of the decision-making 
process (decision making and decision taking), 1 we realize that they are quite compatible and 
not exclusive. Theorists concerned with the final decision (decision taking) may generally 
accept the assumptions of those concerned with preparing the basis for a decision (decision 
making), and vice versa, but consider the other to be of less significance in terms of planning 
outcomes. These orientations are also interwoven by mutual influence. For example, 
mainstream Rationalist Planning has managed to absorb the ideas of the Pluralist critique as 
practices evolve. It has done this by recasting the concepts in scientific or technical terms. For 
instance, participatory planning of the 1960s became seen as a rational means of acquiring 
information in the 1970s.2 
Not only are they interwoven, but Rationalism and Pluralism are both couched within the 
Power Paradigm. Planning theory, like the Patriarchal culture at large, elevates that which 
distinguishes Man from nature, women and matter. Generally, human and natural resources 
are valued to the extent that they serve Man's purposes. That purpose is a kind of 'manifest' 
destiny (sometimes called progress). It is based on an idealized, denaturalized portrayal of Man 
apart from nature. Masculinist values of particular relevance to Planning theory are: 
(a)purposiveness - a belief in a special vision of material 'progress'; 
(b) rationality - a belief in the efficacy of goal-oriented linear thinking; 
(c)positivism - a belief in the scientific method as the true source of knowledge; 
(d) individualism - a belief in the separateness of the person from the community; Risk 
taking and competition are glorified as a means to progress; 
(e) autonomy - a belief in Man's ability to choose his own principles of action; and finally, 
(f) control - a belief in Man's ability to gain control over society, nature and human destiny. 
As we later see, these Masculine values pervade Planning in all areas - structure, theory, 
method and process. It is no coincidence that these values coincide with those that are 
associated with Masculinity: what is valued in a culture can be ascertained by defming its 
concept of maleness. The elements of this value system reflect Man's insecurity, and the desire 
to achieve certainty in a chaotic world by controlling nature and the future. Planning 
1 The distinction between decision 'making' and decision 'taking' was made by Andreas Faludi, 1973, Planning 
Theory (Oxford: Pergamon). 
2 Rosemary Whip, 1977, "Social Research Methods in Planning", in John C. Western and Paul R. Wilson, eds., 
Planning in Turbulent Environments (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press) pp. 17-31, at p. 24. 
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techniques, which are modelled upon science, have been centred on prediction (rather than 
prevention) as a means of coping with uncertainty. 1 With a focus on prediction, only disasters 
that can be predicted will be prevented. For example, global warming has not yet been taken 
very seriously in the mainstream because it is 'unproven'. Or, again, because we do not have 
the capacity to predict the synergistic interactions of different chemicals or biogenetic 
experiments in the environment, it is not a 'problem' until there is measurable damage, if at all. 
(Thus, LTryphophan, a genetically-engineered product, was allowed to be sold as a health 
food. To date it has killed 32 people.)2 
While Rationalism is concerned with prediction and control of the future through scientific 
knowledge, Pluralism relies on Man's supposedly 'innate competitive nature' to provide 
predictability, and hence a means of control. This at first appears contradictory; risk taldng and 
competition, as ultimately manifested in military and technological adventurism, would seem to 
be the antithesis of control. Nuclear weaponry and biogenetics have made humanity more 
vulnerable to extinction. However, by manipulating and anticipating what people or markets 
will do, one can develop strategies for exploiting change or gain power. (On a deeper level, 
recklessness can be understood as attempts to immunize feeling and block out the knowledge of 
death; that is, to control reality itself.) 3 Thus Rationalism and Pluralism, rather than being 
conceptual polarities, are no more than a friendly opposition within the Power Paradigm 
(Figure 1). While Planning reform efforts have nibbled at the pillars of the Patriarchal edifice, 
none have really challenged this basic meta-ethic and its Masculine values.4 
In manifesting the apparent Masculine impulse to predict and control, rather than, say, to 
seek harmony, Planning is a reflection of social priorities in general. These priorities have led 
to disastrous consequences that need no recitation here. On all levels of society, vast resources 
are spent on prediction and control, while almost nothing is spent on prevention. Also, as in 
society as a whole, Planning practice is oriented towards conflict control, rather than addressing 
1 See Patsy Hallen, 1989, "Careful of Science: A Feminist Critique of Science", The Trumpeter 6 (1) (Winter) 
pp. 3-8, for a discussion on Patriarchal values in Science; Sandra Harding, 1991, above (NY: Cornell University 
Press); Evelyn Reed, 1978, above (NY: Pathfinder); Londa Schiebinger, 1989, above (MA: Harvard University 
Press). 
2 "Four Corners", Australian Broadcasting Commission TV, 20 April, 1992. 
3 Robert Lawlor, 1991, "Male Power on Earth", in John Matthews, ed., Choirs of the God: Revisioning 
Masculinity (SF.: Thorsons) pp 210-233. 
4 Because Planning scholars have traditionally tended to see the critique as oppositional, some have saught a 
'meta-theory' which can encompass the dichotomous tradition in planning thought. I later contend that such a 
synthesis would only further entrench the underlying premises. See for example, P. Healey, G. & T. McDougall, 
and J. Michael, eds., 1982, Planning Theory, Prospects for the 1980s (London: Pergamon Press); Andreas 
Faludi, 1982,   "Towards a Combined Paradigm of Planning Theory?", second edition, in Chris Paris, ed., Critical 
Readings in Planning Theory (Sydney: Pergamon Press) pp. 27-38. 
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the causes of conflict (which are, of course, beyond the present scope of Planning). For 
example, the world military spends in the order of US$900 billion dollars on the arms race 
annually to 'deter' war by making war, through both psychic terror and physical aggression, 
yet spends less than one percent of that budget on prevention, or peace-building efforts. 1 
Developed countries spend on average 5.4% of GNP for military purposes as opposed to 0.3% - 
aid to developing countries.2 For every one dollar the United States spends on environmental 
protection, for instance, it spends 126 dollars on the military. 3 A final example: 
The cost of protecting endangered species from illegal trade and funding 
additional field projects is [US] $5 million a year. The UNEP budget 
for combating pollution in the oceans is 2.6 million a year. All this 
could be achieved for $8 million, 5 minutes worth of arms spending. 4 
Pluralism defined 
Having suggested that the paradigm underlying (both descriptive and normative) political 
theory in Planning is what I term Pluralist, we will now look in more detail at Pluralism. 
(Rationalism, the operative paradigm underlying Planning methods, is discussed later.) 
Pluralism interprets society as a contest among competing interests, groups or classes and 
hence construes social conflict as groups, classes, or individuals competing for political 
influence. Politics is a series of conflicts between different private interests, or alliances of 
interests, over the control of social or natural resources. The government is often assumed (by 
liberals) to be a neutral arbiter in this struggle or, in some cases (by those on the left), another 
interest group. 
Pluralism underlies major social reforms of the 60s and 70s in the United States. The basic 
concepts of U.S. environmental legislation of the late 60s and early 70s were also inspired by, 
or at least reflect, Pluralist theory. Pluralism in Planning found explicit definition in a rather 
short-lived Planning theory that was introduced by Paul Davidoff in 1965. This traditional 
pluralist theory was an attempt to make Planning processes conform to the liberal ideal and 
provided a theoretical legitimation for 'advocacy planning'.5 Advocacy planning emerged in 
the wake of the social disruption associated with post war redevelopment (slum clearance) 
programs, and the widely-noted gap between comprehensive plans and their implementation. 
1 For example, in 1986, the International Year of Peace, the world spent over (U.S.) $900 billion on military 
activity. Source: Frank Bamaby, ed., 1988, The Gaia Peace Atlas: Survival into the Third Millennium 
(London: Gala Books) at p. 96. 
2 Frank Bamaby, ed., 1988, above p. 105. 
3 Seth Shulman, 1990, Nuclear Times (Autumn). 
4 Frank Bamaby, ed., 1988, above p. 109. 
5 Paul Davidoff, 1965, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning", Journal of the American Institute of Planners 1 
(November) pp. 331-338. 
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Some planners had begun to work as advisers and advocates to assist disadvantaged 
community groups to develop 'counter-plans' in response to government plans and proposals 
that would disrupt their communities. Advocacy planning, while initially associated with 
pluralist theory, later evolved into progressive planning. Progressive planning was influenced 
by the critical social theory of the Frankfurt School (Chapter 11) and rejected many of the naive 
assumptions of pluralist theory. (The following section on pluralism and its usefulness may 
cover familiar territory for those with a background in Planning, but is necessary to inform 
other readers.) 
Paul Davidoffs pluralist theory represents the conservative wing of Pluralism, while the 
more left-wing approach is represented by, say, John Forester's version of progressive 
planning (below). I first show that traditional pluralism is unsatisfactory for issues of social 
justice (2 dimensions), which should come as little surprise. I then suggest that progressive 
planning, while perhaps adequate to address social issues, is unsatisfactory for environmental 
issues (3 dimensions). The problem definition and framework of analysis created by the 
Pluralist paradigm, even in its progressive form, does not fit the essential nature of the 
environmental problem. Thus it creates impediments to environmental problem solving. Let us 
begin by defining narrow pluralist theory and its application to social justice. 
Traditional pluralist theory holds that people inevitably have different needs and claims 
around which they coalesce into groups. Groups are structured on many kinds of alliances - 
ethnic, racial, religious, gender, economic, locational, educational, occupational, and so on: 
Every individual has a plurality of interests and, therefore, many and varied group allegiances. 1 
One group recognizes an issue relevant to its needs and acts to influence a political outcome. 
Then other groups form to speak for their claims, becoming countervailing forces. As many 
problems are beyond the resources of single-issue groups, these groups tend to conjoin 
(formally or informally) to influence government policy to their advantage. 2 
As individuals have overlapping group allegiances, it seems to follow that power is also 
dispersed, such that no elite can totally monopolize resources or power. This is because, in 
traditional pluralist theory, power is seen as a function of people (groups or classes), not 
systemic biases. Furthermore, elites are assumed to be heterogeneous in their views and 
affiliations, so that self-interests are cancelled out in the long run. Therefore, it is reasoned, no 
one group structure has complete control over any constituency. The fact that both public and 
private interests are represented by groups is given primacy, rather than other characteristics 
(hierarchical dualism and gender) that might allow us to better theorize the differences of scale, 
power, interests and resources. 
1 This is not the case for the urban isolated poor - particularly single mothers and migrants. 
2 Manstream green groups seldom strategize together on campaigns. 
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Means of influence are also portrayed as dispersed. Although perhaps unequally 
distributed, access to policy making is considered available to all. For example, there are many 
points of access into the many tiered decision-making apparatus of democratic government, 
providing the opportunity for many different forms of influence. Because different social and 
economic institutions are influenced by different groups, power is (in theory) effectively 
decentralized. This overlap of interests gives the system a set of 'checks and balances' such 
that all groups can affect policy and no one group or interest can dominate. 
In pluralist theory it is further reasoned that interest group action improves policy making. 
Political debate benefits from adversary action as a broader range of claims and issues are 
brought before the public. Elites, lay workers, and voluntary organizations all interact to 
influence each other in constructive ways. It is also believed that these countervailing interests 
tend to balance out, so that basic needs are eventually satisfied. Because individuals have 
multiple, even conflicting affiliations, conflicts in a pluralist system will also be non-violent. 
Thus, a pluralist system creates a form of social cohesion by directing competing groups 
toward constructive ends and keeping conflict within reasonable limits. Conflict is therefore a 
natural function. The purpose of social policy is to manage conflict by ensuring it remains 
pluralist in character. In short, society is an aggregate of atomistic groups and individuals with 
many varied, overlapping and changing networks of interests, in a state of stable conflict. 
Applicability of pluralisml 
Having defined the Pluralist paradigm, I suggest that it screens out many relevant facts, or 
interprets them in a way that obscures important issues, in ways which increase environmental 
conflict. As control over social and natural resources is the main source of power and security, 
it is not objectionable that environmental conflict is commonly defined in Planning literature as 
one of 'competing interests' over resources. However, the competing interests in resource 
allocation could be just as accurately described as pyramidal. While there are diverse 
subcultures and belief systems in Western society, a plurality of subcultures does not mean that 
the resource allocation system is also pluralist in character. 
Pluralism is in fact an idealized abstraction of how Planning in a market system should 
work, not how it does work in reality. We now look at how Pluralism (a) is wedded to an 
ideological myth based on invalid assumptions, and (b) distracts analysis away from perhaps 
the most crucial environmental issue: the increasing power of competing special interests in 
resource allocation. The paradigm disadvantages the environment because it enshrines an 
1 Janis Birkeland, 1972, The Value and Limitations of Advocacy Planning (Berkeley: University of California, 
Department of Architecture). See also Donald F. Mazziotti„ "The Underlying Assumptions of Advocacy 
Planning: Pluralism and Reform", in Chris Paris, ed., Critical Readings in Planning Theory (Sydney: Pergamon 
Press) pp. 207-225. 
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androcentric value system that devalues such concepts as a public interest, community, 
altruism, and an environmental Ethic which are essential to environmental protection. 
For widespread acceptance, a theory must be logically compatible with the dominant social 
ideology. A Planning theory must therefore provide definitions of Planning purposes that are 
compatible with capitalist beliefs. However, to be useful to reform, a theory must define and 
explain the reality of the socio-economic and political context. Where there is a significant 
divergence between theory and reality, the theory becomes not only unhelpful in inspiring 
questions and insights, it becomes ideological, in that it helps to preserve existing power 
relations in society. Thus, although the Pluralist interpretation of society has inspired Many 
sound ideas which should be retained as part of our repertoire of legislative concepts, the 
rights-based ethic instilled by that paradigm has come to undermine those very ideals. 
The problem is that Pluralism interprets society in terms of individual or inter-group 
conflict, when the dispositive conflict is special interests versus a general public interest in 
sustainability and natural amenity. Many practitioners and students see Planning as reconciling 
public and private interests, but it cannot do so in an institutional framework, composed of 
market, political and legal arenas, which are structured on a pluralist paradigm and problem 
definition. The paradigm conceals the nature of environmental conflict by perpetuating certain 
myths. These myths serve to reinforce the position of the beneficiaries of the resource 
allocation system by concealing the subtle ways in which power operates. To explain this, four 
basic myths are presented in a packaged tour of some communitarian critiques of pluralist 
theory. These myths have been pointed out, yet the pluralist framework still endures. This is 
demonstrative of the profound advantage that paradigm control provides the powerful. 
Power cannot be monopolized 
A fundamental tenet is that power cannot be monopolized in a pluralist system. As noted 
above, pluralism holds that people have many types of interests, alliances and avenues of 
political influence, and therefore that no one interest group can monopolize all resources or 
influence in any significant sphere. Therefore, if interest group competition is pluralist, no 
special interest group can obtain undue power because of the inherent checks and balances of 
the system. But interest groups do have monopolistic power. 1 Private firms and 
conglomerates have obtained control over vast resources (the micro-level example of Tasmania 
is given in Appendix 1). Because they monopolize resources, many large corporations today 
are not subject to the controls of the market.2 Nor are they reliant upon government. The 
former dependent relationship of corporations with the State has largely reversed (Chapter 4). 
1 See generally, G. William Domhoff, 1983, Who Rules America Now? A View for the 80s (NJ: Prentice-
Hall). 
2 See generally, J.K. Galbraith, 1973, Economics and the Public Purpose (MA: Houghton Mifflin). 
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Many firms are now able to carry out the large-scale Planning and capital intensive activities for 
which they once looked to the state. 
Furthermore, corporations have the power to dictate macro-planning policy: that is, to 
stabilize prices and costs, or to plan resource use. This explains why public services aimed at 
assisting large corporations tend to grow faster than other parts of the public sector. 1 Today, 
some special interests are more powerful than public agencies, or even nation states, as 
evidenced by bribes of sufficient magnitude to alter foreign affairs policy (for example, the 
Lockheed 2 or Contragate scandals). As a consequence, individuals or corporations have, in 
some cases, more power to 'regulate' our lives than did government authority in the past. In 
fact, their power is such that they can not only influence prices and costs, but can persuade 
consumers how to think. 3 
Freedom to choose 
Pluralism presupposes a democratic system through which groups can vie over meaningful 
choices. This assumption has the effect of reinforcing the notion that the system is 
substantively (as opposed to procedurally) democratic. However, voting for representatives 
does not, in reality, mean choosing the kind of policies we want or the environment in which 
we wish to live. Environmental issues that lend themselves to public exposure and debate 
around election time are not of a substantive or systemic nature. They do not concern Planning 
issues, but rather a determination of which groups will prevail; for example, whether to dam or 
not to dam a particular river. Moreover, not all forms of power are exercised within the scope 
of public purview or control. Through various forms of monopoly, power can be exercised by 
industry even without the support or acquiescence of government. 
Many decisions are largely determined by the market rather than government, such as the 
content of mass media, income distribution or location of industries. Such decisions greatly 
affect social resources and the form and quality of the living environment.4 In Planning 
practice, for example, most choices are limited to alternatives that are defined by private 
developers. Groups can petition and protest, but such tactics must centre on issues with 
symbolic value, for instance, wild rivers, endangered species, or the demolition of historic 
1 J.K. Galbraith, 1973, above. 
2 Bribes create a market that otherwise do not exist for nuclear plants and arms: see generally Anthony 
Sampson, 1977, The Arms Bazaar (London: Hodder and Stoughton). 
3 J.K. Galbraith, 1973, above. 
4 See generally R. Friedland, 1983, Power and Crisis in the City's Corporations, Unions and Urban Policy (NY: 
Schocken Books). 
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buildings. 1 Thus, despite the rapid and irreversible alienation of the natural environment, 
community pressure is proscribed by corporate and private property interests to relatively small 
issues. 
But most significant is the fact that the social ideology limits the range of alternatives to 
issues of consumption. Debate is over the relative distribution of material benefits, such as the 
quantity of housing, jobs, or wilderness areas. Nothing which challenges basic premises can 
be debated, such as the structure of private property and ownership, or the many indirect public 
subsidies to developers. Democracy in a liberal system, then, means participation in 
consumption. 
The system is sound 
Another myth of pluralism is that the basic distribution system is sound because dramatic 
changes cannot occur. This reason is that pluralism underwrites an incremental policy and 
decision-making process. Pluralists assume that the public interest can be met through the 
resolution of local, short-term conflicts. Incremental improvements can gradually balance out 
the distribution of resources and environmental amenities (by consuming more of the natural 
environment). Given the premise that the reason for environmental management is the 'need to 
balance the interests' in resource consumption (Chapter 6), an incremental decision-making 
processes would certainly suffice - provided that the socio-economic system is just. Pluralism 
presumes the basic problems of human life have been resolved by providing for the economic 
well-being of a majority. The only problem remaining is the redistribution of material goods 
and services to those now at the margins. However, it only needs to be said that the gap 
between the rich and the poor continues to broaden.2 
The belief in private property and exchange contains a basic paradox: private property and 
capital accumulation deprives those without property and capital of their freedom (Chapter 3). 
There is presently no mechanism for limiting private wants for the sake of the public good. It 
is the very structure of the laws, institutions and rules of the game (as well as social norms) that 
prohibit the equitable distribution of costs and benefits. When the problems that threaten 
smtainability and social welfare are embedded in an ethic and institutional structure, marginal 
restructurings and ameliorative, ad hoc, programs can at best only postpone the inevitable 
collapse. 
1 A major problem in campaigns to save native forests is that the general public often does not appreciate the 
differences between forests. If there are other forests still in existence, why save one in particular? Consequently, 
activists must usually focus on a particular species, such as the famous spotted owl. 
2 From 1981 to 1988, there was a net transfer from the Third World to lender countries of over 150 billion, 
while Third World debt rose from $748 to $1,319 billion dollars. Source: Paul Eldns, Mayer Hillman, and 
Robert Hutchinson, 1992, Wealth Beyond Measure: An Atlas of New Economics (UK: Gain Books) at p. 25. 
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The government is neutral 
Traditional pluralist theory assumes government to be an independent and neutral arbiter 
through which interests groups seek political influence, although government can also act as a 
self -interested party. However, special interests dominate resource allocation policy at all 
levels. For instance, lobbies for special interests groups often cause bills to be either passed or 
blocked against the wishes of the clear majority. 1 Military and corporate looting of the 
productive capital of the system for short term profits or power is dramatically increasing 
pressure on the environment. Not just resources, but public dollars are flowing to private 
hands.2 According to John Hanrahan, one fourth of the United States federal budget is spent 
on services provided by private contractors: democratic oversight is made more difficult 
because the transfers are poorly monitored, especially in the areas of defence and energy. 3 
There is little public accountability in such deals. 
In addition, the 'revolving door' between regulated industries, universities, and government 
agencies creates a certain similarity of interests. Planning and resource management courses in 
universities reproduce an instrumentalist ideology which ultimately serves the interests of 
industry - as much as do university forestry departments. The intimate and growing 
relationship of government, university, and industry removes much from public surveillance 
(as the case study illustrates, Appendix 1). 
Governments seldom put forth comprehensive, ethics-based policies against which 
decisions can be evaluated (as opposed to ad hoc decisions).4 Special interests often operate on 
a policy-making level to fill this vacuum. Special interests market policy ideas through such 
'think tanks' as the Heritage Foundation and American Enterprise Institute in the United States, 
or the Institute of Public Affairs, National Civic Council and H.R. Nicholls Society in 
Australia. Powerful corporate lobbies have been called "legalized corruption", as they prevent 
the creation and implementation of a consistent public resource policy. 5 For example, the 
irreversible decision to allow life forms to be patented in the U.S. was not made in the context 
of public debate, but was, in effect, made by industry lobbyists. 
In any case, what forward or strategic planning does exist in the public sector is nugatory 
against the power of special interests. Large corporations do the real planning, while 
1 See generally Amitai Eztioni, 1984, Capital Corruption: The New Attack on American Democracy (CA: 
Harcourt Brace Jonanovich). 
2 See generally Seymour Melman, 1983, Profits Without Production (NY: Alfred A. Knopf). 
3 See generally John D. Hanrahan, 1983, Government by Contract (NY: W.W. Norton). 
4 Sometimes opposition parties have developed a comprehensive set of policies, however, such as the 
environmentalist parties in Australia - the Australian Democrats and the Greens. 
5 Eztioni, 1984, above. 
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government struggles to mitigate social costs and dislocations, fund pollution clean up and 
waste disposal, and search for new resources. For example, Love Canal (a housing 
development built upon a toxic waste dump in the U.S) cost about US$250 million to clean up, 
and the cleaning up of other priority sites in the U.S. is estimated at $100 billion. 1 Corporate 
domination is an issue that has not been adequately addressed in reform proposals for Planning 
and environmental legislation. To do so would require that the investment decisions which 
shape land use and resource allocation be publicly controlled. 2 
In summary, pluralism does not describe socio-political reality in a useful way. It fits a 
market ideology but not political reality, and tends to obscure the pyramidal character of power 
in contemporary society. But while traditional pluralism has been largely abandoned, the 
underlying model of Man and society upon which it is based still persists, and is found even in 
progressive planning thought. Let us now look at the applicability of pluralism to the third 
dimension, the environment. 
Pluralism and the environment 
How does Pluralism impede our ability to resolve environmental conflict usefully? Pluralist 
ideology creates a perceptual barrier which serves the interests of the powerful at the expense of 
the natural environment in several ways. Pluralism: (a) legitimizes a power-based, competitive 
social structure; (b) depicts humanity as divorced from nature and 'community 13 ; (c) 
delegitimizes the concept of the 'public interest'; (d) privileges corporations over the state. (e) 
obscures the conflict between special interests and the public interest; (f) portrays the 
environmental issue as conflict among competing interest groups having equal 'claims' to 
resources; (g) conceives of 'ethics' in the narrow sense of (rights-based) egalitarianism, and 
finally; (h) is based on (consumer) preferences, which favours short term interests. 
(a) I have already suggested that Pluralism reinforces the competitive social structure 
because of the androcenttic model of Man upon which it is based. It does so by, among other 
things, construing human relations as a series of bilateral or contractual exchanges. This 
conception of relationships tends to exclude the idea of moral obligations, such as those a 
parent has to a child or humans have toward other species. Thus pluralism reinforces a power-
based social structure where a person's standing in society is determined by bargaining power 
1 Paul Ekins, Mayer Hillman, and Robert Hutchinson, 1992, above at p. 17. 
2 See generally Mark Hertsgaard, 1983, The Atomic Brotherhood (NY: Pantheon) for discussion on corporate 
domination of public investment decisions. 
3 By community, I mean a relationship of mutuality and reciprocity, rather than a parochial identification with a 
particular group. 
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and competition. This 'contractual' metaphor for human relationships allows little space for 
plants, animals, and children who cannot bargain or consent. Also, the focus on market and 
resource exchange devalues social skills in such areas as communication, caring and conflict 
resolution - what are often considered as 'women's skills'. (The power-based conceptions of 
instrumental Rationalism and competitive Pluralism have not yet totally colonized the women's 
cultures, but these cultures have been made invisible by the Patriarchal prism.) 
(b) Pluralist ideology reinforces the estrangement of Man from the Feminine, community 
and nature. Pluralism portrays the 'self as separate from nature and community - yet we are 
what we are because of nature, culture and emotional bonds. The Pluralist interpretation of 
human nature makes the political doctrine of liberalism seem preordained. Liberalism holds 
that the function of government is to protect basic individual liberties while not imposing any 
particular conception of the good life or human fulfilment. But liberal thinkers have tended to 
devalue the idea of community by excluding it from its conception of what is essential to 
human well being while, on the other hand, reifying individual rights. Similarly, liberalism 
depicts political activity as a mere means to an end (or means to the achievement of power) 
rather than an important aspect of community involvement and personal development. 1 
(c) Because of its focus on the individual or groups of individuals, Pluralism devalues the 
public interest. A cliche that derives from this ideology, often heard in Planning circles, is that 
"no one can speak for the public interest". Among planners, it is often said that there is no 
public interest - only an accumulation of individual needs and interests which others cannot 
judge morally, or in any other way. One might have thought that the destruction of the life 
support system and military conflict would be against a 'public interest' in survival. But this 
problem is overcome by a tautology: people are (by definition) self-interested actors, and since 
Pluralist politics (by definition) maximizes self-interest, the public interest is (by definition) co-
extensive with the sum of private interests, so the public interest is thereby served (by 
definition). Pluralism in planning is therefore a public decision-making model that is 
paramorphic with the market. 
(d) Pluralism privileges corporations over the state. By dropping the 'public interest' from 
the equation, the public sphere becomes synonymous with the state ('public sector') and thus 
conceived as something in opposition to individual rights (or the 'private sector'). This is 
supported by the fundamental division in Patriarchal society between the private and public 
1 These latter two points also apply to some environmentalists as well. For example, deep ecology is primarily 
focused on the self in relation to the total environment. Although deep ecologists advocate community, it is not a 
core element of the paradigm they advocate. See Freya Matthews, 1992, "Relating to Nature", in Ecopolitics V 
proceedings, ed. Ronnie Harding (Sydney: Centre for Liberal & General Studies, University of NSW) pp. 489-496. 
Also, as argued in Part III, many greens seek political power (or at least influence through a mass movement) as a 
prerequisite to bringing about change. 
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spheres. Further, the human element is associated with private (Pluralist) interests and the 
impersonal state is associated with public (non-Pluralist) interests. This means, for example, 
that the private sphere (property and family) is to be protected and preserved from intrusion by 
the public sphere (the state). Thus, corporations, being fictional 'individuals', are often 
regarded in law as if they belong to the private pluralist sphere, and the U.S. Courts have 
therefore protected the rights of corporations as fictional individuals, while simultaneously 
eroding the Constitutional rights of (less powerful) individual citizens. The Bill of Rights was, 
of course, designed to limit government power over individuals, not over private corporations 
or institutions such as the armed forces.' However, this public/private dichotomy has enabled 
the corporate sector to receive state protection from citizen's rights-based challenges. 
(e) Pluralism supports special interest claims to public resources by interpreting 
environmental conflict in terms of competing private interests (or, alternatively, the individual 
against the government). But the pivotal conflict is not competing (private) interest group 
demands. As I have already argued, the crucial environmental conflict is that between the 
public interest and special interests, and it is fast becoming the life and death struggle of our 
species. Since the concept of a public interest does not fit the pluralist model, pluralist theory 
does not recognize this fundamental conflict of interests. As we have seen, because the 
ideology defines social problems in terms of inter-group conflict ,the solution is defined in 
terms of equity (rights) rather than Ethics (responsibilities). When applied to the environment, 
the problem becomes: the need to "balance the interests in conservation and development". 
This means trading-off a bit of public land each year for development, which is patently 
nonsustainable. 
(0 In liberal society, the cultivation of ethical principles and relationships is deemed to 
belong to the private domain of home and family. This means that determination of principles 
are not matters for public agreement, but for individual conscience. The function of the public 
sphere, therefore, is to work out only those rules or codes which best enable people to pursue 
their private ends without interfering in the rights of others. Consistent with this tenet, the 
pluralist paradigm does not recognize 'Ethics', except in the narrow utilitarian sense of 
determining rules by which to live or make choices. (However in reality, as we later see, this 
selection of rules has been largely predetermined by the technocracy where superordinate goals 
such as 'efficiency' underlay the decision rules). Since equal rights fills the place of ethics in 
this paradigm, ethical decision making means balancing competing interests in resources or 
maximizing aggregate individual welfare through consumption. 2 
1 Charles A. Reich, 1991, "The Endangered Individual", California Lawyer (July) at p. 116. 
2 The utilitarian conception of the greatest good for the greatest number does not recognize that the community 
is greater that the sum of its individuals. 
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(g) In a paradigm that does not recognize altruism or responsibilities, but only rights, 
values tend to be equated with preferences. As people are of equal value, their values would 
appear to be equal. It would follow then, that the 'claims' or preferences of environmentalists 
and developers must therefore be equal. This is because, in this paradigm, competing claims, 
and values have the status of constitutive elements. On the other hand, Ethics and altruism (like 
the 'public interest') are outside the paradigm, and therefore are seen as irrelevant or ephemeral. 
This explains why, when planners allocateland to development, such as subdivisions or timber 
preserves, many believe it suffices to set aside a percentage for environmentalists to 'use'. 
Within this pluralist, instrumentalist framework, the environmentalist 'claim' is assumed to be 
for recreational or other 'use', rather than simply an Ethical concern for life - even though many 
greens do not hope or intend to even visit some of the environments they work to protect. 
(h) Because the paradigm favours preferences over moral responsibilities, pluralist • 
decision-maldng systems are biased toward short-term interests. Over time, a Pluralist process 
designed to settle individual claims and determine the most 'efficient' use of land in a case-by-
case basis has led to the incremental reduction of cultural and biological diversity and 
environmental quality - and will continue to do so until there are scarcely any remnants of a 
'natural' world left. The Pluralist model, which depicts the environmental problem as 
competing claims to environmental goodies, has militated against belief systems that value 
community and nature. 
Progressive planning 
Progressive planners certainly recognize the inequalities of power and the existence of a 
public good, but nonetheless treats humans in atomistic terms, society as the dynamic of 
competing interests and conflicting demands, and social change is therefore believed to be a 
product of struggle. Arguably, most progressive planners are ensconced in the Pluralist 
paradigm. Thus, while progressive planning overcomes some of the criticisms of pluralist 
planning that pertain to social justice, it is inadequate as a paradigm with which to address 
environmental problems. 
John Forester's book, Planning in the Face of Power, provides an exemplar of the 
progressive position. It is informed by Critical Theory (in particular, the work of Habermas). 
His theory is an actor-oriented one which does not look at the psychological and structural 
dimensions. Rather, he looks at what progressive planners, as individuals, can do to redress 
the power imbalance involved in the development approval process. "To focus on power 
structures while neglecting planners' strategies will produce paralysis, not empowerment." 1 
Unfortunately, however, the context of the planner is now changing dramatically; and public 
1 John Forester, 1989, Planning in the Face of Power (Berkeley: University of California Press) at p. 102-103. 
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planners may become expendable altogether (Chapter 4). Thus, in developing strategies, 
planners ignore structural and contextual forces at their peril. 
Although recognizing the structural injustices of capitalist society. Forester subscribes to 
the Pluralist view that fair procedures lead to (more) fair ends. Due process and democratic 
argumentation, free from the "distorting influences of concrete productive relations and the 
structure and policies of the state", will therefore resolve social and environmental problems. 1 
In this way, genuine participatory democracy becomes an end, rather than a means to, say, a 
sustainable society. Consistent with Pluralist ideology, then, this implies that if people are 
given a real choice and perfect information, they will invariably adopt rational and just 
solutions. But will they? Only (I would suggest) if the causes of the abuse of power are solely 
structural and therefore power is only abused by those at the top of the power structure. 
Furthermore, improving the fairness of a case-by-case decision-making process when that 
process is in itself inherently biased against the environment, may contribute to the very 
communicative distortions Forester hopes to overcome. The very fact of a fair process can 
obfuscate the inevitability of the outcomes in a power-based social order. For example, 
development proposals for a given ecologically-sensitive site must periodically be contested, 
usually by volunteer groups, until a development is eventually approved. Even National Park 
classification can be rescinded. The fact that trade-offs may have been gained through mediated 
negotiations does not alter the fact that the ecosystem will be destroyed. 
Most notably, Forester does not directly address the issue of ecological sustainability. This 
is not so much a matter of anthropocentric values as I am sure he is concerned about 
environmental issues. Instead, it is due to the fact that the Pluralist paradigm cannot wrap itself 
around the environmental problem. 
Summary 
In this chapter we have looked at some inherent biases created by the Pluralist paradigm. I 
have argued that while Pluralist theory may be a useful aid in resolving social issues, but it 
cannot comprehend environmental ones. It is difficult to find non-feminist Planning literature 
that contradicts my contention that environmental conflict is seen as a function of competition 
over resources among self-interested, but incompatible interests groups (Pluralist). Similarly, 
professional planning, whether conducted by an advocate or technocrat, is seen as entirely a 
rational process focused on achieving certain social or selfish (ie. 'rational') goals, and thus 
ignoring subjective motivations. 
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1 Forester, 1989, above at p. 140. 
The two main orientations in Planning theory are therefore not oppositional, but merely 
concerned with different stages of the decision-making and implementation process. Both 
those that focus on the decision maker's thought processes (Rationalist, technical, or actor-
oriented theories), and those that focus on the context and forces operating upon decision 
makers (Pluralist, political, or structure-oriented theories) operate within the Power Paradigm. 
They accept in large part the existing socio-political context as natural, given Man's supposedly 
individualistic, competitive, and self-interested nature (whether a product of culture or • 
biology).' 
The Pluralist description of reality (which backgrounds the environment), and the social 
decision-making processes that follow from it, are power-based and designed to balance 
competing claims to resources. Environmental issues are not merely matters of efficiency in 
wealth distribution or even equity in consumption. They are fundamentally matters of Ethics in 
that they involve decisions as to how a society should live and what constitutes our 
responsibility to the planet's ecosystems and species. Many of the crucial issues today (eg. 
population, wilderness, and species preservation) fall outside this decision-making framework. 
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1 Marxists attribute these characteristics to structural rather than innate causes, and see class rather thin groups as 
major forces for change, and call for struggle rather than competition. However, the androcentric foundations 
remain. I do not discuss Marxism here because it relies upon capitalism, industrialism, and revolution - which are 
all incompatible with environmental protection. See Chapter 11. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
Ecofeminism problem description 
We have seen how the dominant model of Man as rational, competitive and striving for 
freedom (whether by virtue of modes of production or biology), has underwritten an 
interpretation of environmental conflict as a struggle among conflicting individual, group or 
class interests in resources. This image of Impersonal Man, and the social and ideological 
division of public and private spheres that typifies Western Patriarchal society, combine to 
create a misleading picture of the nature of power relations in resource allocation. An 
ecofeminist paradigm would shape an alternative description of environmental conflict, and the 
role of Planning in that conflict A different paradigm, by providing a different problem 
description, should in turn suggest different types of reform. 
The task of the Planning theorist has been to find a model that reconciles reality with the 
ideal of Masculine rationality and individualism. The curly bits that do not lend themselves to 
rational models and strategies are left out of the analysis. In contrast, an ecofeminist would 
portray conflict over resources not as a contest, but as a pitiful consequence of the abuse of 
power, stemming more from personal and psychosexual motivations than from rational ones. 
Our environmental problems are the ultimate manifestation of a power drive that is closely 
linked to the association of power with Masculinity in a misogynist and hierarchical social 
order. The elevation of Masculine values and attributes has ultimately led to a pyramidal, 
capitalist resource distribution where powerful special interests often stand above government 
or democratic control. This suggests that we must first dissolve the glue that holds the house 
of cards together: the personal insecurities that fuel the exercise of political power should be 
brought into the open. 
Most planning theorists not only avoid the personal dimension, but they also avoid the big 
picture. They focus on minor players while the greatest portion of environmental damage and 
conflict can be traced to the allocation of public goods to powerful, large-scale corporate, 
military and industrial uses. These consume vast amounts of resources, create vast amounts of 
pollution, and are inefficient means of creating work. But we become dependent on them 
when, through public subsidies, they grow big enough to have large economic multiplier 
effects. The activities of these structures are not subject to public consensus, planning, or 
supervision. Despite their enormous global impacts, military planning is left to military 
strategists and corporate planning is left to corporate strategists. Thus, by focusing on the 
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games of minor players (developers and their opponents), analyses of conflict leave out both 
the psychological and structural dimensions. 
Conflict around the world is essentially over (personal, social and natural) resources. 
Military conflict, for instance, may seem to be only about obtaining or maintaining political 
power or dominance. But power is by definition control over resources, and hence the ability 
to get one's way. When natural resources are not shared, but alienated to private individuals or 
firms, the competition for resources becomes 'zero sum'; one group or person's gain means 
another's loss (except in the long term, of course, when everyone loses). This situation 
reinforces a culturally-inbuilt drive for control over resources, or more power. Competition, 
power, and environmental conflict are therefore inseparably intertwined. 
As structures become more pyramidal, through the concentration of power, the pressure on 
both firms and individuals to acquire more resources becomes a matter of survival. Although 
monopolistic in structure and operation, powerful special interests also compete among 
themselves for control over global resources. Thus, for example, there has been an enormous 
concentration of power in the resource development corporations, such as agribusiness, 
forestry and mining. This global corporate resource grab is one of main factors behind the 
am-is race and troubles in the Third World. 
The drive to acquire resources, territory and status - in a finite world - leads inevitably to the 
diminution of the public domain. In the face of diminishing resources, competition becomes 
greater, fuelling the conflict spiral. This is witnessed in the Tasmanian case history (Appendix 
1), and in many other parts of the world, where there is an almost desperate drive by large 
transnational corporations - and subsistence farmers displaced by corporate activities - to chop 
down native forests before plantations in Third World countries come on line. The alienation 
of remaining natural areas to special interests (as has happened quite literally in Tasmania), and 
the conversion of public goods into commodities, means the decimation of the life support 
system and reduction of biological diversity. 
This conversion process is facilitated by the fact that special interests do not pay the 
replacement costs of resources (as if environmental 'goods', such as wilderness, were 
replaceable). The market system is not operative with regard to environmental goods. On 
several continents, for example, logging companies are deadening public land at a net loss to 
the taxpayer (even or especially when profits soar). Private interests benefit to the detriment of 
the general public interest in sustainability. The reasons for public subsidies are not always to 
assist industry, of course. More to the point, the market has become a powerful myth that 
makes the conversion of public resources to special interests sound democratic. For example, 
the Tasmanian Forestry Commission debt of A$500 million, mentioned above, was incurred by 
the state government largely for nonforestry purposes. The state government used the Forestry 
Commission as a borrowing agency for general revenue purposes, but the debt did not appear 
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to be a state debt. Over the last twenty years over 5,000 jobs in the industry have been lost, 
while the annual cut has doubled. The royalties paid for the timber resource are so low in 
Tasmania that they do not cover the public costs, and paper recycling is not considered feasible. 
The resultant transfer of the public estate to special interests through the political, market and 
Planning mechanisms generates conflict and instability. The end in store is the irreversible loss 
of substantial freedom and choice for individuals, which the "free market" system and • 
democracy are supposed to protect. All remaining space will be divided up, packaged and 
consumed on what is basically a first-come-first-served basis. This is the inevitable result of a 
system of adversarial competition for ever diminishing space and resources: very different 
results from that of a system designed to assist us in preparing for the future or providing for 
long-term community needs. According to an ecofeminist analysis (or one which focuses on 
the abuse of power), then, disputes over resource allocation and their externalities within the 
market, political and Planning arenas are subsumed by a more fundamental conflict: that 
between the demands of special private interests and the needs of the human/biotic community. 
Socialists, of course, also uphold the idea of a public interest. With regard to its description 
of the environmental crisis, therefore, an ecofeminist analysis might at first seem to coincide 
with a socialist one. However, disappointingly, socialist theory is almost universally 
androcentric and instrumentalist with regard to its treatment of nature (and women). It is 
steeped in 'the androcentric premise' and a Masculinist definition of progress and freedom. 
Socialists have therefore accepted the idea that the means to saving the environment is through 
the struggle to determine who 'owns' natural goods or makes the decisions concerning them 
(rather than, among other things, psychological work). In this sense then, socialist theories are 
very similar to liberal theories with regard to the environment. The omnipresence of this 
instrumentalist attitude across the left-right political spectrum is evidenced by the fact that one 
cannot speak of forests, rivers, deserts, air, land or ecosystems except in terms like resources 
or public goods and amenities - which imply possessions or things that exist for human use 
alone. (In the absence of better terminology, I refer to natural entities as environmental 'goods' 
to distinguish them from 'bads', such as pollution, produced by humans. I do not use the term 
goods in the sense of things that exist for Man's use.) 
Liberalism and socialism are also similar in that they accept their respective descriptions of 
environmental conflict as the basis of prescriptive or normative theory. To put it differently, 
because they see politics as struggle over who (or which team) makes decisions and, therefore, 
whose interests prevail, they have a similar conflictual praxis. The liberal game metaphor also 
leads to 'levelling the playing field' as the 'solution' to conflict. (The game metaphor 
dominates the language of many reformists as well as the mainstream.) Ecofeminism, in 
contrast, suggests that we must move beyond any notion of a game. Social and environmental 
injustice, after all, is no game. Thus, while socialists recognize the public/private nature of 
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environmental conflict, they buy into the mainstream position that accepts gaining power as a 
prerequisite to social change, whether through numbers of voters, demonstrators, arguments or 
guns. A description of social interaction that regards the actors as atomistic, rational 'black 
boxes' also conceals the operation of power in resource allocation by missing the link between 
the personal and political (as discussed later). The prevention of competition and the abuse of 
power requires both new forms of institutions and social relationships. 
Implications 
I have suggested that the central issue in environmental conflict is: (a) the transfer of public 
goods, natural amenities and resources to special interests at a public cost disproportionate to 
the benefits received by the public (through for instance, invisible subsidies and conflict 
control), and (b) the transfer or externalization of private development costs over the general 
public (such as pollution, medical costs, and the loss of social choice and opportunity). But 
what are the implications of this problem description for our decision-making institutions? The 
transfer of environmental goods and dispersal of environmental bads is facilitated by ostensibly 
value-neutral institutions for resource allocation and Planning. In a power-based social 
structure, institutions such as Planning may be set up with the best of intentions, but they are 
eventually corrupted to serve the interests of the powerful. This is evident from the fact that, 
while some acquisition of resources on a world scale is through military conquest, much 
concentration of power and resources occurs through democratic public institutions which 
allocate resources - the market, political and Planning systems. For instance, in the political 
arena, through plant variety rights legislation in the United States, the number of seed 
companies has been reduced from 120 to 5, and varieties are being deliberately destroyed for 
monopolistic purposes. 1 
Perhaps the basic difference between an analysis that relates environmental destruction and 
social conflict to the abuse of power as opposed to competing interests is this. It necessarily 
dictates fundamental institutional and social reform. This is because, while there are forums for 
interest groups to compete within, there is no forum for resolving the Ethical issues inherent in 
environmental problems. We have systems for managing disputes that arise in the competition 
for resources and other consequences of misallocation, but not for preventing the problems that 
gave rise to the misallocations. 
The task then is to create institutions that prevent certain interests becoming too powerful, 
within which democratic decision making can occur. This was the problem facing the 
designers of the United States Constitution, except that they were concerned with only two 
dimensions: the individual/private and the social/public spheres. According to an ecofeminist 
1 See David Godden, 1992, "Proposed Amendments to Plant Variety Rights Legislation", Ecopolitics VI 
Conference Proceedings (Melbourne: RMIT). 
74 
problem description, power-based relations and values are embodied in social structures, 
decision-making systems and the decision makers themselves, so change must be made on at 
least three dimensions: the personal, social and institutional levels. We need new institutional 
forms and processes, along with a new consciousness. This requires that we look beyond 
simply who makes the decisions and where they are made, and develop systems that can 
accommodate the Ethical nature of environmental issues. 
Private/public dualism 
We now look at how the sharp distinction between private/public spheres in Patriarchal 
society creates a bias against Planning as a form of resource allocation. This bias can be traced 
to the difference between the actual and perceived relationship between these public and private 
spheres. The public sphere is associated with bureaucracy (command) while the private 
(market) sphere is associated with freedom. This is ideological in that the conception favours 
development interests who are in a position to manipulate 'them versus us' thinking and 
disguise the hierarchical nature of the modern corporatist state. As we see below, this 
conventional dualistic model of resource allocation is ultimately reinforced and legitimized by 
hierarchical dualism and the androcentric model of Man. As the connections may seem tenuous 
at first, let us begin with a snapshot of the argument. 
The power of corporations to influence government decision-making does not operate 
through formal and informal channels alone; it also operates through the systemic biases of the 
resource allocation system itself. In the rest of this chapter, the aspect I wish to pursue is not 
so much the structure of the resource allocation system but, rather, how we are conditioned to 
perceive that system (through for example, ideology and language construction). How we 
conceptualize the resource allocation system can obscure the means through which power is 
exercised. 
This 'ideological model' is centred on two ideas. The first is that elected representatives 
stand above the market and bureaucracy (hierarchy). The second is that the Planning system is 
diametrically opposed to the market system or, at least, seen as constraining economic growth 
or development (dualism). The false dichotomy between the market and Planning system 
works to the benefit of corporate, industrial, military, and bureaucratic interests (VEMBIs'), 
who, not coincidentally, have the greatest access to the means of shaping public perceptions. 
Whether deliberate or not, their political advertisements continually reinforce this hierarchical 
and dualistic model as if it were both accurate and appropriate. 
A major outcome of this model is that public and private interests in natural resources are 
represented as already being catered to by separate, independent institutions - the public 
Planning and private market sectors. However, the Planning system has a symbiotic 
relationship with the development sector that is quite different than generally depicted. Rather 
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than impeding development interests, it reinforces existing power relationships in resource 
distribution. Another outcome is that the model conceals the shared interest of the state and 
market - as well as the unions - in resource consumption as a means of resolving conflict 
(discussed below). 
Using an ecofeminist framework, I propose two antidotes to this cognitive trap. First, I 
suggest a more appropriatedescriptive model to clarify the actual relationship between the 
major decision-making arenas for resource allocation (the Planning, political, legal and market 
spheres). This model suggests that the resource allocation system is hierarchical, but not 
dualistic. Then, I suggest a prescriptive model to guide the constitutional design of a new 
resource allocation system that is intended to make long-term environmental protection a 
possibility or, at least, more a matter of public choice. We first look at problems created by the 
existing 'ideological' model (to which I believe most unconsciously subscribe), after describing 
its basic features. 
Ideological resource allocation model 
Constructed in the popular imagination is a conception of how resource allocation is 
supposed to work in the real world. This model, however, is constituted by and reinforces 
Pluralist ideology. It is reproduced by a media which portrays the market as an aggregate of 
pluralist interests regulated by a government bureaucracy. The bubble diagram (Figure 2) 
depicts the conventional interpretation of the relationship between the three major resource 
allocation arenas. It makes a sharp distinction between the allocative mechanisms of the 
bureaucracy and those of the private sector. (This is already grounds for suspicion, because 
dualisms in the popular imagination seem invariably to serve the interests of the powerful.) 
Elected representatives are presumed to be above both the bureaucracy and market, yet the 
market is juxtaposed against government as a whole. Politicians and regulators are both seen to 
have power over actors in the market. 
The Market 
Distributes 
"Efficiently" 
Planning seen as 
guiding the spatial 
allocation and 
development of 
land and natural 
resources 
Government 
or Executive 
Congress or 
Parliament 
Re-distributes 
"equitably" 
Bureaucracy 
Price mechanism 
allocates private 
resources automa- 
tically 
	./ 
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Figure 2: Conventional (descriptive) resource allocation model 
Public Sector versus Private Sector 
Let us look at some of the elements of this misleading conception of the resource allocation 
system. Chapter 5 takes up other problems created by this model at the structure level. 
Planning as a constraint on development? 
The traditional model is based upon who makes decisions and where they are made (the 
public or private arena - as opposed to, say, how and why they are made. This reinforces the 
dichotomy between public and private sector activity. The public/private dichotomy is also 
reinforced by the characterization of government Planning as "intervention" (the direction of 
influence is indicated by arrows in the diagram). Planning is often defined in terms like a 
"rational and intentional intervention in the affairs of some ongoing structure") This suggests 
that regulatory/planning agencies are a 'constraint' on economic growth or an interference in 
private sector development. However, their intervention into the economy is generally seen to 
be more pervasive and influential than it in fact is. There is, as we later see, a symbiotic 
relationship between special interests and the state that is obscured by this hierarchical, dualistic 
configuration. 
1 John S. Western, 1977, "Planning and Social Planning", in John S. Western and Paul R. Wilson, eds., 
Planning in Turbulent Environments (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press) pp. 3-16, at p. 5. 
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The reality is that government Planning does little to protect the environment largely because 
the basic decisions, those concerning investment and production, are made by CIMBI's, not 
planners. That there is, if any thing, insufficient intervention should be clear by the fact that the 
environment is rapidly deteriorating - even in the West. For example, there are thousands of 
toxic waste sites in the United States and only a handful have been cleaned up so far, at a public 
cost of billions of dollars.' One can hardly argue, therefore, that the Planning sphere has 
imposed itself too heavily on industry. Further, the case of toxic wastes can be used as 
evidence of market inefficiency. The public costs of cleaning up after the fact are necessarily 
higher than those of legislating to require that these costs be internalized The market has had 
ample opportunity to do so on its own. 
Such intervention as exists is generally only sufficient to mitigate conflict over the impacts 
of development, and not sufficient to prevent social costs by guiding development. Moreover, 
Planning facilitates the transfer of resources to the corporate sector by directly and indirectly 
subsidizing development, while displacing conflict to the public sector (Chapter 5). For 
example: (a) the state covers many forms of infrastructure costs, such as roads, sewers, and 
airports, to facilitate private investment; (b) as infrastructure and planning costs are covered 
beforehand, private capital is free for other uses; and (c) Planning provides certainty, thereby 
freeing up capital that would otherwise be absorbed in 'hedging'. Contrary to its obstructionist 
image, then, Planning services reduce the capital expenditure of large business and industrial 
concerns. They are left out of the model because it is a tenet of liberal society that there is no 
general public interest Oust a public sector as against private interests). There is a public 
interest in a safe, secure future and this is jeopardized by short-term, individualistic decision 
making (resulting in, for example, ozone depletion, deforestation, and erosion). 
The dualistic resource allocation model (Figure 2) also conceals both the takeover and 
manipulation of the public sector by CIMBIs, and the symbiotic relationship of state Planning 
with the development sector. Big corporations have bankrupted the public sector and are now 
claiming the spoils through privatization. The corporate sector is taking on many Planning 
functions itself, because working through the Planning bureaucracy is no longer as 
advantageous as the new corporatist structures are proving to be (Chapter 4). (In Tasmania, 
for example, the forest industries have cost the public an amount similar to that by which 
schools were cut back in 1991. These industries are now pushing for corporate sponsorship of 
schools and, as my own children have discovered, are already influencing the curriculum. 2) 
1 Funding of the Superfund program in the United States (for cleaning up toxic waste sites) rose from $1.6 
billion for the first 5 years to $9 billion in the second 5 years. Source: Gary Cohen and John O'Connor, 1990, 
Fighting Toxics (Wash. DC: Island Press) at p. 174. 
2 For example, a Forest Education Institute, funded by the forest industry, sends 'experts' to children's classes to 
present the industry line, and their view of the green line. 
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The public/private dichotomy is, therefore, increasingly less valid as the formative concept for a 
descriptive model. 
Planning can protect basic needs? 
Another misleading feature of the ideological model is that it suggests that Planning, as 
presently conceived, can protect basic human needs. In theory, Parliament or Congress can 
legislate to provide for basic needs where the market fails to do so. This supposedly provides a 
check against the excessive ingenuity of free marketeers. In what is generally regarded as a 
'negative' function - Planning, health, safety and land use regulations are permitted to constrain 
market transactions where necessary to protect human welfare. The function of Planning, then, 
has generally been conceived of as a means to ensure that public needs are met by allocating 
different parts of the natural and spatial environment for alternative uses; or by regulating or 
guiding development. However, some progressive planners have argued that Planning 
regulations and programs have little impact on the location and shape of development - 
especially as compared to the indirect effects of government subsidies (Chapter 5). 1 
Democratic control? 
The conventional or ideological model pictured in Figure 2 obscures the systemic bias 
against the environment by making environmental destruction appear an inevitable, though 
regrettable, concomitant of democracy. According to this scheme, the market price mechanism 
and the Planning process are both seen as subject to democratic control through elected 
representatives, and therefore accountable to the general public. This means that the private 
sector is not held responsible for the misallocation of public resources, although businesses 
benefit from the misallocations for which they lobby. If there are injustices or a misallocation 
of resources, or if basic needs are not met, this is generally blamed on politicians and their 
policies. The solution, then, is to work to put those politicians out of office, rather than reform 
the system. 
But this 'solution', of course, is punitive and comes too late to protect the environment. 
Representative politics or markets are not appropriate for deciding environmental issues that 
have long-term horizons. The political forum, as presently structured, does not lend itself to 
consideration of potential futures or the long-term consequences of resource transfers between 
public and private sectors. Politicians are subject to special interest groups who have a lot to 
gain now from particular decisions, the cost of which can be distributed over a large future 
population that cannot vote. As the 1992 'Earth Summit' in Rio de Janeiro demonstrated, most 
politicians do not worry about spillover effects that will occur after they are out of office. 
1 See Chris Pickvance, 1982, "Physical Planning and Market Forces in Urban Development", in Chris Paris ed., 
Critical Readings in Planning Theory (Sydney: Pergamon Press) pp. 69-82. 
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Moreover, voters are held ultimately responsible where politicians fail. Bad government is 
seen as the result of flaws in the collective consciousness. In a word, the general public gets 
the ultimate blame. In fact, however, with regard to major decisions, powerful business 
interests control the market, political and Planning processes. They make their own decisions 
as to the use of public resources. 'Corporatism', where decisions are made by powerful 
interests negotiating around a table, is becoming the norm (see Chapter 4). This stands in 
contrast to quasi-judicial decision-making processes based on explicit principles, or an ethics-
based framework, as I later discuss. 
Planning is autonomous? 
Perhaps the most important conceptual problem is the false autonomy of Planning that is 
implied by the ideological model. Planning (in the administrative or "fourth branch" of 
government) appears to be not only structurally autonomous, but diametrically opposed in 
function, nature, scope, and practice from market or private sector decision making. Thus, one 
is given the impression that the public sector guides the use and allocation of public resources, 
and the private sector allocates private goods and services, according to different norms and 
practices. Government and business decision-making goals, processes, concepts, methods and 
organizational characteristics have traditionally been treated in the literature and schools as very 
different in character, if not as opposites. 
What is the significance of assigning different goals and modes of operation to government 
Planning and market decision-making? It gives the illusion that the public interest is being 
protected by a separate sphere that can deal with the special nature of public interest issues 
regarding the environment and land use. The model obscures the shared interest on the part of 
government and industry in resource exploitation, and the fusion of the concepts and values of 
the Planning system with that of private business. In reality, government Planning and 
business decision making have merged in theory and practice. The trouble with this is that the 
mainstream economist's construction of reality leads to methods and processes that are 
inherently biased against the public interest in environmental protection and human rights over 
the long term. 1 
As suggested earlier, neither the market nor the political arena can address long-term public 
needs (let alone the needs of other species), because short term demands will always take 
precedence over needs, except where social conflict threatens the system itself. Governments 
can only effectively deal with short-term issues as dictated by the election cycle. Any major 
1 See Paul Ekins, ed., 1986, The Living Economy: a New Economics in the Making (London: Routledge), and 
Herman E. Daly and John B. Cobb. Jr., 1989, For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy Toward 
Community, the Environment and a Sustainable Future (Boston: Beacon Press). These works fail to appreciate 
that the economic paradigm they criticize is founded upon an androcentric construction of Man and society. 
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reforms can be undone by the following government. Governments have met market demands 
through economic expansion, or 'growth', without questioning the efficacy of that approach in 
meeting basic needs or rights. Moreover, regulation, taxation and subsidies have been used to 
accommodate consumer demands - or 'needs' created by the market - as if they were basic 
needs or rights. Planners have therefore concerned themselves with resolving conflict over the 
use and rate of supply of public goods to placate interests groups. 
In a dualistic system, both government and market are able to blame or shift responsibility 
for problems onto the bureaucracy which it, in reality, is not empowered to redress. Thus, 
politicians, on the one hand, set up committees or agencies to study and monitor environmental 
problems, while business, on the other, bemoan red tape (even in Tasmania, where there is 
virtually none). Moreover, role identification shapes one's perception of the facts. For 
example, industry representatives are likely to exaggerate the likely costs of proposed 
regulations, while government regulators may well inflate their benefits. 1 The problem with 
such 'misinformation' is that, as John Forester notes, citizens' comprehension of the issues, 
trust in government, and beliefs are manipulated to their disadvantage.2 In addition, while the 
buck is circulating, the public estate continues to be divided up and sold off. 
Planning might better be visualized as 'gun fodder' between the market and political 
spheres, caught in the battle over individual wants and public rights. Yet, while Planning has 
largely only mitigated conflict and subsidized development, it is only Planning, which takes a 
long-term perspective, that can resolve conflict over basic needs and priorities. Unfortunately, 
Planning - as it is presently positioned in the resource allocation model, and designed on the 
premises of the liberal economic paradigm - cannot do so. Thus, there has been an enormous 
vacuum in the resource allocation system; namely, a public choice arena through which we can 
determine and provide for basic needs such as world peace and environmental preservation. 
Planning as big brother? 
The public/private dichotomy also conceals powerful allegiances while simultaneously 
dividing the general public. One way this occurs is that the market is conceived of as the sum 
of separate pluralist interests, thus obscuring the integrated structure, and shared values and 
interests of large organizations. 3 The atomistic framework of liberalism causes many 
1 Forester, 1989, above at p. 34. 
2 Forester, 1989, above at p. 34. 
3 Diversification of products and subsidiary companies is often confused with diversification and decentralization 
of structures. See, for example, Michael L. Rothschild, 1992, Bionomics: The Inevitability of Capitalism 
(London: Futura), discussed in Chapter 11. 
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confusions that are manipulated by those with control over, or privileged access to, the media. 1 
On the one hand, public interest groups and CIMBIs are regarded as having similar motives. 
For example, environmental groups are often portrayed to be acting in their narrow self-
interest, like business, industry and fmancial groups. This is despite the fact that 
environmentalists do not benefit more than others in the community from preservation. 
Similarly, it is assumed that resource extraction interests, such as forestry and mining 
corporations, have the same interest in preservation as do citizens. Yet, environmental 
diminution and degradation does not affect corporations relative to their competitors. A 
corporation's relative position is the primary concern of corporate managers (in part owing to 
the separation of business and citizen roles in Patriarchal society). 
On the other hand, the public sector is visualized as a single interest: a monolithic 
bureaucracy concerned only with tax revenues. 2 Thus, it is easy for those who determine the 
categories by which problems are described to define government as "big brother' and business 
as the victim - deflecting attention from the operation of power that occurs outside the formal 
decision-making apparatus of government. It should be remembered that the initial reason for 
creating the legal entity called the corporation was to limit the liability of business and therefore 
promote enterprise, but the environment (or third dimension) was not a consideration at the 
time this was done. An allocation system that removes decision making from public input and 
oversight can hardly be capable of ascertaining basic community needs. 
Planning impedes reform? 
The model also displaces the energies of reformists away from CIMBIs to the public sector. 
At present, people lobby the politicians, or the statutory gate-keepers of industry, because they 
generally perceive government to be at the top of the formal decision-making hierarchy. 
However, private corporations and individuals make the fundamental decisions concerning the 
environment: what is produced and by what processes and components. Thus, for example, a 
corporate decision to switch from natural to synthetic substances can have major public 
consequences, such as producing toxic wastes that will never leave the ecosystem. Similarly, 
medical research goes into drugs, rather than non-profitable areas such as nutrition. The public 
are not given a real choice on such investment decisions. 
Finally, because the model is dualistic, it enables divisions and allegiances to cement, and 
this impedes analysis and reform that would be threatening to the power structure. Dualistic 
frameworks tend to create false choices, such as that between the bureaucracy or market, as if 
1 See Martin A. Lee and Norman Solomon, 1990, Unreliable Sources: A Guide to Detecting Bias in News Media 
(NY: Carol Publishing Group). Noam Chomsky, 1989, Necessary Illusion: Thought Control in Democratic 
Societies (London: Pluto Press). 
2 See generally P. M. Jackson, 1982, the Political Economy of Bureaucracy (Oxford: Phillip Allan). 
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they were necessarily in a zero sum relationship. Relations become adversarial as people get 
locked into certain positions and lose site of general aims (below). This explains why people 
divide over whether the market or bureaucracy needs reform, instead of looking for entirely 
new alternatives. In short, the false dichotomy between the public and private sphere has, in 
part, prevented us from designing a new resource allocation system, let alone identifying the 
existing problems usefully. 
Recap 
To recap some points, the conventional model of public resource allocation (Figure 2) is 
ideological in that it creates the false beliefs that: (a) there is a rigid public/private dichotomy, 
which in fact conceals corporatist and collusive structures; (b) government Planning is capable 
of checking market excesses; (c) there is democratic control of public resources; (d) Planning 
theory and practice is different in nature from that of the market, which in fact conceals the 
shared values and technocratic methods of public and private sector decision making; (e) public 
as well as private interests are capable of being safeguarded under the present system; (f) basic 
needs can be met through a decision-making process which in fact obscures the long-term 
distributional effects; (g) powerful special interests are, above all, pluralist in nature, which in 
fact conceals the integrated structures and shared interests of CIMBIs; and finally, (h) the 
model impedes reform by dividing the general public against itself. 
But perhaps the main upshot of the above is this: a 'false' government versus free 
enterprise dichotomy conceals the fact that, at present, there is no sector that is actually both 
responsible for, and capable of, resolving environmental problems. There is no decision-
malcing system set up with the powers, processes, or conceptual framework adequate to deal 
with basic needs and other Ethical issues - of which environmental protection is the most 
fundamental. 
To resolve environmental conflict requires that society collectively address fundamental 
ethical questions about how to reduce population, redistribute the wealth, resolve the Third 
World debt, recognize the rights and needs of indigenous people and women, eliminate nuclear 
weaponry and so forth. These issues - which are now left essentially to the invisible hand - 
mean life and death for real live people at home and abroad, and for the social, cultural, and 
biological systems upon which they depend. Whether we distribute the spoils of development 
equitably through the political system or efficiently through the market system will be moot if 
there is no planet left to divide up. 
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Implications of the resource allocation model 
Having scanned some of the ways the resource allocation model lends itself to manipulation, 
what are the implications with regard to environmental protection? As already mentioned, the 
ideological model conceals the shared interest of the state and market in resource consumption 
as against preservation. The Patriarchal/capitalist socio-economic system has many conflict-
generating features brought about by its divisions. To manage these conflicts in the interest of 
self-preservation, the state has relied on resource consumption or growth. Three examples of 
the conflicts endemic to this social system are labour versus owner/management, private 
ownership of land, and the competition for resources. 
First, in a competitive market commodities are often produced in excessive amounts. As a 
result, products are unsold. This means, in turn, that workers are laid off or poorly paid, and 
cannot therefore buy goods, so producers go out of business, and so on. At a larger scale this 
'anarchy of production' leads to a struggle for customers and markets, competition between 
factory owners and, finally, between states for the world market. Second, the adversarial 
process of determining wages through relative bargaining power is inherently conflictual. 
Capital has an interest in maintaining a significant level of unemployment (regardless of profit 
levels) to keep employees' bargaining power and wages down. The inherent tendency of 
market systems towards booms and busts amplifies this ongoing conflict. For example, 
economic downturns create leverage to disempower workers by the threat of layoffs and 
closures. Recessions are used by CIMBIs to pressure governments into opening up resources 
for exploitation and to cut back worker gains. The workers' only 'weapon' in response is the 
mobilization of unions and threats of social disorder, which creates economic insecurity for 
workers as well as owners. Their only hope is a bigger pie, rather than a bigger portion. Thus 
labour also has an interest in resource exploitation, especially in times of recession. This is 
partly why advances in environmental protection, or rather delays in destruction, are also 
cyclical. 
Another systemic division which generates conflict and pressure to open up resources for 
exploitation is that land use is, in effect, in private control. In a finite world, when land is 
alienated to private use and development, 'haves' and 'have nots' are created, along with a 
separate set of interests. This also creates a situation where people are born into a pre-existing 
distribution of rights and property, and eventually a de facto caste system, especially once 
available 'frontier' land runs out once and for all. This further entrenches a social order where 
different races, classes and sexes are divided into status and occupation groups, because these 
groups develop differing values and cultures (being in relative isolation). These differences, in 
turn, make corresponding social divisions seem natural. By dividing the opposition against 
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itself, an elite is able to stay in power without force, despite having relatively small numbers.' 
The classes and groups are occupied at fighting each other, rather than questioning the system 
itself. 
Public ownership of land is, of course, no answer in itself. As Daly and Cobb note, even 
land in public ownership has been of, by, and for resource exploitation interests: 
Governments are frequently the largest landowners by far, but have not 
performed the landlord's function of keeping resource prices high. On 
the contrary, governments have usually followed a low price policy for 
resources precisely in the interests of fostering growth and buying 
peace between labor and capital, at the expense not only of landlords, 
but also of future generations. 2 
These social divisions are not only structural, but psychological as well. Shared perceptions 
about the nature of society and humanity influence behaviour. Thus, in Patriarchal society, the 
competitive social structure and belief that Man is by nature aggressive, competitive and self-
interested, creates a self-fulfilling prophecy. People believe that another's gain will be their 
loss and that their survival depends upon power over others. In this social climate, 
cooperation and altruism are penalized, and the belief that humans are autonomous from 
community and nature reinforces competitive behaviour and makes ownership and 
instrumentalist relationships seem natural. 
State's interest in resource consumption 
The conflictual nature of Patriarchal/capitalist society creates an interest on the part of the 
state in resource exploitation, as well as on the part of labour and business. The state is 
ultimately dependent upon both powerful special interests and the general public. The state has 
an interest in supporting the process of capital accumulation through natural resource 
exploitation. The state also depends on being able to secure votes and taxes from the general 
population. Further, state agencies involved in social services, such as Planning, health and 
welfare, exist by virtue of a disparity in wealth and the dependency of the disadvantaged.3 The 
state therefore has an interest in maintaining a dependent, low-income population as well. 
Too great a disparity between rich and poor is detrimental for the economy, however, as 
people cannot purchase goods, yet require more social services. The state and its agencies thus 
have an interest in preserving the existing unequal but 'balanced' social order upon which they 
1 See generally Cynthia Enloe, 1989, Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International 
Politics (London: Unwin Hyman). 
2 Herman E. Daly and John B. Cobb Jr., 1989, above at p. 116. 
3 For example, about 75,000 non-Aboriginal Australians are employed, indirectly at least, through 
Commonweath funds expended on Aboriginal affairs, while Aboriginals, as a whole, remain impoverished. 
Source: Gary Foley, 1992, "The Black Voices", Age Melbourne (2 April) at p. 10. 
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depend. If authoritarian methods of maintaining stable inequality are employed, social chaos 
and revolution follows at some stage, as has occurred, for instance, in the former satellites of 
the Soviet Union and in Latin America. In market societies, this balance is maintained by 
managing social conflict and mitigating the cyclical extremes of unemployment and recession. 
The state meets its interest in 'stable inequality' while resolving conflict by allocating public 
resources to development. Thus, when governments speak of the balance between 
development and conservation, they are really only talking about adjusting the rate of 
consumption. 
As the long-term impossibility of continued growth and the irreversible loss of nature and 
environmental quality has become ever more undeniable, Planning has taken on the function of 
managing disputes over the environmental impacts of the wealth transfer process that occur 
through capital-intensive development. As the new descriptive model indicates, Planning is 
caught in the interstices between the state and market, shifting responsibility and displacing 
conflict. It is the 'automatic transmission' of the development machine, adjusting the speed at 
which development proceeds, in order that it not lead to excessive social disorder. 
In short, the false public/private dualism of Patriarchal capitalism (a) creates the appearance 
of an adversarial conflict of interests between separate OMB's and a monolithic state; (b) 
entrenches a conflictual dog-eat-dog ethic and belief that one needs ever more power and wealth 
for security; and (c) obscures the shared interest in resource exploitation of the major actors of 
the corporatist system, labour unions, government and industry. If we want to begin to 
understand and resolve environmental problems, then we need a better descriptive model of the 
resource allocation system, one which clarifies the actual relationship between public and 
private sectors in decision making. 
To this end, we now look at how androcentrism in Planning theory and practice (at the levels 
of Superstructure, Structure and Infrastructure) reinforce power relations in resource allocation 
and, ultimately, generate conflict We begin by examining Planning at the Superstructure level, 
or the relation between Planning as an institution and the other major arenas for resource 
allocation: the legal, political and market systems. 
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CHAPTER 4: SUPERSTRUCTURE OF PLANNING 
Introductionl 
This chapter focuses on the level of decision-making structures and the structural 
relationships between the three major parties in Planning disputes: elected representatives, 
large development interests and public interest groups (in particular, greens). We consider the 
proposition introduced earlier that a growing fusion between public and private sector theory 
and practice on all levels belies the conventional idea that Planning stands in opposition to 
market forces. There is a trend towards collusive (corporatist) decision-maldng structures 
which is concealed by the public/private dichotomy of Patriarchy. Contrary to the myth. that 
decision-making with regard to major resource allocation is either democratic and/or scientific 
in character, I suggest that the decision-making system can best be seen, for practical purposes, 
as power-based. This is evidenced by the fact that a decision-making structure and process has 
evolved which does not conform to the Constitution or blueprint for governance. We then 
consider the implications this has for environmental protection and, consequently, human well 
being. 
The myth that Planning is separate from and opposed to development interests is a powerful 
one. It is so powerful, in fact, that although many greens and socialists accept the notion that 
there is a symbiotic relationship between the state and corporate capitalism, they still act on the 
faith that Planning - as presently conceived - can provide a counterbalance to the excesses and 
problems of capitalism. However, as Planning (in its current form) is a creature of capitalism, 
it is unlikely to represent a real threat to capitalist interests. As Bruyn and Meehan explain, 
Planning exists because capitalism lacks effective self-regulatory mechanisms. Government 
intervention is necessary because the capitalist system is not accountable to the environment, 
the local community or the public interest therein. The government must therefore remedy the 
many externalities and endemic conflicts generated by the capital accumulation process. The 
capitalist system: 
... continues to be subject to mass unemployment, cycles of inflation 
and recession, labour-management conflict, environmental pollution, 
exploitation of consumers, corporate monopoly, runaway factories, 
1 Chapters 4 and 5 are based on Janis Birkeland Myths and Realities of Planning and Resource Allocation, 1990 
(Hobart Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Tasmania). Some of this material 
was also presented at the Socialist Scholars Conference, Melbourne, July 18, 1991. 
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speculation, and corporate debt - all of which must be solved by the 
government. 1 
Government regulation is thus essential to the creation of a stable climate for business. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that while regulatory agencies are habitually blamed for - and may 
indeed cause - many economic problems, most regulatory agencies have been set up at the 
behest of industry groups to regulate competition (eg. Australian Wool Corporation, Apple 
Marketing board). That regulatory agencies evolve to serve the interests of regulated industries 
cannot be considered a radical observation any more. 2 It is interesting to speculate whether 
these agencies are currently facing 'extinction' because they have failed to adequately provide 
for public well being, or simply because they have outlived their usefulness to large 
corporations. 
In the following, I review only some of the useful services that regulatory planning agencies 
provide to resource extraction, exploitation, and development industries. For specificity, I 
draw examples primarily from Tasmania. Though each jurisdiction varies somewhat in 
structure and history, my experience suggests that the patterns and principles discussed are 
fairly universal in Western capitalist society. We begin by considering the changing 
relationship of the state and private sector with regard to land use and environment planning 
and how this corresponds to the changing functions the Planning system bears in relation to 
resource-based industries. 
Planning in relation to industry 
In theory, Parliament and/or Cabinet makes policy through the political process, while the 
administrative agencies of government serve only to put that policy into effect. Policy making 
is the prerogative of the legislative branch, which is democratically elected and accountable to 
the people. For both practical and political reasons, however, much decision-making power 
has been delegated to administrative agencies. Thus, many crucial governmental decisions 
which affect individual rights and the distribution of resources are made by unelected officials 
in bureaucracies. Government departments or statutory agencies have traditionally controlled 
and managed public resources such as public lands, forests, energy facilities, national parks 
and wildlife reserves. These statutory authorities were set up by legislation as independent 
agencies to be free of political influence (and to take the heat off politicians in controversial 
1 Severyn T. Bruyn and James Meehan, 1987, Beyond the Market and the State: New Directions in Community 
Development (Philadelphia: Temple University Press) at p. 5. 
2 J. K. Galbriath, 1983, Economics and the Public Purpose (London: Houghton Mifflin). 
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matters of public versus private activity). But of course, insulation from possible political 
interference also insulated agencies from political accountability. 
In Tasmania, administrative agencies were effectively delegated complete authority over 
policy making and implementation within their domain, but they had particularly close historical 
ties with the state Premier's Office, rather than with Parliament. The state has always relied on 
primary industry for economic development, and the dominance of the Premier's Office in 
Tasmania is partly due to the growth of the statutory agencies concerned with resource 
exploitation. In turn, Premiers have depended to some extent on these agencies for political 
power. Thus, although theoretically answerable to Parliament, these bureaucracies were 
historically, for practical purposes, a law unto themselves. 
The Hydro-Electric Commission ('Hydro') in Tasmania is a case in point. Its hegemony 
and its consequent freedom from public oversight was the fulcrum of environmental conflict in 
the 60s and 70s. So when the Labor Party of Doug Lowe came to power, it tried to institute 
administrative and bureaucratic reform. But even the government's attempt to bring the Hydro 
under direct ministerial control failed. When Andrew Lowry, Minister of Resources and 
Energy, was deposed, he complained he had been actively undermined and 'disinformed' by 
the Hydro. 1 Its power and influence was greatly curtailed in the 1980s as the direct result of 
environmental controversy (Appendix I), but old attitudes die hard. For example, in a time of 
severe cut backs to the public service budget in 1990, the Commission gave its management 
level significant raises, allegedly without even telling the Minister. 
Such bureaucracies, via personal networks and by virtue of a monopoly on information, 
have also been able to undermine attempts at Planning reform. As a veteran Tasmanian planner 
recounted: 
Both the state Strategy Plan and the state Planning Legislation of 1975 
were largely undermined by the major state Departments and agencies. 
Whilst it is probably fair to say that these bodies were not sufficiently 
involved in the initiatives, it is equally not unfair to suggest that many 
found it difficult to move from the style of the 50's and 60's when, it is 
said, a small number of senior department heads lunched on most days 
at a respected gentleman's club and thereby governed Tasmania.2 
Nonetheless, despite this comparative immunity from parliamentary influence, the 
bureaucracy had never been free of special interest group pressure. As indicated in the above 
quote, personal connections made it easy for special interests to 'capture' resource development 
1 For insights into Tasmanian politics, two books by local policians are available: Terry Aulich, 1992, The 
River's End: A Political Thriller (Balmain: Kerr Publishing); Douglas Ackley Lowe, 1984, The Price-of Power: 
The Politics behind the Tasmanian Dams Case (Melbourne: MacMillan). 
2 Barry McNeil, 1988, "Commentary: State Planning and the Planning Profession", Australian Planner 26 (1) 
pp. 11-12 at p. 12. 
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agencies and Cabinets. In other words, the development sector learned to exploit this 
bureaucratic independence and hegemony to its own advantage. One benefit for business in 
developing close working relations with the regulatory planning agencies was that they avoided 
the expense of lobbying two or more political parties which periodically have new members 
voted in. Timber companies had only to persuade foresters in the Forestry Commission to 
allocate land for timber; concrete suppliers only had to persuade the Hydro-Electric 
Commission to build dams. And it was in the vested interests of these agencies to advocate 
such developments. These agencies did not have to justify developments proposals against 
competing uses for these resources in an open public forum. 
Another advantage of this structure for development interests generally was the use of public 
investment capital for private development. During most of the twentieth century, functional 
planning and engineering for major projects such as urban redevelopment or provision of 
infrastructure (roads, hydro-electric schemes) was carried out by the public sector. This 
represented a major subsidy for the development interests that obtained the resource extraction, 
construction or supply contracts. Developers did not need to cover the up-front costs which 
would tie up expensive investment capital. 
A third general advantage was bureaucratic secrecy, which worked to disempower the 
public. Before the advent of freedom of information legislation (adopted in Tasmania in 1992 8 
years after it was introduced), administrative agencies were protected from public oversight. 
For example, the Tasmanian government and bureaucracy has withheld figures on public 
subsidies granted to large energy consumers and their energy consumption. (It could be 
discerned from annual reports, however, that 66.3 percent of hydro-electric power was 
consumed by 21 corporate users paying A$177 million, while 33.4 percent was consumed by 
retail users paying A$207 million [in 1990].!)  Many of these large industries still do not meet 
the standards set in 1973 due to ministerial exemptions from the provisions of the Environment 
Protection Act (1973). Information on these industrial subsidies had been kept secret by 
successive Labor and Liberal governments (until the Field Labor Government [1989-91] 
released this data). To date, Freedom of Information legislation has not stopped bureaucratic 
secrecy. 
The public has also been disempowered by the dearth of regulation, in at least two regards. 
First, Tasmanian legislation is mainly concerned with the nominal structures and powers of 
government. It specifies government functions, personnel and often clerical rules. But 
administration or the may of doing things has been delegated with no substantive or ethics-
based guidelines. Policy and implementation are left to agencies or departments to work out in 
practice in conjunction with the industries that they regulate. Therefore they tend to adopt the 
1 1990 figures obtained from the research staff of the Green Independent's office. 
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goals, concepts, and methods of industry, rather than the community that the public servants 
(nominally) serve. 
Second, and contrary to the norm in the U.S., the absence of legislated standards makes it 
difficult to challenge agency decisions. Generally, the validity of agency action can be 
challenged in court on grounds of being ultra vires (beyond the power) of the parent Act or the 
procedural requirements set down by the Act. But the enabling Acts which empower 
Tasmanian government agencies have not had policy statements or preambles to guide 
departmental actions or to measure the propriety of agency decisions. 
Moreover, in Australia (unlike the U.S.) the validity of the primary legislation cannot easily 
be challenged. In Australia, according to custom, the government determines the legality of its 
own actions, because the majority in Parliament decides the scope of Judicial Review. 
Parliament can merely decide if it is in the public interest to confer on a Minister the power of 
legislating with immunity from challenge. Therefore, Parliament can exclude Judicial Review 
of agency action by simply declaring that, for example: 'regulations made under an Act shall 
have effect as if enacted in the parent Act'. 
In the past then, and in Tasmania still, vast discretionary power was given to bureaucrats, 
and corporations were able to exploit this situation by capturing agencies. Because of the 
dualistic system of governance, efforts to reform the Planning system in Tasmania have always 
centred on two alternatives: more power on the part of Cabinet and/or more power on the part 
of statutory authorities or commissions. The choice was unchecked discretion on the part of 
either political or bureaucratic organizations, neither of which were designed for environmental 
problem solving (and, incidentally, were not part of the government apparatus set out in the 
Constitutionl). This either/or approach to reform has greatly overlooked the fact that there has 
always been a symbiotic relationship between the Premier's Department and statutory 
authorities. Under the present order, whether it is the Premier's Department or statutory 
authorities that negotiate deals with powerful development interests behind closed doors is a 
rather moot point. Moreover, this debate is still occurring in Tasmania at a time when the 
influence of large corporations in the planning activities of government is growing alarmingly 
(Appendix 1). Tasmanians have therefore historically wrestled with a false choice which 
conceals the true nature of power relations in resource allocation. 
1 The Cabinet and Premier are not specifically mentioned in the state Constitution. The Governor, as 
representative of the Queen (of England) cannot be held accountable, by legal convention, so he invites the leader 
of the party that has the majority in the House to form a government. The leader (who becomes the Premier) 
selects Ministers and gives them portfolios (responsibility for government departments) who together form the 
Cabinet. This system evolved since the Constitution was developed. 
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Changing relationships 
Power relationships between state and special interests have been changing on a global scale 
and at a remarkable pace. As corporate giants grow in size and power, their planning activities 
are increasingly less subject to either public scrutiny or consumer purchasing power. As 
already mentioned, they are increasingly independent of the market and political allocation 
systems. First, the corporate sector is no longer reliant on the market. The power of laige 
corporations is such that they can determine costs and prices, and even persuade consumers 
how to think. 1 Through advertising, they can even change 'wants' into basic 'needs'. 
Second, the corporate sector is increasingly less subject to government control. Because large 
firms are able to integrate vertical functions, they can organize supply. Government agencies 
were once criticized for regarding business interests as 'clients'. Today, however, 
governments could be considered clients or 'markets' for private firms. In fact, some 
individual multi-national corporations are more powerful than some governments; private 
companies have been involved in coup d'etats and some have virtually formed alliances with 
foreign governments. 2 
With this increasing power, corporations have been able to 'capture' not only bureaucracies, 
but elected governments. Recent events in New Zealand provide a case in point. The New 
Zealand Labor Party raised NZ$3.5 million to fund the 1987 election campaign from one dozen 
businessmen. The corporate elite donated to both parties as an investment in pro-business 
policies.3 When a businessman donated NZ$250,000 directly to the (then) Finance Minister, 
these funds went through a campaign committee. They should have gone through the Labor 
Party's regular accounting system, but the campaign committee withheld fundraising 
information from the party. After the election, NZ$14 billion worth of public assets were sold 
off and many of these bonanzas went to the largest campaign contributors. For example, the 
above businessman's Corporation got N.Z. Stee1. 4 
Moving from the particular to the general, the implications of corporate political influence 
for environmental destruction and militarism in the Third World are obvious and well 
I J. K. Galbriath, 1983, above. 
2 For an interesting, if not impartial, account of Big Business and the overthrow of the duly elected government 
in Chile, see F. Sergeyev, 1981, Chile: CIA, Big Business, trans by Bev Bobrow (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers); Anthony Sampson, 1973, The Sovereign State of ITT (NY: Stein and Day). 
3 The ABC T.V. investigative series "4 Corners" has documented examples of this in Australia and New Zealand. 
The example in the text was presented on "Frontline" New Zealand TV (May 1990). 
4 "4 Corners", above. 
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documented. 1 But unchecked corporate decision maldng adversely affects the environment in 
the First World, even in the absence of corruption. To take one example, chemical 
manufacturers argue that consumers demand products that involve risks: "to have jobs you 
gotta have pollution". But as John O'Connor asks: 
...whoever demanded polyvinyl chloride, DDT, dioxin, synthetic 
clothes, flammable textiles, and toxic building materials? Rather than 
"market demand", it is the chemical industry itself that has carefully 
shaped consumer demand by producing large volumes of toxic 
materials to replace natural-based products and advertising them to the 
American public. This major shift in production has been based not on 
what is necessarily needed by society but on the chemical industry's 
financial self-interest. 2 
What is the result of the growth in corporate power in relation to decision-making structures 
in Planning? While business interests have historically enjoyed close working relations with 
state-owned enterprises and agencies, they are now increasingly bypassing the bureaucracy. 
This is partly because governments are less able to provide the infrastructure to encourage new 
development. In some cases, however, the corporate sector is choosing to internalize 
planning and development costs. At the same time, public interest groups are gradually 
learning to skip the bureaucracy and politicians and are beginning to deal directly with 
industry. Past relationships are thus completely in flux. 
But if corporations are so powerful, why would the private sector abandon the previous 
cosy relationship with the bureaucracy, and the development subsidies it produced? The 
answer lies in changing conditions and power relationships. First, corporations are finding the 
bureaucracy less useful as gatekeepers. This is because public interest groups have 
increasingly made inroads into the bureaucratic labyrinth. Through advocacy, participation, 
mediation schemes and mechanisms such as the environmental impact assessment (EIA), 
concerned citizens have increasingly been able to challenge bureaucratic power. 
Environmentalists and sympathizers in bureaucracies have influenced their associates and 
leaked information back to activists or sympathetic politicians. In Tasmania, documents fall 
off the back of trucks with remarkable reliability. 3 Also, the elected government and 
bureaucracy are increasingly subject to public exposure and hence voter disapproval, especially 
1 See for example, Irene Dankelman and Joan Davidson, 1988, Women and Environment in the Third World: 
Alliance for the Future (London: Earthscan Publications); John W. Warnock, 1989, The Politics of Hunger 
(NY: Methuen); Susan George, 1989, A Fate Worse than Debt (London: Pelican). 
2 John O'Connor, 1990, "The Toxics Crisis", in Gary Cohen and John O'Connor, eds., Fighting Toxics 
(Washington D.C.: Island Press) pp. 11-24 at p. 14. 
3 But see Isla MacGregor, 1993, "User(p) Friendly Science?, Chain Reaction 68, pp. 34-37, who suggests that it is 
difficult to get adequate cooperation from sources, due to intellectual suppression. 
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through the international trend toward 'whistle-blowing'. 1 In sum, the public is gaining 
influence in the bureaucracy through improved decision-making processes and community 
access. 
A second reason that corporations are bypassing the bureaucracy is that, to avoid planning 
processes and approvals, corporations have learned to deal directly with cabinets, premiers and 
prime ministers (Appendix 1). As the (then) state Premier Robin Gray wrote: 
Tasmania has in place mechanisms for conflict resolution in land use 
issues. At the technical level, the Town and Country Planning 
Commission has the responsibility of providing advice to Government. 
state Cabinet has the ultimate responsibility of conflict resolution at the 
political leve1.2 (italics added) 
The advantage of this arrangement is that these government 'executives' are generally less 
subject to checks, balances and public oversight than modern bureaucracies and legislatures. I 
suggest that there is, consequently, a growing fusion between government and resource-
extractive industries with regard to both the form and substance of decision making. 
A recent example of how the system has changed is given below (taken from the local 
newspaper, the Launceston Examiner, 5 March 1993). It reveals the response of the state 
Premier and Cabinet to pressure from a large aluminum smelter, Comalco, which is threatening 
to leave Tasmania if it does not get guaranteed cheap electricity. 
The state Government will force the Hydro-Electric Commission to sell 
part of its power generation system to Comalco. The Premier, Mr. 
Groom, admitted the HEC was opposed to selling part of the grid, but 
its concerns were being overridden. 
"The HEC is owned by Tasmanians so, in effect, the controlling 
shareholder is the state Government on behalf of Tasmania," he said. 
"That means that those policy initiatives which my Government 
believes are necessary to successfully conclude the Comalco 
negotiations ultimately have to be implemented by the HEC". 
The Announcement was made without the knowledge of the Energy 
Minister, Mr. Gray, sparking the possibility of Government 
infighting. The Opposition has condemned the move to sell a power 
generation system ... as a "sell-out". 
"It is a public asset and if the Government was going to sell it off then 
surely it should go to the highest bidder", Dr. Amos, the Opposition's 
energy spokesman, said. 
1 See generally Brian Martin, C.M. Ann Baker, Clyde Manwell and Cedric Pugh, 1986, Intellectual 
Suppression: Australian Case Histories, Analysis and Responses (NSW: Angus and Robertson). 
2 Robin Gray, 1988, "Resource Harvesting and Conservation: The State Government View", Australian 
Planner 26 (1) at p. 5. 
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The new corporatism 
The disempowerment of public interest groups can only generate conflict in the long term. 
As the case history illustrates (Appendix 1), when there are no appropriate formal channels, 
greens have had no option but to take to the streets, forests, skies and rivers. This 'direct 
action' has raised the level of controversy such that elected governments now need to distance 
themselves from environmental decisions which will invariably anger both development and 
conservation interests. Consequently, there has been a trend toward including environmental 
groups in negotiation and mediation processes. 1 Major environmental and land use policies 
and decisions are occurring less through formal adjudicatory planning processes (they were 
never fully developed in Tasmania anyway), and increasingly through new 'conflict resolution' 
mechanisms (as exemplified by the Tasmanian Forestry negotiations in Appendix 1). 
Adjudicatory processes refer to a system where decisions are made in a 'judicious' manner (if 
not in substance), according to a structure designed to prevent the abuse of power. In contrast, 
corporatist processes, again, are where resources are allocated through negotiated arrangements 
between the government and special interests. 
All that is really new about the much acclaimed environmental conflict resolution process is 
the inclusion of environmental representatives into the corporatist negotiation structures that 
previously were monopolized by industry and unions. But what are the broader implications of 
this present trend? On the one hand, it has been met with enthusiasm by some 
environmentalists because of the initial positive results, especially with regard to access to 
information. While corporatism has sometimes meant a few short-term concessions to 
environmental interests, however, the long-term implications are quite problematic. This is 
because negotiation - when removed from a broader adjudicatory framework - is a power-based 
decision-making system and, therefore, the results depend on the relative power of the parties. 
In a power-based system, development interests have that power; greens ultimately can only 
lose. Let us look at some reasons. 
First, corporatism means 'cooptation', or buying off green campaigners by giving them a 
stake in a power structure. (Many former 'greenies' now hold positons in the federal 
government.) Also, the 'spokesmen' of environment groups tend to be those most able to 
speak the Patriarchal and technocratic language of their opponents (rather than representing the 
1 The literature on corporatism has largely ignored environmental issues and therefore no references can be 
suggested in this area. However, further reading with regard to corporatism in general include: Alan Cawson, 
1986, Corporatism and Political Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell); Wyn Grant, ed., 1985, The Policital 
Economy of Corporatism(London: MacMillan); Reginald Harrison, 1980, Pluralism and Corporatism: The 
Political Evolution of Modern Democracies (London: Allen and Unwin); Gerhard Lehmbruch and Philippe C. 
Schmitter, eds, 1982, Patterns of Corporatist Policy Making (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications); Otto 
Newman, 1981, The challenge of Corporatism (London: The MacMillan Press). 
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new paradigm). Further, those who select themselves, or are selected by their peers, to hold 
positions at the bargaining table will sometimes be those who see the movement as a power 
base. Therefore, the negotiation framework will tend to empower those who share the same 
Patriarchal values as those in the development sector. 
Second, a 'round' table does not signify a change in the shape of power relations that 
operate under the table. In an adjudicatory decision-making process, decisions are weighed 
against a set of principles, objectives, or standards. Therefore, a departure from them is an 
early warning system of Corruption, so public support can be mustered for change, or at least 
the situation may be exposed. In mediation or negotiation, in contrast, the stakeholders 
determine the ground rules and objectives. Each party claims to represent the public interest. 
The hidden premises of negotiation are therefore that a compromise is optimal or that the 
'problem' is merely the conflict itself. 
Negotiation on environmental issues is, therefore, only appropriate in the context of 
adjudicatory decision-making structures. Negotiation processes cannot stand alone, because 
win-win solutions are generally only possible at the margins. People can negotiate over 
secondary issues but not over fundamental ones, such as whether to build a dam or clearfell a 
forest. At best, then, negotiation means compromise: the trade offs that result are really 
business as usual - balancing off more of the public estate each year. Yet, given the state of the 
environment, preservation may be the appropriate 'balance' between conservation and 
development (rather than a percentage of each). 
Third, terms like negotiation, participation or conflict resolution are sometimes used in an 
Orwellian or manipulative way. Let us take an example from Tasmania. Here a Council 
composed of representatives of industry and environmental groups set up a joint problem-
solving process to recommend a strategy for the future of Tasmania's forests. The greens only 
participated on condition that decisions would be by consensus only. A year later, however, 
proposals for 'resource security' legislation (to 'protect' forests from preservation) were 
adopted by a majority vote by the Council. This was totally unacceptable to the greens. The 
greens then had a choice to walk out or stay but be nonetheless accused of walking out 
anyway. Resource security legislation was designed to pre-empt public debate with another 
political fait accompli (a tradition in Tasmania). But the fact that such terms as 'conflict 
resolution', 'mediation' and 'participation' were used is perhaps why about 70 percent of one 
thousand Tasmanians polled at the time overwhelmingly supported resource security 
legislation, despite the fact that information about what it would mean in fact was not yet even 
available. 1 After all, what could be more reasonable than a (widely publicized) 'conflict 
1 Poll conducted by the "7:30 Report", Australian Broadcasting Commission TV (1992). 
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resolution' process, especially if greens were a part of that process and only "stormed out when 
they couldn't get their way". 
A final problem with corporatist decision making with regard to the environment is that the 
game is largely controlled by the corporate sector. They can decide the parameters of what is 
bargained over and select certain interests for negotiation and consultation and withhold others 
or 'stack the deck'. For example, it is a common ploy to present the spectre of, say, two large 
pulp mills - in order to negotiate one small one. John Sillince tells of a plan for a 'nuclear 
island' of nine nuclear plants at Oxford Ness. When the debate about the nearby Sizewell B 
plant began, residents were told that the 'nuclear island' idea would be dropped if Sizewell B 
was successful. 1 If all else fails, retrenchments are easily arranged at strategically appropriate 
times. This scares the local population and deflates grass roots support for the negotiators. 
Conclusions 
In summary then, as a result of these changing strategical and power relationships, it 
appears that large resource development interests do not benefit as much from reciprocal 
relationships with functional and resource management bureaucracies as before. Consequently, 
bureaucracies are being disempowered and new structural arrangements for resource allocation 
are developing which sometimes see unions, business, and environmental leaders around the 
same bargaining table. (Currently, however, the once influential Australian and New Zealand 
union movements appear also to be undergoing a process of de-corporatization). 
Paradoxically, however, the decision-making system is unchanged. Decisions are still an 
outcome of power relations operating under the table. 
In Tasmania, resource allocation remains in substance a matter of power politics. The major 
resource allocation decisions occur largely through personal and political influence in an 
autocratic, Patriarchal enclave, free of countervailing viewpoints and values. Large producers 
and development interests still work intimately with both Cabinet and statutory authorities 
behind closed doors in a tripartite 'old boys club'. The institutions through which resources 
are allocated in Tasmania (cabinet, statutory authorities and national and transnational 
corporations) are not in the Constitution, which is the basic framework for government' 
decision-maldng. The people did not actually choose this system of governance or resource 
allocation. 
Thus, it could be argued that Tasmania does not have a 'constitutional' form of government 
vis-a-vis environmental decision-making. In fact, most people do not even know what 
corporatism is.2 In Tasmania, it is particularly ironic that this unwritten, unplanned, 
1 John Sillince, 1986, A Theory of Planning (Aldershot: Gower) at p. 31. 
2 See references on corporatism provided above. 
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institutional system for resource allocation is considered unchangeable, as if chiselled in stone. 
This executive-style decision maldng has even found support among conservative 
environmentalists as well: 
My opinion is that the elected government should manage public 
resources, not the Parliament. This is the tradition upon which 
parliaments in Australia have operated with respect to the use of Crown 
or public resources ever since government was first established here. 1 
But there is nothing sacrosanct about the corporatist decision-making system. It evolved not 
through design or consensus, but as a side effect of power relationships between corporate 
interests, the Cabinet and bureaucracy. 
Moreover, the decision-making framework and processes of Cabinet, statutory authorities 
and private corporations were not designed for dealing with environmental issues. The 
environmental crisis is still not 'on the agenda'. Tasmanian governments are still not interested 
in resolving the causes of environmental conflict. They are just forestalling or manipulating 
that conflict in a desperate bid for political survival, as large corporations strengthen their 
stranglehold on public resources. 
Of course, this crisis of legitimacy could easily be resolved by governments. When 
Parliament delegates authority to an agency it could provide safeguards to discipline the 
decision-making processes and ensure appropriate factors and considerations are taken into 
account. Although Cabinet's power in Tasmania is virtually unchecked, it could, for example, 
choose to exercise 'self-government' and limit its own behaviour by a constitution of Ethical 
principles. This would help to avoid extra-political influences in that decisions could be 
evaluated against standards by the citizenry. This is the least we should be able to expect. 
An ecofeminist resource allocation model 
In Chapter 3, we saw that, as a descriptive model, the public/private dichotomy is a 
dangerously misleading one because it obfuscates the fundamental conflict between private and 
public interests and represents these two interests as being catered to by separate institutions. 
In the present chapter we have seen that business and public decision-maldng structures are 
becoming as one through, for example, the cooptation of public interest groups into corporatist 
arrangements. Such new structures might be desirable if power relations in resource allocation 
were in fact pluralist but, as we saw in Chapter 2, they are not. Thus, the public interest in 
sustainability is under represented in the present system of governance. 
1 Green Independents' spokesperson on planning issues, Gerry Bates, MHA, writing in the Green Independents' 
Newsletter, 1991, "Government Should Manage Resources" The Daily Planet 15, at p. 13. 
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Descriptive model 
Having previously described the problems concealed by the traditional descriptive and 
normative models of resource allocation, which are virtually one and the same, we now 
consider what an ecofeminist paradigm would suggest in the way of descriptive and 
prescriptive resource allocation models. The descriptive model simply diagrams what has been 
argued thus far in Part II. 
Figure 3: New (descriptive) resource allocation model 
In this new model, structural relationships between the private and public sectors are 
indicative of power relations, rather than being based upon where the decisions are formally 
made. The private sector indirectly dictates government policies which are carried out by the 
bureaucracy. Public interest groups are not represented by this ecofeminist model because they 
do not presently have an arena where their participation is meaningful. Though they are skilful 
at obtaining media coverage, this arena does not lend itself to the in-depth Ethical discourse that 
environmental issues require. 
This new descriptive model eliminates the false public/private dichotomy altogether. 
However, it should be emphasized that the public/private distinction is important to retain in 
analysis. The dichotomy between public and private allocative mechanisms, though false in 
descriptive terms, remains an important analytical concept, due to the important difference 
between individual short-term, immediate interests and the long term, diffuse public impacts of 
such decisions. 
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Normative model 
In the remainder of this chapter, I propose a new model which attempts to correct for the 
problems which, I have suggested, are inherent in a power-based, and dualistic/hierarchical, 
resource allocation system. The idea of an ecofeminist structure of governance seems a 
contradiction in terms as ecofeminists, along with many other radical greens, advocate 
something along the lines of an 'anarchical socialist' end state. Greens generally oppose 
centralized forms of government, visualizing instead a society composed of decentralized 
confederations of (relatively) self-sufficient and autonomous communities, paralleling 
ecosystems in diversity and complexity. 
Before taking up the issue of whether a state structure is consistent with a radical green 
position, there is another point raised. Are decentralized communities ecologically-sound, 
given current population levels? Perhaps urban consolidation is better, in view of the 
insurmountable environmental impact of a large population on the rural ecology, regardless of 
life style. Also, the apparent preference of the majority for city living should not be 
disregarded. The comparison would involve complex issues, and alternatives cannot be 
adequately measured and compared, because so much would depend on how the urban areas 
were modified. Certainly, past forms of urban redevelopment have been dramatically 
unsuccessful, but these projects were approached through a social engineering framework. 
Nonetheless, it is remarkable that planners have not really addressed such a crucial issue as 
whether to consolidate or decentralize. For example, in Australia, the push for regional 
development in the 1970s was accompanied by little, if any, analysis of the comparative 
ecological impacts of geographical decentralization and consolidation. 
But in this project, we are concerned with the structure of decision making, rather than the 
substance. Decentralization (and/or bioregionalism 1 ) is a frequent platform of green policy, 
because, among other things: (a) it (arguably) minimizes environmental impacts, (b) 
participatory democracies and self-governing communities are more stable and socially 
fulfilling, (c) the integration of small-scale and diversified forms of industry and agriculture 
reduce transport and thus energy consumption, and (d) human scale favours personal 
relationships and sense of identity, while large centralist structures tend toward alienation and 
excessive individualism.2 The underlying assumption behind geographical decentralization, 
however, is that it would, in itself, bring about social transformation. For example, Rudolf 
1 A bioregion is a community boundary determined by natural landforms, watersheds, or ecosystems. The idea 
of bioregionalism is that political and social arrangements are designed upon the principles of natural ecosystems 
and life styles, and are centred on the natural region. See generally Van Andruss, Christopher Plant, Judith 
Plant, and Eleanor Wright, eds., Home! A Bioregional Reader (PA: New Society). 
2 Edward Goldsmith and editorial staff bf The Ecologist, 1972, A Blueprint for Survival (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin) at p. 52-3. 
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Bahro's proposed (Benedictine-style) communes appears to be premised on this conviction. 1 
In a similar vein, Ted Trainer suggests that geographical decentralization 
would force people together, it would require then to co-operate on 
important common goals, to share, to get to know each other, to 
depend on and to help each other and therefore to build the social 
relations that are so impoverished in affluent society.2 
This sort of 'physical determinism' has been discredited in Planning circles for some 
decades. But even assuming that decentralized social organization leads to personal 
transformation, the preliminary issue is how to bring about a bioregional social order in the first 
place. Ecosocialists generally believe that this would require state involvement. According to 
Martin Ryle, for example, an ecosocialist transformation "implies the necessity of replacing the 
current, highly centralized institutions of capitalist finance and production, and here the state 
must play an activerole also". 3 Similarly, Andre Gorz has argued that a central state is 
necessary to the realization of a green society. 4 Ecofeminists have less faith in the capacity and 
autonomy of a state which is 'manned' by those imbued in Patriarchal consciousness, under the 
de facto control of production interests, and - at the best of times - subject to systematically 
misinformed and manipulated voters. 5 In a Patriarchal social order, a decentralized system 
would result in Lord of the Flies syndrome (authoritarianism) before the presumed magical 
properties of communal living took effect. Of course, bioregional experiments are a step in the 
right direction by setting an example.6 It is my position, however, that social transformation 
requires a dialectic between personal and institutional transformation. Therefore, as I argue 
later, transitional structures are therefore necessary. Therefore, we now explore what a 
prescriptive model might look like. 
Typology 
In this typology, natural goods or 'resources' are allocated by four distinct but overlapping 
decision-making arenas - the political, market, legal and Planning institutions. There are at least 
two different conceptual bases for structuring the relationship between these arenas in a 
resource allocation model. The ideological model, as we saw, places primary emphasis upon 
1 See Murray Bookchin, 1990, "Municipal Libertarianism", in Van Andruss, et. aL, above pp. 145-146; 
Rudolf Bahro, 1986, Building the Green Movement (London: GMP) pp. 187-189. 
2 Ted Trainer, 1985, Abandon Affluence! (London: Zed Books) at p. 76. 
3 Martin Ryle, 1988, Ecology and Socialism (London: Century Hutchinson) at p. 60. 
4 See generally Andre Gorz, 1980, Ecology as Politics (London: Pluto Press). 
5 Similarly, social Ecologist Murray Bookchin's 'municipal libertarianism' suggests political decentralization as 
a means to social change. 
6 From my communications with people who have lived in such communities, it would appear that the problem 
of personal relationships has been significant if not central to their failure. 
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whether the allocation is conducted in the public or private sector , rather than upon their 
function. The proposed model, in contrast, makes a fundamental distinction between the three 
decision-making arenas for resource allocation based on their function in meeting different 
interests: specifically (a) rights/responsibilities (b) wants and (c) needs (including emotional 
needs). Thus it is based not on who (officially) decides and where decision making (officially) 
occurs, but on what is decided and how it is decided. The resource allocation arenas would be 
reconstructed so as to better provide for fundamental human rights, wants and needs 
respectively. This creates a tri-partite model with clear responsibilities and powers, as opposed 
to the existing dualistic one (Figure 4). 
This is much like the arrangement between the judicial, executive, and legislative, division 
of functions in the American and Australian Constitutions which were designed to create 
'checks and balances'. It might have succeeded (were all other things equal) had the third 
dimension been taken into account. Over time, the system was corrupted, because 	• 
governments initially encouraged, even subsidized, the exploitation of land and natural 
resources as 'free goods'. This policy gave de facto control over public goods to private parties 
which were able to become powerful resource extraction and development interests. As a 
function of size and power, these interests then subverted the system of checks and balances set 
up in the Constitution. The fact that the third dimension was not considered led to the failure of 
a system of governance which was designed to balance power relations between the individual 
and society. 
Figure 4: Proposed (normative) resource allocation model 
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The proposed model assumes the state will not 'wither away', but it could be considered as 
a transitional state. Although the conceptual change is radical, the structural change is minor. 
At present, the nature of the decision-making systems (democracy, market, and planning) 
correspond logically - but not in practice - with rights, wants, and needs, respectively. 
Political sphere 
The political sphere is logically that which regulates or structures human rights and 
relationships. In Western representative democracies, the institutions of government were 
expressly designed for the purpose of safeguarding rights and ensuring distributive justice or 
equity (among elites, at least, in the first instance). Via the political process, elected 
representatives, in theory, resolve conflicts over competing claims to natural and social 
resources by constituent interest groups. One problem is that the political system has not been 
participatory in a meaningful or substantive sense. However, due to problems of scale, some 
degree of representative or delegated decision making is probably required in any 'participatory' 
decision-making system. 
Another problem, of course, has been that some 'interests' are more politically influential 
than others. Yet, although the political system has been corrupted, the system of representative 
democracy does provide a forum for the protection of basic rights. The main problem is that 
representative democracy cannot work for resolving environmental planning issues (as, again, 
these are Ethical in nature, not distributive). Such issues cannot be resolved in a power-based 
system where vested interests and the existing distribution of wealth is built into the decision-
making process. 
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Market sphere 
The market sphere, or the exchange sector, is designed logically to meet consumers' 
demands or human wants. The market theoretically resolves conflicts over private goods and 
services through an informal bargaining and exchange process. Its function is to provide for 
goods and services by facilitating efficient material exchanges. It has failed, however, with 
regard to ecological efficiency. The market may be efficient in terms of price, but it is often 
inefficient in terms of materials or energy use. This is because the market is designed only to 
allocate private resources. It is not designed to provide public or environmental goods, such as 
rivers, forests or art museums. In fact (as environmentalists have complained for decades), 
economics treats environmental goods - the very basis of the entire economy - as if they were 
free. 
Another problem already discussed is that powerful individuals, corporations, and 
oligopolies have acquired sufficient power to control both supply and demand. Thus, this 
system too has been corrupted by power relations. It can nonetheless be argued that the market 
is better at satisfying material wants (as opposed to needs) than is state Planning. This is 
debatable, however, as capitalist producers create unnecessary and insatiable wants, and non-
Patriarchal state Planning has never been tried. In the new system, basic investment decisions 
would be determined in the Planning sphere, but the market would operate to provide 
flexibility, diversity, and price control. 
Finally, the market does not work for providing basic needs , such as ecological 
sustainability. It is important to clarify what is meant by 'needs'. In Patriarchal ideology, the 
reality of non-material needs are denied or ignored. This is a major reason why Patriarchal 
Planning causes such major social disruption. The model therefore assumes an ecological 
perspective which holds human 'needs' to necessarily include preserving the integrity of natural 
ecosystems and other life forms, and involve the emotional (and psychic) as well as rational self 
(which is divided in Western Patriarchy). Otherwise, the proposed model would not be 
relevant to environmental protection and human survival in the long term. 
Legal sphere 
A third arena, the legal system, is not presently designed to address environmental issues 
either, as much of its basic concepts and procedures derive from property rights, rather than 
public interests. The law is also is being colonized by concepts from the economic sphere 
(below). However, it is nonetheless tailored to resolve disputes which result from 
jurisdictional conflicts, and thus could sort out similar territorial issues involving the other 
resource allocation arenas (market, political and Planning). It can be the final arbiter of disputes 
over interpretations of the new Constitutional framework, a present function of the legal 
system. 
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As it now stands, the political, legal, and market spheres do not achieve the ideal functions 
of protecting and providing for the rights and wants of all, let alone basic needs. This is 
because, as we have seen: (a) they reflect the power-based social system in which they 
operate; (b) the consequent rise of large-scale corporate and military power was not anticipated 
when Western democracies were first envisaged and instituted; (c) the paradigms upon which 
those economic, legal, and political theories were based were not designed to deal with 
ecological issues. 
Planning sphere 
It is the fourth allocative arena that concerns us in this work, however. In the next chapter, 
we look at why we need Planning in the first place, and consider in more detail why it should 
be a separate sphere, of at least equal importance to the market and political spheres (as 
represented by the proposed normative model). 1 The change needed is so fundamental that 
Planning cannot be adequately restructured unless it is instituted as a third distinct decision-
making sphere. We then examine why the Planning system, as presently designed, militates 
against peace, social justice, and environmental preservation - the prerequisites of 
sustainability. 
1 John S. Dryzek has also proposed a new decision-making sphere. His is based on Habermas's idea of an 'ideal 
speech' situation or 'communicative rationality' wherein individuals can operate under conditions free from 
domination, deception, self-deception and strategizing. My position is that to create this setting we must address 
androcentrism and gender-blindness, which are key factors in the above conditions. See John S. Dryzek, 1990, 
"Designs for Environmental Discourse: The Greening of the Administrative State", in R. Paehlke and D. 
Jorgenson, eds., Environmental Politics and the Administrative State (Ontario: Broadview Press) pp. 97-111. See 
also John Forester, 1989, above ; hirgen Habennas, 1984, The Theory of Communicative Action , Vol. 1 ; 
Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Boston: Beacon Press). 
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CHAPTER 5: STRUCTURE OF PLANNING 
This chapter concerns Planning as an institution (Structure level). We first discuss the need 
for planning. The existing Planning system, however, encourages the abuse of power because 
it facilitates the conversion of natural resources to private interests. Planning, as presently 
designed, contributes to the economic and ethical deficiencies of the Allocation system, and 
exacerbates the environmental problems and social conflict which justify its existence in the first 
place. I argue that simply more Planning, or a Planning system with more centrality along the 
lines of socialist reforms is not the answer. A total rethink is necessary, not just of the system 
of governance and the place of Planning within it, but of the Planning system itself. Let us 
begin with a review of the standard reasons usually presented for and against Planning, for the 
benefit of lay readers. 
Reasons for Planning 
Planning texts often begin with a (seemingly mandatory) justification for having any 
Planning at all - as if Planning were in conflict with democracy. If we accept the main premise 
of market capitalism, then Planning is at best unnecessary. That premise, of course, is that the 
independent activities of individual consumers and producers, making decisions in their own 
self-interest, will result in the greatest common good in the long term. As often pointed out, the 
market system is supported by the fiction that buyers have complete knowledge, because to 
pursue their self-interest they must know what their self-interest is and what their alternatives 
are. The same assumption holds for voting systems. If this fiction held true, then illegal or 
deceptive business practices would automatically be forced out of the market. But this is not 
the case. 
In a capitalist economy, state Planning functions are theoretically limited to those things the 
market cannot do. One of these is referred to as 'market failure', which occurs in the case of 
public goods, natural monopolies and external diseconomies. Another deficiency of the market 
is that it does not always allocate land and resources efficiently in terms of public costs and 
benefits and therefore tends toward the polarization of rich and poor. Finally, the market 
cannot develop and implement long-term social policy objects that require planning and 
coordination. As mentioned earlier, 'production anarchy' leads to waste, instability, and 
conflict through cyclical overproduction and unemployment - even though centrally planned 
economies may be even less successful in this regard. (Of course, the New Right contests 
these traditional arguments for Planning.) Let us review some of the arguments for Planning. 
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Market failure 
Public goods  
The price system is an efficient means of rationing many types of goods and services. Land 
and resources are a special case, however. Individuals and firms do not always use land and 
resources to their most profitable end, or in a manner that furthers the public interest over the 
long term. Land and natural resources are subject to the principles that apply to public or 
collective goods. Public goods are goods and services that cannot be provided through the 
market because they are necessarily provided to groups. This means that individuals who will 
not pay cannot be prevented from using them. For example, those who pay no tax will 
nonetheless receive the benefits of national defence, just as taxpayers 'pay' for weapons 
whether they vote for increased defence or not. They cannot be excluded from either the benefit 
or burden of military expenditures. 
In the case of complete market failure, there is a need for the direct provision of goods and 
services by the public sector. Such goods include foreign aid, wildlife preservation, public 
facilities, flood control, disaster relief, police, military, fire protection and 'pure' research. 
Problems have often resulted from the fact that the government generally does not pay or charge 
the true market value for land, resources, and other public goods. Examples are royalties for 
public timber and compulsory conscription. Cost-benefit analyses pertaining to public 
resources and military expenditures have tended to undervalue the resources, whether human or 
natural. Thus, the true social cost of resource exploitation and militarism are hidden from 
consumers and voters. 
Where there is partial market failure, some form of regulation is required, as in the case of 
monopolies and pollution control. Public services that are not profitable often need to be 
provided by the public sector. For example, although the use of theatres, museums, parks and 
nature preserves can be withheld by tolls and user fees, they will not generally be provided by 
the private sector. Public goods such as cultural facilities, natural amenities and welfare 
standards, benefit society in general even though many individuals may not make direct use of 
them. To illustrate, open space in urban areas has the characteristic of a public good because if 
a private developer provides it, the benefits accrue to competitors. Because adjacent 
development will have more light, air and aesthetic quality, clients may be drawn by the 
amenities provided by business competitors. Therefore, regulation is generally necessary to 
provide benefits like open space and environmental amenity. 
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Externalities 
Another type of market failure is that of external economies. Externalities occur where a 
private activity creates social costs. For example, externalities created by cars is estimated to 
cost the United States' public US$300 billion a year. 1 Where an industry pollutes a river or 
depletes the timber resource, the value of that river or forest is reduced for other purposes, and 
public health costs may be inflicted upon third parties. Public costs are not paid for by the 
company in the absence of government intervention to, for example, require the installation of 
pollution control or clean up measures. According to the United States Environmental 
Protection authority, for example, water pollution externalities cost US$10 billion a year 
excluding the costs of hazardous chemical wastes. 2 Consumers can theoretically influence 
corporate behaviour through boycotts or simply through buying green products, but they will 
not have the information to do so in the absence of government action. For example, irradiated 
and genetically-altered food products are generally not required to be labelled as such, so 
consumers cannot 'vote with their pocketbook'. 
With regard to externalities, government regulation often assists developers as much as the 
general public. For example, acting separately, developers cannot afford to devote valuable 
floor area to public uses, such as day care centres, libraries or galleries, given the cost of land 
in densely developed urban areas. Yet the competition for marketable office space can result in 
social costs such as congestion and health problems (eg. micro-climatic effects like wind 
tunnels and heat banks) which can reduce the commercial value of their developments. The 
abandonment of inner city shopping areas for regional shopping malls is partially a reflection of 
this development anarchy. By regulating to prevent unjust externalities, inner city 
developments may remain commercially viable. 
Some decision-making system is necessary to internalize the private costs of development. 
Whether the devices used are market-based, Ethics-based, or command forms of regulation, the 
research precedent to deciding what forms of regulation are appropriate must be done by 
planners (by whatever name). Someone must explain the potential ramifications of such policy 
decisions on the environment and society to inform (lay or expert) decision makers. If 
producers and/or consumers are to make collective decisions, planners are necessary to mediate 
this process. 
Monopolies 
The market tends toward monopoly as firms and individuals attempt to control resources and 
maximize profit. Thus, antitrust laws are to preserve, not restrict, the free market. Natural 
1 Paul Ekins, Mayer Hillman, and Robert Hutchinson, 1992, above at p. 34. 
2 Mark Green and John F. Berry, 1985, "Corporate Crime", The Nation June 8th and 15th. 
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monopolies occur where a major facility or infrastructure is required such that one producer 
controls the market. An example is hydro-electric power. In these cases, there are economies 
of scale in having only one producer. However, a private producer will tend to lower output 
and increase prices for greater profit and thus become inefficient. So will a public authority for 
that matter. A monopoly can be state-operated, or privately-operated with state regulation. In 
either case, however, a public utility (where people can buy stocks in the monopoly) is often 
managed in terms of economic efficiency only. As the stockholders are concerned with profit 
maximization, public utilities have not proven a terribly effective form of control. 
In sum, there are two basic approaches to dealing with the problems related to externalities, 
public goods and monopolies: direct government operation or government regulation. In a 
market-oriented system, direct government operation is generally disfavoured on the 
presumption that the bureaucracy is less efficient than the corpocracy. The alternative, 
regulation, generates its own set of public relations problems. Most obvious, of course, is that 
people do not like being on the receiving end of a regulatory relationship. Also, bribery and 
kick-backs often accompany this relationship, although this occurs in purely private sector 
activity as well). The externalities are rarely considered in the decision-making process•whether 
by corporate managers, stockholders, or government regulators. 
The New Right, of course, argues for deregulation and privatization on the grounds that the 
private sector can prevent or manage the problems of public goods, monopolies and 
externalities. This position has become extremely influential since the late 1970s, partly 
through the work of New Right think tanks. In Australia, these include the Institute of Public 
Affairs, the Tasman Institute, the Sydney Institute and the Centre for Independent Studies. 
These think tanks operate under the pretence of political independence, but are largely funded 
and answerable to resource development interests. 1 
An example of problems created by deregulation is provided by the recent scandal 
concerning private psychiatric hospitals in the United States (particularly National Medical 
Enterprises and its subsidiary, the Psychiatric Institute of America). Many of these hospitals 
were spawned in the 1980s by the deregulation of health care, and it has been estimated that 
mental health fraud now costs U.S. taxpayers US$5 billion dollars a year. 2 There have been 
cases of people without psychiatric problems being 'kidnapped' and detained against their will 
until their medical insurance ran out. Medical practitioners were paid to submit people to these 
institutions. 
1 "7.30 Report", Australian Broadcasting Commission TV, October 5, 1992. 
2 "4 Corners", Australian Broadcasting Commission TV, October 16, 1991. 
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The corpocracy, then, is as prone to Corruption as the bureaucracy, but it is perhaps less 
open to public scrutiny. In any case, private enterprise arrangements involve perhaps as much 
regulation and social control - but in the hands of powerful and unaccountable individuals and 
corporations rather than elected representatives. (In my experience, deregulated airlines have, if 
anything, more restrictions and impositions on customers than did publicly-regulated airlines.) 
Efficiency of land use 
Another problem with the market is that it does not put land and resources to their most 
efficient use in terms of public policy objectives. The most profitable use is not necessarily the 
most efficient in terms of resource allocation or social benefits. Market solutions or outcomes 
are often costly in terms of indirect ramifications. A well known example was given by 
Hotelling using, for simplicity, the case of ice cream sellers along a given stretch of beach. 1 
The first seller would naturally locate in the middle, creating the shortest average distance for 
purchasers to travel for ice cream. Where there were two sellers, however, the Planning 
solution would place them each at 1/4th the length from the ends of the beach, to reduce the 
average travel distance to 1/8th of the beach (optimal solution, Figure 5). 
The market solution would be different. Seller A would locate next to seller B in order to 
capture all the traffic from the main length of the beach (stage 2). Seller B would then relocate 
to the opposite side of seller A for the same purpose (stage 3). Finally they would achieve the 
market solution of being juxtaposed right in the centre of the beach (stage 4). This creates the 
situation where the average travel distance is 1/4th of the beach, rather than 1/8th. • 
1 H. Hotelling, 1929, "Stability in Competition", Economic Journal 39, pp. 41-57. 
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Figure 5: Market misallocation of land use 
Optimal solution: 
	 A 
Market solution: 
Stage 1: 
Stage 2: 
	 A. .I.I. B 	  
Stage 3: 
	 B .I.I. A 	  
Stage 4: 
	 A .I.I. B 	  
Projecting this case to other situations, transport costs and environmental impacts could be 
greater in the market 'solution'. For example, because roads are provided at public cost, and 
travel time costs incurred by consumers are not entered into the equation, these costs are often 
not considered in the calculations of private firms. The social costs of many individual 
consumers (wasted time, energy and petrol) can be enormous however. 
Planning and freedom 
A more general reason for Planning is that the 'visible' hand is more democratic than the 
invisible hand. It is a means to set collective goals for a society by which government policy 
and implementation can be judged. If government decisions are not made through an open and 
public process, they are made by and for special interests. Planners working in the corpocracy 
are unlikely to develop means of self-regulation that restrict their freedoms relative to others, 
because the corporate ethic (and survival) depend upon a competitive advantage. Perhaps the 
most universally-accepted collective social goal in Western society is 'freedom', although this 
means different things to different people. The main emotion generated against Planning has 
been its association with 'command_and control' systems, while market has been associated 
with freedom. However, in a world with ever more people and consequently less space, 
'freedom from' the adverse effects of other's actions becomes increasingly more important than 
'freedom to' do what one wants. I would suggest that Planning can provide 'freedom from', 
 
II 
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while the market provides 'freedom to'. Therefore, at this stage we need to explore the Idea of 
freedom more closely. 
While Planning supposedly runs counter to basic individual rights and freedoms, the 
imbalance between market and Planning spheres has meant that the reverse situation has 
occurred. It is today the unchecked power of those operating at the top of the market pyramid, 
• with its tendency toward centralization, that militates against those very human attributes that 
the liberal state is meant to enshrine and protect. As discussed in Chapter 3, the alienation of 
the public estate gradually eliminates meaningful social choices and socially-responsible 
opportunities. This, along with the great differentials in wealth and power that are made 
possible by the conversion process, undermines basic rights and freedoms, which in turn leads 
to social conflict. Let us take some general examples. 
Freedom of choice 
Freedom cannot be said to exist where there are no meaningful life quality choices. When 
cultural and biological diversity are gone, a greater selection of automatic tooth brushes or 
frozen TV dinners will be of little solace. More meaningful choice would be whether to live in 
the country or city, a choice which many in both the developing and over-developed worlds no 
longer have. One cannot live in bush or woodland areas if they are all under concrete. 1 
Further, with privatization, or the transfer of public amenities to special interests, there are 
increasingly fewer free public environments to enjoy, either in the city or country. Currently, 
there is a push toward charging admissions for all public goods and facilities, such as museums 
and parks. Although the 'user pays' principle helps make people aware of the costs of their 
actions, its application in this context often excludes the poor, reduces their choices and often, 
in reality, becomes a substitute for intelligent management Moreover, in the long term, it 
portends the end of environmental or non-material experiences and values that do not generate 
income. 
Freedom of movement 
An important freedom is that of travel and free movement. It is one of the rights which 
separated the 'free world' from the wrong side of the 'iron curtain'. In fact, it is a right. 
enshrined in the U.S. Constitution. Freedom to travel loses all meaning, however, where there 
is no difference between environments and cultures. There will soon be no where to go. 
Today most cities and suburbs are indistinguishable, except for their remaining topographical 
features, and most rural environments are being converted to monocultures by agri-business 
and agro-forestry. Rows of skinny trees, standing in formation, await harvesting where once 
1 Many songbirds and other species are dissappearing because of the disruptions of the ecology caused by roads 
and land clearing. 
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deep, mysterious forests sheltered incomprehensibly complex living communities. The 
environment is becoming homogenized, simplified, polluted, and partitioned into private 
fiefdoms. Where work can only be found in urban areas, it is impossible to escape urban 
blight, overcrowding and pollution. This is as if to build a prison around ourselves and throw 
away the key. 
Artistic freedom 
In the West, we equate freedom with creativity and the human spirit, and believe artistic 
freedom also sets us apart from totalitarian regimes. But it is hypocritical to accuse others of 
cultural repression if we do not preserve and nourish cultural diversity ourselves. Indigenous 
cultures are being systematically destroyed at home and around the world in the name of 'land 
rights' for the military-industrial complex. This is no exaggeration. Genocide of indigenous 
cultures is still being practiced in places like Guatemala and South Africa. Art forms that were 
developed over a period of hundreds and thousands of years are being wiped out for the short-
term profits of a few. Such cultural imperialism, on the part of both left- and right-wing 
regimes, has led to violent political reactions such as the Basque movement in Spain, and 
separatist movements in the Balkans. The freedom to express cultural traditions through 
various art forms is not surviving in the market system. 
Security  
Freedom from harm is surely as essential as freedom to express oneself. Crime and a break 
down in social organization is inevitable given the stresses of a dehumanized environment and 
the great differentials in access to resources. Where the use of public resources is subject to 
decision making by or at the behest of the corpocracy, opportunities are created for only the 
rich to get richer. Where wealth can only be generated through one's money and not one's 
labour, the deck is stacked against wage earners, as well as their offspring who do not have the 
benefits of capital accumulation. Street crime and violence have many causes, not the least of 
which is hopelessness. Poverty is relative and the disparity between rich and poor is growing. 
The United States is developing its own Third World, with over three million people now 
homeless and 32 million living in poverty. As periodic street riots in the U.S. have 
demonstrated (as in the 1992 Los Angeles riots), people will not agree to remain in poverty 
when there is no hope for the future. There is freedom for no one in a divided society with an 
impoverished class (now composed mostly of women and children). 
Democracy 
Institutionalized or 'organized' crime is even more dangerous over the long term than street 
crime. For example, the illegal dumping of toxic chemicals can cause more deaths and 
suffering in the long term than terrorist bombs. But 'laissez faire' market activity also subverts 
democracy. In Australia, the 1980s saw powerful businessmen attempt to bring down 
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governments through bribes, destabilization and stand-over tactics. 1 The drug war in 
Colombia and Mafia activities in Italy have profound effects on democracy, as many elected 
politicians and judges who oppose organized crime have been assassinated. Government 
involvement in the commercial arms market has had a devastating effect on democracy. 2 At the 
behest of arms merchants, governments and security blocs pressure their allies to buy weapons 
systems that they can neither afford nor use. The often covert use of power at the international 
level creates dependency at the same time as it subverts democracy. For instance, Spain elected 
a Socialist Government which promised to close United States bases. Once in power the new 
government refused to carry out its promise because, it was widely believed, it feared 
destabilization. 3 
The public is increasingly losing control over its own destiny through the market-based 
allocative system. Perhaps the best examples are the allocation of control over crop species to 
the corpocracy (called 'plant variety rights', somewhat ironically, given that it has reduced the 
number of species), and the patenting of genetically-engineered species. 4 In 1987, the United 
States Patent Office extended a 1980 United States Supreme Court ruling that allowed the 
patenting of a genetically-engineered micro-organism to include genetically-engineered animals 
(except humans). 5 The gene pool is being sold off to special interests! These cases represent 
an irreversible decision made by and for lobbyists for special interests. As Jeremy Rivkin 
notes, all of nature has been finally "debased to a commodity status". 6 Ominously, we have 
seen already that Man is willing to use food, or starvation, as a political weapon in the Third 
World.7 
Health 
Finally, if there is a basic human right, it is health, or life itself. Poverty is the world's 
greatest killer of children. In the United States, eight times as many poor children die of 
disease as non-poor children. The relation between environment and physical health is obvious 
1 See Appendix 1. Following the stock market crash of 1988 many of Australia's wealthiest businessmen went 
bankrupt, and some have faced jail terms. 
2 Janis Birlceland, 1986, The Environment and Weapons Trade (Hobart: Dept. of Geography and Environmental 
Studies, University of Tasmania). 
3 I heard this view expressed by many during a four month stay in Spain in 1986. 
4 David Suzuki and Peter ICnudtson, 1988, Genethics: The Ethics of Engineering Life (London: Allen & 
Unwin). 
5 Jeremy Rivkin, 1991, Biosphere Politics: A New Consciousness for a New Century (NY: Crown Publishers) 
p. 69-70. 
6 Rivkin, 1991, above at p. 70. 
7 See generally Susan George, 1979, Feeding the Few: Corporate Control of Food (Wash. D.C.: Institute of 
Policy Studies); John W. Warnock, 1989, The Politics of Hunger (NY: Methuen). 
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to most of us, and soon even Patriarchal social science may try to determine if access to a 
natural environment and belief in a future is necessary for mental health. In the market, 
however, research goes into exotic high-technology forms of medicine (often to prolong the 
lives of the terminally ill). 1 When we talk about human health today, we are really talking 
about nothing less than the health of our global environment and all its natural components. 2 
Species loss, pollution, and military adventures have adverse multiplier effects upon the food 
chain and ecosystems upon which we depend absolutely, as well as upon the human spirit. 
In conclusion, these examples suggest ways in which the market fails to protect basic rights, 
needs and freedoms. These freedoms are inseparable from the preservation of non-human 
nature and cultural diversity. The priority has been on 'freedom to' use human and natural 
resources for one's private ends. The problems that stem from this rights-based conception of 
freedom still tend to be discussed as isolated problems requiring 'bandaids'. They are seen as 
an inevitable, though regrettable, side-effect of the exercise of freedom, rather than as central to 
a system that favours rights and, therefore, favours those with more power to exercise their 
rights. It has become impossible to repair the environment after the fact and, even if it were, it 
would not be affordable. In an age of toxic poisons and nuclear weapons, the stakes and risks 
of the bandaid approach are simply too high. Clearly, it is necessary to prevent environmental 
damage, risk, and conflict in the first place. This the market cannot do. Hence, the resolution 
of environmental problems, and the social conflict they entail, requires some form of Planning 
system: a public decision-making framework that will enable society to debate and decide the 
underlying Ethical issues and to engage in preventative planning. 
The Impotence of Planning 
Having defended the value of Planning in general, we now discuss what is wrong with the 
existing system. I address the actual functions of Planning and suggest more appropriate ones. 
In the last chapter, I maintained that Planning is structurally integrated with development 
interests through corporatist decision-making processes. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, 
Planning is neither as autonomous, nor different in character, from business decision making. 
In the following chapter, I argue that there is a similar convergence between business and 
Planning on the level of detailed decision rules and techniques. If we acknowledge that there is 
a growing fusion of private and public sector decision making (the same actors, processes, 
structures and goals), this suggests that there are no restraints upon the individualist values of 
1 See generally Ivan Illich, 1976, Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Wealth (NY: Pantheon). 
2 For example, according to UNEP, over one third the world's population or two billion people, suffer chronic 
water shortages and UNICEF estimates that over seven million children die every year due to lack of safe drinking 
water. Paul Bcins, Mayer Hillman and Robert Hutchinson, 1992, above (London: Gaia Books) at p. 17. 
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the market on behalf of broader social interests. Price efficiency comes at the cost of 
fundamental decision-making safeguards such as separation of powers and checks and 
balances. 1 
One might ask, of course, what difference does that make, if Planning nonetheless guides 
the nature and location of development more 'efficiently'? Is that not enough? But does 
Planning guide development or achieve efficiency? It is first argued here that Planning is, in 
fact, relatively impotent, having little effect on political decision-making or land usage. This 
then raises the question: what purpose does it serve? 
As Planning theoretically guides land use and development it (and the public sector 
generally) is held responsible for many social problems that correlate to spatial distribution, 
such as urban sprawl, loss of prime agricultural land, the development of low-income ghettoes, 
and so forth. However, the main factors determining the use or spatial distribution of land and 
resources lie outside the narrow professional scope of Planning as presently structured. For 
example, the U.S. transportation system, which commenced in 1956, had by 1974 consumed 
26 million acres of rural American land by 1974, fostered suburbia, urban sprawl, and 
commercial and industrial fringe development. 2 While the planning for this system was carried 
out by engineers, not environmental planners, this transportation system had irreversible 
impacts on land use and the environment (thus increasing the need for planners). 
A recent Planning text demonstrates the futility of the planner's mission. It says that the root 
problem facing town planners is to accommodate changes in the rate and distribution of 
population growth. 3 Planners, it says, must try to maintain a social, economic, and physical 
infrastructure in cities facing population and employment decline and an associated decline in 
locally-raised revenue, and to provide appropriate levels of service in the receiving areas. 4 This 
conjures up images of the sorcerer's apprentice in his futile effort to mop up the spillover 
effects of the invisible hand. Planners, after all, cannot control population growth or the 
supply and demand of housing. While, local council planners may determine an appropriate 
amount of public housing, the supply will depend on funding available for low-income housing 
from the national or state government, mortgage rates and their availability, and so forth. In 
this regard, lobbyists deal directly with politicians and arguably have more influence than 
planners. 
1 It is questionable whether the alleged price efficiency of market economies is real, because controlled, 
comparative, empirical studies are impossible to conduct. 
2 R. H. Jackson, 1983, "The Federal Government", in James H. Carr and Edward E. Duensing, eds., 1983, Land 
Use Issues of the 80s (NJ: Transaction) pp. 178-189. 
3 M. J. Bruton, ed., 1984, The Spirit and Purpose of Planning (London: Hutchinson) at p. 16. 
4 Bruton, 1984, above at p. 19. 
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Further, notwithstanding a policy of, say, urban maul development and an investment in 
urban redevelopment, the preferences of home-buyers and industrialists may simply be to move 
outside the inner city. Or, new employment opportunities beyond a given district may create a 
demand within a nearby district for commuter homes. More recently, the electronics revolution 
has made much of traditional location theory anachronistic. Traditional Planning, it would 
seem, can only chase demographic trends. 
But even when development occurs where called for by Planning schemes and policies, it is 
questionable whether physical planners have any significant influence over the shape or pattern 
of that development. As a case in point, Chris Pickvance challenges the general assumption 
that physical planners have really been responsible for such infamous failures of design and 
social planning as the high-rise flats and decline of inner-city areas in post war Britain. 1 He 
shows that the determining factor in these urban development patterns was the largely 
unrestricted operation of market forces in land, property, and finance - notwithstanding the 
existence of a system of development control. Planning was not at fault - it was merely 
irrelevant 
In one of his examples, Pickvance establishes the connection between government subsidies 
and local authority high-rise buildings. He then shows that the subsidies which promoted 
high-rise flats were in response to a desire to introduce technological innovation into the 
building industry - rather than in response to Planning policy or principles: 
This involved the encouragement of prefabrication of materials, more 
on-site mechanization, better coordination, and standardization of 
design - in a word, "industrialization". According to this argument 
high-rise housing was necessary to provide the scale of operation and 
opportunity for use of standard designs to justify the introduction of 
new techniques. Thus the main beneficiary of high-rise housing was 
intended by central government to be the building industry, in the first 
place, with subsequent benefits in lower costs to the public purse. But 
the latter did not occur, with the result that subsidies for high-rise 
housing primarily helped the building industry to adopt new technology 
with probable benefits to it in other areas of construction such as offices 
and hotels.2 
Sillince provides another example of how land use is not demonstrably affected by Planning, 
even where it is operative. He shows that while the English 1947 Town and Country Planning 
Act was credited with saving rural land for agricultural use, the calculation overlooked several 
outside factors discouraging urban sprawl. War and government decisions to encourage 
agriculture after 1940 meant, among other things, that "agricultural land prices rose, farming 
1 Chris Pickvance, 1982, "Physical Planning and Market Forces in Urban Development", Chris Paris, ed., 
Critical Readings in Planning Theory (Sydney: Pergamon Press). 
2 Chris Pickvance, 1982, above at p. 75. 
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became more profitable, especially on the good land near the lowland towns, and farmers 
became more reluctant to fragment their operations". 1 
So we see that the representation of traditional Planning as a constraint on the market system 
and therefore capable of protecting the public interest in health and environmental quality is 
questionable. But surely Planning influences government policy? Apparently not very much. I 
have not met a planner who feels that planners have a satisfactory influence within government. 
While planners serve in an advisory capacity to elected representatives, the degree to which they 
are consulted depends on the importance of the issue to powerful interests. 2 This has been the 
case, for example, with several controversial projects in Australia.3 Environmental planners are 
often not even consulted before irreversible decisions are made, such as the siting of major 
developments. When political decisions do benefit from Planning expertise, it is usually after 
the dispositive decisions are made; the planner's role becomes to make the decision 'work', 
spatially, after the fact. Moreover, Planning recommendations, codes and processes are often 
ignored or by-passed via 'fast-track' legislation for political expediency. 4 (The new state 
Planning system proposed for Tasmania will legitimize fast track legislation in larger projects.) 
Perhaps more significantly, many decisions considered to be squarely within the proper 
domain of 'political' decision making restrict the potential of society to plan, by cutting off 
future land use options. Immigration policy, for example, is a political decision which can 
dramatically undermine any plans for a sustainable society. Nonetheless, the Costigan Royal 
Commission in Australia, which was established to advise the government on immigration 
policy, rejected the suggestion that it have a biologist on staff to look at environmental issues, 
such as the carrying capacity of the land (as proposed by Australian Democrat Senator John 
Coulter). Large, expensive Planning projects have been undertaken to determine how best to 
accommodate a predicted population growth on the unquestioned presumption that the land can 
1 John Sillince, 1986, A Theory of Planning (Aldershot: Gower) at p. 37. 
2 For example, when responsible for design review in a large planning department, I was told to stay away from 
a particular project because there were "powerful people" involved. A committee of important business people and 
officials reviewed the design instead, without reference to the officially adopted city policies (a 'corporatist' design 
project). 
3 Australia abounds with examples of this pattern: at the federal level, there was the 'VFT (Very Fast Train), The 
'Space Base' at Cape York Peninsula, and the 'MFP' (Multifunction Polis); at the state level, there was the 
Electrona Silicon Smelter and Wesley Vale controversies in Tasmania; and at the local level, there was the 
Darling Harbour project and Monorail system in Sydney. 
4 For example, plans for a controversial International Hotel in Hobart bypassed the established planning 
principles, procedures, policies, and regulations over the opposition of the normally apolitical architecture and 
planning institutes (the RAIA and RAPI). As a result of massive public protests there were design modifications, 
but these did not meet the substantive objections of the opponents. 
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support the increased population. 1 For example, a supposedly 'ecologically sustainable' plan 
to accommodate a 1.8 million increase in the Melbourne area did not look at the ecological 
feasibility of this increase. Such Planning exercises drain public finances, but serve to facilitate 
development by giving (relative) investment certainty. 
Another example of political decisions pre-empting Planning is the case of subsidies to, say, 
the auto industry to promote economic growth. This encourages energy consumption, 
pollution, and urban sprawl, and contributes to the greenhouse effect. Similarly, subsidies to 
coal extraction in Australia have diverted funds from solar energy research. Planners are called 
upon after the fact to mitigate the impacts of these 'social forces', but there is little they can do. 
Once people have cars and fossil-fuel heating systems, conversion becomes too expensive. In 
private business decisions, these 'sunk costs' would be ignored. In collective political decision 
making, however, private businesses have investments in these ecologically-inefficient systems 
and so prevent the sunk costs from being disregarded. 
Instrumental functions of Planning 
We have discussed how Planning is largely impotent in affecting political policy and market 
behaviour. But some development interests go even further and argue that Planning causes 
patent inefficiency in resource allocation. The New Right maintains that Planning constrains 
the market, creates environmental problems and is, perhaps, altogether expendable. Yet 
powerful resource extraction and development interests often operate above Planning controls 
(through fast-track legislation and so on) and dictate de facto government policy towards land 
and resources. As explained earlier corporate and military power is now such that CIMBIs do 
their own planning. If the above conflicting points are true, then it follows that Planning must 
exist by the grace of these same interests that seem to perpetually complain about government 
interference through Planning: Thus, perhaps the apparent ineffectiveness and inefficiency of 
Planning serves to benefit existing power relationships in resource allocation. Is government 
Planning only needed to legitimize the transfer process and manage social conflict surrounding 
the conversion of resources from public to private sectors? 
Facilitating resource transfers 
It must first be noted that Planning in the urban arena is much more advanced than regional 
Planning in terms of adjusting externalities between public and private interests. For example, 
regulatory schemes which exact percentages of subdivisions or large buildings for public 
amenities (open space, child care facilities and so forth), or those which allow for trading 
1 Department of Planning and Housing, 1992, Shaping Victoria's Future : A Place to Live (Melbourne: 
Government Printer) 
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pollution rights, are really attempts to rectify problems of externalities. However, these trade 
off the costs and benefits of development, by 'balancing environment and development'. The 
'balance' is that point where the maximum amount of growth is allowed before dissatisfaction 
or social conflict from above or below begins to threaten political stability and power relations. 
With regard to the non-urban natural (as opposed to the Man-made) environment, however, 
regulatory schemes are practically non-existent, with the exception of land preserved as wildlife 
and habitat reserves. However, at the regional level some 'planning schemes' have recently 
been introduced at the behest of development interests (in Australia and Canada) which. 
legitimize the transfer process under the veil of a formal public decision-making system. A case 
in point is the recently adopted resource security legislation in Tasmania mentioned above. At 
first blush, it would appear to replace ad hoc decision taldng regarding forest allocation with a 
master plan to be overseen by a (future) Planning Commission. Generally, in a market system, 
a master plan allocates land to appropriate uses in advance of specific development proposals to 
put land to its best use without dictating specific uses. In this case, however, forests are zoned 
for production without planning. Native forests will still, as before, be allocated through 
private supply contracts between the government, the Forestry Commission and powerful 
timber companies. The decision-making system is therefore substantially the same in this new 
scheme, but planning is foreclosed by predetermined zones. The proposed creation of a new 
Planning Commission creates the impression of a transfer of decision-making power to an 
independent 'balanced' body of professionally-trained decision makers, but the corporatist 
system itself is actually further entrenched. 
The overall policy guideline of resource security remains production. Its underlying 
presumption is that forests should be logged, so advocates of forest protection are given the 
burden of proving that areas should be withdrawn from production. Further, the opportunity 
for adversarial issue identification in policy development is bypassed. In fact, the future 
rezoning of areas is expressly prevented if already found to contain heritage or Aboriginal 
values. Such facts are only to be considered if their discovery was made since passage of the 
legislation. This means that the planning process is pre-empted, if not nullified, by the 
existence of a Planning Commission whose mandate is not to plan, but to review applications 
for variances from a de facto plan made 'of, for and by' the forest industry (of course, the 
Commission does perform other tasks). 
The Planning Commission will advise Cabinet on cases where the withdrawal of forests 
from production is proposed. Cabinet makes the real allocation decisions, and Cabinet is an 
executive body which deals with a multitude of issues in an ad hoc manner. The Commission 
serves as functionaries or staff to the Premier and Cabinet. Therefore, the new Planning 
system cannot achieve what I have suggested is its broader purpose of 'preparing for the 
future'. In short, although a comprehensive zoning scheme for native forests was introduced, 
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it was for the purpose of preventing any substantive Planning and pre-empting public debate. 
The end result of a costly process of Planning 'reform' is still, therefore, an ad hoc and power-
based system biased ultimately in favour of resource consumption as against preservation. 
Subsidies 
There are several kinds of subsidies that Planning facilitates in a capitalist economy. These 
include wealth transfers, impact mitigation, and conflict mitigation or displacement 
Wealth transfers 
As noted above, a major justification for Planning and land use regulation derives from the 
failure of the market to internalize the private costs of development However, if Planning were 
achieving the internalization of environmental costs, the costs of remedial action would not be 
so high. In Strahan, Tasmania, a mining company was permitted to dump waste (including 
copper, cadmium, nickel, and zinc) into the King River for a century. The King River is 
technically dead and will continue to pollute Macquarie Harbour (through drainage from acid 
dumps) for decades. The government extended the company's pollution exemption with the 
stipulation that it contribute A$150,000 toward an environmental study. This, however, would 
in no way begin to cover the costs of pollution to the town. When the company leaves in 1997, 
the municipality is not likely to be able to obtain compensation as the firm is based off-shore. 1 
Moreover, due to international competition and pressure from powerful companies, the 
public does not usually even receive the market price for its alienated resources. For example, 
Robert Repetto (World Resources Institute, Wash, DC.), has shown that, in the United States, 
timber rights are often sold off for a - cost that is less than the transaction costs of preparing for 
the sale, let alone the public cost of growing the forest He has estimated that the United States 
taxpayers could save US$100 million annually just not to sell these forests. At present 76 of 
the 156 national forests in the U.S. sell timber at a loss, despite management plans, 
representing a direct subsidy to private production interests.2 
Such transfers of public resources to special interests is legitimized and concealed by 
Planning processes. For example, forest management plans are often developed to meet the 
needs of resource development interests first Although allowing for multiple uses, the areas 
conserved are often those not of high conservation value, but rather those areas that could not 
economically be felled. Of course, these practices result from broader power relations in 
society and the individual (forest) planners involved cannot be expected to alter the system 
1 The Examiner Launceston, Jan. 31, 1993, at p. 6. 
2 Robert C., Repetto, 1988, The Forest for the Trees?: Government Policies and the Misuse of Forest 
Resources (Wash. D.C.: World Resources Institute); Robert C. Repetto and Malcolm Gillis, 1988, Public 
Policies and the Misuse of Forest Resources (NY: Cambridge University Press). 
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itself. However, it is (largely unpaid) environmentalists who have generally researched and 
brought these facts to general public attention rather than professional foresters, planners, or 
academics (see intellectual suppression below). 
Other astonishing examples of public subsidies for transnational corporate interests are found 
in Australia's proposed Multi-function Polls (MFP) and Very Fast Train (VET) Projects. 1 The 
proposals to build the MFP and VFT as (nominally) privately-fmanced ventures appeared in 
1987. The consortium behind the Very Fast Train proposal also argued that they should receive 
part of the 'betterment' or capital gains tax on the unearned increment that would accrue to 
properties due to the new rail line. Public takes would therefore, in effect, be charged by 
private development interests. (Perhaps the corpocracy now considers itself synonymous with 
the 'citizen'?) Betterment existed in Tasmanian Planning legislation since the 1940s, but was 
never implemented: now development interests are taking up the concept for their own benefit. 
The public could also end up holding the bag. According to Ron Pain, very fast trains have 
lost money in countries having 10 times the Australian population adjacent to the route. Also, 
the required overseas borrowing would increase the national debt, government support would 
be required for the compulsory acquisition of (4-500,000 hectares) land for the track and new 
towns,2 and the project might have to be completed at public expense if abandoned by the 
developers. 
The developments associated with the VFT will provoke huge amounts 
of freight which, because the VFT cannot carry heavy freight, will 
have to go by road creating road construction and maintenance costs to 
be borne by the taxpayer3 
The irony, as pointed out by Pain, is that the government has starved the publicly-owned rail 
system for years, which would now be lost. It could have been upgraded to reduce 
environmental damage. (At present, the VFT project is in abeyance but the MFP is being built 
in Adelaide.) 
Impact mitigation, 
I have suggested that Planning often operates after the basic decisions are made. Therefore, 
Planning is not geared toward preventing environmental damage, but only fixing, mitigating or 
cleaning it up. Impact mitigation is another form of subsidy. The problem of Planning in a 
market system is exemplified by the proposal to build the Very Fast Train (VET), above, which 
1 See generally Ross E. Mouer and Yoshio Sugimoto, 1990, The MFP Debate: A Background (Bundoora, 
La Trobe University Press); and Ron Pain, 1990, A Tale of New Cities: Japan's Plans for Australia (Melbourne: 
R. Pain). 
2 Ron Pain, 1990, above at p. 2. 
3 Ron Pain, 1990, above at p. 2. 
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would connect the three major eastern cities in Australia. 1 At an international Planning 
conference in Sydney,2 it was explained by the project manager that the main reason for the 
project was to find a use for Japanese investment capital. The design criteria were dictated by 
engineering constraints, which amounted to the shortest, straightest route between destinations. 
The location of the track would create a 'growth corridor', which its proponents proudly 
proclaimed would be the greatest land use determinant since Australia was settled by 
Europeans. There was no prior analysis, public or private, nor public debate regarding where 
growth should occur, if at all 3 - that fundamental question was pre-empted by market and 
engineering constraints upon Planning. 
Public planners would be called upon to select the best sites for terminals or to mitigate 
environmental impacts of the physical bather created by the high speed train corridor. Planners 
could do little for the wildlife habitats and native forests that would be divided and hence 
destroyed. Of course, planners would have the opportunity to participate in schemes to control 
new development surrounding VFT stations, but this is still 'remedial' Planning - making the 
private initiatives work. Bridges, roads and public utilities would need to be constructed or 
relocated in the first place. 
Conflict displacement 
While planners are often not involved in the more 'significant' decisions either, they 
sometimes serve as mediators for developers and producers where there is public resistance to 
development proposals - and their mediation is paid for by the public. With regard to less 
significant decisions, as we have seen, planners have comparatively little impact compared with 
industrial 'subsidies', which are a function of political influence. Yet, because Planning is seen 
as a distinct decision-making arena, planners are held accountable for the geographical and 
spatial character of growth. Thus, Planning works to displace the conflict that results when the 
'invisible hand' of the market gets into the public cookie jar, by directing public animosity 
towards the bureaucracy. Some of the other ways Planning performs this conflict management 
function is by: 
(a) obfuscating the conversion process by removing the debate outside the political arena to 
an ostensibly neutral, professional one, though the decisions themselves are often value-laden 
and spolitical';4 
1 See generally Ron Pain, 1990, above. 
2 Talk by Mr. Castleman at the International Conference on Local Planning, sponsored by RAP!, LGPA, and 
AACP at Darling Harbour, Sydney (March, 1990). 
3 Some ecologists have argued that the human population already far exceeds Australia's carrying capacity. 
4 An example of this is the Helsham inquiry, see Appendix 1. 
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(b) legitimizing the process by, for example, positing the debate in technical terms which 
exclude Ethical considerations; 
(c) focussing on separate claims and controversies to deflect debate from their relation to 
basic social divisions, the public interests at stake and the cumulative effects of decisions; 
(d) defining social impacts of development in a narrow way to exclude many externalities 
and indirect subsidies; 
(e) channelling interest group competition into formal processes where precedents (past 
mistakes) and power relationships are established; that is, creating and enforcing rules of the 
game (such as establishing the burden of proof, or rights of standing and appeal); 
(f) limiting decision-making methods to distributional issues, rather than Ethical or 
environmental ones (such as whether to allow other species to live); 
(g) removing moral responsibility away from the 'corpocracy' and placing accountability 
into a complex bureaucracy; and, finally, 
(h) providing a barometer for public resistance to development or pollution, and modifying 
impacts to an extent that development does not threaten business ventures or the business 
'climate'. This last function of Planning is, again, called 'finding the balance between 
conservation and development', or Planning as the automatic transmission of the resource 
allocation system which presently gears the speed of development to that which can occur 
without social disorder. 
In sum, I have suggested that, often, Planning practice (a) is incompatible with 
environmental protection, (b) has little impact upon decision making (at least until the basic 
decisions have been made by power brokers), and (c) subsidizes development by transferring 
wealth, mitigating the adverse impacts of development, and displacing the social conflict 
surrounding this transfer process. Not surprisingly, then, environmentalists argue that there is 
virtually no Planning. Yet free marketeers protest that there is too much Planning. To them, the 
Planning system is unnecessary or counterproductive, and deregulation could only improve the 
situation. It is true, of course, that (poor) Planning processes can create inefficiencies and 
inequities directly. For example, Planning processes can impose costs on developers which are 
then passed on to the public through: (a) increased development costs from the delays and 
transaction costs entailed in government Planning and mediation; (b) inbuilt incentives to 
misdirect resources into influencing the regulatory process (kick backs and lobbying); (c) both 
speculation and uncertainty in the land market that result from changing government policy 
through master plans; and (d) structural conflict between development and conservation 
interests, with its attendant opportunity costs. 
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At this point, one might be wondering how the Planning system has managed to be so many 
bad things to so many people? Why do these negative functions of Planning, or various forms 
of subsidies, remain unchallenged? One reason is that the public/private duality allows each 
sector to avoid responsibility. Another is that the concept of 'corruption' is narrowly defined to 
exclude corruption that is due to the nature of the institutional system and culture. Finally, the 
commonly perceived model of the Planning system at the Structure level is obfuscatory as it 
does not correspond to reality. Let us explore these points in detail. 
Buckpassing 
At the Superstructure level, we_saw that the hierarchical, dualistic model prevents reform by 
obfuscating the nature and operation of power relations. The same is true at the Structure level. 
First, Planning can only perform these transfer functions if it is seen as an autonomous 
institution of government juxtaposed with the market (see Figure 2, Chapter 3). In the public 
imagination, Planning exists as a separate technical, independent, and relatively value-neutral 
operation intended to assist efficient and rational private sector development in the public 
interest. It therefore provides politicians with a set of concepts to justify policies, and give 
plans and decisions an aura of being 'rational' or 'comprehensive'. 1 If Planning were instead 
seen as subject to power relations, it would be less effective in serving the interests of the 
powerful. 
Second, a model which presents Planning as autonomous impedes reform by encouraging 
speculation to the effect that either more Planning, or alternatively its elimination, will benefit 
the public. We are led to debate two alternatives - more regulation (Planning) or more free 
enterprise - rather than reconsidering the overlapping of Planning with other decision-making 
spheres. Therefore, some who believe Planning is necessary to protect the shared public 
environment have invested vast amounts of time, money and energy debating the pro's and 
con's of decentralizing, centralizing, or reorganizing Planning, as if it could be extricated from 
contextual power relations. 
While bureaucratic, hierarchical structures have inherent problems, that have been discussed 
ad infinitum in the literature, these problems do not establish that some form of privatization is 
a viable alternative. These problems relate to the inherent problems of power structures, and 
cannot therefore be solved by merely replacing a publicly-controlled power structure (the 
bureaucracy) with an uncontrollable one (corporate anarchism), through privatization or 
deregulation. Both command and competitive resource allocation systems lead to the same 
1 John Sillince, 1986, above at p. 50. 
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result - a self-sustaining power structure. The difference largely consists of who makes the 
rules. A de-regulated 'market' is, in fact, highly regulated - but by the private sector.' 
Also, the irreversibility of privatization or deregulation must be factored into the equation. 
As world events of late have demonstrated with staggering frequency, it is easier to overthrow a 
government than to overthrow the military or corporate power structures that dictate that 
government's policy. In being pressured to sell off their assets, state bureaucracies are now in 
the same position as many Third World nations. Regardless of whether this trend is for better 
or for worse, it is a fundamental turning point in Western 'civilization'. The move to a 
feudalistic capitalism, which probably spells the end of the natural environment, has not been a 
matter of conscious public choice, yet it has been falsely promoted as democratic, or at least an 
inevitable consequence of democracy. 
The problem with a public/private duality that obscures Planning's service to special 
interests is that each sector can avoid responsibility. Earlier we saw that since the resource 
allocation arenas are viewed as separate in the public imagination, the buck can be passed 
endlessly between the public sector (politicians and planners) and (the private sector 
developers' economists). This occurs at the structure level as well. For example, political 
economists allied with the private sector do not accept responsibility for the effect of economic 
'forces' on land use and the physical environment, because the spatial distribution of land use is 
the responsibility of Planning. Instead, they tend to take the position that spatial distribution 
affects the economy (eg. rivers determine city location). Planners, in contrast, emphasize how 
the economy or technology affects spatial distribution (eg. containerization determines port 
location). 
Within the public sector, the politicians and planners can also 'pass the buck' (Figure 2). 
While planners advise governments on policy and implementation, they maintain the resolution 
of social and environmental problems to be, ultimately, a matter of politics. 2 Thus many 
planners do not accept responsibility for Planning failure, as their role is only technocratic and 
advisory. After all, planners may advise on major Planning issues, but it is for representatives 
to actually decide, as Planning decisions are "ultimately political". The failure of planners 
has been due in part to the inadequacies of their ideas, but more to the 
inadequate political support which planning has received. This failure 
of political support stems from the nature of politics in a property- 
1 For example, the airlines are now regulated by special interests and it is at least debatable whether de 
'efficiencies' accrue to the public when, for instance, the cost of social dislocations such as the concomitant 
'closing of towns is considered. 
2 For example, see Michael Goldsmith, 1980, Politics, Planning and the City (London: Hutchinson) at p. 128. 
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owning democracy. The structure of political power has been and is 
such as to protect property owners and to pamper rural interests. 1 
The argument in favour of political decision making is based on the 'accountability' of 
elected representatives. However, politicians are not accountable in a meaningful way. 
Accountability is passed down the ladder through agencies, such as Planning, which serve to 
insulate elected representatives from the consequences of unpopular decisions. While 
politicians are subject to electoral sanctions, this remedy is not relevant to environmental issues, 
as it is punitive rather than preventative. And, since the public knows the opposition party will 
do the same or worse, the electoral sanction is a pyrrhic one. Finally, perks and membership in 
a social 'elite' can have greater material value to a politician than re-election; after all, politics 
for many is a springboard to lucrative corporate positions. 
To make a long story short, we have a merry-go-round with planners, economists and 
politicians all structurally incapable of planning, yet passing blame onto the others. None of the 
actual decision makers are held accountable in meaningful ways for the long-term consequences 
of their decisions. The proposed resource allocation model (Figure 4, Chapter 4), by having 
clear lines of Ethical responsibility, would make buckpassing more difficult. At the Structure 
level, a similar reconstruction is necessary, which we now discuss. 
Systemic Corruption 
Another way in which the transfer of wealth to CIMBIs is obfuscated is through the use of 
language to conceal the moral character of the transfer process. It is seen as neither right or 
wrong, but just inherent in the nature of democracy. The conversion process is often justified, 
ironically, by reference to market forces. It is often said that resource extractors claim that the 
'market' makes them do it; they 'have to' chop quicker and cheaper because of the world 
market, even though it would cost the public less to leave the trees standing. The market does 
not apply if resources are sold off below cost. The transfer of public goods to private interests 
by a system that does not sustain vital and irreplaceable resources, especially public health and 
wilderness, involves the misuse of political or administrative power for the diversion of 
resources to special interests. When such issues are cloaked in value-neutral terms, such as 
'externalities' or 'values', the personal, social, and environmental impacts are hidden beneath 
abstractions. 
In order to begin to correct the pathologies created by the above word associations, false 
dualisms, and misconceptions, it is necessary to redefine the Planning system in a way that 
1 Leonie Sandercocic, 1976, Cities for Sale: Property, Politics, and Urban Planning in Australia (London: 
Heinemann) at p. 215. 
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exposes its key problems. In this regard, a focus on the abuse of power leads to different 
criteria: a Planning system that allows special interests to receive benefits disproportionate to 
their contribution to the public by preventing genuine choice, would be seen as 'Corrupt'. 
How can an institution be corrupt? In theory, any government institution such as Planning 
exists solely to protect and promote the 'public interest'. By definition, an agent or agency is 
defined as corrupt where the interests of the Principal are betrayed to benefit that agent or a third 
party. In the case of a government agency, however, the 'principal' is the general public. So a 
person, institution, or process which transfers public goods or resources to special interests to 
the net disadvantage of the general public should be seen as 'corrupt'. 
The term 'corruption' has been narrowly construed in our society so as to make systemic 
corruption hard to see. It is used where: (a) an individual (b) intentionally betrays the trust of 
the (c) organization for (d) monetary (or in kind) gain (e) by violating organizational rules. 
These limitations block our perception of widespread systemic corruption, such as where (a) a 
public organization (b) unintentionally betrays the trust of the (c) general public (d) due to 
ideological filters (e) by following organizational (and institutional) rules. Because this latter 
set of conditions is not perceived as corruption, the phenomenon is less subject to disapproval. 
Also, because people identify with government institutions 'of, for, and by' the people, 
disapproval requires self-criticism. Therefore, there is a tendency to deny that institutional 
corruption exists (as opposed to corrupt individuals). 
If Planning serves to transfer public resources and costs from public to private sectors, it 
cannot therefore resolve the central cause of environmental conflict - the alienation, depletion 
and degradation of the public domain. This may be painfully obvious, but it casts a different 
slant on the usual progressive interpretation of the problem. This is that the state manipulates 
consent by obstructing democracy and disempowering citizens. 1 But while democracy may be 
a necessary precondition to building -a sustainable society, it is not sufficient. Public needs 
would not triumph over private wants if people simply had better information. The materialistic 
desires of average people are probably no less than those of the powerful, just harder for them 
to obtain. This is one reason why voting systems are not necessarily the most rational form of 
public choice system when it comes to determining Ethical questions. 
Intellectual suppression 
One of the main ways in which institutional Corruption is perpetuated is through intellectual 
suppression, where "a person is attacked because their research, teaching or public statements 
1 See for example, John Forester, 1989, above at p. 179. 
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are threatening to a powerful interest group". 1 To use a recent example from Tasmania, the Mt. 
Lyle Mining company threatened legal action to stop the publication of an honours thesis which 
examined the environmental impacts of their operations on Macquarie Harbour and the local 
citizens. The thesis showed that the levels of mercury and other metals in some types of fish 
exceeded safety standards. To their credit, the sttident's academic supervisors publicly backed 
her study, however.2 
There are many more subtle ways in which intellectual suppression operates. One 
disturbing pattern is that the perpetrators of Corrupt practices are often protected by institutions, 
while the 'whistleblowers' lose their jobs and/or promotional opportunities. A common form 
of persecution is character assassination by rumour, which is particularly difficult to defend 
oneself against. 3 
In Tasmania, as in the other Australian states, intellectual suppression is legitimized by law. 
The state Services Act says that a permanent employee who "without the permission of the 
Minister administering the Agency in which he is employed or otherwise in the ordinary course 
of his duties divulges any information gained by him in his employment in the state Service, is 
guilty of an offence". It is ironic in a state where citizenship is a criteria for employment at the 
higher levels of government, that one must give up one's basic human rights to work in 
government.4 The act also provides an excuse for not speaking out. According to Isla 
MacGregor, scientists with the CSIRO (Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organization) do not have these constraints and yet will not speak out. 5 
The false policy -making model 
One remedy for the planning problems covered in this chapter is to redefine the relationship 
of Planning to the market and political systems so that it is less easy for decision makers to 
'pass the buck' and escape accountability. To do so, we must refine the simpler models 
proposed in Chapters 3 and 4, which dealt only with resource allocation writ large, and hence 
treated the market and Planning arenas as monolithic spheres. In the conventional model, 
1 Brian Martin, 1992, "Intellectual Suppression: Why Environmental Scientists are Afraid to Speak out", 
Habitat Australia pp. 11-14, at p. 11. See also Brian Martin, C.M. Ann Baker, Clyde Manwell and Cedric 
Pugh, 1986, above. 
2 The Mercury Newspaper, April 7, 1993, at p. 11. 
3 Brian Martin, 1992, "Scientific Fraud and the Power Structure of Science", Prometheus 10 (1) pp. 83-98. 
4 See Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
5 See MacGregor, 1993, above. 
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Planning is seen as a relatively separate sphere that regulates and constrains the market, upon 
policy advice from political bodies like Congress, Parliament or City Councils (Figure 6). 
Figure 6: Conventional descriptive model of policy development 
At the Structure level, however, the market is in fact composed of two major sphered: 
production and consumption, and the Planning sphere is composed of two corresponding 
separate processes: economic planning and physical planning. In the proposed model (Figure 
7) the Planning system would mediate and reconcile the conflicting needs and interests of 
producers and consumers, and present the resulting policy advice to the decision makers. The 
decision makers - elected representatives and/or community groups - would depend upon the 
nature of the issue. This would be an open, public process, so that decision makers could be 
held more accountable. These decision makers would then (hopefully) select the best 
implementation measures from alternative recommendations rather than just policy. Under the 
present model, decision makers decide policy but leave implementation to the administrators 
and technocrats (Chapter 6). In the proposed model, implementation issues would be central. 
The decision making model would also be Ethics-based (Chapter 7). 
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Figure 7: Recommended model of policy development 
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A close up of the Planning system within this proposed structure is as shown in Figure 8 
below. It suggests that economic/social and physical/ecological planning needs to be 
integrated, as they now operate in relative isolation with the priority in the former. 
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Figure 8: The proposed integrated Planning system 
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We saw above, ways in which false dualisms allow subsidies and transfers of wealth to 
special interests to remain unchallenged. Within the Planning system, however, the situation is 
reversed. Planning involves a dualistic system that is often conceived of as one. That is 
(following Galbraithl), there are two separate public Planning systems. On the one hand, there 
are the (primarily) economic planners who are involved in facilitating production and 
investment These economists have become particularly influential of late. Many among their 
ranks are key advisers to political decision makers, which is unfortunate, as economists usually 
lack a lateral education. The control mechanisms they use to stimulate growth involve wealth 
transfers (various forms of subsidies) to production interests. As these interests exercise 
influence through lobbying elected representatives, we can call this the 'top down' Planning 
system. 
What I will call the 'bottom up' Planning system is primarily composed of physical 
planners, whose control mechanisms involve the regulation of consumption. (It is not 
necessarily bottom up in the sense of participatory planning.) These planners advise officials 
who oversee the public service, such as Planning Commissions or Town Councils. Their 
powers are generally limited to prescriptive regulations, such as the particulars of building size 
and shape. These regulations are enacted in response to complaints and conflicts that result 
from the externalities of production and investment decisions, mostly in the top down Planning 
1 See J.K. Galbraith, 1973, Economics and the Public Purpose (MA: Houghton Mifflin). 
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system. These planners are the visible ones because they impose constraints upon consumer 
choices directly, such as where and how people can build their homes or park their cars. 
Economic planners, due partly to their linear, narrow education, tend to have a one-
dimensional goal structure: more investment and production at any cost. Also, as they are 
shielded from the tangible repercussions of their actions, they can operate on the level of 
abstract theory. Physical planners, on the other hand, are held accountable for the impacts of 
decisions made by those in the production sphere. They must reconcile these 'market' trends 
with myriad social goals. Although physical planners are often generalists, or more broadly 
educated than economists, they are ill-equipped for their role, having absorbed the ideology of 
the economic planners (chapter 6). 
The above models are only partial ones. How do the market and Planning systems interact 
together? The following descriptive diagram is intended to clarify the relation between the two 
systems. The two Planning spheres are now functionally separate, but planners in the bottom-
up system are held accountable for decisions in the top down system. The two Planning 
spheres are now functionally separate, but planners in the bottom up system are held 
accountable for both. By creating the appearance of a single Planning system in juxtaposition 
to a single market, those in a position to determine the framework and terminology of public 
debate can associate_the 'market' with consumers in a bottom up system, and 'planning' with 
producers in a top down system. This false polarity has served to create a spectre upon which 
producers and consumers can project the negative aspects of decisions made in the market. 
Thus, producers often blame Planning for bad outcomes even where there is little or no 
Planning of any form. Thus, the mere existence of a Planning system, though relatively 
ineffectual in shaping the rate or location of development, nonetheless absolves those in the 
market from responsibility. 
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Figure 9: The existing 'dual' Planning system 
The new Planning system would combine the two forms of Planning into one Planning 
sphere (see Figure 4). In this way, subsidies and the distribution of externalities, or private 
development costs, could be made visible to the general public. Further, cross-subsidization of 
social services by income generating functions (eg. electricity production) would become 
possible. In this way, production could be linked to conservation. 
To wrap up, I have argued for a relatively autonomous sphere that integrates economic and 
environmental planning. Its mandate would be to address basic needs, so economic planning 
would be less likely to subsume environmental planning (than is now the case). A separate 
sphere would, if properly designed, enable us to address the Ethical issues underlying 
environmental conflict, and provide a check upon power-based decision making in the market 
and political spheres. I have shown that the need for such a system has been obscured by the 
way in which we are taught to perceive the system of governance and resource allocation in 
general, and the Planning system itself in particular. We now turn to problems created by the 
design of decision-making processes and methods in the Planning system itself, the 
Infrastructure. 
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CHAPTER 6: INFRASTRUCTURE 
Recap' 
I have argued for a new Planning institution that is relatively autonomous and different in 
nature from the market and political spheres, through which society can prioritize basic needs. 
In the last chapter, I suggested that, at the structure level, this could be partially achieved by (a) 
integrating economic and ecological planning in keeping with democratic processes, and (b) 
recognizing the Ethical implications of decision-making institutions, in order that 'systemic 
Corruption' can be addressed. But now, in order to design the new Planning system, we need 
to look at the problematic features of the Planning system itself (or the Infrastructure). 
Following my initial premise that social and ecological sustainability is a substantively 
rational goal (Chapter 1), I suggested that a Planning system should, at a minimum, contribute 
to three basic objectives that are essential to sustainability and well being. These are to protect 
and restore the life support system, to preserve cultural and biological diversity, and to prevent 
conflict over resources and environmental amenity. In this chapter, it is argued that the 
decision-making methods employed in Planning practice militate against the above objectives. 
This is because, I contend, Planning has yet no appropriate paradigm of its own. Planning 
methods (goals, decision-making norms and processes) derive from liberal economic theory, 
just as Planning processes derive from liberal political theory. 
Since the failure of control-oriented comprehensive Planning, Planning theorists have been 
taking the concepts and techniques of liberal economists and superimposing them upon issues 
fundamentally incompatible with the underlying premises and assumptions of the economists' 
paradigm. That is, planners have adopted concepts that fit the preconceived solutions of 
mainstream economists. 2 I am not arguing that economic methods in limited application are the 
problem, but rather, their 'selective' and inappropriate application to environmental issues. 
Since I began trying to articulate this problem, a growing number of green economists have 
moved towards explaining the inherent bias of the economic system. Hazel Henderson, 
Marilyn Waring, Herman Daley, Paul Ekins and many others have contributed much to public 
1 This chapter is a revised version of Janis Birkeland, 1990, The Inherent Bias of Planning Methods" (Hobart: 
Department of Geography and Environmental Studies: University Of Tasmania). 
2 See Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johann P. Olsen, 1972, "A Garbage Can Model of 
Organizational Choice", Administrative Science Quarterly 17 (March) pp. 1-25, which analyzes problem solving 
as a reciprocal process of matching problems with available solutions. 
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awareness in this area. 1 Consequently, it is unnecessary to replicate that material here. My 
point is simply that the existing Infrastructure of Planning is conceptually parallel to those of 
mainstream economists, when instead, we need to design methods to fit the Ethical nature of 
the environmental crisis. 
It should be noted, of course, that the implementation of market-based controls (such as 
emissions trading and user pays systems) would represent a vast improvement over traditional 
Planning regulations. However, they are ultimately incompatible with environmental 
preservation. This is because, while they can create more efficiency in consumption, they only 
slow the rate of resource depletion. Thus Planning is inherently biased against environmental 
sustainability over the long term. We begin by defining decision making in Planning. In the 
first section, we look at decision-making norms, processes, and goals. In the following section 
we look at methods, techniques and regulations. 
Types of decision making 
With regard to decision making by staff planners, there are two nominal types of decision-
making processes: technocratic and quasi-judicial. In Faludi's typology (again), these could be 
called 'decision making' and 'decision taking' respectively. 2 Of course, administrative 
agencies generally exercise legislative, judicial, and executive functions to some extent (despite 
the separation of functions in the Australian Constitution, or separation of powers in the 
American Constitution), but the above two part distinction is more relevant to government 
Planning practice. 
Statutory Planning or implementation is an administrative function involving delegated 
decision 'taking'. This is sometimes an 'executive' function, as in the case of project review 
processes where approvals for certain uses are permitted 'as of right' or automatically. Non-
discretionary decision taking does not concern us here however. Our concern lies in cases 
where decision taking involves the application of policy to a specific case or quasi-judicial. 
Planners make determinations over private development applications in accordance with public 
policy as expressed in Planning legislation, codes, or directives. Where there is an impasse 
concerning development applications, or conflicting Planning goals or policies, it is usually 
reconciled 'higher up' by a Planning commission or administrator through a formal hearing 
1 See Helen Henderson, 1978, Creating Alternative Futures (NY: Berkeley); Marilyn Waring, 1988, Counting 
for Nothing: What Men Value and What Women are Worth (London: Allen & Unwin); Herman E. Daley and 
John B. Cobb, jr., 1989, above; Paul Eldns, Mayer Hillman and Robert Hutchinson, 1992, above ; Paul Bdns, 
ed., 1986, above. 
2 Andreas Faludi, 1973, Planning Theory (Oxford: Pergamon). 
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process (quasi-judicial). Because, in practice, this often entails evaluating and deciding land 
use conflicts after interests have vested and positions have set, this type of Planning could be 
characterized as 'dispute settlement' or 'conflict management'. 
The second staff Planning function is advisory or 'technocratic'. It involves research and 
analysis preparatory to 'taking' a decision or choosing among alternatives. This includes policy 
analysis, where, for example, planners inform government decision making with regard to the 
allocation of public or environmental goods, such as land, water, air and forests. It also 
includes plan making (also calledstrategic, advance, master or comprehensive Planning) 
wherein planners make decisions about such things as: how to allocate land for its most 
appropriate use in advance of specific development proposals, balancing housing supply and 
demand, or providing for adequate open space, transportation, water supply and so on. In a 
sense, plan making is 'legislative' in nature as it involves deciding on the criteria by which 
future disputes or issues will be resolved. When seen in terms of the planner's function, 
however, it is 'technocratic' in that plans are developed and proposed by planners for • 
consideration by Planning commissions or political decision makers (although the adoption of a 
Planning scheme is a legislative act). 
Traditionally, Planning policy is implemented by a comprehensive plan, which is meant to 
provide for the efficient spatial distribution of activities and structures to meet predicted 
changes in demographic and market trends. "In order for land use controls to be effective in 
achieving efficient development patterns, regulations of the use of land must keep abreast of 
changes in the complexity of factors affecting the demand for land." 1 Plan making could 
therefore also be characterized as a 'conflict avoidance' function, in that it provides certainty to 
both developers and community. 
These two types of decision making in Planning appear to be quite different in nature. 
However, these two processes, technocratic decision making (conflict avoidance) and quasi-
judicial decision taking (dispute management) have similar goals, premises, and consequences. 
Both are designed to deal with conflict rather than its (deeper) causes. Hence, both are 
premised on balancing the interests, or costs and benefits, of alternative land uses. 
Accordingly, they lead to trade-offs and nonsustainability. The following grid suggests the 
discrepancy between staff decision-making norms and the actual practices: 
1 James H. Carr and Edward E. Duensing, 1983, Land Use Issues of the 1980s (NJ: Transaction) at p. ix. 
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Figure 10: Decision-making norms and practices 
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We now look at how these categories of decision making in Planning are falsely juxtaposed 
against private sector decision making. 
Decision-making norms 
A model that sets up a dichotomy between public Planning and private sector decision 
making leads people to believe that their respective decision rules and decision making 
processes differ in character. Market transactions have been characterized as ideally 
'competitive', occurring through bargain and exchange by consumers. In contrast, public 
sector decision-making is ideally supposed to be formal and quasi-judicial. It is constrained by 
legislative requirements, such as community participation, freedom of information, and open 
meeting rules or other checks on administrative discretion. The 'New Right' would argue that 
the public sector is inherently authoritarian, but they are ignoring these safeguards. How do 
these distinctions conform to present norms or ideals (whether or not they conform in reality)? 
Planning as quasi-judicial? 
Let us first consider whether (discretionary) project approval processes in Planning are 
quasi-judicial in character; that is, where decisions interpret and apply explicit guidelines. 
Under the traditional quasi-judicial model; land use decisions would be made in accordance 
with plans, policies, or regulations which were known to all parties in advance of an 
application. Controls were meant to implement Planning principles and criteria and to be 
largely self-regulating. The role of the staff planner would merely be to judge whether the 
proposal met the criteria. 
The controls themselves, however, were not always based on principles. Zoning for 
example, was largely to protect existing property owners. In fact, zoning is inherently 
exclusionary. Similarly, building codes are notorious for favouring particular products and 
impeding innovation. The recognition of the problem has led to performance standards which 
allow the use of any technology or product which meets the desired criteria. To an extent, of 
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course, the evolution of development control mechanisms has necessarily been responsive to 
pressure group activity (in particular, regulated parties), rather than broad Planning principles: 
Land use controls are one of many cases where it is difficult to 
distinguish between theregulated and the regulator - industry and 
government. The development community and related industries which 
supply it have played a central role in the evolution of land regulations, 
both through frequent representation on planning commissions and 
boards and in strong leadership in promoting new styles of regulation. 1 
There has always been a "tension arising from a desire to lay down rational and dependable 
rules in advance of land development, on the one hand, and the need for leeway to respond to 
changing demands or to maximize the potential of individual sites, on the other". 2 To allow 
for more flexibility, negotiated agreements between development interests and Planning 
agencies, which bypass standard zoning provisions, have increasingly become the norm (with 
regional and national variations). Of course, these contractual arrangements are not necessarily 
inconsistent with the quasi-judicial model if they are carried out so as to implement Planning 
objectives, rather than merely accommodate special interests. For example, when I reviewed 
major projects for a Planning department in the 1970s, negotiations with developers were staff-
controlled but nonetheless quasi-judicial in nature, as there was a complete set of written 
policies to guide administrative discretion. Builders and other parties had access to department 
policies and guidelines, and our files were open to all parties (this freedom of information 
policy also helped to ensure that agreements were conducted properly). Only cases incapable 
of resolution by staff, neighbourhood groups, and developers went before the Commission on 
discretionary review, at the request of any interested person (provided the Commission agreed 
to hear it ,which it did if there was a controversy). 
The problem here, however, is that both developers and adjacent property owners have 
learned to exploit the discretionary review process (often with a view to their own property 
values) by preventing, for example, home owners from making minor property improvements 
even where permitted by the policies, codes and guidelines. 3 Mediation and review processes, 
which were intended as a flexible and fair means of resolving conflict, have tended 
increasingly to be resolved through strategic manoeuvres rather than by the judicious 
application of general principles. As a result, the Planning process has become at once more 
complex and more 'flexible' (read uncertain). This has created opportunities for any planners 
with government work experience to open up consultancies as 'expediters' or advocates for 
proponents. That is, they get paid to ferret plans through the subterranean passages of City 
1 Charles Thurow and John Vranicar, 1983, "Procedural Reform of Local Land-Use Regulation", in Carr and 
Duensing, eds., above pp. 190-206, at p. 191. 
2 Thurow and Vranicar, 1983, above pp. 190-206, at p. 192. 
3 This is based on discussions with six planners from that department [in 1992) . 
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Hall. The Planning arena in San Francisco is the stage for a contest in which lawyers, 
developers, consultants, and neighbourhood groups continually devise new rules for the 
project approval game. 
In Tasmania, by way of contrast, decisions concerning large projects or rezonings (that is, 
economically significant projects) have been made collusively by politicians, rather than by 
Planning staff who are bound by explicit policies. 1 Because government-led negotiations are 
carried on outside the formal decision-making processes and constitutional restraints on the 
bureaucracy, decisions concerning major projects are not subject to procedural safeguards - at 
least not until an initial agreement between the government agency and the private parties is 
reached and positions are entrenched. In such cases, for citizens or planners to question the 
project would therefore be to position themselves as the adversary of the government and 
developers, by virtue of their mutual investment in a joint decision. Thus, a staff planner 
exercising his/her proper advisory function is perceived as 'taking sides' and therefore • 
unprofessional, which is not conducive to professional advancement. 
But planners' sometimes have agendas that do not reflect Planning principles. Today, it has 
become fashionable for planners in Australia to define their role as 'proactive' (careerist might 
be more apt). By proactive they do not use the term in the context of 'designing the future' as 
did Russell Ackoff who I believe coined the term in 1971.2 Rather, they mean deciding which 
types of industries might be accommodated by the geographic and demographic characteristics 
of their jurisdiction, then initiating negotiations with those industries to woo them to nesting 
sites in the region. This is especially true of local government planners. 'Entrepreneurial' 
seems to be replacing 'quasi-judicial' as a decision-making norm to which planners aspire. 3 
While one could argue that these local government entrepreneurs are implementing an implicit 
(or even explicit) growth policy, it is a process which is neither comprehensive nor designed to 
take into account broader environmental and social issues. Thus, it is a de facto land market, 
not a Planning sphere, that such planners are operating in. 
Closed negotiations between developers and entrepreneurial staff may, of course, lead to the 
best feasible compromise concerning the siting or design of a project. However, such 
compromises can only lead to an optimal decision if the project itself is a good one; that is, 
where the proposal is the best use of the land in absolute terms. Even the best among 
1  Moreover, although Planning appeals in Tasmania involve a formal hearing process, there is no comprehensive 
set of policies or decision rules to guide them, at State or local level. New legislation, as presently proposed, will 
limit third party appeals. 
2 Russel L. Ackoff, 1970, A Concept of Corporate Planning (NY: Wiley). 
3 These points are based on numerous personal communications, including informal interviews at the 
International Conference on Local Planning, sponsored by RAPI, LGPA, and AACP at Darling Harbour, Sydney 
(March, 1990). 
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competing projects or alternative designs may still represent an inappropriate land use in social 
or environmental terms. For example, the construction of speculative office space on 
undeveloped land may be less desirable than no use at all but, as a practical matter, it only 
needs to be the best presently proposed action (as distinct from non-action) to be approved. 
This means, in reality, the main principle for 'resolving conflicting interests' in the Planning 
arena today is actually 'first come first served'. 
Negotiation and bargaining processes also undermine the quasi-judicial model's underlying 
norm of natural justice or due process. My point is not to suggest that quasi-judicial Planning 
processes are always better than informal bargaining processes. It is to suggest that there is a 
false perception that decisions are made in a system where due regard is given to explicit 
principles, or at least, sound professional judgement, a process only occasionally violated by 
personal forms of corruption. In fact, decisions are made in a power-based system where 
development of some sort will eventually prevail over preservation, despite occasional 
rejections, modifications, or delays to proposals in response to public opposition. 
Decision taking norms in Planning have changed from the ideal of being open, quasi-
judicial, and inflexible (though seldom achieved) to that of being 'entrepreneurial'. I have 
suggested that decision making norms do not conform to theory. It would perhaps be more 
accurate to say that theory often follows practice. In effect, Planning theory often seems to 
rationalize trends after the fact.' In the 90s, however, there is little theory which even bothers 
to justify the new entrepreneurial planner (as opposed to the progressive planner which 
Forester discusses). While Planning journals were (relatively) philosophically or socially-
oriented in the 1960s, they have generally become more technical and specialized. 2 With the 
new pragmatism that has accompanied the adoption of economic jargon, philosophical or moral 
justification apparently now seems unnecessary. 
Market as competitive? 
The idea that the market is competitive, even as a norm, is certainly also subject to major 
qualifications. While large corporations are competitive in some respects, cartels, deals and de 
1 That is, private sector processes in Planning bureaucracies which were 'taken on board' through practical 
necessity, power relations or other influences, tend to be legitimized after the fact by Planning theory. in the 
1970s, for example, planning literature began to promote the reform of Planning organisations by introducing the 
management practices of business into public Planning bureaucracies which had begun in the 1960s. Flattening 
the bureaucracy, proactive planning and corporate management became buzz words within Planning departments. 
(Dates vary, of course, depending on the locality. In Tasmania, corporate management styles only became 
fashionable in the 1980s.) Similarly, in the 1980s, mediation and conflict resolution literature legitimized the 
practice that developed in the 1970s of staff planners negotiating with developers in camera for 'concessions' (a 
term which reflects the true power relationship). 
2 Trends within the Journal of the American Institute of Planners constitute a case in point. 
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facto monopolies are commonplace. Corporations must expand and centralize control to 
compete with one another and with foreign enterprises. Buy-outs, mergers and takeovers lead 
to further centralization and decreased competition (and often the loss of production as assets 
are sold off). The resulting structure of corporate mobility, absentee ownership and centralized 
decision making, combined with the lack of structures for accountability, has resulted in many 
social costs which the state must ameliorate. 1 Large corporations (as a group) have a 
'competitive' advantage because they do not have to pay the full social costs of their 
operations. The social costs of corporate capitalism include not only pollution and health 
costs, but the loss of community through the collapse of local institutions, the dislocation of 
workers, and resulting social problems. 
While few still contend that the corpocracy is competitive in reality, members of the 
corporate sector often contend that business is competitive but for government regulation. If 
the corporate sector were indeed competitive, the present trend towards deregulation would 
surely create a more competitive environment. However, there is no evidence that the market 
is becoming more competitive, except in the sense that the weaker are killed off, leading to 
fewer competitors - which destroys competition. It has been suggested that deregulation does 
not so much represent confidence that the private sector is 'competitive' as it shows that people 
lack confidence in their power to control their own destiny.2 Giving up on public sector 
decision making is giving up responsibility for society as a whole. Moreover, deregulation is a 
misnomer, as corporations impose their own rules on the consumer. 
Perhaps the government would be more efficient but for the corpocracy. The growing 
'bankruptcy' of the government service sector is directly related to the social costs of • 
development generated by powerful special interests. For example, public forests on several 
continents continue to be sold off at below cost. 3 In Tasmania, at least, the Forestry 
Commission's A$500 million debt has resulted neither from competitive market forces nor 
public Planning, but rather from power relations (or institutional Corruption). First, 'royalties' 
are set through closed negotiations with specific forestry companies and these royalties do not 
cover the real costs imposed on the Tasmanian forests or public. Second, much of the 
'forestry' debt in Tasmania was incurred - not through the servicing of private forestry 
interests, but - through the actions of a recent pro-development government. It used the 
1 Severyn T. Bruyn and James Meehan, 1987, Beyond the Market and the State: New Directions in Community 
Development (PA: Temple University Press) at pp. 3-4. 
2 Sheldon S. Wolin, 1988, "Collective Identity and Constitutional Power", in Gary C. Bryner and Dennis L. 
Thompson, eds., The Constitution and the Regulation of Society (Salt Lake, UT: Brigham Young University) 
pp. 93-122. 
3 Robert C. Repetto, 1988, The Forest for the Trees?: Government Policies and the Misuse of Forest Resources 
(Wash. D.C.: World Resources Institute). 
142 
Forestry Commission, a statutory authority, to borrow money in order to circumvent ceilings 
on borrowing imposed by the Loans Council. It is thus more than ironic that the bankruptcy of 
government services is one of the main pressures on governments to privatise, sell off assets 
and deregulate. Privatization creates bonanzas for special interests as they are spared all the 
development and infrastructure costs, while paying only the present recessionary value of 
public facilities and resources. Some have gone beyond the claim that the corporate state is or 
should be competitive. They are now glorifying the corporate hierarchical structure (as we 
discuss in Chapter 11). 
In summary, 'competitive markets' and 'quasi-judicial' Planning processes do not represent 
a Valid dichotomy. The association of the market sphere with 'competition' and the Planning 
sphere with 'quasi-judicial' decision-making processes is no longer even accurate as ideals. 
As we have seen, on the one hand, many staff planners are pleased to serve development 
interests as facilitators or entrepreneurs in the land market. (In effect, these planners also make 
policy, which would be 'Corruption' in the quasi-judicial model.) On the other hand, 
corporations externalize the social costs of their activities and receive many other kinds of 
subsidies and this is being rationalized as appropriate. If the dichotomy is real but bad, then 
the take-over by the private sector must therefore be good. 
Organizational norms 
Closely related to the above competitive/quasi-judicial dichotomy is the idea that public 
sector organizations are 'bureaucratic', 'hierarchical', and impersonal, while the market sector 
is 'decentralized', and promotes management 'efficiency'. These word associations still 
persist even though people realize that firms in the market are becoming ever more centralized 
and impersonal, if not pyramidal. Distant corporate boards make decisions, such as to move 
firms or import workers, which devastate local economies and communities that they have 
never seen. Outside investors and managers are often indifferent to local welfare as their aim is 
to remove wealth. Local elites also place personal economic interests above those of the 
residents in the service of elites located outside the area. 1 Local residents become dependent on 
decisions made elsewhere by people not committed to the locality. 
State Planning has been conceived of as command and control, by analogy to the now 
demised Eastern Bloc countries. However, as Sheldon Wolin points out, business 
organizations are in fact structures of control and discipline, often every bit as hierarchical as a 
centralized state bureaucracy.2 Moreover, corporations are now beginning to take over many 
1 R. Matthews, 1983, The Creation of a Regional Dependency (Ontario: University of Toronto Press). 
2 Wolin, 1988, above at p. 116. 
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of the social control functions of the state (such as prisons). The institutions of the private 
realm are increasingly "deemed capable not only of taking over functions previously thought to 
be the unique preserve of the state but of appearing to favour functions - such as schools, 
prisons, and hospitals - that are particularly coercive/disciplinary". 1 This ominous trend is 
even now occurring on an international as well as on a domestic level. For example, private 
sector groups in the United States have set up private armies to overthrow governments with 
which the United States has formal diplomatic relations. 2 
In contrast, Planning bureaucracies, in some places at least, are increasingly less 
hierarchical. For decades, Planning schools have encouraged interdisciplinary team problem-
solving approaches, and this has gradually infiltrated into government bureaucracies. Also, if 
only because of the many different tasks that Planning and pollution control agencies face, 
many planning organizations are composed of small divisions that are horizontally structured. 
This is not to suggest that Planning agencies are not bureaucratic; however, I would dispute 
the idea that they are necessarily more bureaucratic and unaccountable than large private firms. 
While the private sector appears more efficient, it is arguable whether large firms are in fact 
more efficient than government agencies. First, as we have seen, corporations have appeared 
more efficient than they really are because they have been able to externalize their social costs. 
Public sector bureaucracies, in contrast, have appeared less cost effective than they really are. 
This is partly because they subsidize development, the beneficiaries of which keep the profits, 
not the agency. If pollution control agencies were credited with the costs they saved the public 
by preventing pollution it would improve their apparent efficiency. And, it should be 
remembered that such studies evaluate the monetary cost equivalences alone, which, even 
when allowing for health and longevity costs, ignore such considerations as the reduction in 
life quality and scope of public choice. Whether inefficiencies in the market are passed on in 
higher prices or in higher taxes, the bureaucracy bears the blame, as an 'invisible hand' cannot 
be held accountable. 
Second, there is no proof that government agencies are less efficient. In contrast to 
business, government agencies have multiple goals. They have myriad social considerations to 
account for, which often conflict with one another, while business just looks at the bottom 
line. Charles Goodsell argues that when such incommensurables are allowed for, and relevant 
measurements are used, government bureaucracies (in the United States at least) are as efficient 
1 Wolin, 1988, above at p. 115. 
2 Wolin, 1988, above at p. 114. 
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as corporations. 1 The argument against the idea of Planning has really been over whose goals 
it is serving. 
Also, there are no adequate grounds for comparing business and government efficiency as 
public sector bureaucracies have not been analyzed as economic organizations. P.M. Jackson 
shows that the political economies of both large corporations and large bureaucracies are very 
similar.2 Waste and wide discretionary power, the two problems associated with bureaucracy, 
arguably exist to the same extent in large corporations. 3 
Organizational goals 
Although government has had to contend with many conflicting goals, it has tried to meet 
these goals through cost efficiency and contiol - jut as business does. Planning undertaken on 
behalf of either large corporations or a central communist state has traditionally had one 
predominant strategy - control over resources and the environment. This control (or power 
over prices, consumers, suppliers, community, and state) has been achieved through vertical 
integration, horizontal expansion, economic blackmail, and indoctrination through the mass 
media. Control is achieved by means of growth and growth is achieved by means of control. 
In effect, then, growth has become a universal 'solution' to social problems; an 
overarching policy in both Planning and market sectors. When the spillover effects of growth 
create social injustice or inequity, the solution is assumed to be more growth, the benefits of 
which will theoretically 'trickle down' to the victims of earlier spillovers. Then, when • 
industrial growth creates environmental problems, the solution is assumed to be greater 
efficiency to achieve growth with less social cost. For example, The highly acclaimed 1987 
Brundtland Report 4 - although it links poverty and environmental problems to the economic 
system itself - proceeds to call for more efficiency (less waste) and increased growth as 
measured by GNP.5 Like so many 'progressive' documents, it was premised on the 
assumption that we can continue to divide up land and resources as long as we do so more 
equitably and efficiently. 
1 Charles I. Goodsell, 1983, The Case of Bureaucracy: A Public Administration Polemic , 2nd ed. (NJ: Chatham 
House). 
2 P.M. Jackson, 1982, The Political Economy of Bureaucracy (Oxford: Philip Allan Publishers). 
3 In fact, the most hierarchical, 'bureaucratic', and wasteful organizations I worked for were two large businesses. 
4 The "Brundtland Report" has been published as the World Commission on Environment and Development, 
1987, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
5 The Brundaand Report, above at p. 50. 
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The Brundtland Report also assumed that we can somehow solve the little hiccups in our 
economic order with technology before we reach some nebulous limit. For example: 
The accumulation of knowledge and the development of technology can 
enhance the carrying capacity of the resource base. But ultimate limits 
there are, and sustainability requires that long before these are reached, 
the world must ensure equitable access to the constrained resource and 
reorient technological efforts to relieve the pressure. 1 
This suggests that we consume more land and resources while waiting for someone to 
irrefutably determine the scientific 'limits of growth' - yet we may have already exceeded the 
carrying capacity of the planet. 2 Even were such 'brinksmanship' a rational policy, this limit 
cannot be ascertained 'scientifically' because it involves Ethical considerations, such as whether 
we exterminate fellow species and ecosystems and how we as a society should live. To be 
'Ethical', such important decisions cannot be made by 'non-decision', as is currently the case. 
Planning texts from the eastern bloc have also argued for conservation through more 
efficient development, as if wilderness and natural ecosystems were of endless supply. 3 As 
Paul Ekins points out, growth does not in fact equal welfare. Growth "begs three vital 
questions: growth of what? growth for whom? growth with what side-effects?" 4 In a 
framework whose superordinate goal is growth, broadening the scope of public participation 
means very little in relation to the third (environmental) dimension. The idea of freedom and 
choice is specious in a society where the basic Ethical questions about how we should live are 
not open to public debate (as discussed in Chapter 5). The invisible hand belongs to powerful 
producers and uninformed consumers, blinded to the long-term social and environmental 
implications of their behaviour. 
Implications 
I have questioned the association of Planning with: (a) quasi-judicial decision making as 
opposed to the competitive bargain and exchange of the market, (b) a hierarchical bureaucracy 
as opposed to the managerial efficiency of the private sector, and (c) empire building, lack of 
accountability and growth for the sake of growth, as opposed to the dispersed power and 
choice of the market, or, more generally, domination versus freedom. In so doing, I have tried 
to dispel the myth that the public and private sectors are dichotomous in organizational and 
procedural norms and practices. But what is the effect of this false polarity? 
1 The Brunchland Report, above at p. 5. 
2 Many have argued this. See for example, William R. Catton, jr., 1980, Overshoot: The Ecological Basis of 
Revolutionary Change (IL: University of Illinois Press) 
3 See A. D. Ursul, 1983, Philosophy and the Problems of Civilization, trans. by H. Campbell Creighton 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers). 
4 Paul Ekins, 1986, "The Need for a New Economics", in Paul Ekins, ed., above at p. 8. 
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One important effect is this: the public versus private dichotomy of the conventional 
resource allocation model creates the notion that the relationship between the public andprivate 
sector is zero sum.. This is, of course, untrue: a larger sphere of public sector budget making 
does not necessarily mean less private sector activity. 1 James O'Connor has explained how the 
growth of state and monopoly sectors is a single process: "the growth of the state is both a 
cause and effect of the expansion of monopoly capital". 2 Further, a greater amount of 
government regulation does not decrease total consumption and production in the private 
sector. This depends more upon what money is invested in. Economic activity is a function of 
natural resources, labour, capital, and brains. While these may be limited, we will never run 
out of work to do, so unemployment is not necessary (as the Japanese demonstrated). 
Qualitative development can continue indefinitely, although material growth cannot. 
The issue, then, is only what kind of work we wish to pay for. When resources, labour, 
and capital are exhausted into weaponry they are not being used to meet basic needs, wants or 
rights. In terms of the economy, paying people to lean on shovels can be a better investment 
than military 'white elephants'. But the general public is excluded from these decisions; 
military spending is not brought to a vote, nor subject to 'opportunity cost' comparisons. 
Similarly, while we may all want, say, private cars, we are not able to compare what sort of 
world we could be living in had we created jobs producing other things (and not needed to 
commute so far to escape the unpleasantries of car-infested urban areas). Public Planning alone 
can do these sorts of advance projections in order to create social choices. In contrast, private 
interests can only look at predictions and opportunities for investment, which cut off social 
choices. Planning can also result in more market activity and promote more competition by, for 
example, reducing monopolies and redirecting spending into productive (less inflationary), job-
creating civilian uses. 
Decision -making concepts 
It has been argued that there has been a merger of decision-making and organizational norms 
and goals which belies the idea of an irrevocable and zero sum conflict between private 
business and public planning. We now discuss the merger of Planning and business 
methodology. At the most basic level, Planning has generally been conceived in the literature 
as the process of evaluating and selecting alternative land uses. Planning methods are designed 
to help us 'choose' among the best present use values of land and resources (as proposed by 
vested interests), by 'balancing' private rights and claims to these environmental goods. We 
1 Jan-Eric Lane, 1985, State and Market: The Politics of the Public and the Private (CA: Sage). 
2 James O'Connor, 1973, The Fiscal Crisis and the State (NY: St. Martin's Press) at p. 8. 
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now discuss why these two concepts each tend to limit the range of public choice, and are 
incompatible with sustainability. 
First, the implicit purpose of our decision-making methods is to 'choose' among land and 
resource uses. We try to choose now, from presently known options, what is best for the 
future. This approach can be logically linked to Rationalism in Planning which, as we saw, 
concerns itself with designing techniques for framing decisions. A result of Rationalism, and 
the phenomenon of 'economic creep' generally, Planning practice has, in a sense, merged with 
contemporary policy analysis. 1 It has become concerned with predicting, weighing, 
modelling, choosing and monitoring, rather than with resolving such fundamental Ethical 
issues as what constitutes progress, or how to determine and achieve a better quality of life. 
The implicit criterion for decision making is that of balancing individual or group interests 
in land and resource use to achieve the so-called 'balance between conservation and 
development'. This is largely traceable to Pluralist ideology, which is concerned with 
processes for settling disputes over conflicting preferences (as opposed to resolving the Ethical 
dilemmas that underlay them). Given a Pluralist framework, such a 'balance' is generally 
achieved through an incremental decision-making process, weighing of costs and benefits of 
individual proposals and obtaining 'concessions' from developers. Again, in practice, this 
must lead eventually to balancing off the public estate through the incremental divestiture and 
degradation of land and resources. 
We look first at problems with existing decision-making concepts and methods and • 
development control techniques. Then we examine the assumptions that support them. 
Choosing 
In both Rationalist and Pluralist orientations, problem solving is seen as finding means for 
choosing among strategies, counterplans, methods of implementation and so forth. The 
various definitions of Planning are often synonymous with procedural rationality itself, which 
seeks to choose the most efficient means to a given end. As a representative example, a United 
Nations study defines the process of land use Planning as: 
the process of evaluating land and alternative patterns of land use and 
other physical, social and economic conditions for the purpose of 
selecting and adopting the kinds of land use and courses of action best 
calculated to achieve specified objectives •2 (italics added) 
1 See R. Alterman and D. Macrae, Jr., 1983, "Planning and Policy Analysis, Converging or Diverging Trends?", 
American Institute of Planners Journal 49 (Spring) pp. 200-215, which attempts to distinguish planning and 
policy analysis. See also Dennis A. Rondelli, 1973, "Urban Planning as Policy Analysis: Management of Urban 
Change", Journal of American Institute of Planners 39 (January) pp. 13-22. 
2 Gregory K. Wilkinson, 1985, The Role of Legislation in Land Use Planning for Developing countries 
(Rome: FAO). 
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This definition also reflects an instrumentalist ethic and latent goal of 'progress'. While an 
articulated goal of planning may be to provide for human welfare, welfare (as we saw earlier) 
has been equated with progress, which is believed to be achieved through growth. 
Consequently, the purpose of planning becomes to choose the optimum present use of land, 
which, given the_association of welfare and growth, will seldom be the 'no use' option. Often, 
however, the best present use for a particular site may change the ecosystem for all time, cut off 
future choices, and hence reduce our chances of adapting to environmental change. The 
distinction between 'prevention' and 'choosing among alternatives' is not semantic: if we only 
have methodologies for choosing among alternative land uses, a hidden imperative to use land 
is created regardless of the value system we adopt. Because it centres on choosing, the present 
conceptual framework does not encourage us to think in terms of keeping options open or 
preventing problems. 
In a series of decisions, developments will eventually prevail over the no-development 
option. Greens must continually fight the same battles until they lose. While convicted 
criminals in some jurisdictions are immune from double-jeopardy, the environment never is. 
The defence of nature is therefore very expensive because it will be threatened over and over 
again - and its defence is undertaken by (mostly poor) volunteers. While greens must often 
fund their own activism or raise funds for their campaigns, corporate interests have 
stockholders funds to spend, and government developers can spend taxpayers funds. 
This tendency towards closing off future options also holds true whether we have 
incremental or comprehensive decision-making strategies. Even 'comprehensive planning' is, 
in fact, undertaken in an incremental manner. The development of comprehensive zoning 
schemes and master plans really involves choosing among potential uses for land, just as does 
the evaluation of project impacts to decide on permit approvals or design conditions for 
mitigating those impacts. 
Furthermore, planning processes are structured to respond to and select from private market 
initiatives. In lieu of planning for the future, given alternatives are, at best, selected and 
assessed by a technical staff using methods that are biased toward the development of land, 
such as cost-benefit analysis (discussed below). As development of some sort will eventually 
prevail, planners end up bargaining with the developer to get the best development on the 
immediate horizon. This is the case even if planners apply strategies designed to balance the 
stakeholders' relative power. 1 
1 John Forester, 1989, above. 
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Some green economists have suggested setting up a trust fund to compensate future 
generations for present damage. 1 However, tacking on a price (or tax) to cover the value of 
keeping options open will not alter the fact that options have been lost forever. Looked at from 
an Ethical basis, it is like one neighbour destroying the use of another's home and garden, but 
deciding unilaterally: (a) that there is a monetary equivalent to the environmental damage and 
(b) what that damage is worth, according to his own value system. The neighbour has no say 
at all. 
Incrementalisrn 
As we saw in Chapter 2, Pluralism provided the theoretical rationalization for this 
incremental bargaining approach in Planning practice. 2 With the social turbulence of the 1960s, 
planners in the United States had become self-conscious about their inability to implement 
'comprehensive' plans and programs. Incrementalism seemed to conform to actual patterns of 
coping among decision makers - making decisions as little and late as possible, or "muddling 
through".3 Incremental decision maldng is supposed to minimize the risk of big mistakes and 
to be versatile; that is, small steps allow for marginal and tentative adjustments to be made in 
direction or approach. In many contexts, of Course, this is a rational way of coping with the 
uncertainty of modernity where, for example, unexpected technological or political change can 
nullify a long range plan. Incrementalism was therefore accepted as both a natural and 
pragmatic approach to planning. 
In a 'frontier' of endless resources, incrementalism is indeed a reasonable planning strategy. 
However, with regard to land use decisions in a finite world it is, paradoxically, very risky. A 
process designed for making marginal, incremental choices works only if the basic direction 
and institutional structures are appropriate. Incremental adjustments cannot change direction or 
momentum; "one cannot cross a giant chasm in small steps". 4 Preparing for a safe, secure 
future would require living in harmony with nature and in harmony among ourselves - which 
represents a radical and systemic change of direction. The validity of the incrementalist 
strategy, therefore, depends on the type of problem being addressed. 
Incrementalism is especially problematic when applied to the allocation of environmental 
goods. For example, a system which is set up to review, on a case-by-case basis, development 
1 Paul Ekins, Mayer Hillman and Robert Hutchinson, 1992, above at p. 65. 
2 C.E. Lindblom, 1965, The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision Making through Mutual Adjustment (NY: 
Free Press). Lindblom saw bargaining as the central feature of democratic decision making, but placed the 
incremental approach in a broader Rationalist paradiipn. 
3 A term introduced by C.E. Lindblom, 1959, "The Science of Muddling Through", Public Administration 
Review 19 (Spring) pp. 79-88. 
4 A saying attributed to Lloyd George. 
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applications or resource acquisitions, such as timber or mining leases, tends to obscure the 
cumulative social and environmental effects of these resource transfers. The case-by-case 
decision-making approach is therefore incompatible with the concept of 'sustainability', let 
alone the other basic precepts of systems theory and ecology. It is, after all, nonsense to speak 
of 'sustainability' on any given plot of, say, agricultural land, with an accelerating human 
population rate juxtaposed with an accelerating species extinction rate. A 'cancer' on one part 
of the body is a cancer of the whole system. The cumulative effect over the long term is the 
allocation of land and environmental goods to private consumption and thus the elimination of 
future public options. Incremental planning, therefore, merely postpones and exacerbates 
conflict over resources. 
Over time these incremental choices form a 'decision tree', and we are going further and 
further out on a limb. At each branch, Planning decisions are rational, but taken as a whole 
they are not, most dramatically evidenced by the increasing possibility of the collapse of 
planetary life support systems. It is not that the individual decisions are necessarily wrong, but 
that the framework for decision making is inappropriate in a world of finite land and space. To 
use an analogy, drug addicts and criminals do not get up one morning and decide "I believe I 
shall now commence a life of crime"; rather, they do so incrementally in a series of market-
based choices which seem to maximize their self-interest, by balancing the costs and benefits of 
foreseeable alternatives. In this sense, the individual criminal is rational, but over time he gets 
caught up in a kind of momentum which cuts off any meaningful life choices. 
Predicting 
Contrary to the general perception, comprehensive planning, as well as being incremental, is 
also market-based. In practice, master plans in Western liberal democracies rely upon 
predictions of demand, tempered by geographical and other constraints. This usually just 
means allowing for market trends on coloured maps, based on the profit-maximizing potential 
of the land. 1 Of course, prediction is a key part of the methodology of science and makes 
sense in that context. For instance, the prediction of earthquakes can lead to better building 
design and locational decisions or preparedness for the unavoidable. However, 'predictions' 
of social change are really 'projections' of consumer trends, not analyses of the reciprocal 
dynamics of social causes and effects. 2 
If much of physical as well as economic planning involves predicting the market, one could 
not expect planners to perform better than market analysts, whose failure in recent years is 
1 Hamid Shirvani, 1983, "Retrieving the Environmental-Based Physical Development Plan", U.D. Review 6 (4) 
pp. 19-22. 
2 HJ. McCloskey, 1983, Ecological Ethics and Politics (NJ: Rowman and Littlefield) pp. 11-25 distinguishes 
prediction and projection. 
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almost legendary. If we have learned anything from market analysis, it is that predictions 
themselves influence the market. Currently, however, these predictions are made public by 
those who have a vested interest in the direction the market takes. There are, for example, 
individuals and interests in a position to buy vast amounts of stocks in, say, mining resources, 
and then predict a boom in the resource or mining industries. When stocks go up they sell off 
theirs. In the meantime, however, communities have invested vast time, energy and money 
planning for this eventuality, 'counting their chickens'. 
Further, while there is certainly some value in both predictions and projections, we often use 
these methodologies, not to prevent catastrophes, but merely to mitigate their effects. For 
example, where floods can be predicted, flood barriers are often built in lieu of flood plain 
zoning - to accommodate demand for housing. But these can actually increase flood impacts. 
Similarly, because of the professional investment in methods to anticipate and measure 
consequences, we develop cures for consequences, rather than prevention. For example, 
environmental 'controls' treat wastes at the wrong end of the pipe, stack or vent. Despite 
mitigation measures, the pollution is filtered or dispersed - it all gets into the environment 
eventually. Thus, scrubbers absorb toxic air emissions which are later flushed into the water 
system, and land fills, even when lined with clay or rock beds, eventually leak (as people in the 
central United States, where the ground water is now contaminated, have learned). Once 
ecosystems are shattered for their resources or infiltrated with toxics, they are never the same 
again. In short, prevention is the only cure. 
Prevention means changing not only consumption patterns, but industrial processes and 
products themselves. A case in point would be the use of hemp instead of timber to make 
paper. But were such basic investment decisions to be a matter of considered public choice, a 
major overhaul of Planning processes and methods would be required. 
Seeking control 
The underlying fallacy of prediction is that it seeks 'certainty' in an uncertain world. Society 
is a 'chaotic' system and any variation, such as a technological innovation or political event, . 
can affect the entire system. 1 An important lesson to be learned from chaos theory 2 is that, 
because we do not have the knowledge and wisdom to comprehend the complex ecological and 
social ramifications of new technologies, we should make no irreversible choices regarding 
undeveloped land, and instead should invest in restoring life support systems.3 Instead, typical 
1 Mothers, of course, have experienced chaos in childraising, but it was not recognized in science until Mankind 
developed formulas that could begin to encapsulate it. 
2 James Gleich, 1988, Chaos: Making a New Science (London: Heinemann). 
3 See generally Paul B. Thompson, 1986, "Uncertainty Arguments in Enviromental Issues", Environmental 
Ethics 8 (1) pp. 59-75. 
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responses to the new theory of chaos have been an intensification of attempts to better control 
nature. 'Pure' research is not free from either the projections of the observer, or the 
instrumental uses of the results of the research by others. Thus, while the recent interest in the 
science of chaos will change Man's terminology, it will not automatically affect His means of 
problem solving - trying to control, monitor and measure the unknowable and uncontrollable. 
A frequently heard complaint against comprehensive planning is that we 'cannot change our 
rigid, inflexible master plans and regulations fast enough when social or market forces change'. 
But what we call 'social' forces are usually the side-effects of economic determinism. (The use 
of the word 'forces' is also instructive: it is a term of physics - as if the capital accumulation 
process were an act of God, manifesting in scientific laws.) Physical planning, in practice, 
means figuring out how to best engineer people to fit what we call technological or economic 
imperatives, phrases which imply that these imperatives are not Man-made. In other words, 
there is a tendency to change (genetically or culturally-encoded) human needs and relationships 
to find solutions to our Man-made problems, such as our blind faith in the market and 
technology. 
In short, comprehensive planning has often meant trying to control nature and people to 
better serve the needs of the market at the expense of the ecosystem. It is not 'comprehensive' 
in the sense of holistic. Quite the contrary, it ignores the 'whole' and confines public choice to 
narrow parameters set by development interests. 
Balancing 
Comprehensive and incremental planning merge in policy writing. When planners write of 
comprehensive policies by which future land use planning decisions should be made, they can 
usually be paraphrased as "mitigating the bad and enhancing the good", which epitomizes the 
incrementalist approach. (In fact, this was the motto of a planning agency where I once 
worked). This cliche reflects the fact that public sector planners walk a picket fence between 
community and development sectors. A delegation of visiting planners from the former 
U.S.S.R. once concurred with me in this - only they said they had to tiptoe between the 
community and government developers instead. 1 Perhaps this is why planners so often speak 
of the need for more 'coordinated' and 'balanced' decision making. 
As stated above, the criterion for choosing between different land and resource uses is 
'balance': balancing interests or balancing costs and benefits. However, to use 'balancing' 
processes and formulas in making decisions does not mean that the outcome will be balanced. 
What we are really doing is dividing up and distributing the environment in a manner which 
minimizes immediate overt conflict through environmental 'porkbarreling' on a grand scale. 
1 Discussions held with Russian planners visiting the Department where I worked in (circa) 1977. 
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Politicians and developers seem to appreciate this fact because they frequently assert that we 
need more balance. 
Egalitarianism, which underlies this criterion, is an important value, and quite appropriate 
for inter-human issues, but it is inadequate as a Planning paradigm, because it is concerned 
only with two dimensions. The idea that egalitarianism can extend to animals and nature is 
certainly not objectionable, but from a practical stand point it is unhelpful. This is because the 
rights of animals will never be balanced equally with the rights of humans, even in a 
dramatically more aware and less anthropocentric culture (one's own children will never be 
sacrificed for the sake of an entire species, for instance, which is hardly balanced or egalitarian) 
Moreover, there can be no scientific formula for 'balancing conservation and development' 
as it involves Ethics. To achieve a state of ecological sustainability, a 'balanced' end state 
would probably require reverse growth and a reduction of population (hopefully voluntarily). 
This could not be achieved through a balancing process. A master plan that purports to achieve 
sustainability by accommodating an increased human population and 'balance between 
conservation and development' is only wasting taxpayer's money (and fiddling while Rome 
burns). The crucial issues, such as whether an increased population is ecologically sustainable 
have been left to non-decision through the incremental actions of profiteers, politicians and 
technocrats, all of whom are trained to pass on the long-term costs of development. 
The arguments against truly 'comprehensive' (or ecological) planning, are based on the 
Patriarchal forms of Planning attempted in the past - often with allusion to centralized, 
'draconian' regimes such as those of the Eastern Bloc nations. Yet comprehensive planning 
need not be either technocratic and authoritarian, or incremental and market-based. New 
methods can be devised to inform public choice and promote community debate on substantive 
planning issues (Chapter 7). Having looked at the bias created by concepts underlying 
Planning methods, let us now look more specifically at how present planning techniques create 
a penchancy toward the transfer of public resources to development interests and are hence 
non-sustainable. 
Techniques 
Decision analysis 
There are many types of decision-analysis techniques. The better known are cost-benefit 
and risk-benefit analysis. Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) came into use as early as the 1930s, but 
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was criticized for its limitations regarding the 'weighing in' of non-material values. 1 In the 
1970s, new attempts were made to integrate values into decision analysis techniques. Space 
does not allow an exposition of the many incongruities of these decision tools and this topic has 
already been explored by various authors.2 For present purposes, two arguments should 
suffice. First, I have already argued that these decision techniques encapsulate the broader 
approach of modern liberal society toward social and environmental policy making in general 
(choosing and balancing). Second, as I now argue, these techniques and their philosophical 
underpinnings serve to reinforce existing power relationships in resource allocation decisions. 
Of course, it must be said that cost-benefit analyses are not intended nor designed to 
determine social goals or policy. They are evaluative tools at best. They can help us to choose 
among alternative proposals by, in effect, 'balancing' two sides of an equation. These 
techniques are appropriate to aid a developer in determining the feasibility of pursuing a given 
project. However, planners have adapted them for the purpose of determining whether a 
project should be approved by the public. Furthermore, by default, these techniques now serve 
to determine what kind of future we should create for ourselves. 
The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process, fast becoming the 'bread and butter' 
of many planners, was patterned on cost-benefit analysis. The EIA process was designed to 
improve decision-making rationality by forcing the consideration of a wider range of social and 
natural impacts, and alternative land and resource uses. 3 However, it is almost exclusively 
used to evaluate choices as defined by proponents, or vested (corporate or government) 
development interests. In Tasmania, as in most jurisdictions, EIAs are prepared by consultants 
who are paid by, and answerable only to, the project sponsors. In the Third World, the writers 
of CBAs are sometimes employees of large international construction companies who stand to 
gain from lucrative construction contracts. Moreover, in real life, EIAs usually serve a.t 
promotional documents designed to justify government and industry plans. 4 
Not only do EIAs put the basic decisions before the study, but they also impede our ability 
to find the best use of public investment capital. For example, more jobs might be created by 
assisting small business enterprises than by borrowing to build a dam; however, analysts 
1 The U.S. Flood Control Act of 1936 required benefits to exceed costs of dams and other water resource 
developments constructed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 
2 See Michael Clark and John Herington, 1988, The Role of Environmental Impact Assessment in the Planning 
Process (London: Mansell). For a critical review of cost-benefit analysis generally see Daniel Swartzman, Richard 
A. Liroff, and Kevin G. Croke, 1982, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Environmental Regulations: Politics, Ethics, 
and Methods (Wash. D.C.: The Conservation Foundation). 
3 See Serge Taylor, 1984, Making Bureaucrats Think (CA: Stanford University Press). 
4 For example, see the ElAs for the Export Woodchip and Wesley Vale Pulp Mill in Tasmania. They appear to 
make no effort to disguise their promotional intent. 
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frame the issue as whether or not to build a dam. The EIA, then, focuses on that narrow 
question, despite the requirement of presenting alternatives. Of course, dam construction 
appears to create more jobs than the 'no dam' alternative simply because the question is framed 
to disregard the relative cost of the jobs created, the nature of the work, the social displacement 
entailed by a short-term construction project in a remote area, and alternative ways of creating 
jobs. More fundamentally, these studies do not enable us to examine the public value of the 
industry itself in relation to, say, alternative decentralized energy structures. Thus, EIAs tend 
to confine debate to a narrow range of alternative actions presented by their proponents. 
Merely by asking the wrong questions, these decision analysis techniques favour their 
proponents, the development interests. 
In addition, it is widely recognized that what often passes for a cost-benefit analysis or EIA 
usually excludes many social costs, such as pollution, medical bills, lost options, cleanup 
costs, and so forth. 1 For instance, cost-benefit analyses for nuclear plants have not included 
the costs and risks of insuring or decommissioning nuclear plants. Consequently, these costs 
have been left for taxpayers, investors and consumers to worry about, which amounts to over 
50 million to 3 billion per plant? As well as ignoring costs, decision analysts often ignore the 
indirect subsidies and pre-existing benefits the developer receives from the community at large 
that make the project likely to be profitable in the first place. These include the existing 
infrastructure of roads, grants, tax shelters, and cheap loans. 
Similarly, these studies do not take into account the fact that land distribution and values are 
based, not on labour, but on power. 
A man with much property has great bargaining strength and a great 
sense of security, independence and freedom; and he enjoys these 
things not only vis-a-vis his property-less fellow citizens but also vis-a-
vis the public authorities. An unequal distribution of property means 
an unequal distribution of power and status. 3 
The profits from land and development are no longer proportional to the time or energy 
expended on the land, as they were when John Locke propounded his seminal theory. 4 This 
again biases the outcome of these analyses toward the existing distribution of wealth as . it is, in 
a sense, investment capital, more than labour, which generates income ('it takes money to 
1 For example,the 'cost-benefit study' of a controversial hydro-electric dam in Tasmania only considered benefits. 
See H.J. Saddler, Bennett, I. Reynolds, and B. Smith, 1981, Public Choice in Tasmania (Centre for Resource and 
Environmental Studies, ANU, Canberra) and A. Kellow, 1983, "Public Project Evaluation in an Australian State: 
Tasmania's Dam Controversy" The Australian Quarterly 55 (3) (Spring) pp. 263-277. 
2 Lester Brown, 1986, State of the World 1986 (Wash. D. C.: World Watch Institute). 
3 J.E. Meade, 1964, Efficiency, Equality and the Ownership of Property (London: Allen and Unwin) p. 38. 
4 For a discussion on John Locke's theory of property, see Herman E. Daley and John B. Cobb, jr., 1989, above 
at p. 109. 
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make money'). It should instead be recognized that land values now derive from the 
community, that is, resources, labour, and economic activity that are largely external to the 
site. 
Peter Junger illustrates clearly how the outcome of cost-benefit analysis will be a function 
of the existing distribution of wealth in society. 1 One example he uses is the Aswan High 
Dam, which required the relocation of 90 thousand fellahin and nomads. Had they had 
enough power or 'nous' to require compensation to move, the opportunity cost of relocating 
them would have equalled the amount they would have paid to be left alone. Had they been 
rich, however, the cost of relocation could have been greater than all the benefits produced by 
the dam, and the cost-benefit analysis would have therefore invalidated the project. 2 In a more 
recent example, the Three Gorges Dam in China will require 1.7 million people to be moved. 
It would not be feasible to move 1.7 million people in, say, California because they have more 
material possessions (so much for egalitarianism). 
These economistic decision-making techniques are also biased against preserving and 
expanding future social options. For example, if we use 'present value' analyses for choosing 
among alternative land uses, a hidden imperative is created to use land at the highest present 
use, regardless of the particular discount rate used. And, as noted earlier, while the 'do 
nothing' alternative is always one choice, it will seldom outweigh development proposals in 
ad hoc decision making and a cost-benefit analysis favouring non-action will have to be 
defended every time a development is proposed, or the public coffers run low, thereby 
changing the relative costs and benefits. 
In sum, those decision-making tools are predicated on the false metaphor of balancing 
interests when we are really "balancing off' the public estate in response to pressures to 
placate producer and consumer demands and to contain conflict over resources. From a long-
term perspective, decision-making techniques favour development and the existing distribution 
of power, and they tend to incrementally reduce future options - especially when land and 
resources are alienated to centralized, powerful interests. This is not to say that cost-benefit 
analysis is not a useful aid to decision making, but it is only appropriate for making choices 
among given proposals usually based on a narrow conception of monetary efficiency (or 
preferences, below). There is nothing sacrosanct about the concept of efficiency that underlies 
Planning methodology. It was not arrived at democratically. The selection of cost efficiency 
rather than, say, public health, as the superordinate goal or measure of social welfare, has not 
been explicitly voted upon, nor is it to be found in any Constitution (to my knowledge): 
1 Peter D. Junger, 1979, "The Inapplicability of Cost-benefit Analysis to Environmental Policies", Ekistics 276 
pp. 184-194. 
2 Peter D. Junger, 1979, above at p. 188. 
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Is there really no alternative to the concept of 'balancing the good and the bad', upon 
which our complex methodologies are designed? If we must 'balance' something, why not 
consider other things. For example: (a) Are the developers gaining more from society than 
they are contributing? (b) Does the energy used in extracting and converting resources (in, 
say, energy facilities and agricultural production) exceed that produced in the process? (c) 
Can crops be grown within the land's sustainable limits of soil, water, and nutrients, or, are 
we giving back something to the land in return for what it gives us? 1 (d) If previously 
undeveloped land is required for a necessary structure, can this be balanced by restoring an 
equivalent area of developed land to open space for other plant and animal species (for . 
instance, derelict farmland)? (e) Will the decision affect the life quality of future generations 
adversely, or, is there inter-generational equity? (f) What is the 'opportunity cost' of closed 
options itself for future public choice? (g) How is the life quality of children, our greatest 
'resource', affected? and so forth. 
The above decision-making techniques derive from a rights-based ethic based on an 
androcentric model of Man. Further, it is a view of decision making made possible by the 
liberal model of Impersonal Man: the decision maker as a rational goal optimizer or 
'satisficer'.2 If we accept that the Masculine model of Man is not universal, is there any 
reason why we cannot develop in our children an Ethic of caring and responsibility, as 
opposed to one based on rights? Are the norms of risk-taking, interest balancing, and trading 
off rights (preferences) any more 'real' than the norm of preparing for a safe, secure future? 
Let us consider the idea of preferences in relation to environmental decision making. 
Preference based 
The inability of the economist's models to comprehend environmental issues is becoming 
well understood.3 But even if properly applied so as to take into account the long-term and 
indirect costs of development, the underlying concepts of economics are still incongruous 
when applied to environmental issues. This is because they are based on 'preferences' which 
are needs created by the market. For example, suburban sprawl has been attributed to 
people's preferences. Sprawl has in fact provided a greater market for appliances and cars. It 
has also isolated people and mandated the inefficient use of resources and energy. The market 
may lead to efficiencies in price but is highly wasteful of resources, and it has, of course, 
1 Sara Ebenrecic, 1983, A Partnership Farmland Ethic", Environmental Ethics Vol 5 (1) pp. 43. 
2 'Satisficing' was the term introduced by Herbert A. Simon, 1957, Models of Man (NY: Wiley). See also 
1976, Administrative Behaviour A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization 3rd ed. 
(NY: Free Press). See Amitai Etzioni, 1967, "Mixed Scanning: A 'Third' Approach to Decision-Making", Public 
Administration Review 27 (December) pp. 385-92. 
3 See Herman E. Daley and John B. Cobb, jr., 1989, above. 
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created other costs, such as social and psychological impacts which reverberate within the 
economy. People do not necessarily prefer these side effects of sprawl. 
The mainstream environmental economists' approach purports to measure what people are 
willing to pay (or what payment they will forego) to preserve environmental amenity or 
wildlife. For example, there are several techniques to find 'surrogate markets' for those 
priceless public goods that have no market. This requires all kinds of assumptions that are 
value-laden and permits all kinds of manipulation in converting values to numbers. As a case 
in point, the 'hedonic' price approach looks at how property values vary with the 
environmental attributes of different neighbourhoods. By using multiple regressions, analysts 
can then assess what difference in property value is attributable to a unit increase in factors 
such as pollution, noise, or diminished view. But this excludes the opportunity cost of all the 
people who forego higher salaries, status and other benefits of city life to live closer to a 
relatively 'natural' environment (to which many urban refugees here in Tasmania can attest). 
These Rationalist decision-making methods are ultimately based on the view of the self-
interested, atomistic, non-sexed and non-gendered human of Pluralist theory who relates to 
others through exchange relationships. How is this so? Pluralism, as we have seen, raises 
individual rights above responsibilities because of its conception of the human as a freedom-
seeking individual. The paradigm does not recognize Ethics, except in the narrow utilitarian 
sense of determining (contractual) rules by which to make decisions. 1 The choice of rules for 
decision making has been predetermined by the technocracy in the selection of positivist, 
economics-based techniques. Since equal rights fills the place of Ethics in this paradigm, 
'ethical' decision making is taken as either synonymous with equity, or with maximizing 
aggregate individual welfare (as the utilitarian conception of the greatest good for the greatest 
number assumes the community is the sum of its individuals). 
Pluralism thus supports and validates the economic concept of aggregating preferences in 
order to weigh alternative choices. But this conception is inherently biased against 
preservation because it ignores the realities of power relationships. Consumers and voters do 
not have meaningful choices because they do not have adequate information and, as we 
discussed above, they do not have a say in fundamental investment decisions. When 
members of the public object to development proposals which will result in resource 
exploitation and industrial pollution, the proponents of these projects claim they are just 
following the dictates of the 'market'. Problems which cannot be blamed on voters or 
consumers are attributed to the mythical 'invisible hand' (this con is air tight). 
1 Again, ecofeminism would interpret Ethics to mean seeking fundamental, ecologically-based principles for 
guiding relationships, as opposed to formulas for making decisions. 
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Wilderness and preferences 
Wilderness preservation is an example of a problem that falls between the cracks of a 
resource allocation system that is based on the precepts of economics. Wilderness areas, as 
public land, can only be protected by Parliament or Congress. It is said that if people 'prefer' 
to preserve wilderness they can express this by their voting and purchasing behaviour. Thus, 
in a democracy, the citizen 'as voter' is ultimately held responsible, just as is the citizen 'as 
consumer' in the market. But to assume that wilderness is just a matter of 'preferences' is to 
assume it is either expendable or inexhaustible, which today should be considered tantamount 
to the view that the earth is flat. 
The pricing system cannot protect wilderness (or non-human nature generally) in the long 
term. If market preferences are the source of value, wilderness will be valued highly enough 
to preserve only until economic cycles create a demand for more resources. While public 
protest may stop a particular development, the fate of wilderness will depend on the public 
perception of the economy in any given year. Even then, the fear of a scarcity of resources 
can be created (and often is). This perception is subject to manipulation by the media, which 
is controlled by powerful special interests. 1 As the scarcity of resources drives up the relative 
price, the public pressure to open wilderness up to development eventually becomes 
irresistible. 
What environmental economists call 'existence values' - the measure of our 'preferences' 
for preserving the intrinsic value of nature - will also fluctuate with our perception of the 
economic situation.2 (This is a peculiar concept, as the 'intrinsic value' of nature should not 
depend on its value to people.) When a scarcity of resources eventually drives up the use 
value of a remaining natural area relative to its existence value, it will again be divided with 
perhaps some more (smaller) areas set aside to meet the 'claims' of environmentalists. When 
wilderness is so scarce as to cease to be natural, or when segregated in islands, it will lose its 
value (and sustainability) as wilderness. This outcome is in no way 'balanced', as wilderness 
is gone forever. 
Pluralism, which depicts the environmental problem as competing claims to environmental 
goodies, has militated against alternative (ecofeminist or deep ecologist) conceptions that value 
community and nature for their own sake. By legerdemain, Pluralism legitimizes a power- 
1 For a discussion on corporate influence over public opinion as a form of social control, see Elizabeth Noelle-
Newmann, 1984, The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion and Our Social Skin (University of Chicago Press). 
She argues that the media can shape public opinion by merely stating what public opinion is. Also, as minority 
views are deterred, the dominant viewpoint gains more force. See also H. McClosky and J. Zaller, 1985, The 
American Ethos: Public Attitudes Toward Capitalism and Democracy (Mk. Harvard University Press). 
2 See for example, David Pearce, 1989, Blueprint for a Green Economy (London: Earthscan). 
160 
based social structure and yet makes it invisible by reifying individual rights and competition. 
This underwrites utilitarian, rationalist, decision-making techniques which favour the existing 
distribution of power. However, both Rationalism and Pluralism rely upon an androcentric 
model of Man for their legitimacy. Recognizing this, the intellectual structure is easy to 
dismantle. 
Regulatory design 
Let us briefly review some criticisms that have been levelled at different types of 
environmental regulation. 'Ambient quality' pollution controls set standards for, say, air 
quality. One problem is that they assume a safe threshold level for toxic wastes although there 
are no safe thresholds for many toxic substances. 1 Also, there is not (as yet) adequate 
knowledge about the synergistic interrelations of chemicals, ecosystems, and human health in 
order to set thresholds of safety. Technology -based' pollution controls require the best 
available or practicable equipment (in terms of pollution minimization). They have also been 
criticized, as they effectively impose greater requirements on new industries and technologies 
by 'grandfathering' or giving dispensations to existing establishments. It seems inequitable to 
shut down old industries even if they are compensated. This again relates to the fact that 
ethical considerations - to the extent that they enter the picture - are taken for fairness, or 
'equity' among producer interests. It is interesting how this norm contrasts with the well-
established policy of paying farmers to not produce crops. By a similar logic, society could 
subsidize modernization rather than continuing to subsidize polluting industries by covering 
some of the resulting medical costs of its 'victims'. 
The trend, however, is toward market-based regulations. These are based on the 'polluter 
pays' principle, whereby one can pollute if one, in effect, buys a ticket. 2 (Not only does this 
create a 'right' to pollute, it can make polluting fun: transferable development rights and 
emissions trading may soon appear as board games.) As a means of minimizing waste and 
resource consumption, of course, the 'user pays principle' makes sense as individuals become 
more ecologically aware if they have to pay for resource use directly. In the case of pollution, 
however, it is a different story. Emissions trading is where polluters are sold tradeable 
property rights in resources and can therefore buy and sell rights to pollute. It can be, in 
effect, a grant to continue the present rate of emissions by cleaning up pollution elsewhere. 
1•Hilary Brown and John Valentine, 1981, Power Corrupts: The Arguments against Nuclear Power (London: 
Pluto Press). 
2 See generally G. Nagel, 1981, "Environmental Policy on the Hazards of Incentives and Merits of 
Regulations", in Frank Joyce, ed., Local Government and Environmental Planning and Control (Aldeishot: 
Gower Publishing Company) pp. 138-151. 
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While it can reduce overall levels, it does not create much incentive to develop abatement 
technology. The method still requires the political will to force technological modernization 
through the reduction of the emissions value of permits. This requires some form of Planning 
system. Further, the method cannot take into account the relative value of the product 
produced, or the costs per job created. This means that market-based regulations can give a 
competitive advantage to a relatively anti-social product. 
Part of the reason for these regulatory incongruities lies in the conceptual basis upon which 
the regulations are built. Although land, water and forests are often called public 'goods', our 
methods treat them as being raw materials of no intrinsic value. Thus their destruction can be 
compensated for or traded off by such devices as cash contributions, taxation, development 
impact fees or emissions trading schemes. Regulatory devices do not protect the public 
domain and public health, but merely exact a tax or royalties on their destruction, or provide 
for compensation in another area. Thus, a mine may be permitted which destroys an • 
ecosystem, but half a million is required to be spent on developing a management plan for 
preserving one species of threatened parrot. 
Planning regulations can also contribute directly to inefficiencies, conflict, and risk. For 
example, the process of monitoring and enforcing complex controls is expensive for both 
industry and taxpayers, and creates an incentive to oppose regulation in court - a highly non-
productive activity. Further, the wrong activities are often regulated. For example, because 
Ethics is not recognized as a valid category of decision making, risk taking is not regulated. 
Instead, we regulate accidental or excessive pollution, usually by charging a fine after the fact. 
Those who profit from risk taking are penalized only if an accident occurs, based on a portion 
of the amount of damage. This is like stopping a reckless driver only after someone is killed 
and then only charging a fine. This form of subsidy gives corporations a fiscal incentive to 
take risks: because accidents are rare, one only has to pay a fine when one is caught, and the 
cost is invariably less than the damage. 
There have, of course, been some alternative ideas mooted by planners and 
environmentalists with regard to both project assessment and development control. One 
approach is 'scenario planning', where the possible outcomes of alternative actions are 
predicted and compared. This is an improvement over methods geared toward merely 
deciding whether or not to approve a particular development. However, as scenario planning 
is geared to make the best use of investment capital, it is primarily useful for developers. For 
example, it is useful to governments in their capacity as developers in deciding, say, where to 
invest road building funds. As in the case of cost-benefit analysis, it is not practicable for 
determining social goals, but only for deciding which development to undertake. Like market 
and political decision-making processes, it cannot make more basic Ethical decisions. The 
system could, however, be expanded to acquire information on the broader ramifications of 
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these larger issues and improved means of assessing the impacts of human activities on 
different ecosystems precedent to determining the limits to growth. 
Others have proposed Planning methods designed to correlate development with the 
carrying capacity of the environment. The assumption behind trying to establish a carrying 
capacity is that there is an amount of development that can occur without transgressing the 
limits of the ecosystem to sustain or repair itself. Along these lines, Jercy Kozlowski has 
promoted what he calls the Ultimate Environmental Threshold or UET method. 1 The idea is 
that environmental boundaries are determined which then become the basis for constraining 
development and human activities; that is, development is framed by environmental 
'dimensions'. These dimensions are spatial (the allowable area of an activity); quantitative 
(the allowable level or volume of the activity); qualitative (kind of output); temporal 
(allowable rate or time periods for development). 2 
In concept, the UET method is not unlike the conditions placed on development permits, 
only they could apply to all developments in a regional area. The result could be similar to 
'pollution bubble' schemes, which allow a certain level of emissions for certain substances or 
set total air quality requirements for a region. Within the bubble, industries could distribute 
the allowable pollution rates among themselves by various emissions trading schemes. • 
However, the UET process would attempt to consider the synergistic effects of chemicals and 
unite the different environmental media (air, water, soil). 
While it is useful to determine the limits to regional development based on the carrying 
capacity of the environment, there are some problems here. For example, the concept is 
analogous to 'building envelopes' in urban development controls, which are defined by 
allowable yard areas, set-backs, height and bulk restrictions and floor area ratios. If one 
creates a 'solution space' in regional Planning, then, just as in the case of allowable building 
envelopes, projects will expand to fill the allowable space. Otherwise, developers feel they 
are not maximizing the development potential of the site. 
Another problem is that it assumes there is a threshold beneath which the environmental 
impact is not significant. The same assumption was made in the case of radioactive and other 
toxic contaminants, until measurement techniques became so accurate that it could be 
determined that one part per trillion of, say, dioxin, was harmful. We may have already gone 
beyond the point of elasticity whereupon the capacity of GAIA to repair herself is 
transgressed. Even so, in the case of a highly overstressed planet, it is questionable if 
1 Iercy Kozlowski, 1986, Threshold Approach in Urban, Regional and Environmental Planning (Si Lucia: 
University of Queensland Press); Jercy Kozlowski, no date, "Integrating Ecological Thinking into the Planning 
Process", Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fiir Sozialforschung (Reichpietschufer 50, 1000 Berlin (West) 30. 
2 Kozlowski, no date, above at p. 19. 
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development of any sort in the remaining (relatively) natural habitats can be considered safe. 
For example, the first use of this technique was a regional plan for the Tatry National Park in 
Poland. When seen as a self-contained park, development can easily be justified. But when a 
park in Poland is seen as a rare remnant island in a sea of environmental devastation, perhaps 
it is appropriate that no development occur. A region as big as a national park is still not self-
contained. 
Prevention 
Market-based techniques and regulations are an attractive alternative to calls for more 
fundamental institutional reform. The basic argument is that private interest in profit will lead 
to more 'efficiency' and that this will be adequate to reduce pollution. Yet individual polluters 
may prefer to continue polluting for a fee where, for example, the resource (eg. minerals, rare 
timbers) is running out, therefore maldng factory upgrading impractical. True economic 
efficiency would dictate that no pollution leave the site. When externalities and the 
replacement value of resources are considered, it necessarily costs the public more to clean up 
pollution and accidents than to pay for cleaner technologies outright. Thus, greens propose a 
'preventative' approach where pollution is internalized physically by having a closed-loop 
system. This means, for example, that the intake of water for a timber mill would be piped 
back from downstream of the mill. 
Prevention is the only cure. Once ecosystems are shattered for their resources or infiltrated 
with toxics, they will never be the same again. Environmental controls only filter or disperse 
pollution - it all gets into the environment eventually. And, as explained above, prevention 
means changing not only consumption patterns but the industrial processes and products. 
This our present regulations cannot do, especially where these processes and products give a 
competitive advantage. We have the capacity to enforce new technologies and systems, but 
because we impose the costs of regulations on individual firms, the conversion to sustainable 
production is politically infeasible. In the long run, it would be cheaper to forget the sunk cost 
and re-engineer industries or convert highly polluting activities to ecologically-sound ones at 
public expense. If society can afford to pension-off thousands of redundant workers, surely 
it can pension off a few industrialists. It may be cheaper in the long run for society as a whole 
to bear the cost of converting to sustainable industrial/commercial interests than to continue to 
subsidize the destruction of the environment. Again, this positive form of subsidy could only 
be achieved through some form of Planning system. 
This form of subsidy suggests that greens and industrial interests share a common interest. 
Yet powerful interests do not lobby for this 'obvious' approach. Let us consider some 
possible reasons for this. First, because they are in a competitive mode, they perhaps cannot 
collectively demand compensation for industry-wide change. This is unlikely to be the case, 
because they presently operate on a collective basis to demand protection and subsidies from 
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governments. Second, they may be locked into a mode of grabbing what they can get from 
the public trough and are too busy felling trees to see the forest. Third, they may be 
'irrational' in not pursuing their individual and collective self-interest This latter possibility 
could be because powerful interests do not want to appear to be holding society to ransom, or 
accept accountability for their part in the problem - or even recognize that there is a problem. 
It could also be that the competitive mode is underwritten by a mindless power drive. Power 
for power's sake is (an inappropriate but) prevalent means of getting one's personal needs 
met. 
This leads us to another problem. Let us assume that new, improved concepts and 
methods for determining the ultimate limits of development, evaluating proposed projects, 
and/or regulating development were designed. We would still be left with the problem of 
decision makers who still embody pre-ecological ways of thinking which would bias the 
implementation of general policies and site-specific decisions. This reality is faced by green 
politicians and activists daily. 
The Impersonal decision maker 
The above concepts and methods might work fairly well if the assumptions of Pluralist 
society and Rational Man were true (Chapter 2). However, in a Patriarchal society at least, 
decision making is affected by both hierarchical power relations and personal emotional 
insecurities. Pressures of both kinds can lead to corruption. This has been reinforced by the 
traditional approach to analyses of government decision making which ignore individual 
emotional factors. The individual is treated as if she or he were a 'firm' or a black box on a 
management chart. Since Man is 'rational', he optimizes, by definition. And since Man is an 
optimizer (satisficer or maximizer), the decision maker in government becomes an objective 
public goal maximizer. It seems somewhat paradoxical that the competitive, self-interested, 
rational Man of the political/economic sphere becomes a selfless decision-making node when 
employed in the public sector. In both cases, however, He is a goal-oriented information 
processor rather than an emotionally complex (and sexed) individual. 1 It follows from the 
mechanistic view of the human that poor decisions or outcomes must simply be the result of 
the decision maker's inability to cope with information and complexity. 
The traditional portrayal of planners and officials as Rational goal maximizers was 
considered problematic in that it did not explain poor Planning decisions, and the widely 
1 The traditional view of organizational behaviour conceived of humans as "mechanisms for computation and 
choice", limited by environmental and intellectual constraints. See Herbert A. Simon, 1957, Models of Man: 
Social and Rational (NY: John Wiley & Sons), especially Part IV, from p. 196. 
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recognized failure of policy implementation in Planning. The decision maker came to be 
described as a goal 'sufficer' who would only scan a limited range of options, bounded. by an 
aspiration level that fluctuated with the available time, resources, energy and information. 1 
Later the 'garbage can' model was introduced, a metaphor which conveyed the idea that 
decision makers took mixed scraps of information from anywhere. Problems were explained 
in terms of the human's inability to process information, while the model of Impersonal Man 
remained essentially the same. 
This narrow, positivist, and gender-blind View of decision making meant that the 
psychological, political, and cultural influences on the decision maker were not adequately 
factored into analyses. Actual resource allocation processes that did not fit the Impersonal 
decision maker model were left unanalyzed. Therefore, deals, bargains, custom, Corruption, 
and personal influence from within and without government decision making were largely 
ignored. Because the political activity did not fit the Rationalist paradigm that has dominated 
studies of decision making, these factors were not considered relevant to Planning and 
administrative theory.2 
More recent theories, such as process models, 3 consider the interaction of power and 
values, such as the effects of 'rules of the game' and 'non decision-making' structures. 
However, they largely ignore the irrational by-products of Patriarchal programming on 
(particularly) the male psyche. They cannot explain the political behaviour of bureaucrats 
intent on building a dam regardless of the public opposition or economic/social arguments 
against it (apparently just to prove their masculinity: Appendix 1). 
Further, the Rational model does not comprehend the idea of Corruption. To repeat, 
systemic Corruption occurs where a government agency betrays the public trust by 
transferring resources to special interests at net public cost and without significantly violating 
organizational and/or institutional norms. This form of Corruption - the misappropriation of 
public resources and trust - is not necessarily deliberate, but is a function of the perceptual 
'filter' formed by the organizational Infrastructure itself. In the Rational decision-making 
model, Corrupt behaviour is not stigmatized, at least to the extent that it is consistent with 
Rational or self-interest maximizing behaviour.4 For example, it has been argued that, 
1 Herbert A. Simon, 1976, Administrative behaviour A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative 
Organization 3rd ed. (NY: Free Press). 
2 Janis Birkeland-Corro, 1988, "Land Use Planning and Conflict Resolution", Australian Planner (March) pp. 
8-11. 
3 See R.H. Simmons, B.W. Davis, R.J.K. Chapman, and D.D. Sager, 1974, "Policy Flow Analysis: A 
Conceptual Model for Comparative Public Research", Western Political Quarterly 27 (3) pp. 457-468. 
4 See Steven Kelman, 1981,What Price Incentives? Economists and the Environment (Boston: Auburn 
House). 
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according to the logic of micro-economic analysis, resources should not be invested in 
eliminating Corruption unless it is cost effective to do so. 1 This approach ignores the moral 
dimension of Corruption altogether and it also assumes that the given system, which fosters 
Corruption, is adequate to prevent Corruption. 
Efficiency 
Due to this mechanistic model, efficiency has been taken as an ultimate goal, rather than a 
means, and efficiency has been measured in terms of cost. This narrow view of what 
constitutes efficiency is in part because the administrative sciences have built upon ideas taken 
from private sector micro-economic theory. This theory is useful to explain the behaviour of 
the individual firm - if that firm's goal is to maximize profits. Generally, therefore, micro-
economic theory is applicable for developing means for firms to arrive at optimal business 
decisions in terms of profit alone. 
As a consequence, decision-making models in the administrative sciences were based on a 
one-dimensional and vertical goal structure, parallel to that of profit maximization by the 
individual firm. Following the administrative sciences, planners studied the government 
process in terms parallel to that of the private firm. Their analyses were thus based on a linear 
and rational goal structure. As noted above, the model was incongruous as government 
organizations are concerned with multiple and often conflicting goals. 2 
In a one-dimensional goal structure, the Rational decision maker theoretically has one 
motive - to optimize - whether profit, efficiency or social welfare. To optimize means to 
increase the efficiency of the means-ends relationship. In government, the superordinate goal 
has increasingly been considered to be efficiency per se , rather than the profits that, in the 
private sector, are to be achieved through efficiency. Efficiency is taken to be the highest goal 
despite the fact that sub-optimization at the agency level often means waste of resources and 
inefficiency at broader levels. For example, maximizing the efficiency of a hydro-electric 
agency may result in an oversupply of energy or a misallocation of resources to capital 
intensive energy facilities, as opposed to more cost-effective conservation measures. 
For purposes of accounting, efficiency has also come to be synonymous with social 
welfare, though it also refers to the relationship of input to output. This has been confused, in 
practice, with cost minimization. Other goals or other types of efficiency could just as well 
have been selected. We could, for example, seek efficiency in 'life saving', energy or material 
(input/output) efficiency, or 'ecological effectiveness'. Health indices could also be used to 
1 For example, see Edward C. Banfield, 1975, "Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization", 
Journal of Law and Economics 18 pp. 587-605. 
2 See generally P.M. Jackson, 1982, The Political Economy of Bureaucracy (Oxford: Philip Allan Publishers). 
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measure efficiency. It must be remembered also that efficiency was not selected through a 
democratic process. Rather, it developed through the shared consensus of a technocratic elite. 
Moreover, the goal of efficiency was never really questioned by the technocracy. It has been 
the dominant value of academic and professional models since the turn of the century. 
Efficiency has also been the dominant goal in the eastern bloc or socialist countries, despite the 
cold war - supporting mythology that the two camps had diametrically opposed values and 
ideologies. The technocracy in both political blocs, socialist and capitalist, marched to the beat 
of the same drum - cost efficiency to be achieved through the control of all factors of 
production. 
It is hard to oppose fatherhood terms like efficiency. After all, it appears to be a value-free 
concept for measuring input and output, and implies conservation of resources. However, 
efficiency is not value free when placed in context. When, in the name of cost efficiency, 
government agencies or elected representatives assume cost minimization and economic 
growth as the goal, they place the welfare of large corporate interests above public health and 
environmental quality - both of which are also vital 'resources'. This transfer of resources 
and costs is possible because people are denied a meaningful choice through the operation of 
the Planning system itself. As we have seen, the public has not selected cost efficiency as the 
goal upon which the decision-making models are built (they have never been voted upon and 
are not in the Constitution). Nor has the public been given a real choice of whether to achieve 
efficiency through a growth or a conservation policy. 
Cost efficiency has been a goal, yet in a 'rational' decision-making system, it would be a 
secondary criterion for selecting among development options, below more fundamental goals 
such as planetary and human survival. Given the androcentric Enlightenment view of Man, 
however, the quest for self-realization has been more fundamental, so basic and natural in 
fact, that it need not be named. And, as progress is the manifestation of androcentric Man's 
quest for self-realization, progress has been associated with welfare. Where does this leave 
us? When we put the above assumptions together, we have the following circuitous logic: (a) 
progress = welfare; (b) welfare is measured by efficiency; (c) efficiency requires control 
over all means of production; (d) control is achieved through economic growth. And (if a = 
b, and b = c, and c = d, then a = d), therefore, growth = progress. In sum, welfare, 
efficiency, control, growth, and progress have been invisibly, yet inextricably linked. 
This chain of values holds together only because 'the personal' element has been dropped 
from the equation. Man has become a rational goal optimizer who seeks policy change to 
make the political context more amenable to the furtherance of His goals through pluralist 
struggle. We are trapped in a closed system of Masculine values. The Planning system has 
evolved around concepts that have been unselfconsciously selected 'of, for and by' those who 
are inculcated to associate progress with their sense of self. But where is the Feminine 
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principle in this equation? What about personal and emotional dimensions of life? (Appendix 
2 gives an account of how this value system affects the ability of citizens to undertake 
community improvements.) 
In this chapter, I have suggested that the public and private sectors increasingly use the same 
one-dimensional processes and methods for reaching decisions. Planning methodology shapes 
goals and criteria that create an inherent bias against environmental protection by, among other 
things, framing Ethical issues as technical choices and ignoring the realities of power and 
gender influences in decision making behaviour. Planners are becoming merely economic 
auditors. As more people come to perceive Planning as an extension service of the 
development industry, it will lose any remaining legitimacy as a forum for resolving 
environmental conflict 
CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION OF 
PART II 
Recap 
It has been said that the reform of our decision-making system is 'no substitute for maldng 
the right decisions about resource allocation'. I have argued, however, that over the long term, 
at least, we cannot make the right decisions within the present system, regardless of what 
policies we may officially adopt. Contrary to the prevailing ideology of economic determinism, 
some form of Planning is essential for a sustainable society, as it enables a society to provide 
for basic needs and 'freedoms' within a long-term framework. However, given its present 
design, Planning contributes to the economic and ethical deficiencies of the Allocation system, 
and exacerbates the environmental problems and social conflict which justify its existence in the 
first place. 
Of course, many examples of sound, substantively rational Planning can be cited. But in the 
context of the accelerating destruction of the environment, those decisions which are not 
ecologically sound will eventually cancel out any that are. As unalienated land, resources, and 
amenity continue to diminish, social conflict must inevitably increase, particularly in the 
absence of an environmental conflict prevention system. Therefore, Planning cannot achieve 
basic needs, the most basic of which is sustainability. If we are to begin to heal the earth and 
human spirit, an entirely new public choice system is needed that will enable society to debate 
and decide the fundamental Ethical questions that underlie environmental problems, and to 
engage in preventative planning. A Planning sphere that can assist us in making the necessary 
transition to a society that exists in harmony with itself and the rest of nature must be, not only 
separate, but of an entirely new order. It must be Ethics-based as opposed to market or power-
based (again, I refer to an Ethic of care and responsibility rather than a rights-based or 
egalitarian conception of ethics). 
The previous chapters have been an attempt to contribute to this rethink. This has involved 
(a) a redefinition of the environmental problem; (b) a realignment of the major public decision-
making institutions for resource allocation - the political, legal, market and Planning areas 
('superstructure'); (c) a reconstruction of the Planning system itself ('structure'); and, (d) a 
redesign of the methods and processes of Planning practice ('infrastructure'). Let us briefly 
review the ground we have covered in reaching this conclusion. 
We saw that Planning thought is premised on the androcentric assumptions of Pluralist 
ideology, a prism designed around (atomistic) individuals and rights-based social relations. It 
therefore cannot envelop the environment, or 'third dimension'. Thus, the solution sought is 
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more equity and efficiency, rather than prevention and preservation. In a Pluralist framework, 
the concept of 'ethics' itself has been narrowly construed to mean distributional justice - who 
should obtain the benefits of environmental exploitation and how quickly. The decision-
making framework itself causes us to construe environmental problems as matters of 
distribution. Environmental issues cannot be resolved by rights-based forms of disputation. 
This is not a sufficient Ethic upon which to build a system that can prevent environmental 
conflict. 
For practical purposes, the 'crux' of the environmental problem can more usefully be 
understood as the abuse of power and the resulting transfer of resources from public to 
corporate interests (often at below real cost), which leads to a spiral of environmental 
destruction, social injustice, and conflict. Such a problem definition suggests very different 
solutions than the conventional treatment of environmental problems as 'the need to balance 
competing interests' in resources, or its more radical version, 'the need to extend the ethics of 
egalitarianism to include nature'. The redesign is based on preventing the abuse of power, and 
on fairness of outcomes, rather than fairness of process alone. 
We saw that powerful development interests reinforced by a blind faith in market 
determinism dictate government policy. Rather than providing checks on market and political 
decision making, Planning replicates these systems in making trade-offs of environmental 
protection for short-term -private 'wants'. Hence, ultimately, Planning favours the powerful 
and facilitates the transfer of resources to special interests. One reason for this is that (with 
regard to significant development projects) public sector Planning is merging with that of the 
business sector through corporatist decision-making processes. 
The conventional description of this resource allocation system, in contrast, presents the 
public and private sectors in a dichotomous relationship. It portrays the resource allocation 
system as dualistic when it is, in fact, hierarchical. This creates a series of false choices in the 
public imagination which advantages powerful development interests. A new descriptive 
model was proposed to accentuate the problems with the actual resource allocation system. 
An alternative to the hierarchical system and its dualistic ideology is proposed. Because 
Planning is permeated with power-based ideologies and practices that promote self-interest and 
competition, it cannot be reformed. Giving more importance to Planning would therefore not 
be sufficient. A new, relatively autonomous social decision-making arena is therefore 
necessary to deal with Ethical (environmental) issues. While the design and implementation of 
Ethics-based decision-making processes and methods is essential, institutional reform is not a 
solution in itself. It cannot overturn the realities of structural power and decades of collective 
value formation. One advantage of a new institution, however, is that vestiges of old ways of 
thinking are more easily prevented than weeded out. Also, as institutional change is necessary 
and reciprocal to social transformation, new institutions can help stimulate social change. 
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The Planning sphere would be on a more equal footing with the market and political sphere 
to form a (tri-partite) model of governance, with a fourth legal arena mediating these spheres. 
The function of the new governmental structure would be to constrain the abuse of power and 
enable society as a whole us to address environmental, as well as social and economic issues. 
A tri-partite model would help to create such safeguards as 'checks and balances' and 
'separation of powers' - principles which, though enshrined by liberal thought, have been lost 
through the corruption of our rights-based decision-making institutions. 
The Planning system itself would need more appropriate structure and function. I have 
suggested that the Planning system does not, at present, encourage a 'preventative' problem 
solving approach that is necessary for sustainability. Planning has been concerned with the 
physical side effects of wealth transfers, rather than with the ethical, ecological, and economic 
implications of the wealth transfers themselves. It only mitigates the environmental and social 
impacts of decisions in the political and market arenas. It does so by remedial measures, 
modifying the rate of environmental destruction, or settling disputes over the impacts of 
development - after the fundamental direction or course of action has been set by developers. 
Planning is often attacked as constraining development, yet (by the fact of its existence) it 
subsidizes development and promotes growth in many ways. This apparent anomaly is 
resolved when we recognize that economic planners who are involved in facilitating growth or 
production are confused with physical planners who are involved in regulating consumption. 
In the new Planning sphere these two systems would be combined so that production could be 
linked directly to conservation in a rational manner. In this way, the costs of subsidies and the 
distribution of externalities could be made visible and linked to benefits. 
Planning methods address the third dimension (the environment) with concepts appropriate 
for two dimensions: Man and His society. Decision-making tools (such as cost-benefit 
analyses) are primarily useful for determining distributional questions (such as where, how 
much). They tend to 'balance the good and the bad' - or trade off the needs of future 
generations, the poor, and other species with the narrow, immediate wants of consumers and 
producers. This is because (even progressive) planners employ concepts derived from the field 
of business management and economics. The result is a kind of cost-benefit analysis system 
writ large, designed for 'balancing and choosing' among development proposals - a process 
biased against keeping social options open. Redefining the purpose of Planning as 'designing 
a sustainable society' would result in different Planning methods. The case for an Ethics-based 
system is essentially as follows: 
The need for an Ethics -based system 
(a) Planning, as an institution, is legitimate (in the traditional sense) only if it can improve 
the condition of society and protect the planet. According to traditional contract theory of 
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government, human survival and fulfilment (or health and sustainability) would be among the 
basic objectives of any conventional Planning system. The most basic physical and emotional 
needs cannot be met in the absence of environmental quality and peace. Human 'needs', of 
course, logically include the well-being of all natural life forms and ecosystems upon which 
humans depend. 
Some have argued that anthropocentric arguments should not be used because they reinforce 
the human-centred perspective that some creatures have no survival value to the ecosystems 
upon which humans depend and might therefore be eliminated. However, while I agree, an 
anthropocentric person should nonetheless appreciate that an ecosystem depends upon all its 
components. In any case, as communication is a two-way street, it is necessary to begin the 
search for common ground with the anthropocentric mainstream. Therefore, the case for an 
Ethics-based system should begin with a premise acceptable to traditionalists as well. 
(b) Environmental quality and peace require social justice. Although moral relativists could 
argue that there are no ultimate principles for structuring human relationships, those that result 
in the destruction of the life support system are folly by any standard. Social structures based 
on dominance relations eventually lead to systems that abuse both human and non-human 
nature (see Part III). For example, an unjust social system tends to become more unjust as 
those on top exploit their advantage. Such a society eventually leads to militarism, at home 
and/or abroad, in order to maintain social control. Militarism destroys the environment even in 
the absence of actual war, through wasteful production and the creation of vast amounts of 
toxic waste. Also, it can be argued that dominance relationships or various forms of 
enslavement destroy the human spirit as well ('a life lived in fear is a life half lived). 
(c) Social justice requires a sustainable level of consumption (as distinguishe4 of course, 
from 'sustainable development', an oxymoron). Land, water, air, life forms, ecosystems and 
so on are finite. World poverty has been the result - not of limited resources - but of 
dominance relationships reflected in, for example, the conversion of Third World resources to 
First World commodities, the destruction of local economies and disenfranchisement of small 
landowners through colonization, 'created dependency' on herbicides and fertilizers and, of 
course, inequitable distribution. Nonetheless, the demands for equality for the vast majority of 
the world's population who have been deprived of safe drinldng water, basic health care, and 
self-reliance cannot be met with diminishing and degraded resources. Thus, more equitable 
distribution is no substitute for sustainable consumption. Each condition is dependent on the 
other. 
(d) Sustainable resource allocation requires a preventative Planning system. Decision-
making systems biased toward meeting the preferences (as opposed to needs) of individuals 
cannot preserve natural ecosystems, which is the prerequisite to sustainable consumption. 
Efficient consumption cannot preserve ecosystems. Prevention is necessary. Given the above, 
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a preventative Planning system that would provide for human survival is one that can, at a 
minimum: protect or restore our life support systems, preserve cultural and biological 
diversity, and prevent conflict over natural resources and amenities. (I use the terms prevent, 
protect and restore purposefully, because 'sustaining' what we now have is not good enough. 
For instance, woodchippers have argued they can increase the 'sustainable yield' of an ancient 
forest by harvesting it. However, the forest then loses a native forest values, such as a habitat 
for wildlife and as a watershed. 'Sustainable logging' of rainforests is a contradiction in terms. 
(e) Finally, these imperatives require an Ethics-based, as opposed to a power-based 
decision-making Infrastructure, for their realization : Our existing decision-making 
institutions are not designed to address, let alone resolve, Ethical issues. Environmental 
problems are treated as consumption issues, or who gets how much, how fast and when. 
Thus, while our power-based market, political, Planning and legal systems may settle 
immediate disputes regarding resource distribution, they are at best postponing conflict and 
hence increasing instability in the long term. Conflict over environmental goods and amenities 
around the world can only increase as the public domain diminishes. 
A Constitutional approach 
It is surely time for self-governance; but where do we begin? If the abuse of power is the 
problem, the solution must find means to expose and prevent the abuse of power on 
psychological and institutional levels. I have argued that, in a social structure built upon 
hierarchical systems and power-based personal relationships, institutions and methods are 
eventually corrupted to serve the interests of the powerful, who select and propagate (dualistic) 
ideologies that suit their interests. 
Of course, any social decision-making system is subject to the same degenerative forces if 
individuals in it seek power. Also informal relationships will always exist, and can be 
obscured behind formal statements of principle. But while any system can become distorted 
and imbalanced over time, a Constitutional system is harder to corrupt (all other things being 
equal), because it makes the ethical basis for structures, actions, and decisions explicit. This 
means that departures from the underlying Ethical principles (as opposed to goals) can be 
recognized and acted upon before powerful interests become entrenched and unaccountable. 
The collective development of an Ethics-based environmental decision-making system 
through a constitutional process would therefore be a reasonable place to start the process of 
institutional reform. The constitutional approach that I have in mind for the design of a new 
Planning arena must be substantively different from past constitutional experiments, however. 
For example, while the United States Constitution and its Bill of Rights provides a model, its 
values are inadequate for Planning issues. The liberal model, being two-dimensional, is only 
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capable of encapsulating issues of interpersonal rights as opposed to responsibilities or an ethic . 
of care. A beacon in its time, the U.S. Constitution is now out of date, as it was concerned 
only with protecting the 'rights' of Man (literally). It therefore reinforces an individualistic, 
competitive, Patriarchal social structure that conflicts with the caring, relational, and 
responsible attitude toward the world and one another that is called for. 
The proposal here, differs from the United States, Canadian, and Australian Constitutions in 
that ecologically-based principles would form the Constitution upon which the Planning system 
itself would be designed. The decision-making methods, processes, and structures themselves 
would derive from and adhere to these fundamental ecological/Ethical precepts. It must be 
emphasized that this is a very different thing from the present practice of developing objectives 
and policies for implementation within the existing (biased) theoretical and institutional 
framework. For example, several significant environmental laws in the United States, such as 
the federal Endangered Species Act and Wilderness Acts, were supported by preambles which 
stated Ethical principles. However, the methods employed pursuant to the legislation were not 
consistent with these principles, based as they were upon concepts from economic liberalism. 
A basic problem with any institutional reform is that before this design process can occur, 
some devolution of power through the existing political system is required. The paradox is, of 
course, that this new framework for social decision-maldng - even if necessary for human 
survival - has little prospect of implementation within the present decision-making structure. It 
is unlikely to be achieved through representative democracy, where decision making is 
controlled by powerful extra-mural interests. It is also unlikely to be achieved through voting 
processes where preferences are manipulated by big business, and Ethical considerations 
scarcely enter the public debate. Any solution to the social/environmental crisis requires that 
powerful interests give up power, and this, in a Patriarchal society, is a form of crucifixion for 
which there is presently no reward. As taken up in Part III, the powerful will only relinquish 
power if their personal and emotional needs are met in some way other than indirectly through 
dominance and status seeking. 
The response to these counter-arguments (apart from psychological approaches just referred 
to) is that such major restructurings have occurred before. After wars and revolutions of 
independence, several countries have been able to start from the ground up, inspired by a new 
vision of humanity. The Bill of Rights, for example, gave legislative form to a new model of 
Man-in-relation-to-Man. (More cynical interpretations of history are, of course, possible as 
well.) At one time, it was a major step forward to recognize that despotic royalities did not 
have the divine right to rule. Around the world today, there is less acquiescence to corrupt, 
despotic, governments, whether 'elected' or not. The next great leap, logically, is to give 
legislative form to a new understanding of the intrinsic value of the ecological community. In 
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this context, the tri-partite Ethics-based Constitution could be seen as less radical and 
threatening than revolution - perhaps even a welcome bridge to a sustainable society. 
A second dilemma is this. The sort of precepts upon which the new Planning system would 
be built cannot be ascertained or weighed scientifically. Therefore, they should be adopted by 
the general public through an open, educative, and participatory process, following reasoned 
public debate. But the population is presently steeped in anthropocentric/Patriarchal values. 
There are two responses to this problem. First, people are much more ethically-minded in 
subscribing to general principles before specific issues affecting themselves arise (thereby 
avoiding situational ethics). Second, community-based and person-to-person processes are the 
only context within which the necessary educative processes can occur. Citizens will not take 
responsibility for public decisions until they are in a position to have some say in public 
matters, something the electoral system now discourages. 
Constitutive goals 
Assuming for the moment a new Planning sphere were created, what would its Constitution 
look like? As the Constitution would necessarily be developed democratically, I can only offer 
suggestions. The constitutional process would, of course, be conducted on principles of 
participatory democracy. In a genuine democracy, the broader public needs to be involved at 
the stage of determining what goals we are to invest in and what means will be used to achieve 
them. However, green planners and academics could contribute to the realization of a new 
Planning system by developing proto-type Planning Constitutions for public consideration and 
debate. The generation of proposals could help governments, their staff, and advisers to see 
the feasibility of substantively rational public decision-making and planning to occur. 
If the fundamental purpose of Planning is to design a sustainable society, the basic function 
of Planning would therefore be to ensure the prerequisites of sustainability and prepare for 
basic needs. It would function as a preventative planning system, aimed at resolving 
environmental conflict, rather than settling disputes. Planning as an activity, then, would be a 
community-based process for determining collective social, economic, and environmental goals 
in the long term public interest. This is markedly different from current definitions that 
emphasize guiding land use efficiently and/or distributing resources equitably. 
To determine the foundational goals of the new decision-making system, then, we would 
begin at the bottom line, or basic needs. It has been estimated by many scientific organizations 
that the earth may have only decades left before it breaches the ecological 'point of elasticity', 
or point of total irreversible ecosystem break down - assuming the environmental crisis is 
reversible. Perhaps the most basic need is sustainability (which is constituted by the 
preservation of our cultural and natural heritage, peace, health, and social justice and a safe, 
secure future). Therefore (a) ensuring sustainability, or biospheric health and (b) promoting 
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human fulfilment would be reasonable foundational goals for most people, regardless of their 
social/political orientation (anthropocentric goals are used for wider acceptance). 
If Planning is to foster these goals, it would have to be designed to meet at least the 
following basic imperatives (mentioned above): (a) to protect and restore our life support 
system, (b) to preserve cultural and biological diversity, (c) to provide for the basic needs and 
health of living beings, and (d) to prevent conflict over resources and environmental amenity. 
Among the formative criteria for a decision-making system that could, if adopted, meet these 
basic imperatives (above) would be, for example: (a) to avoid unnecessary risk (eg. by not 
poisoning the environment), (b) to prevent unconstructive conflict, by facilitating substantive 
public debate, (c) to keep future options open by avoiding irreversible decisions (eg. via 
biological diversity, non-nuclear defence and energy options, and wilderness preservation), 
and (d) inhibit the potential for the abuse of power. 
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Figure 11: Draft guidelines for a Planning system 
Purpose Designing a sustainable society. 
Function Prepare for basic needs (preservation of our cultural and natural heritage, peace, health, social justice and a safe, secure future. 
Goals 
Ensure ecological sustainability (biospheric health) 
Promote human fulfilment. 
Imperatives 
Protect and restore the life support system. 
Preserve cultural and biological diversity. 
Provide for basic needs and health of living beings. 	 ' 
Prevent conflict over resources and environmental quality. 
Criteria 
Avoid unnecessary risk. 
Prevent unconstructive conflict (by facilitating substantive public debate and 
conflict resolution. 
Keep future options open (by avoiding irreversible decisons). 
Inhibit the abuse of power. 
Operation of the system 
Once the system is established, how would specific issues be dealt with? The process could 
involve lay citizens from a diverse background serving as jurors to assess Ethical criteria and 
concepts for policy development and implementation. These policy issues centre on basic 
controversies that cannot be contained within a 'me first' or 'pocket book 'perspective' such as 
genetic engineering, population growth, and appropriate technology. The purpose would be to 
encourage citizens to think about issues that are never included in the ballot box or supermarket 
approach to voting, and to enlighten elected personalities who seem to seldom consider the 
deeper aspects of political issues. Once the basic decision-making policies are adopted, citizens 
could workshop and adjudicate Planning decisions. 
In a complementary proposal, some activists in Tasmania are developing a new polling 
system, called Odpoll (opinion development poll) to elicit public views on substantive issues.' 
Unlike other polls, which try to ascertain people's current preferences, the primary aim of the 
1 Proposed by former Tasmanian forester, Paul Smith. 
Odpoll is to foster the development of public debate. Questions of fundamental importance, 
permanently available in the form of a booklet, would be solicited at regular (say, yearly) 
intervals. Voting would be voluntary and be accessible by phone. The desired result would be 
the discussion of these weightier issues in the community at large. Trends in public opinion 
over time would then be more apparent to voters, politicians and corporate managers. Of 
course, this scheme is premised on the naive assumption that politicians listen to voters rather 
than business and industry. It also ignores the idea that basic tension between democracy and 
sustainability; however, such a process would nonetheless empower people and encourage the 
taking of responsibility. 
Only face-to-face democracy can counteract both the problems of internalized Patriarchal 
structures and values, and of electoral and representative democracy (such as media 
manipulation, biased voting procedures and the ability to 'purchase' decisions). The process 
itself would be educative, community building, and encourage people to question underlying 
assumptions and to think in terms of basic social goals. This community-building process 
would not, by itself, achieve the social transformation required, but it would at least contribute 
to the self-critical, empowering processes we must work to develop. It would still serve as a 
community-building and educative process, and improve the communicative and thinking skills 
of those involved. Such an undertaking could also serve as an experiment for the broader 
social reconstruction process that is required. While slow, the means are as important as the 
ends, because otherwise we inevitably end up back where we began, at Patriarchy. 
I have presented a reform proposal and the (ecofeminist) analysis on which it is based, if 
only to improve the level of debate. The reader will undoubtedly be sceptical: how could a 
comprehensive and radical reform proposal ever be implemented, when previous attempts have 
failed? This is the question addressed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 8: IMPEDIMENTS TO REFORM 
Introduction 
In order to reform the Planning system, it is necessary to examine the reasons why the 
system has not been reformed to this point. This discussion (and Appendix 1) retraces, in a 
manner of speaking, my own personal Odyssey through efforts at Planning reform, and 
explains why I began to search for a new paradigm for social change that relates the personal to 
the political, and centres on causes and cures for the abuse of power. 
Generally spealdng, greens and progressive planners understand that representative politics 
and the market, as decision-making systems, are biased toward short-term interests and against 
sustainable resource allocation. Yet, in their concern over the social and environmental costs of 
inappropriate or unsustainable development, they have tended to assume 'more and better' 
environmental planning is the answer. On the other hand, traditional planners (while relatively 
unconcerned about environmental issues) have at least recognized that there is a serious 
problem within the existing Planning system itself. Their concern, however, has been 
primarily focused on the economic costs associated with both poorly conceived forms of 
regulation. Thus for decades it was commonplace at mainstream Planning seminars and 
workshops to hear the Planning system characterized as an accumulation of piecemeal changes 
resulting in an inefficient and anachronistic system. 1 (Tasmania epitomizes this problem, as the 
Planning system has remained virtually unchanged in substance since the 1940s.) 
If planners on the right side of the traditional political spectrum are correct about the 
inefficiencies and conflict entailed by current practices and those on the left are correct about 
the long-term costs of poor environmental decision making, then retooling the management and 
regulatory system would make both economic and ecological sense. After all, restoring 
environmental quality necessarily costs far more in the long run than do prevention measures. 
However, despite vast amounts of time and energy invested in talking about Planning reform, 
there have been (to my knowledge) no proposals for ecologically-sound institutional reform of 
a fundamental nature anywhere in the liberal democratic world. Bioregional Planning, of 
course, represents a new form of 'plan' which seeks to reflect natural boundaries and 
processes, but it does not represent a new form of 'planning'. Such major Planning reforms as 
1 There may now be a disturbing trend in the opposite direction however. For example, in an Australian 
planning conference on sustainable development in 1991, the organizers indicated that they wanted only case 
studies or nuts and bolts papers, and the flyer which advertized the conference stated that planning practice was 'on 
track'. 
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have occurred have not addressed what I have contended are the anachronistic concepts, 
methodological bias, and conflict-generating practices of the decision-making system itself. 
As this inertia suggests, the barriers to ecologically-friendly institutional reform are 
daunting. In fact, as I suggest below, the impediments are such that perhaps only radical 
change can be effective and lasting. Herbert Kaufman, although proceeding from an a-political 
account of the difficulties of organizational change, also concludes that: 
It may be more economical to introduce some innovations by replacing 
organizations than by reforming them. In fact, the death of intransigent 
or rigid but influential organizations may facilitate social change more 
readily than marginal adjustments that keep the old organizations alive 
but resistant to innovation. 1 
To continue with incremental reform has no more prospect of success than continually 
pruning a tree with root fungus. Institutions, by and large, are inseparable from the broader 
social context. Thus problems of institutional reform entail problems of social change 
generally. 
To comprehend the pervasiveness and depth of the problem underlying planning reform, we 
now survey some structural, communicative, conceptual, and ideological barriers to reform. I 
hope to demonstrate that the difficulties of reforming the Planning system all relate back to (a) 
dominance relationships (b) dualistic thinking and (c) the fallacy of Rational Man, all of which 
(as discussed in Part III) are part and parcel of Patriarchal consciousness. These kinds of 
(personal) issues are avoided by reformists as well as conformists, I suggest, largely because 
of the cultural taboos of Patriarchy. 
For example, among the right, it is generally felt to be 'unprofessional' to analyze non-
rational motivations in organizational behaviour. The exercise of self-interest is a matter of 
optimizing measurable benefits, not the satisfaction of unconscious, emotional needs. Such 
motivations are of course attributed to consumers (the masses) by those in marketing, but they 
are not generally attributed to professionals (the elite) by academics and theorists. Among the 
left, personal motivations (jealousy, insecurity, resentment, power for power's sake) are 
viewed as products of the bureaucratic organization, rather than attempts by the actors to have 
their unacknowledged emotional needs met. The system is made responsible for behaviour 
Rational Man would prefer not to 'own'. 
1 Herbert Kaufman, 1971, The Limits of Organizational Change (AL: University of Alabama Press) at p. 98. 
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Dominance relationships 
In understanding many of the impediments to reform, it is helpful to examine them in terms 
of hierarchical structures and dominance relationships. Perhaps the first impediment to 
Planning reform that springs to mind is the formal design of the political system itself. In 
Tasmania, for example, by virtue of the Constitution, the conservative Upper House, the 
Legislative Council, has remained unchanged for 140 years. Due to its design, it can block any 
reform: it can even block reform of itself by the Parliament as a whole. It can also take a 
government to an election without itself having to go to the polls (reputedly the only Upper 
House in the world with this power). Change is therefore dependent upon an 'old boy's club', 
the members of which gain personal benefit from the existing institutional and social structure. 
To date, there have been some 30 legislative attempts to amend 
Tasmania's Constitution Act, and most of them have been to reform 
aspects of the Legislative Council's powers. All have failed. You 
don't have to search far to find the reason ... there's one in every 
Legislative Council electorate. 1 
Those with power have little inclination to even consider changing a structure which protects 
their monopoly on power. Change only comes when the powerful are made to want a change - 
apart from cases of violent revolutions, which seem to replace one problem with another. 
When organizational changes are made, these tend to be due to the energies of those motivated 
to increase their personal power. 
Another structural barrier is the pyramidal complexity of bureaucratic organizations. Any 
change to one area of governance involves change in other aspects of the whole system. 
Bureaucratic reforms therefore tend to add a further layer of administration or to be cosmetic, 
perhaps involving no more than a change of names, but they seldom address the more 
fundamental problems. Such administrative changes, by creating the illusion of reform, can 
even impede genuine progress. But the problem of bureaucratic complexity is more than a 
matter of intellectual strain. Threats of reorganization upset the existing power relationships 
among individuals and agencies of government, leading to surreptitious and sometimes overt 
power struggles: 
In fact, people sometimes seem to resist innovation even when they 
cannot identify any results harmful to them, simply because they grow 
anxious about consequences they cannot foresee that might injure their 
interests. Occasionally they resist even when they know they will 
suffer no injury in order to exact concessions or other advantages in 
return for their acquiescence.2 
1 Di Hollister, 1991, "Colonial Rule Totters On: Men Who Still Talk of Floggings ...", The Daily Planet: 
Newsletter of the Tasmanian Green Independents, 4 (September) at p. 6. Di Hollister is a Green Independent 
member of the Tasmanian House of Assembly. 
2 Herbert Kaufman, 1971, above at p. 11. 
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Even in a relatively simple bureaucratic structure, such as in Tasmania, there are myriad 
points where reform proposals can -be shunted onto side tracks. Bureaucratic complexity is one 
reason why privatization has been a popular way out of the proverbial morass: it simply 
eliminates what it defines as the problem, 'government bureaucracy' and thereby avoids feudal 
infighting. Unfortunately, privatization simply transfers wealth and power without addressing 
the problems underlying what is blamed upon bureaucratic failure. In short, in a power-based 
structure, any change will threaten positions within the hierarchy, but only changes that benefit 
the powerful - being at present the corporate sector - will prevail. 
Political structures notwithstanding, there are also practical barriers to even developing 
comprehensive reform proposals in the first place. For example, issues concerning the 
allocation of land and resources cut across many professional boundaries, and these 
professions need to collaborate in developing a comprehensive reform proposal if it is to be 
successful. Yet there is a lack of consensus, let alone a common perception, even as to what 
the legitimate scope and function of a Planning system should be. Foresters, lawyers, and 
engineers bring different discipline-based values and attitudes toward the land, and there are 
differing paradigms and ideologies operating within these disciplines as well. Moreover, those 
in a professional discipline share an ideological prism and linguistic structure which filters out 
information that does not conform to the basic precepts of that thought system. For example, 
as we have seen, concepts like environmental ethics, to the extent that they cannot be squeezed 
into the normative concepts of equity or efficiency, are left out of the picture. Thus, in my 
experience, interdisciplinary working groups have resembled a Tower of Babel, with people 
talking past each other until mutual frustration builds up. 
Perhaps more significantly, meaningful citizen involvement in the process of institutional 
reform is necessary in order to ascertain real needs, yet specialist language makes professional 
debates inaccessible to lay people. Similarly, it is difficult to get those in a position to enact 
change to even listen to people 'beneath' them, or outside their power structure. Power might 
be defined as being in a position where one can, with impunity, not listen to those who are 
unhappy with the system. In a society structured upon dominance relationships, people tend to 
listen only to those seen to be 'above' them in the social order. 1 As John Forester, in Planning 
in the Face of Power , explores this (communicative) dimension of Planning practice and 
discusses what progressive planners can do to compensate for those problems of 'distorted 
communication', and we need not replicate his discussion here. 
1 This explains the difficulty feminists have in getting so-called women's issues on the political agenda. For 
example, while many men in Patriarchal society justifiably dissociate themselves from those who abuse women 
and children, few if any groups of non-offending men concern themselves with such issues. Instead, they 
organize to deal with men's own personal problems. See for example, Robert Bly, 1990, Iron John: A Book 
About Men (Shaftesbury, Dorset: Element Books). 
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This listening disorder partly explains the tendency in the mainstream to reject green and 
feminist ideas without knowing what they are. 1 Green views are also excluded even when held 
by those in establishment positions. Greens are derided as feminine (whimps and cowards), 
and green economic alternatives (like women) regarded as 'airy-fairy' or of marginal relevance. 
(This is despite the fact that it is the mainstream economic system that is in fact built upon thin 
air, having no basis in ecological reality.) The same problems of communication exist in the 
environment and peace movements as well, which indicates how deeply hierarchical thinldng is 
internalized. Thus, many greens, in turn, marginalize feminists in the movement. 
Another problem is self-censorship. There have been barriers to the participation of 
mainstream ecologists and other scientists in political and ethical debates, partly because of the 
pretence of value-neutrality among many scientists, 2 and/or the adverse consequences that are 
thought to accrue to their 'professional standing' from political involvement. Professionals in 
and out of government are often prevented by their employers from speaking out on 
contentious issues.3 Some scientists have run their own campaigns within their organization 
before leaking information; this can lead to environmental losses during the time that the 
information and debate is kept outside the public arena. Also, scientists who have taken an 
environmentalist stance have had their credibility smeared by being painted 'green' which, in 
our corporatist society, is tantamount to being 'unscientific'. In sum, then, the interdisciplinary 
and participatory decision maldng required for Planning reform is greatly impeded by a power-
based social order. 
But even when 'green' policies are taken on board a political bandwagon, the underlying 
philosophical orientation that produced them is usually not fully understood or integrated, and 
implementation is therefore usually partial or incomplete at best. There has not been a 
'vocabulary' within the established disciplines that facilitates the recognition and articulation of 
new ecological insights and values. To use a well-worn example, the dominant culture has 
generally defined the value of nature as residing in its exploitation for human purposes.. 
Therefore, the debate between environmental versus corporate interests in nature has been 
couched in economic and instrumental terms. While deep ecologists and ecofeminists have 
1  In committees dominated by men, women feel their contributions are often ignored. See Carol Gilligan, 
1982, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (MA: Harvard University Press). 
2  See for example Klaus-Peter Koepping, 1977, "The Ethics of Planning", in John S. Western & Paul R. 
Wilson, eds., Planning in Turbulent Environments (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press) pp. 34-53, who 
criticized Noam Chomsky for taking a political position when he has the protection of the 'Ivory Tower'. As a 
scholar, Koepping says, "I have to distinguish and make clear to the outside world how much of what I say is 
scientifically defensible and how much of what I say is my own personal morality" (at p. 49). 
3  See generally Brian Martin, C.M. Ann Baker, Clyde Manwell and Cedric Pugh, eds., 1986, Intellectual 
Suppression: Australian Case Histories, Analysis and Responses (NSW: Angus and Robertson). 
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been working to develop a radically new conceptual prism and network of concepts, the 
assimilation of this into the broader culture is therefore very slow. 
The communication problem goes even deeper than this, however. Language in itself can 
be ideological in serving to maintain the status quo. (I use 'ideology' to refer to a belief pattern 
that has become entrenched because it works to preserve certain power relationships in 
society). 
There can be no doubt that political actors employ language (whole 
networks of concepts) for their own interests, particularly as these 
underwrite their status and iegitimacy. 1 
Language can operate like a belief system to impede problem descriptions, analyses, or 
reforms that would pose a threat to the power structure. In fact, words can exclude certain 
concepts altogether through the narrow definition of terms. Our vocabulary tends to conceal 
forms of mischief that are endemic to institutions. One example mentioned earlier (Chapter 5) 
is the conception of 'corruption' as an attribute of people, not systems. But systemic 
corruption is also difficult to address because, when corruption is associated with individuals 
passing money under the table, it becomes almost synonymous with criminal intent or knowing 
malfeasance. This serves to exclude forms of moral indifference, neglect or failure to act which 
stems from structural pressures and power relations. These 'acts of omission', that result 
from institutional corruption are not addressed by professional codes of ethics. It is this 
amorphous area that must be directly addressed in Planning reform. 
Metaphor, like words, can also limit our analysis. For example, the conception of an 
institution as a 'mechanism', that follows from liberal ideology, conceals or even encourages 
corrupt action or inaction on the part of individuals. As long as the institutional systems within 
which decisions are made are accepted as legitimate and value-neutral, few bureaucrats will take 
the initiative to identify and solve systemic problems. Most merely follow orders or 'second 
guess' the Minister. For example, a bureaucrat from the Department of Mines in Tasmania 
attended part of a seminar on mining put on by greens in 1991 and chastized them for not 
presenting their alternatives in terms of formal cost-benefit analyses. 2 The fact that his 
department would not release the necessary figures to the greens did not appear to trouble him. 
In accordance with the prevalent view in the Tasmanian bureaucracy he apparently felt it was 
the role of unpaid citizens to develop alternatives. 
1 N.P. Low, 1991, Planning, Politics and the State: Political Foundations of Planning Thought (London: 
Unwin Hyman) at p. 36. 
2 The conference was "Minerals, Mining and Tasmania's National Estate", Philip Smith Education Centre, 
Hobart, July 1, 1991. 
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Similarly, it follows from a mechanistic view of institutions that 'fair' decisions within a 
legal or Planning system are those that conform to a process considered legitimate, regardless 
of their outcomes. Thus, if an administrative agency or official follows social norms and 
precedents in decision making, the decision is (by definition) 'just', even if the consequences 
are not. The lack of accountability this metaphor engenders can only encourage the abuse of 
power. 
Another related conceptual barrier to reform is that Planning is still largely conceived of as a 
technocratic and marginal project approval or decision-making process within the wider 
mechanism of governance. This distracts attention from the political character of the Planning 
system as an institution in society. While planners recognize that Planning decisions are 
ultimately political, in that they determine winners and losers, the Planning system itself is seen 
as a mere administrative function of government. Yet, as already argued, the Planning system 
has a political function in that it serves to transfer resources and wealth over time - often 
irreversibly. The problem is that, as long as Planning is regarded as a peripheral aspect of the 
public resource allocation system, environmentalists will continue to direct their energy at 
trying to reform the market and/or political systems, giving little attention to the intrinsic biases 
of the Planning system itself. In sum, terms, concepts, language and metaphor can serve to 
preserve the status quo and therefore protect or enhance the position of the powerful. One is 
therefore led to ask: why do people seem unable to find their way out of this proverbial paper 
bag? Some reasons cannot be found in the dualistic thinking that characterizes Patriarchal 
society. 
Dualistic thinking 
In liberal Patriarchal society, where political life is portrayed as a contest, and where 
individuals are identified with groups or teams, there is a strong tendency for social choices to 
be presented in oppositional terms. The media, for example, seems incapable of presenting 
intricate political dynamics in terms other than simplistic, bilateral conflict between 'winners 
and losers'. This tendency of the media (a big business itself) to define things in terms of polar 
opposites is capitalized upon by political interests who seem to invest more resources in 
painting a demonic spectre of the other choice, than in spelling out the benefits of their own 
policies. Thus, in Tasmania, ex-Premier Robin Gray is actually re-elected with massive 
majorities on an 'anti-green' backlash, despite allegations against him of bribery, corruption, 
womanizing, and lying - a strong man who could deal with the threat of 'disorderly' greens 
(Appendix 1). 
It is the powerful who are in a position to define the countervailing positions of their 
opponents. The green movement is thus portrayed as being against life quality and jobs. 
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Greens have continually pointed out that the 'jobs versus trees' argument is, if anything, quite 
the opposite of how it is portrayed, and that, even if sustainability means lower wages, "a good 
job is not worth much if one retires into an iron lung". 1 Greens have argued that public health 
problems and environmental pollution lead to profound economic inefficiencies and social 
dislocations. Nonetheless, saving the public environment is always portrayed as a trade-off 
against the individual's livelihood. The public interest is juxtaposed against the interests of the 
individual 'little guy', as if they were in essential conflict. 
To win is to destroy one's opponent, therefore a whole range of alternatives are excluded 
from public discourse through, for example, stereotyping, negative associations or simply 
labelling the alternatives as 'fringe' views. The powerful are thus able to restrict debates to 
false choices, the most familiar of which are perhaps the false capitalist versus socialist and 
male versus female dichotomies. For example, Mrs. Dan Quayle (wife of the then United States 
Vice President) at her speech to the Republican Presidential Convention of August, 1992, 
referred to how women's 'essential nature' is to stay home and therefore that the opposition, in 
supporting women's rights, is against "family values" 2 By this logic, then, to be for women is 
to be against the family. 
Political ideologies are also entrenched through the manipulation of dualistic thinking by 
those in a position to influence public discourse. Thus, pacifists are painted as 'militant' and 
pacifism is associated with disorder and instability, regardless of how chaotic and genocidal the 
existing system may in fact be. 3 This accounts for why the peace movement has always been 
portrayed as the 'enemy' within; the advocate of the evil empire. To be for peace is somehow 
to be unpatriotic. 
This tendency to reinforce and manipulate dualistic thinking in the service of the status quo 
begins early. No malice or conspiracy is necessary. I can best illustrate this with an anecdote. 
I once overheard my young baby sitter harassing my (then) four year old child for expressing 
concern about butterflies dying-off due to chemical sprays, following a TV documentary which 
both had seen. The sitter said: "So what do you want, butterflies or food?" (no answer) ... 
"Tell me, which do you want? ... do you wain to eat or starve?" (no answer) ... "which will it 
be?" After more of this kind of pressure, my daughter responded ingenuously: "Don't be 
silly, I don't have to choose one of those things". However, with the media continually 
1 Jesse Jackson, keynote address, SEAC 'Catalyst' Conference, Urbana, Illinois, 5 October, 1990. 
2 An earlier quote by Vice President Dan Quayle sheds light on why his wife is intellectually satiated at home. 
She "has a very major cause and a very major interest that is a very complex and consuming issue with her. And 
that's me". Tama Starr, 1991, The "Natural Inferiority" of Women (NY: Poseidon Press) at p. 176. 
3 While 40 thousand people die each day of preventable disease and starvation when there are adequate food and 
medical supplies for everyone, it is the people who wish to change this state of affairs who are usually labelled 
radical and militant. See Paul Ekins, Mayer Hillman and Robert Hutchinson, 1992, above at p. 105. 
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presenting stark choices and painting an insecure future, and the dimming prospect of finding 
work in a Man-eat-Man society looms ever closer, many seem to have lost the capacity for this 
broader, common sense perspective. 
The repertoire of ideas concerning Planning issues has been similarly limited by the creation 
of false choices. Common examples of this are the false 'environment versus employment' 
debate to the exclusion of ecologically-sound employment alternatives, or 'clean' nuclear 
energy versus 'dirty' fossil fuel to the exclusion of, say, solar power. Earlier, it was suggested 
that the main impediment to Planning reform is the 'Planning versus market' dichotomy. Both 
sides of the debate over whether there should be more or less Planning have accepted the 
association of the word 'planning' with 'intervention in the economy'. Because Planning is 
associated with 'command' economies or authoritarian approaches to social control, so-called 
'free market' approaches to environmental problems (under such buzz words as deregulation 
and privatization) are perceived as somehow involving less social control. But the same 
question remains in the case of private as well as public sector control: "who controls the 
decision-maker?" 
Within Planning theory as well, false choices impede the creation of positive new theories 
and alternative systems. Planning reform proposals have often concentrated upon centralizing 
or decentralizing, or privatizing or socializing, under the so-called 'simple decision rule': if 
things are not working, do the opposite. An example is the 'choice' between comprehensive 
versus incremental planning methods. The choice is ostensibly either being locked into an 
inflexible end-state plan or pattern of land use, as opposed to merely deciding among competing 
land uses when they are proposed. In reality, as we saw (Chapter 6), the two methods have 
very similar end results. 
The perpetuation of the outdated decision-making framework for Planning is partly a result 
of the tendency for complex political issues to be presented as simple either/or choices. 
Tasmania provides an example of how power relations and dualistic thinking interact to impede 
genuine Planning reform. The debate over reform in Tasmania has always centred on two 
alternatives - more power on the part of Cabinet, and/or more power on the part of statutory 
authorities or commissions. This is curious because, at present, both (jointly and separately) 
negotiate deals with powerful development interests behind closed doors. 1 Yet, because of this 
false dichotomy, the issue has been portrayed as a matter of 'who' should formally decide. 
1 Even in 1993, the Hydro Electric Commission is negotiating in secret with a large industry, Comalco, on 
their unit price of electricity. Comalco is threatening to go elsewhere if the subsidy is insufficient. 
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Rational Man? 
The third category of impediments to institutional reform relates to basic assumptions about 
the nature of Man. Because Man is by definition 'rational', we tend to believe rational 
arguments work. This belief, combined with the ability of the powerful to demonize the 
alternative to the status quo is one reason why Greens cannot win the case for alternative 
policies simply by maldng more reasoned arguments. Greens have offered sound reasoning for 
at least 30 years, but have nonetheless lost ground vis-a-vis the rise of corporate power. Why 
has reason been relatively ineffective? Let us consider a few possible contributing factors: (a) 
the nature of reason and mental processes themselves, (b) the power of political myths, (c) 
academic practice, and (d) professional ideologies. 
Reason 
There is now evidence that the structures of reason and language actually shape the way the 
brain functions. If so, this would create a 'natural' tendency (in Western Patriarchy) toward 
dualistic thinking. Edward de Bono has popularized the current research in this area. 1 He has 
argued that the European conception of 'reason', dating back to the ancient Greeks, has 
contributed to the tendency toward unconstructive debate. However, perhaps because of his 
gender-blind perspective, he has failed to notice that 'reason' was deemed Man's greatest 
achievement because it was thought to set him apart from animals, nature, and woman (not an 
altogether rational motive). 
The elevation of reason was made possible by a hierarchical, dualistic construction of reality 
and human nature that existed perhaps thousands of years earlier (as discussed in Chapter 10 ) 
But regardless of the (debatable) origins of the Western reason, it receives its legitimacy from 
the underlying Patriarchal cosmology. 2 As put by Pythagoras in the Sixth Century BC., 
"There is a good principle which created order, light, and man, and an evil principle which 
created chaos, darkness, and woman". 3 
Nonetheless, de Bono is certainly right that the (androcentric) conception of reason has 
been a pivotal source of problems. He has explained that Western reason is based on arguing 
according to a particular set of rules. The search for truth has been through argumentation; this 
means that we create mutually exclusive categories in order to apply our system of logic. And, 
in order to seek truth and/or win arguments, we choose perceptions, values, and concepts that 
1 See Edward de Bono, 1990, ! am Right--You are Wrong. From this to the New Renaissance (NY:Niking 
Penguin). 
2 Eastern cosmology is beyond the scope of this study, but women are also given an inferior status in religions 
such as Buddhism, Jainism, and Confusionism. 
3 Quoted in Tama Starr, 1991, above at p. 33. 
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fit that argumentative form of logic. 1 Thus, Western culture has become locked into a self-
contained universe of discourse with a set of rules for thinking that excludes things like 
intuition, emotion, and feelings, and hence militate against green and feminist values. 
Myths 
As de Bono also noted, ultimate 'truths' themselves cannot be questioned through the 
reasoning process, as they form the shared belief system or 'prism' through which the world is 
perceived. Early on, these 'truths' were in fact dogmas reinforced by the institutions of the 
powerful, such as the church, universities and so on. Likewise, today we have many 
unquestioned truths or myths that militate against reasoned arguments for environmental 
preservation. Some myths noted by Timothy Doyle, for example, are: 'history always' 
repeats', 'the universe is infinite', and 'you can't stop progress'. 2 
Another example of a sacred truth which impedes the effectiveness of rational argument is 
the evocation of the idea of 'democracy'. This is often used very cynically. For example, 
several Western democracies, in the name of democracy, overthrew a popular socialist leader in 
Uganda, and installed Idi Amin in his place; yet, the fact that Uganda had such a ruler was 
often used in popular discussion to support the contention that Ugandans were not ready for 
self-government. 
Yet another myth or cliche is that the public is not 'willing to pay' for cleaner or more 
appropriate technologies in the form of higher prices or simpler life-styles. Apart from the fact 
that the public has not really been given this choice, the argument evades the obvious, which is 
that the public pays for everything in the end. We pay far more in terms of social impacts and 
remedial costs than it would cost us to do things right in the first place. Cliche was also 
effective in maintaining the cold war for the benefit of the weapons trade and military 
establishments. 
Academia 
Another reason for ineffectiveness of reasoned arguments relates to the exercise of power in 
academia. Academic success requires one to build upon past ideas. New concepts are not 
considered academically valid unless they relate to existing frameworks of thought and use the 
same (inaccessible) language. Even radical theories must first criticize former ideas within the 
same framework. Academics are thus forced to look inside existing theories and back in time. 
Likewise, as it is necessary for 'credibility' to cite the works of relevant theorists in the field, 
1 Edward de Bono, 1990, above at p. 28. 
2 Timothy Doyle, 1990, "The Pot at the End of the Rainbow: Political Myth and the Ecological Crisis", in 
Ken Dyer and John Young, eds., Changing Directions: The Proceedings of Ecopolitics IV (Adelaide: University 
of Adelaide) pp. 88-101. 
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many papers are surveys or recompositions of existing literature. The cumulative effeci creates 
the impression of progress towards truth. 
Similarly, to write acceptable theses, one must look at narrow topics that are focussed and 
easy to document and argue. Thus, one is encouraged to be reductionist rather than 
comprehensive. As a result, little is published that does not conform to biased rules of logic 
and sacred truths. It is important to learn from the past, but we need not be rooted in the past 
(This is in part a justification for the somewhat iconoclastic approach taken by this work.) 
The reliance on past work has much to do with the nature of how power is exercised in 
academia. Those in a position to publish, teach, and so on (mostly men) benefit from the 
nature of power relationships on personal and/or political levels. Hence, academia is generally 
controlled by those whose power depends on the perpetuation of the theories to which they 
subscribe. To change their views is to admit they were wrong: something that can be costly to 
academic careers and egos. Consequently, academia moves in slow, incremental steps while 
environmental problems and power increase geometrically. It gradually incorporates ideas from 
other fields, or even radical social and environmental critiques, but only when they can be 
absorbed into the existing (liberal) framework. Thus, for example, feminists are still 
marginalized into women's studies programs and ignored by the mainstream. Women who 
want to participate in the male-dominated intellectual domain must to a large extent accept and/or 
internalize these values, language and logic of Patriarchy. In spite of the increasing integration 
of women into academia, then, feminist analysis has remained at the fringe. In short, despite 
the influence of lateral thinkers and iconoclasts, and the exposure of most people to ecological 
issues on television, there has been a remarkable resistance to the ideas of greens and feminists. 
Professional ideologies 
Given the above, it is still unclear as to why professional and academic disciplines 
concerned with environmental planning would adopt, develop, or perpetuate ideologies that run 
counter to the protection of the environment? There are many reasons for this which, again, 
relate back to the Patriarchal social structure. 
One reason to which I have referred is Masculine identification. The values associated with 
Masculinity, such as abstract and instrumental rationality, are elevated, while feeling, emotion, 
and intuition are denied. At the same time, paradoxically, the organization becomes a support 
network for men - a 'club' which engenders both loyalty and dependency. This bond is all the 
more significant because it is denied. The 'male-serving' behaviour in organizations is a non-
rational one, which protects the institution from threats to the invisible value system. Women 
and feminine values are excluded because they threaten the very foundation of the social order. 
Second, if a social system allows some to obtain undue power and influence, some will. 
These individuals are then in a position to provide social reinforcement and employment to 
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those who work within paradigms that are supportive of the dominant ideology. This is partly 
because of a phenomenon that B. F. Skinner called 'operant conditioning'. 1 People need 
recognition, and work that is not supportive of the powerful (or at least the dominant social 
ideology) tends to receive little backing, let alone funds. 2 Insecurity from, say, a lack of tenure 
or a zero-sum environment, increases this pressure to conform. Those in the environmental 
fields in particular have traditionally been on the defensive. 
Another reason that ideologies are perpetuated is that professionals have invested much time 
and education internalizing the logic of a particular paradigmatic approach. There is thus a 
tendency to apply what they have learned to any problem, seldom to step outside their 
framework to question basic assumptions. This phenomenon has been called 'skilled 
incompetence' by Chris Argyris. 3 This is one reason why many ecologically-concerned 
professions are still wedded to concepts inspired by the dominant Patriarchal ideology which 
are not conducive to sustainability. 
Finally, environmental problems were taken over by the traditional scientific disciplines and 
created a new opportunity for academic empire building. When it was subsequently realized 
that a transdisciplinary approach was needed, efforts in this direction were attacked by some 
traditional academics as sloppy, rather than as a search for new systems to make the approach 
more rigorous. 
Conclusion 
The above is by no means all of structural, communicative, conceptual, or ideological 
impediments to reform. The sampling suggests, however, that fundamentally regressive 
aspects of the culture coincide with basic categories of ecofeminist analysis and blind spots in 
Manstream literature; namely, power-based relationships, dualistic thinking, and the myth of 
Rational Man. Although most people have experienced the kinds of phenomena listed above, 
surprisingly little has been written about the impediments to social and institutional change. 
Based on the above points, the impediments to reforming the Planning system could be 
divided into two basic categories, those concerning the actor and those concerning the context. 
The first are personal/cultural barriers: the psyche, culture, and perceptions of individuals. I 
1 B.F. Skinner argued that the 'literature of freedom and dignity', while enabling us to defend ourselves from 
those who would control us by punishment and coercion, makes us more susceptible to those who would control 
us with inducements and subtle indoctrination - advertizers, politicians, media, and entertainment See.13. F. 
Skinner, 1971, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (NY: Alfred A. Knopf). 
2 The examples of this are more obvious in disciplines that have application to peace and environmental issues. 
See generally Nicholas Hildyard, 1983, Coverup: The Facts They Don't Want You To Know (Kent, UK: New 
English Library), and Robert Junglc, 1976, The Nuclear State, trans. by Eric Mobacher (London: J. Calder). 
3 Chris Argyris, 1986, "Skilled Incompetence", Harvard Business Review 64 (5) pp. 74-79. 
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call this way of 'seeing' and 'being' the 'Power Paradigm' for short, as there is no existing 
term which expresses both levels of human relationships: content and process or (alternatively) 
ideology and behaviour. The second are social/structural barriers: the institutional and political 
forces operating outside the Planning arena, or power relationships generally, which I call 
Patriarchy for short. But, perhaps the biggest bather to reform is that both structural and social 
change must precede the other ; institutions reflect and reinforce culture, and culture reflects 
and reinforces institutions. An ideal Planning system - even if it could be designed - would 
stand little chance of acceptance, given the present Patriarchal construct and the power of 
CIMBIs, or military, industrial, capitalist concems. 1 Thus, basic personal and social 
transformation is required. 
Social change must therefore be of a truly 'radical' nature. To proceed, therefore, we must 
look deeper into the nature of human society for means to overcome impediments to 
institutional reform and social change generally. This takes us up to the point where radical 
environmentalism leaves off. The green movement recognizes that the sources of 
environmental problems are deeply rooted in modem cultures, and therefore fundamental social 
transformation is necessary if we are to preserve life on earth in any meaningful sense. The 
first task of social transformation is to find or develop an appropriate theoretical framework that 
could integrate structural, intellectual, and cultural influences on decision making, and to 
address squarely the problem of the abuse of power. In my own case, I began with the 
proposition that radical green philosophy and strategy is necessary to guide social 
transformation. However, I found Manstream green theory not yet adequate to deal with both 
dimensions of power, the intellectual/psychological and structural/systemic. I intuitively felt 
that feminism offered the best guide, because it theorizes power relations on both the personal 
and political levels. Nonetheless, only by implication did feminism analyze the relationship of 
society to the natural environment. I was therefore engaged for some time in the slow process 
of 'reinventing' an ecofeminist paradigm when I discovered it already existed. It is certainly 
not the only useful analysis, but I suggest it is the one most needed in the green movement 
(and perhaps that of other social change movements) at this point in time. In Part III, then, we 
explore ecofeminism in depth as a guide to personal and cultural change. 
1 For a discussion of how power operates on a global scale, see Holly Sklar, ed., 1980, Trilateralism: The 
Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Management (Boston: South End Press). 
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PART III: SOCIAL CHANGE AND ECOFEMINISM 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART III 
The purpose of Part III is to delineate and defend ecofeminism as a 'meta-paradigm'to guide 
strategies for social transformation generally. (This is not to advocate that everyone adopt a 
particular belief system.) Ecofeminism was introduced in Part Ito make it possible to read 
Parts II and HI independently, although their respective subjects - institutional and social 
change - are inseparable. Chapter 9 already provides a more in-depth explanation of 
ecofeminism. I only attempt to present one viewpoint, as I cannot speak for all ecofeminist.s. 
The balance of Chapter 9 is devoted to debunking the false stereotypes associated with 
ecofeminism which, unfortunately, remains a necessity. 
Chapter 10 begins with an ecofeminist account of the evolution of Patriarchal 
consciousness, primarily to show that ecofeminism is not a-historic (a frequent claim), but in 
fact provides an interesting and comprehensive explanation for the origins of Western 
Patriarchy. It must be emphasized that this history is speculative and not an exclusive account. 
The bulk of the chapter is concerned primarily with the analytical problems of non-feminist, or 
'Manstream', radical environmentalism. First, I show how androcentrism is implicated in the 
pathologies to which radical theories generally reduce the modern crisis. This is followed by a 
discussion on how environmental problems are obscured by a gender-blind analysis of 
environmental problems. 
The theoretical problems of Manstream green theories are discussed in Chapter 11. In 
particular, I show how these green theories are also limited by the androcentric premises they 
hold in common with mainstream thought. The androcentrism of the New Right is also 
touched upon, but does not warrant serious theoretical analysis. I argue that radical green 
theories are unsatisfactory to the extent that they are not informed and broadened by a feminist 
perspective. In my view, feminism alone questions certain underlying assumptions shared by 
the mainstream, its radical critique; and the green movement generally. 
I suggest that ecofeminism is a comprehensive paradigm that can fill in the gaps and add a 
whole new dimension to existing environmental theories. For example, mainstream green 
theory, because it centres on anthropocentrism, usually separates out militarism as a separate 
issue, although it is perhaps the most-crucial environmental problem (why 'save' the natural - 
environment only to have it 'nuked'?). Therefore, the second part of Chapter 11 is devoted to 
the links between militarism and Patriarchy. It serves to demonstrate how analyses and 
strategies based on the myth of Rational Man are of little practical use in addressing real world 
problems. 
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The strategical problems of Manstream approaches to social change are discussed in 
Chapter 12. I suggest that an ecofeminist paradigm not only provides insights into problem 
analysis, but guides action as well. That is, it provides a unity of theory and action ('praxis') 
which Manstream environmental theories lack - at least with regard to environmental issues. 
Problems related to Patriarchy also still plague the green movement itself impeding its 
effectiveness. Moreover, I question the idea that social movements can, by themselves, can 
bring about social change. A movement's value is in empowering and supporting activists, but 
too often activists are 'used' by leaders. A feminist approach is necessary if activists are to 
create a sustainable social movement. Finally, basic concepts to guide social and institutional 
change are then summarized. 
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CHAPTER 9: ECOFEMINISM AS A NEW DIMENSION 
Unfolding ecofeminism 
Other feminisms distinguished 
Ecofeminism is what you get when you mix (deep) ecology, anarchical socialism, feminism 
and stir. For some it is a value system, a social movement and/or a practice, but for our 
purposes it offers a political analysis or paradigm through which to explore the links between 
androcentrism and environmental destruction with a view to developing means to bring about 
social change. 
This is what distinguishes ecofeminism from other forms of feminisms (such as liberal, 
Marxist, radical, and socialist feminism), and the many individual interpretations of these 
positions. 1 Katharine MacKinnon has explained these prefixes by suggesting that liberal 
feminism is liberalism applied to women, Marxist feminism is Marxism applied to women, and 
radical feminism is feminism. 2 Along similar lines, I see ecofeminism as feminism taken to its 
logical conclusion. Contrary to the views of several academics who write about ecofeminism, 
my position is that there is one ecofeminist paradigm: a complete, self-contained thought 
system.3 Ecofeminism builds upon the work of feminists in academic fields, but applies 
feminist analysis to the broader environmental problem, exploring the impacts of Patriarchal 
consciousness on non-human nature, and theorizing the problematic interrelations among self, 
society, and nature. 
1 Susan R. Bordo and Alison M Jaggar, eds., 1989, Gender/Body/Knowledge: Feminist Reconstructions of 
Being and Knowing (N.Y.: Rutgers University Press). 
2 Quoted by Judith Allen in a talk recorded by the Australian Broadcasting Commission, 1990. 
3 This is somewhat parallel to Arne Naess' view that while there is one deep ecology, each deep ecologist 
possesses his or her individual expression of it. Arne Naess, 1989, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, trans. 
by David Rothenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). The division of ecofeminism into categories 
and factions is a gratuitous service to its opponents. Some papers which classify ecofeminism into categories 
include Karen J. Warren, 1993, "Introduction" (to Part Three: Ecofeminism), in Michael E. Zimmerman, ed., 
Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall) 
pp. 253-267; Pliunwood, Val, 1986, "Ecofeminism: An Overview and Discussion of Positions and Arguments", 
Australian Journal of Philosophy 64 (June supplement) pp. 120-38; Carolyn Merchant, 1992, Radical Ecology: 
The Search for a Livable World (NY: Roudedge). Merchant does not even accord ecofeminism the status of 
theory, but instead relegates it to a section on social movements. 
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Another view, however, is expressed by Anne Cameron: 
The term secofeminism' is an insult to the women who put themselves 
on the line, risked public disapproval, risked even violence and jail.... 
Feminism has always been actively involved in the peace movement, in 
the antinuclear movement, and in the environmental protection 
movement. Feminism is what helped teach us all that the link between 
political and industrial included the military and was a danger to all life 
on this planet. To separate ecology from feminism is to try to separate 
the heart from the head. 1 
While I agree with this point, some feminisms are still anthropocentric, while ecofeminism 
is not. In addition, ecofeminism is fundamentally different from liberal feminism that has 
sought access for women into the existing power structure without challenging the nature of the 
structure itself. Ecofeminism is concerned with cultivating an ecological Ethic that goes 
beyond concepts of social justice alone. 2 
It has also been suggested that the prefix 'eco' is a sop to those Masculine-identified greens 
who cannot handle 'hard' feminism. However, in my experience, people have a harder time 
coming to terms with ecofeminism, as it strikes deeper into the core of Patriarchal reason. 
Some basic precepts to which most ecofeminists would subscribe are set out below. This 
chapter should clarify their meaning. 
Basic precepts and values 
1) Fundamental social transformation is necessary. The underlying values and structural 
relationships of our Western Patriarchal culture need to be reconstructed. The promotion of 
equality, non-violence, cultural diversity, participatory decision making, and non-competitive 
and non-hierarchical forms of organization would be among the criteria for the new social 
forms. 
2) Everything in nature has intrinsic value. A reverence for, and empathy with, nature and 
all life forms ('spirituality') is an essential element of the social transformation required. 
3) Our anthropocentric viewpoint, instrumentalist values, and mechanistic models should 
be rejected for a more biocentric view that can comprehend the interconnectedness of all life 
processes. 
4) Humans should not attempt to 'manage' or control non-human nature, but should work 
with the land. The use of agricultural land should be guided by an ethic of reciprocity. 
1 Anne Cameron, 1989, "First Mother and the Rainbow Children", in Judith Plant, ed., Healing the Wounds: 
The Promise of Ecofeminism (Ontario: Between the Lines) pp. 54-66 at p. 64. 
2 Words used in a special way are capitalized 
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5) Humans should intrude upon the remaining natural ecosystems and processes only 
where necessary to preserve natural diversity. 
6) Power-based relationships and hierarchy must be supplanted by an Ethic based on 
mutual respect. Merely redistributing power relationships is no answer: we must move 
beyond power. 
7) The dualistic conceptual framework of Patriarchy supports the ethic of dominance and 
divides us against each other, our 'selves', and non-human nature. The false dualisms that are 
based on the male/female polarity must be questioned (such as thought versus action, the 
spiritual versus natural, art versus science, experience versus knowledge). 
8) We cannot change the nature of the system by playing Patriarchal power 'games'. To 
do so is to give credence to those who are directly involved in human oppression and 
environmental exploitation. We must therefore withdraw our power and energy from the 
Patriarchy (this does not necessarily preclude working 'in the system' to change it). 
9) Process is as important as goals, simply because how we go about things determines 
where we go. As the power-based relations and processes that permeate our societies are 
reflected in our personal relationships, we must enact our values in both personal and political 
spheres. 
10) We must change the ideology that says the morality of the (Female) private sphere has 
no application to the (Male) public sphere of science, politics and industry. We must rebalance 
the Masculine and Feminine in ourselves and society. 
Problems of definition 
I have suggested only a working defmition and some values associated with ecofeminism. 
This is because ecofeminism is not something that people are meant to 'convert' to. Rather, it 
can add a new dimension to anyone's individual perspective. Further, eofeminism is not 
stationary. As a collective consciousness and social movement, as well as a paradigm, 
ecofeminism is continually evolving, as green thought should. There are several reasons why 
this is particularly true of ecofeminism. First, while Patriarchal movements have leaders, 
gurus, and experts, ecofeminism has none. If this ever occurs, it would be the warning bell of 
cooptation into Patriarchy. Consequently, the writings of academic ecofeminists cannot be 
said to represent the full breadth of ecofeminist thinking. The developing consciousness of 
women working at the 'grass roots' level for social change is therefore at least as valid a source 
of wisdom as are academic publications on the subject. 
Second, theory and action are one, as ecofeminism is centrally concerned with developing a 
realistic praxis for changing the system of exploitation and domination over both humans and 
nature. In contrast, because Patriarchal philosophy stresses transcendent concepts (of either a 
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mathematical or metaphysical order), practice is often unrelated to, or out of sequence with, 
theory. 1 Ecofeminism is a mode of inquiry which attempts to examine our actual ways of 
thinking, relating, and acting, rather than applying abstractions to human behaviour. For 
example, it asks how ideas and actions affect nature, children, emotional needs, and human 
relationships (often called 'women's issues' in Patriarchal society). Differing opinions among 
ecofeminists and other greens can be more a sign of health rather than of division; it means 
that they have not stopped asking questions. 
A third reason that feminist thought is continually evolving is that it has had to develop 
within the Patriarchal construct and language. As de Bono explains, perceptions and concepts 
that become frozen in language tend to control and limit our thinking, because "we may be able 
to see the world only in ways defined, packaged, and boxed by language".2 The bias against 
non-human nature and non-Manstream values is deeply entrenched in our words and syntax. 3 
The Power Paradigm is reflected in, and reinforced by, linguistic, religious, educational, 
theoretical, cultural, political, and economic institutions. Therefore, entirely new concepts and 
words must perhaps be created before we can internalize a new way of thinking. 
In conclusion, because of the evolving nature of ecofeminism, and because it is eclectic 
(drawing upon and synthesizing ideas from ecological, feminist, critical social theory and 
elsewhere), I do not try to discuss the expanding literature on ecofeminism here. As Judith 
Plant says, "the strength of the ecofeminist movement lies in the fact that it did not emerge 
solely in the halls of academia, or the mind of one person or even one culture ...".4 Therefore, 
my approach is to try to define one perspective while acknowledging the many varied and 
personalized styles within it 
Having prefaced this chapter with many qualifying remarks, it is now time to undertake a 
more in depth discussion of some of the concepts which ecofeminists are developing to better 
understand world problems. 
1 For example, this explains why the controversy surrounding tree spiking and the recommendation of not 
alleviating aids or famine in the Third World has been associated with deep ecology, although deep ecologists do 
not generally advocate these positions. Abstract concepts, when superimposed on real world issues, can lead to 
inappropriate strategies or actions. See Dave Foreman and Bill Haywood, eds., 1989, Ecodefense: A Field Guide 
to Monkeywrenching , 2nd ed. (AZ: Ned Ludd Books) and Edward Abbey, 1990, The Monkey Wrench Gang 
(UT: Dream Garden Press). Foreman repudiates his earlier position on aids and immigration in Murray 
Bookchin, Dave Foreman, Steve Chase, and David Levine, 1991, Defending the Earth: A Dialogue between 
Murray Bookchin and Dave Foreman (MA: South End Press). 
2 Edward de Bono, 1990, I Am Right, You Are Wrong. From Rock to Water Logic (London: Viking). It is 
not surprising, therefore, that - if de Bono's claim is correct - Western languages (evolving in Patriarchal cultures) 
are poor in expressing relationships. 
3 See Deborah Cameron, 1985, Feminism & Linguistic Theory (London: MacMillan Press). 
4 Judith Plant, 1989, The Circle is Gathering", in Plant ed., 1989, above pp. 242-253. 
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Androcentrism, denial and dominance 
There is a prevalent tendency among green activists and theorists to see anthropocentrism 
(human-centredness) as the primary force operating behind social and environmental problems, 
or, at least as providing the legitimation for the exploitation of nature. If this were so, it would 
follow that the means to create better societies would be through changing our perception of 
our 'selves' in relation to nature, or, as deep ecologists would have it, expanding our sense of 
identification to encompass all life, perhaps even 'Gaia' itself. One of the central arguments 
developed in Part 111 is that the adoption of a non-anthropocentric way of experiencing the 
world alone will not exorcise a more crucial pathology of our contemporary culture: the 
power-based morality and social structures, which pervade all levels of Patriarchal society, 
from personal to international relationships (power-based', again, refers to both dominance 
and hierarchy). 
The adoption of a non-anthropocentric perspective would not make sufficiently visible the 
prism that shapes an exploitative attitude toward non-human nature. Androcentrism or male-
centredness is a more crucial variable to address in theory and practice because it provides 
insights into the hierarchical structures and ethic of dominance that characterizes Patriarchal 
society. (For convenience, I refer to the power-based way of thinking, relating, and acting as 
the Power Paradigm, and to power-based social structures and relationships as Patriarchy.) 
As explained in Part I, androcentrism refers to the fact that theories of society have been 
based on a Masculine stereotype of 'Mankind'. 'Humanity' evokes a picture of a single, 
autonomous male. In this portrait, 'community' is just Man in plural, 'nature' is just a 
backdrop for Man's activity, and 'women' are just a subset of Man. "All that is distinctly 
human is the male. The males are the race; the females are merely the sex told off to reproduce 
it" (Grant Allen, 1881). 1 
Within this androcentric world order, the Feminine is seen as incomplete, non-rational, or 
non-substantial, as if the Feminine were merely the shadow of humanity. By subsuming the 
Feminine principle under a Masculine model of Man, the Other is , paradoxically, excluded 
(the Other being other races, classes, nature, and women). Although individual men love 
individual women, women as a caste are often regarded as being of instrumental value: • 
Woman furnishes the soil in which the seed of man finds the conditions 
required for its development. She nourishes and matures the seed 
1 Grant Allen, 1881, The Evolutionist at Large. Source: Tama Starr, 1991, The Natural Inferiority of Women 
(NY: Poseidon Press) at p. 28. The Natural Inferiority of Women is a collection of mysogynist statements 
throughout the ages and across several continents. 
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without furnishing any seed herself. Thus man is never derived from 
woman, but always from man. 1 
The one-sided headset created by androcentrism has been compared to a frontal lobotomy. 2 
Reason severed from emotion becomes irrational. The glorification of what has traditionally 
been seen as Masculinity is simply mal-adaptive in an age of toxic waste and nuclear weapons. 
It is this Masculine ego-centredness, more than human-centredness, that is behind the irrational 
ideas and behaviour displayed on the evening news. (Again, I use Masculine/Man as icons for 
concepts and values to which people of any sex can subscribe.) Ecofeminism seeks to redress 
this 'imbalanced' world view. I believe that ecofeminism is more rational because, for one 
reason, it is not engaged in denial. The Manstream is substantively irrational for the very 
reason that it is based on a false and limiting conception of reason. 
Ecofeminism begins with the realization that the exploitation of nature is intimately linked to 
Western Man's attitude toward women, tribal cultures, and nature or, in Ariel Salleh's words, 
that there is a "parallel in men's thinking between their 'right' to exploit nature, on the one 
hand, and the use they make of women, on the other". 3 This is legitimized by Patriarchal 
cosmology which divides reality according to gender, and places a higher value on those 
attributes associated with Masculinity ('hierarchical dualism). 4 In such cultures, women have 
historically been seen as closer to the earth or nature (an idea reinforced by childbirth and 
menstruation). In the words of the poet Charles Baudelaire (1857): "Woman is nature, hence 
detestable". 5 Women and nature have been juxtaposed against mind and spirit, which have 
been associated in Western cosmology with the Masculine and elevated to a higher plane of 
being. As expressed by Otto Weininger: "a female genius is a contradiction in terms, for 
genius is simply intensified, perfectly developed, universally conscious maleness". 6 
That nature has generally been associated with the Feminine in our androcentric culture is 
not contestable.7 This association of nature and women is a product of a Patriarchal 
1 Paracelsus, 1530, Man and the Created World (Source: Tama Starr, 1991, above at p. 31). 
2 Brian Swimme, 1991, "How to Heal a Lobotomy", in Irene Diamond and Gloria Feman Orenstein, eds., 
1990, Reweaving the World: The Emergence of Ecofeminism (S.F.: Sierra Club Books) pp. 15-22 at p. 15. 
3 Arid l Salleh, 1989, "Stirrings of a New Renaissance", Island Magazine 38, pp. 26-31. 
4 See generally Karen J. Warren, 1987, "Feminism and Ecology: Making Connections", Environmental Ethics 
9 (1) pp. 3-20, and Karen J. Warren, 1990, "The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism", 
Environmental Ethics 12 (2) pp. 125-146. Also Val Plumwood, 1986, "Ecofeminism: an Overview and 
Discussion of Positions and Arguments", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (June supplement) pp. 120-38. 
5 Charles Baudelaire, 1857, Les Fleurs Du Mal (Source: Tama Starr, 1991, above at p. 44). 
6 Otto Weininger, 1903, Sex and Character (Source: Tama Starr, 1991, above at p. 219). 
7 See generally Carolyn Merchant, 1990, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution 
Second Edition (San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row). . 
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cosmology and construction of reality, and has been used by Patriarchal society to justify the 
exploitation of both. 1 That is, nature, because it is associated with the Feminine (or vice versa 
), is deemed a lower order which exists to serve Man's 2 physical needs. Man sees Himself as 
not merely separate from, but above , nature and women, which He can therefore 'manage' or 
dominate. 
To refresh our memory, the link between androcentrism and dominance relationships is 
this. Patriarchal societies prize that which is associated with Masculinity. Masculinity has 
historically been measured by powerfulness and autonomy - to be Masculine is to have power; 
to be in control. Because Masculinity is taken for full personhood and Masculinity is measure 
by powerfulness and autonomy, weakness and dependency has been seen as inferiority and 
grounds for unequal treatment. Also, since women are, by definition, what men are not, this 
makes women (again by definition) inferior, as women are less able to do what humans (read 
men) are distinguished for. This, when blended with a gendered construction of reality, makes 
a lethal potion - a sense of identity which depends on power and control over Others. As 
Karen Warren explains: 
....patriarchal value-hierarchical thinking gives rise to a 'logic of 
domination'...which explains, justifies, and maintains the 
subordination of an 'inferior' group by a 'superior' group on the 
grounds of the (alleged) inferiority. 3 
This logic of domination is omnipresent, in part, because the belief that dominance 
relationships are normal is self-reinforcing. In a society based on dominance, according to 
Susan Griffin, it is often those most "severely ill with dominance disease" who get into 
power.4 Further, the powerful (often 'power addicts') are in a position to adopt ideologies that 
suggest those on top are superior by virtue of their power and success. The self-reproducing 
character of dominance relationships is one reason why, in Susan Griscom's words, 
hierarchical dualism is "the most powerful conceptual link between the four modes of 
oppression" - racism, sexism, classism and 'naturism' (the abuse of nature). 5 
1 Of course, there have been minority positions which have argued for a less mechanistic view of reality. This 
has been traced in Merchant, 1990, above. 
2 Man is capitalized herein to refer to the dominant culture. 
3 Karen J. Warren, 1990, above. 
4 Susan Griffin, 1990, "Celebrating All Of Life", in Christopher Plant & Judith Plant, eds., 1991, Turtle Talk: 
Voices for a Sustainable Future (Lillooet, BC: New Society) pp. 50-57 at p. 53. 
5 Joan Griscom, 1981, "On Healing the Nature/History Split in Feminist Thought", Heresies 13 (4) pp. 4-9 at 
P. 5 . 
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In the following chapters, it is argued that the abuse of power and denial of dependency 
(upon workers, women, mother, nature, oppressed races and so on) can best be understood in 
the context of the egocentrism engendered by Patriarchal society. 
In spiritual terms, ego is defined as that which separates us from being, 
nature, the Goddess. Aspects of the ego are fear, the need to control 
and dominate, vanity, insecurity, dualistic thinking, excessive 
materialism, and a pathological need to be beyond the laws of nature. 1 
To heal the powerful psychological undercurrents created by thousands of years of 
Patriarchy requires rigorous social and self-conscious introspection. We must move beyond 
limiting conceptions of both the Masculine and Feminine in ourselves and our societies. This 
requires not only introspection, but a gender-conscious political analysis, because only through 
naming the invisible realities can we break "the silent conspiracy that upholds the status quo". 2 
Later we speculate about how Patriarchal consciousness evolved. Regardless of how it 
emerged, however, it is clear that a complex morality based on dominance and exploitation has 
developed in conjunction with the devaluing of nature and Feminine values. The association of 
women and nature has had tragic consequences for humans and the rest of nature. Some 
feminists have suggested, however, that this association can be converted into a positive by 
affirming so-called 'Feminine' values, such as caring, openness, and nurturing, and by moving 
beyond limiting and imbalanced conceptions of the Masculine and Feminine. This affirmation 
of the Feminine has been distorted by some who seem to fear that feminists will somehow take 
power and do what men have done.3 This misconceives the central idea of ecofeminism. The 
very essence of ecofeminism is its challenge to the presumed necessity of power relationships. 
It is about changing from a morality based on 'power over', to one based on reciprocity and 
responsibility ('power to'). 
Ecofeminists believe that we cannot end the exploitation of nature without ending human 
oppression and vice versa. To do both, they reason, we must deconstruct the premises .that 
associate Masculinity with 'power over' and challenge the Masculine model of 'Impersonal 
Man' upon which both mainstream theories and radical critiques depend. As we saw in Part II, 
non-feminist theories generally assume that the actors or decision makers are unaffected by (or, 
by virtue of their formal positions and responsible perspectives, somehow transcend) the 
personal and non-rational. Psycho-sexual drives, emotional needs, and personal politics are 
1 Irene Javors, 1990, "Goddess in the Metropolis: Reflections on the Sacred in an Urban Setting", in Diamond 
and Orenstein, eds., above p. 211-214 at p. 214. 
2 Margo Adair and Sharon Howell, 1989, "The Subjective Side of Power", in Judith Plant, ed., Healing the 
Wounds: The Promise of Ecofeminism (Ontario: Between the Lines) pp. 219-26 at p. 222. 
3 In many seminars on ecofeminism which I have attended or given, men and even some women have expressed 
concerns that the alternative to Patriarchy is dominance by women. 
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ignored to the extent that they are incompatible with the archetypal male image. Ecofeminism, 
in contrast, explains Man's ecocidal behaviour in terms of real emotions and life experience, 
such as the importance of sexual identity, the fear of death, the link between personal worth and 
power, the repressed need to belong, and other expressions of personal insecurity. In Charlene 
Spretnak's words: 
Identifying the dynamics - largely fear and resentment - behind the 
dominance of male over female is the key to comprehending every 
expression of patriarchal culture with its hierarchical, militaristic, 
mechanistic, industrial forms. 1 
I would suggest that the power drive relates back to basic emotional needs (such as love and 
sex) that have been repressed in Patriarchal culture. That is, the drive for power and prestige 
may ultimately, though seldom consciously, be an indirect means of obtaining sex and love. 
The denial of emotional needs has led to an excessive need for physical gratification and 
power, which leads on the social level to hyper-competition, conflict, and consumption. 
Differing diagnoses 
Having defined ecofeminism in general, let us compare it to Manstream green theories. 
Ecofeminism is only one of several philosophies concerned with means to bring about social 
change by examining the underlying foundations of Western thought. Unlike the others, 
however, ecofeminism points to the importance of gender and androcentrism in maintaining the 
status quo. Gender-blindness is power-blindness. Gender-blind analyses serve to protect the 
power structure by making the ideological basis of exploitative relationships invisible. 
Because of the refusal to consider the political significance of gender in the abuse of power 
as an important determinant of the modern crisis, green theory generally divides into competing 
analyses that focus on symptoms , such as industrialism, inappropriate technology, capitalism, 
competitive individualism, consumerism, or anthropocentrism. These 'pathologies', however, 
are linked by, and cannot be adequately theorized without, a gendered perspective. I stress that 
I am not claiming a reductionist priority for a feminist analysis over others. In other words, 
although ecofeminism has the capacity to unite radical green theory into one meta-paradigm, I 
do not necessarily advocate a totalist approach. My purpose is instead to show that while 
ecofeminism has been ignored and marginalized by the Manstream, it provides a complete 
paradigm that provides an account for the above symptoms. In my view, it offers a whole new 
dimension to either replace or inform radical social critiques. 
1 Charlene Spremak, 1988, "Ecofeminism: Our Roots and Flowering", The Elmwood Newsletter 4 at p. 1. 
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Although both Manstream greens and ecofeminists view the sources of environmental 
problems to be deeply rooted in the culture, their diagnoses differ. To discuss differences, we 
need to establish a typology. For purposes of this analysis, we can distinguish two basic 
orientations in the green movement, Masculinist and Feminist values, analyses and strategies. 
Manstream theory is that which disregards the political nature of gender. Because it is gender-
blind, it retains some of the basic androcentric premises of mainstream theory and this impedes 
both green analysis and green strategy. Within Manstrearn theory, there are two basic 
strategical orientations: 'Leftist' or structure-oriented approaches to social change, and 
'Liberalist' or actor-oriented approaches. Figure 12 links these to the orientations in Planning 
discussed in Part II. 
It should be noted that while two basic orientations within the Manstream itself correspond 
loosely to left and liberal 'strategies' for social change, they do not correspond to left and 
liberal 'ideology' (hence I capitalize these new terms). The 'Leftist' approach is concerned 
primarily with changing the system itself. Generally speaking, ecosocialism and social 
ecology can be placed in this category. The 'Liberalist' approach takes the individual as a 
sovereign actor, and sees changing values and perceptions as the primary means toward a 
broader social transformation. This category includes deep ecologists, New Age thought and 
the majority of those called 'greens'. Of course, as Judith Plant reminds us, "we are the social 
system", so the split is one of emphasis.' Both orientations ultimately, though indirectly, rely 
on persuading enough people to change their beliefs and values with a view to changing 
political structures or public policy. Note that I do not regard 'revolutionaries' to be green at 
all - at least in terms of strategy - as any approach that could lead to violence threatens the 
environment and is thus unacceptable. For example, any violence can give 'red necks' the 
excuse to burn down a wilderness area that is under contention and/or frame activists for such 
things. An attempt was recently made to do just this in Tasmania. 2 
1 Judith Plant, 1990, "Searching for Common Ground", in Irene Diamond and Gloria Feman Orenstein, eds., 
above pp. 155-61 at p. 158. 
2 March 11, just two days before the 1993 federal election and the same day the forest industry ran adds urging 
people not to vote green, a 'bomb' was planted beneath a railway line in Northwest Tasmania where greens were 
trying to protect the Tarldne Wilderness area. A sign nearby said "Earth First Save the Tarldne". The State 
Premier, Ray Groom, released a statement the next day condemning the use of violence by "extreme elements in 
the conservation movement". This was almost definitely a hoax to prejudice the greens chances for election. 
Mercury (Hobart), March 12, 1993, at p. 1 & 2. 
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I use the terms Leftist and Liberalist to convey the notion that green strategies and processes 
still reflect, in part, the mainstream approach to social change, even though the green movement 
presents a radical vision for new ecological societies. The old ways of bringing about social 
change no longer work. In essence, these approaches have involved rearranging or subverting 
power structures, or pushing for new policies within the old system, but they do not change the 
nature of that power structure or the forces which support it. Thus, one power-based social 
structure seems to invariably replace another. 1 Therefore, in the long term, any gains are 
pyrrhic. 
Of the many shades of green thought, in my view, ecofeminism offers the most 
comprehensive and incisive socio-political analysis to guide both self and social transformation. 
Leftist green theories do not offer a framework that can adequately theorize the personal 
dimension of power; the Liberalist green framework cannot adequately theorize the structural 
dimension. Ecofeminism, I believe, contributes the necessary insight into the link between the 
abuse of power on personal and political levels which underlies both human oppression and 
environmental exploitation. On a theoretical level, an ecofeminist paradigm can help us to 
redress the historic split between experiential/individual (Liberalist) and critical/institutional 
1 This is amply argued in Marilyn French, 1985, Beyond Power: Women, Men and Morals (London: Jonathon 
Cape). 
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(Leftist) orientations. On a practical level, it can enable us to link environmental theory and
practice, and to develop new strategies for social change. 
Deep ecology compared 
Having distinguished the two orientations of Manstream thought, let us distinguish 
ecofeminism from what is a close ally and the dominant philosophical position in Manstream 
radical environmental philosophy: deep ecology. (Deep ecology is associated with the 'Earth 
Firstrmovement.) It must be emphasized in advance that the hard distinctions made here are 
for dialectical purposes and/or clarifying concepts. Individual viewpoints within these 
perspectives overlap and are not mutually exclusive. 
Deep ecologist and other Liberalist greens consider the fundamental cultural pathology to be 
anthropocentrism. This, they believe, has led to the instrumentalist value system whereby 
things are seen to have worth only to the extent they serve people's material interests. Thus, 
what is necessary is a change in our human-centred way of experiencing reality. In my view, 
however, the focus on changing our anthropocentric way of experiencing or perceiving nature 
is inadequate, either as an analysis or as a program of action. Most ecofeminists believe that 
our way of relating or interacting - most particularly in dominance relationships - is more 
difficult to recognize and change than our intellectual awareness. A change in our perception, 
spirituality, or abstract constructs alone would not be sufficient to bring about the radical social 
transformation required. While human chauvinism must be overcome, this cannot be done 
without squarely addressing male-chauvinism - a culturally-encoded ego problem. For 
therapeutic purposes , the operative 'source' of environmental and social problems lies in the 
power-based morality and institutions of Patriarchy. In fact, anthropocentrism and 
instrumentalism can be understood as manifestations of androcentrism. 
Another difference in emphasis is that deep ecology centres on the metaphysical, while 
ecofeminism centres on the mundane: relationships and processes. Deep ecology appreciates 
the sense of oneness, while ecofeminism appreciates plurality. The difference between the two 
approaches in this regard has been encapsulated by Freya Mathews: 
Deep Ecology...takes a basically holistic view of Nature; its image of 
the natural world is that of a field-like whole of which we and other 
'individuals' are parts. It encourages us to seek our true identity by 
identifying with wider and wider circles of Nature, presenting the 
natural world as an extension of ourselves, our Self-writ-large, as it 
were. Since on this view our interests are convergent with those of 
Nature, it becomes incumbent on us to respect and serve these common 
interests. 
Ecofeminists, in contrast, tend to portray the natural world as a 
community of beings, related, in the manner of a family, but 
nevertheless distinct. We are urged to respect the individuality of these 
beings, rather than seeking to merge with them, and our mode of 
relating to them should be via open-minded and attentive encounter, 
rather than through abstract metaphysical preconceptualization. It is 
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envisaged that the understanding born of such encounters will result in 
an attitude of care or compassion which can provide the ground for an 
ecological ethic. 1 
Despite differences in emphasis, these two orientations can be viewed as complementary. 
Deep ecology is working towards a 'theory of ethics' which should be palatable to Masculine-
identified environmentalists. It can contribute by providing a legitimation for a new 
environmental Ethic and for social change that is grounded within the tradition of 
individualism, but which deep ecologists hope to change. Ecofeminism, on the other hand, is 
concerned with the 'ethics of theory', or the links between theory and action. It can provide a 
conceptual basis for designing a new social/institutional Infrastructure and for guiding new 
strategies for bringing about social transformation. As long as deep ecology remains gender 
blind and detached, of course, there will be a gulf between these two orientations. Some 
reasons that a feminist analysis can be considered preferable are listed below. 
First, changing our anthropocentric way of experiencing or perceiving nature is inadequate 
either as an analysis or a program of action, because an analysis focused on the self in relation 
to nature cannot adequately theorize power relationships within society. Such an analysis also 
distracts attention from power relationships at the personal level. It does not address the 
motives underlying power seeking behaviour as, in effect, it presumes behavioural problems 
can be simply transcended. Changing one's anthropocentric way of experiencing the world - 
an objective ecofeminists support - will not make visible the distortions in the prism that forms 
our attitude toward non-human nature and non-Masculine values. 
Second, anthropocentrism cannot account for the lemming-like drive toward human 
extinction, which is hardly a human-centred policy. 
Third, an analysis centred on anthropocentrism suggests a strategy based on individual 
change. It does not provide any ideas for institutional or systemic reform beyond that already 
implied by mainstream ecology. 
Fourth, due to the gender-blind, androcentric analyses of Liberals and Leftists alike, they 
share with the mainstream the same strategy for social change. That approach is essentially an 
appeal to reason. Whether one is being urged to adopt a new spirituality or new structural 
organization, the strategy is to 'persuade' people that it is in their self-interest to change. These 
approaches have not worked (at least, not in proportion to the energy expended and results 
achieved). Social change is in our self-interest. However, I suggest that we are motivated by 
emotional needs , not concepts. 
1 Freya Mathews, 1992, "Relating to Nature", in Ronnie Harding, ed., Ecopolitics V: Proceedings (Sydney: 
University of NSW ) pp. 489-496. 
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This reliance upon an appeal to reason which assumes environmentally-destructive 
behaviour is misdirected self-interest, owes to the fact that most greens still share some of the 
underlying premises of Patriarchal ideology. Because humanity is defined in theory as rational 
and self-interested (read Masculine), it is assumed that people can be persuaded by reason and 
motivated by (hopefully enlightened) self-interest I will argue that this is why Manstream 
environmentalism is bringing about ecological awareness, but not basic behavioural change. 
Before we can proceed, we must address some false stereotypes that some have sought to 
identify with ecofeminism. 
Misconceptions about ecofeminism 
As suggested above, an ecofeminist program means change, not only on the cerebral level 
(intellectual or experiential), but also on an interactive personal level. In this sense, therefore, 
ecofeminism is indeed a 'threat' to the Masculine identity and its entitlement to power on 
personal and political levels. (Of course, it is not a real threat, as people would presumably be 
better off in a more safe and egalitarian society.) Feminism strikes closer to home than other 
calls for social transformation. Evidence of defensiveness is in the refusal to hear what 
feminists are saying. Those who oppose nature preservation generally know what the 
arguments of environmentalists are, but are unmoved, or exercise denial. However, many who 
feel threatened by feminism react with hostility without ever asking what it is. (The experience 
of many women in the green movement with whom I have spoken on the subject is that 
feminism is more threatening to men than environmentalism.) 
Not surprisingly then, it has been falsely stereotyped to the extent that most debates about 
ecofeminism revolve around projections upon it, rather than matters of substance. 1 So before 
going further, I will review some of the stereotypes and problems of definition that this new 
paradigm faces. Perhaps foremost among these have been false assumptions about feminism 
that are transposed onto ecofeminism. These are that ecofeminism: (1) is dualistic, (3) 
'homogenizes' women, (3) female chauvinist, (4) partial or incomplete, (5) essentialist or 
biologist,2 (7) anti-male, (8) only about equal rights, (9) a power grab, and finally, (10) anti-
rational. However, in each case, it is not ecofeminism, but rather Patriarchal theories, to which 
these adjectives should be applied. 
1 See for example, Susan Prentice, 1988, "Taking Sides: What's Wrong with Eco-feminism?", Women and 
Environments (Spring) pp. 9-10; Janet Biehl, 1988, "What is Ecofeminism?", Green Perspectives 11 (October) 
pp. 5-6; Biehl, Janet, 1991, Rethinking Ecofeminist Politics (Boston MA: South End Press); Dolores 
LaChapelle, 1989, "No, I'm not an Eco-feminist: A Few Words in Defense of Men", Earth First! 9 (4 ) pp. 6- 
7. 
2 Essentialist refers to women having an 'essential' or biologically-based nature. 
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Dualistic? 
The fact that some writers have stressed difference and women's special relationship to 
nature has caused ecofeminists to be accused of being sexist and dualistic.' However, it is the 
ecofeminist problem analysis that is gender based. The fact that ecofeminists think that 
militarism and environmental destruction are partly traceable to gender imbalance and 
Patriarchal consciousness does not mean a women's identification as a female takes precedence 
over her identification with non-human nature, community or family. 
Nor does it mean that anyone is suggesting the liberation of women would solve the 
environmental problem. In fact, no one can be meaningfully liberated within a Patriarchal 
culture. Rather, ecofeminism takes the position that the culture has devalued so-called 
Feminine attributes (caring, nurturing and sharing), and this that has contributed to the dualistic 
thinlcing that pervades Western thought, such as the glorification of the 'hard' sciences over 
creative fields. 
To suggest that it is dualistic to focus on gender divisions in society is reminiscent of the 
1950s in the United States, when many tried to pretend they could not see the colour black as 
this would be 'racist'. Implicit in this 'colour blindness' however, was the chauvinistic idea 
that Afro-Americans must want to be like whites, the 'norm', and since they could not be the 
same colour, whites should pretend they could not see the difference. 
Homogenizes women? 
The misunderstanding that ecofeminism is dualistic may derive from the suggestion by 
ecofeminists that alternatives to Patriarchy are possible, as evidenced in women's (and some 
tribal) cultures.2 This has led some to construe ecofeminists as conceiving of women as a 
'homogeneous whole' (in opposition to men) without making adequate distinctions between 
different races, nationalities, or classes, and so on. This would contradict ecofeminist theory 
by creating an oppositional relationship based on sex. This would also run counter to the 
affirmation of cultural diversity by ecofeminists - and by most greens, for that matter. 
The diversity of women and their experience is certainly not denied by ecofeminists. In 
fact, this diversity is celebrated and seen as a cause for optimism: diversity is vital in the effort 
to bring about social change. However, women "are learning to recognize their sisterhood 
under the skin, and know there are many different ways of being victimized". 3 (This is not to 
1 See Warwick Fox, 1989, "The Deep Ecology-Ecofeminism Debate and its Parallels", Environmental Ethics 
11 (1) pp. 5-25 for a critique of ecofeminism through an androcentric prism. 
2 See Ngapare K. Hopa, 1989, 'Papatuanulcu"Spaceship Earth', Ecopolitics V Conference Proceedings 
(University of Adelaide) pp. 574-580. 
3 Barbara G. Walker, 1985, The Crone: Woman of Age, Wisdom, and Power (S.F.: Harper & Row) at p. 6. 
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overlook the fact that women, as well as men, can be part of the problem as many women are 
directly involved in the oppression of others.) 
The notion that women could have some similarities in experience and consciousness across 
national and class boundaries, due to certain shared conditions, is especially troublesome to 
those who reduce social problems to the existence of classes. 1 This is ironic, as the idea that 
workers in different industries, cultures, or nations could have a similar consciousness is 
essential to a class-based analysis.2 The reality is that men of all classes use and take for 
granted power over women within their class, work-place, political party, or family structure, 
even - or especially - when power in the public arena is denied to those men. This is evidenced 
by the fact that violence toward women is fairly universal in Patriarchal societies and does not 
differ significantly across class boundaries. 3 
Female chauvinist? 
Is reference to women's shared experience potentially discriminatory? Some project upon 
ecofeminists the false stereotypes fostered by the male-dominant power structure and media: 
feminists are portrayed as Masculine and aiming simply to reverse things. The impression is 
often given that ecofeminists believe that women have a special closeness to nature through 
child birth, menstruation, and so forth (a position that is inconsistent with an ecofeminist 
paradigm). However, these claims are not made to simply supplant men in the existing cosmic 
and mundane hierarchy based on sex. The purpose of such observations relates to the 
ecofeminist action orientation. Ecofeminists are concerned with how to get from here to there - 
a society in harmony with nature. To that end, affirming women and their experience is a 
crucial step. There is a practical need to empower rather than degrade women because, having 
a different vantage point, they are well placed to create new models, strategies and approaches. 
While there are Masculine-identified women who emulate male processes and ways of 
relating, feminists are increasingly suggesting that society would be improved if we rebalanced 
the Masculine and Feminine. This does not mean however that feminists are proposing an 
androgynous culture. As Ivan Illich has suggested, the differentiation between male and female 
perceptual frameworks provides an important dialectic for cultural development. 4 In any case, 
the fear of creating a society that is over-balanced toward the Feminine principle, in a nuclear 
age, is somewhat unrealistic. 
1 For example, this was frequently expressed in several workshops at the Socialist Scholars Conference, July 
18-21, 1991, University High, Melbourne. 
2 Ariel Salleh, 1991, "Essentialism' - and Eco-feminism", Arena 94 , pp. 167-173 at p. 169. 
3 Diana E. H. Russell, 1989, "Sexism, Violence, and the Nuclear Mentality", in Diana Russell, ed., Exposing 
Nuclear Phallacies (NY: Pergamon Press) pp. 63-73. 
4 See generally Ivan Mich, 1982, Gender (NY: Pantheon). 
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Some are put off by the name itself, as it seems to exclude men or not be 'broad' enough. 
Why is it that when one adds a feminist perspective to Manstream thought, the latter becomes 
more narrow? (The answer is that it does not.) If people are put off by the term, one might 
well ask "what were they doing before they were put off?" If one cannot get beyond the 
threshold issue (affirmation of the feminine) then one probably cannot relate to ecofeminism by 
any other name. The name simply expresses the idea that it merges ecological and feminist 
analysis. But there is also a practical consideration: if men cannot 'own' the term, they cannot 
re-interpret it into a Patriarchal construct. 
Partial or incomplete? 
Ecofeminism has also been portrayed as partial or incomplete, as if it were the shadow side 
of a 'real' theory. It seems partial because, in misogynist cultures, things concerning women 
are peripheral. But why is it that so many fields of knowledge that are primarily of concern 
only to men do not seem incomplete or partial? I later argue that ecofeminism is a complete 
value system and analysis which provides an alternative (or new dimension) to Manstream 
philosophies for both men and women. 
Similarly, in some circles, value systems of women and tribal peoples are still regarded as 
childlike, or unworthy of the term 'culture'. However, aboriginals and women are credited 
with a separate experience and value system when this is useful as a basis for asserting control 
over them, and only denied them in order to delegitimize these groups or their claims. When 
women begin to evince self-esteem, they are accused of essentialism or reverse sexism. (The 
arrogance of labelling the idea that women could have thoughts or experience of their own as 
'sexist'!) 
We must ask why women are often perceived as a 'minority' group by policy makers, 
although they are the majority.' This is not because women have only 1 percent of the world's 
property.2 It is arrogance born of androcentrism: things outside the male experience are not 
important. Therefore, in the dominant political orthodoxy, women and children are seen as an 
interest group, while the Patriarchal establishment (at least unconsciously) is equated with 
society in general. For example, some environmentalists believe that if we solved the problems 
of 'sustainable development' and conservation, the interests of women and children would be 
improved, or at least could then be attended to. 3 But this argument has never worked in the 
social change movement, and never will, because it relies on a group of 'haves' to take care of 
a group of 'have nots'. It reinforces 'hierarchical dualism'. 
1 The rhetoric often refers to women and children, of course, as in the case of men needing jobs in the forest 
industry to support women and children. 
2 See generally, Ruth L. Sivard, 1987, Women ... A World Survey (Washington DC: World Priorities). 
3 Feminists in the green movement have often been regarded as a 'faction', despite women being the majority. 
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Essentialist or biologist? 
The major attack against ecofeminism, however, has been that it allegedly claims that 
women possess an essential nature - a biological connection (biologist) or a spiritual affinity 
with nature (essentialist) that men do not. 1 While perhaps some women believe this, it is not a 
concept relevant to ecofeminism as such. In the first place, 'essentialism' would be 
inconsistent with the logic of ecofeminism, let alone mainstream ecology. After all, as Ynestra 
King and others have explained, since all life is interconnected, one group of persons cannot be 
closer to nature.2 The assertion of 'difference' is based on the historical socialization and 
oppression of women, not biologism. If gender is shaped by culture, ideology, and history, 
and how one experiences nature is culturally-mediated, then gender-conditioning would tend to 
shape our experience of nature. 
The accusation that ecofeminism is essentialist, I believe, results from a Patriarchal way of 
thinking. It presupposes the legitimacy of the Patriarchal construct that sees nature as separate 
from culture. As Joan Griscom explains it: 
... The question itself is flawed. Only the nature/history split allows us 
even to formulate the question of whether women are closer to nature 
than men. The very idea of one group of persons being 'closer to 
nature' than another is a 'construct of culture.' 3 
In the second place, whether women are 'closer to nature' or generally experience nature 
differently is a purely academic question. We cannot know if gender differences are due 
primarily to genes, hormones, an essential nature, culture, or the division of labour: 1 But this 
is not the issue. What matters is that men and women have shown the conscious capacity to 
choose other values and behaviour patterns. We have seen women adopt 'Masculine' personal 
processes to varying extents when they wish to be part of a power structure and, more 
optimistically, we have seen some men become caring, gentle, and non-dominating. In short, 
men can subscribe to ecofeminism, and, in fact, their cooperation is necessary if we are to save 
the planet. 
A related notion is that ecofeminists see the Feminine and Masculine as unchanging over 
time as well as among cultures. This rests on the assumption that ecofeminists, as women, are 
1 For a discussion of women's special relationship to nature, see Susan Griffm, 1978, Woman and Nature: The 
Roaring Inside Her (S. F.: Harper & Row). 
2 Ynestra King, 1981, "Feminism and the Revolt of Nature", in Heresies 12, pp. 12-16. 
3 Joan L. Griscom, 1981, "On Healing the Nature/History Split in Feminist Thought", Heresies 13 (4) pp. 4- 
9 at p. 9. See also Sherry B. Ortner, 1974, "Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture?", in Michele Z. Rosaldo 
and Louise Lamphere, eds.,Woman, Culture, and Society (CA: Stanford University Press) pp. 67-87 at p. 87. 
4 See generally Carol Gilligan, 1982, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development 
(MA: Harvard University Press). 
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simple minded. Again, this charge has come, ironically, from many socialists who have 
doggedly persisted in portraying the working class as a feature of society which has remained 
unchanged. Both class and gender are significant factors in any analysis of oppression. 
Similarly, at several conferences, I have heard ecofeminists accused of seeing nature also as 
an unchanging, mystical whole somewhere 'out there'. This would be incompatible with the 
basic precepts of green thought, which stresses our interconnectedness and interdependency 
with nature. 
It has become fashionable in some circles to regard 'nature' as nothing but a construct of 
culture and thus to disparage ideas like 'interdependency with nature' as myth. However, I 
believe that the idea of nature being merely a construct of culture is itself a construct of culture. 
Obviously, constructs of culture can only be evaluated in terms of their impacts, not in terms of 
higher truths. The idea that nature is merely a construct of culture is a myth with dangerous 
ideological implications. 
Anti -male? 
Ecofeminism has also been confused with 'separatism' and seen as anti-male. 1 While some 
feminists may believe in working separately from men, feminism in general is not 'anti-male'. 
It is only critical of the power-based culture and value system which is male-dominated. In 
fact, most feminists believe that Patriarchy oppresses men as well, and prevents them from 
developing their full potential as self-aware, caring humans. Both men and women live in a 
Patriarchal society and therefore both, to varying extents, internalize the Patriarchal value 
system. Indeed, this is one reason why some women feel that it is necessary to function 
outside the male-dominated sphere. 
It is regularly stated that "women are just as bad: take Margaret Thatcher". Of course, there 
are women who have chosen to be co-opted into the Patriarchy and are even actively involved 
in the exploitation of other humans and nature. In fact, one can argue that the 'victims' of 
violent domestic relationships participate in a two-way process, if only because they believe 
they have no choices. But such notions confuse blaming with problem solving, and confuse 
sex with gender (the social significance of the male/female polarity, not biology). 
Moreover, from a gender-based analysis, the Margaret Thatcher syndrome makes sense, 
because it serves to reinforce power relations while obscuring them. As Cynthia Enloe 
explains: 
...when a woman is let in by the men who control the political elite it 
usually is precisely because that woman has learned the lessons of 
masculinized political behaviour well enough not to threaten male 
1 See for example Dolores LaChapelle, 1989, above. 
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political privilege. Indeed she may even entrench that privilege, for 
when a Margaret Thatcher or Jeanne Kirkpatrick uses her state office to 
foment international conflict, that conflict looks less man-made, more 
people-made, and thus more legitimate and harder to reverse. 1 
Rights-based? 
Feminism has never been about rights alone, but about our collective and individual 
responsibilities. However, in our liberal political system, it is still only possible to get equal 
rights on the agenda. More fundamental issues of environmental Ethics do not get a hearing. 
The dominant reformist paradigm is essentially egalitarianism (as is most Manstream green 
philosophy). Thus, Manstream thought can contemplate ideas like equal rights for different 
races, sexes, generations and species, more easily than the abandonment of Masculine values 
such as power, individualism and control upon which inequality is based. 2 
Equal rights for women is only a part of the feminist agenda. Empowerment ('power to' 
and 'power with' rather than 'power over') for women is not an end, but a means to the social 
transformation required. In fact, while there are 'liberal feminists' who essentially support the 
existing system, they believe that equal rights for women would lead to a better life quality for 
men as well. 
A power grab? 
Ecofeminism also has to wear the false stereotypes attributed to feminism generally. This 
includes the fear that feminism is a power grab by an exclusionary minority group. Many have 
resisted ecofeminism on,the assumption that the alternative is 'matriarchy' - by which they 
mean a transfer of power to women. But few if any are seriously proposing matriarchy. In 
any case, matriarchy would not mean female 'rule', but rather a partnership mode1. 3 To the 
contrary, as said above, ecofeminists believe that we must move away from the fact of power-
based relationships and move towards an Ethic of care and mutual respect. Indeed, this is the 
'womandate' of ecofeminism. 
It is not, after all, ecofeminism that creates power relations based on sex: Patriarchy does. 
To accuse feminists of the same is merely to kill the messenger. Ecofeminists, in contrast, call 
for less limiting and monolithic conceptions of humanity, and this cannot be achieved without 
men's cooperation. (Perhaps some of the resistance to ecofeminism in environmental circles is 
1 Cynthia Enloe, 1990, Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics 
(Berkeley: University of California Press) at P.  7. 
2 For an interesting discussion (in lay terms) of male and female psychological attributes, see Herb Goldberg, 
1979, The New Male: From Self-Destruction to Self-Care (NY: William Morrow and Co.), and Herb Goldberg, 
1987, The Inner Male. Overcoming Roadblocks to Intimacy (Ontario: New American Library). 
3 Riane Eisler, 1989, The Chalice and the Blade (Harper and Row). 
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the fear that some men have of losing control, academically or professionally, over the 
environment movement as a power base.) 
Anti-rational? 
Finally, ecofeminism is not anti-rational but rather highlights the patent irrationality of 
Patriarchy, and the Masculine model of (rational) Man upon which most mainstream theories 
and radical critiques are based. Ecofeminist is substantively rational. Despite its political 
analysis, ecofeminism is visionary and shares with deep ecology and spiritual ecology the 
advocacy of a 'spiritual' appreciation of nature, 1 identification with nature, and a reverence for 
life processes without regard to their usefulness to humans. However, ecofeminism is not a 
religion and ecofeminists are not trying to 'convert' people, as they advocate cultural and 
religious diversity. In their view, people of any belief system can take on board the ethical and 
political insights it offers. Even Starhawk, who is on the spiritual wing of ecofeminism would 
agree: 
Earth-based spirituality influences ecofeminism by informing its 
values. This does not mean that every ecofeminist must worship the 
goddess, perform rituals, or adopt any particular belief system.2 
The denial of the apparent spiritual needs of most people is potentially as dangerous as the 
other extreme; religious dogmatism and/or superstition. Something, it seems, will always fill a 
spiritual vacuum. A reverence for life processes and a deep sense of interconnectedness with 
all life forms such as that encouraged by ecofeminism is not soon likely to become Patriarchal 
in nature. Even so, the honouring and healing of the earth would come as a welcome relief 
from bearing witness to the tiresome incantations of economic rationalists on the fantasy of 
unlimited growth, the atrocious icons of Masculinity erected by developers, or the cruel, 
sacrificial rituals carried out by militarists. 
1 For a discussion of spiritual ecology, see Nollman, Jim, 1990, Spiritual Ecology: A Guide to Reconnecting 
With Nature (NY.: Bantam Books). "Spiritual" can mean very different things, from respect for natural life 
processes to a religious conception. For an example of the latter approach see Charlene Spretnak, 1986, The 
Spiritual Dimension of Green Politics (NM: Bear & Company) which attempts to show how religion can be 
'greened'. See also Charlene Spretnak, 1991, States of Grace: The Recovery of Meaning in the Postmodern Age 
(N.Y.: HarperSanFrancisco). 
2 Starhawk, 1989, "Feminist, Earth-based Spirituality and Ecofeminism", in Judith Plant, ed., Healing the 
Wounds: The Promise of Ecofeminism (Ontario: Between the Lines) pp. 174-185 at p. 174. 
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CHAPTER 10: PATRIARCHAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
AND MODERN PATHOLOGIES 
Having discussed what ecofeminism is and is not, let us look at what ecofeminists see as the 
most significant tributaries of the modern crisis. We cannot be sure of the origins of the 
conceptual link between the domination of women and nature, as they are prehistoric. How the 
drive for power and control over both the social and natural environment may have developed 
has been postulated in various theories, but a review of these is beyond the scope of this 
Chapter. Such theories have been necessarily partial, unravelling patterns on different 
philosophical, socio-political and psychological layers of society. 1 However, the presumption 
of a linear cause and effect relationship in the interplay of social phenomena is a legacy of the 
Patriarchal mindset. The objective of the ecofeminist project is not to construct all-embracing 
explanations of a complex historical evolution. Because it is centrally concerned with the links 
between theory and activism, the purpose of ecofeminist theory construction is to find ways 
that will enable activists to invest their energy in the right direction. 
Although one cannot know the origins of Patriarchal structures and values, it is nonetheless 
Useful to show how Man's antithetical relationship with women and nature, and Man's 
penchant for dominance relationships, could have become institutionalized. Ecofeminism 
provides a plausible account of how the Power Paradigm might have evolved in Europe. I will 
sketch a few of the thoughts that some ecofeminists have offered on this subject. I only discuss 
Eurocentric cultures because they are so greatly implicated in the problems of modernity - 
industrialization, colonialism, and so on. 
Evolution of dominance relationships 
The male monopoly on hunting weapons was perhaps the first factor in the development of 
institutionalized dominance relationships. Weapons enabled sporadic raids and slavery. This 
meant early forms of wealth accumulation and exploitative social relations. 2 When militarism 
became a means of production, as it did in many early societies, slaves were important • 
1 For a discussion on the different types of explanations for the evolution of the Patriarchal paradigm, see Val 
Plumwood, 1986, "Ecofeminism: An Overview and Discussion of Positions and Arguments", Australian Journal 
of Philosophy Vol. 64 (June supplement) pp. 120-38. 
2 See Maria Mies, 1988, "Social Origins of the Sexual Divisions of Labour", in Maria Mies, Veronika 
Bennholdt-Thomsen and Claudia Von Werlhof, 1988, Women: The Last Colony (London: Zed Books). 
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components of the economy. This meant that ideologies and values that encouraged men to 
become good soldier material would develop by 'natural selection', if not by deliberate 
manipulation by tribal leaders. Perhaps foremost among these instrumental beliefs would be 
the devaluing of life and the denial of one's emotions and feelings. 
Another major factor was the development of agriculture some eight to ten thousand years 
ago. 1 For the first time, there was a surplus of food which allowed larger groupings of people, 
priesthoods, and eventually city and state administrative hierarchies to develop. Early societies 
had been domestic societies, structured around the work of women. However, with the 
development of agriculture came a surplus which allowed for cities and the division of labour. 
Men came to monopolize the increasingly hierarchical public sphere, while the domestic, private 
sphere occupied by women became more isolated and more subject to male dominance as well 
(to be later reinforced by industrialism). Logically, if not historically, the domination of men 
over women preceded the domination of men by men, which in turn preceded the domination of 
humans over nature.2 
According to Rupert Sheldrake, the development of agriculture also heralded a 'narrower' 
conception of Mother Earth as a goddess of vegetation and harvesting. 3 Evidence of the 
displacement of earth-based spirituality by Patriarchal monotheism in the near East is found 
from around 5,000 B.C. The metaphorical separation of the heavens from the earth was a 
cosmological division that was closely linked to the opposition of Man to women and nature. 
For example, in a Mesopotamian creation epic of the Fourth millennium B.C., nature was a 
female monster of chaos that was killed by an urban hero-god who then divided her body into 
two halves which become the sky and earth.4 Charlene Spretnak writes that: 
Our separation from nature began around 4500 B.C. with the 
IndoEuropean invasions of nomadic tribes from the Eurasian steppes, 
who replaced the nature-based and female-honoring religion of the 
Goddess in Europe, the Near East, Persia, and India with their 
thunderbolt god, removing that which is held sacred and revered from 
the life processes of the Earth to the distant realm of an omnipotent male 
sky-god. 5 
1 See generally Evelyn Reed,-1975, Women's Evolutions: From Matriarchal Clan to Patriarchal Family (NY: 
Pathfinder). 
2 Murray Bookchin, 1989, Remaking Society (Montreal: Black Rose Books) at p. 65. 
3 Rupert Sheldralce, 1991, The Rebirth of Nature: The Greening of Science and God (N.Y .: Bantam Books) at 
p. 15. 
4 J. Donald Hughes, 1991, "The Psychology of Environmentalism: Healing Self and Nature", The Trumpeter : 
Journal of Ecosophy 8 (3) pp. 113-117. 
5 Charlene Spretnak, 1988, above at p. 7. See also Marilyn French, 1985, Beyond Power: Women, Men and 
Morals (London: Jonathon Cape) at p. 341. 
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As Marilyn French points out, the rise of this transcendent male god was also linked to the 
development of the worship of power. 1 Indeed, the new sky-god was a deification of power. 
The projection of a powerful male sky-god may have reflected fear and denial of death and the 
consequent striving for immortality. A male Creator represents a denial of dependency upon 
the mother and the Earth. One needs power to supplant needs that one is denying. Man's 
effort to distance Himself from all that was associated with women, earth and nature may have 
been partly because it reminded him of his own mortality. In fact, anthropologists have 
suggested that the early ziggurats and pyramids were perhaps literal attempts to reach the sky. 
The domestic sphere of women thus came to be seen as lower than male-dominated religious 
and cultural life. 
The life of women and slaves was a life determined by necessity. Although the elite were 
dependent on both for their material existence, ideologies developed which denied this . 
dependency and rationalized the master-slave relationship. In Plato's work, for example, God 
or the Cosmos became the expression of reason, and nature became Chaos, the realm of 
necessity. Reason was conceived as a means of ordering and regulating the irrational, sensory 
world, just as the mind was conceived as a controlling the body, and the master as controlling 
the slave. 
Val Plumwood suggests that Plato's philosophy was self-serving in providing a 
rationalization not only for the master, but for the rise of an intellectual elite (to which Plato 
belonged) which accompanied the development of a written culture. 2 His philosophy, which 
invested meaning in the realm of abstract ideas and divested meaning from nature, served to 
replace the view of death as a tragic spectre for one glorified as a completion of the separation 
of body and soul. As well as being attractive to both soldiers and slaves by giving them hope 
for a better realm after life, it therefore met the instrumental needs of the military state. 
Although in the 'dark ages' there was a return to a more naturalistic view of life, this 
dichotomous view of earth/chaos and sky/cosmos was reinforced and further entrenched by 
European androcentric theology and religious hierarchies. As Rosemary Radford Ruether 
explains: 
Patriarchal religion split apart the dialectical unities of mother religion 
into absolute dualism, elevating a male-identified consciousness to 
transcendent apriority. Fundamentally this is rooted in an effort to deny 
one's own mortality, to identify essential (male) humanity with a 
transcendent divine sphere beyond the matrix of coming-to-be-and- 
passing-away. By the same token, woman become identified with the 
sphere of finitude that one must deny in order to negate one's own 
origins and inclusion in this realm. The woman, the body, and the 
1 Marilyn French, 1985, above at p. 117. 
2 Val Plumwood, personal communication. 
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world were the lower half of a dualism that must be declared posterior 
to, created by, subject to, and ultimately alien to the nature of (male) 
consciousness, in whose image man made his God. 1 
The basis of Man's attempt to control nature, then, was "the quest to become divine, 
immortal, incorruptible". 2 In this sense, Man's effort to overcome the inevitable - death - was 
through self-delusion. French speculates further that when Man discovered his role in 
pregnancy, He could begin to see women as mere bearers and nourishers, or objects. 3 The 
origins of hierarchy, the power drive, the contempt for women as a caste and fear of nature 
were thus synergistically interrelated. A complex morality based on dominance and 
exploitation evolved along side the devaluing of nature and Feminine values. 4 Thus, just as 
the Christian Bible suggested Man was meant to subdue the earth, Confucius, in 500 B.C., 
said Man was meant to subdue woman: "It is the law of nature that woman should be held 
under the dominance of man". 5 
Another turning point in the institutionalization of gender-based hierarchy took place with 
the rise of industrial capitalism. First, the split between public and private spheres of life and 
morality became further entrenched. 
The home was refashioned from a producer to a consumer unit in 
society, totally dependent upon a separate work structure no longer 
under its control. The work of the home and hence of women became 
concentrated on intensive interpersonal emotionality, extended child 
nurture, and the primary physical support (eating, sleeping) of male 
work.6 
Second, with capitalism, the medieval view of nature as a living nurturing mother was 
replaced by the Seventeenth Century view of nature as inert and mechanistic. 7 Before this time, 
"the root metaphor binding together the self, society, and the cosmos was that of an organism". 
1 Rosemary Radford Ruether, 1975, New Woman: New Earth (NY: Seabury Press) at p. 194-5. 
2 See Michael E. Zimmerman, 1987. "Feminism, Deep Ecology, and Environmental Ethics", Environmental 
Ethics 9 pp. 21-44 at p. 26. 
3 Marilyn French, 1985, above at p. 160. 
4 The evolution of power-based institutions and constructs have been traced in books such as Gerda Gerda 
Lerner, 1986, The Creation of Patriarchy (Oxford: Oxford University Press); French, 1985, above ; Murray 
Bookchin, 1982, The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy (CA: Cheshire Books); 
Michael Tobias, 1985. After Eden: History, Ecology and Conscience (San Diego: Avant); Dinnerstein, 1976, 
above ; Carolyn Merchant, 1990, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution 
Second Edition (San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row). 
5 Confuseius, c. 500 B.C. (Source: Tama Starr, 1991, The Natural Inferiority of Women (NY: Poseidon 
Press) at p. 118. 
6 Ruether, 1975, above at p. 197. 
7 Merchant, 1990, above at p. 1. 
220 
This new imagery was necessary to accommodate the industrial/commercial revolution, as an 
earth that was alive and sensitive could not ethically be raped and pillaged: 
As long as the earth was considered to be alive and sensitive, it could be 
considered a breach of human ethical behaviour to carry out destructive 
acts against it. 1 
It was, however, not the needs, wants and purposes of society at large that changed, but 
only those with the vested interests and social power to bring about change. This conversion to 
a view of nature as dead matter was made possible by an Western ideology of male supremacy 
and a cosmology based on a subliminal sky/mind/male versus earth/matter/female duality.2 
Over time, this mechanistic view of nature became deeply etched in the professional and 
scientific institutions and methodologies of Western society. The rise of modem science and 
medicine, for example, reflected the related concepts of dualism (mind over matter) and power, 
as expressed in such goals as "the heroic conquest of nature". 3 As Andrew Dobson 
summarizes: 
Bacon developed methods and goals for science that involved (and 
involve) the domination and control of nature; Descartes insisted that 
even the organic world (plants, animals, etc.) was merely an extension 
of the general mechanical nature of the universe; and Newton held that 
the workings of this machine-universe could be understood by reducing 
it to a collection of 'solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable 
particles.4 
Human well being, as well as nature, came to be thought of as reducible to mechanism. As 
Marti Kheel notes, the body, when seen as 'inert matter', must conform to mechanical or 
chemical (atomistic) laws: "When disease strikes, it is the body's machinery that must be 
repaired". 5 Also, since the modern medical body is like a machine, it is thought to conform to 
Newtonian laws of cause and effect. Therefore, disease and ill health are usually attributed to a 
single, external 'cause' - the enemy organism - "fought with chemical weapons forced from 
nature on another battlefront - the modern research laboratory". 6 
The rise of male dominance in medicine and science was not entirely through metaphor and 
philosophy, however. The conquest of the remaining vestiges of power held by women in the 
1 Merchant, 1990, above at p. 1. 
2 •Most aboriginal cosmologies do not appear to make this separation. 
3  See Marti Kheel, 1989, "From Healing Herbs to Deadly Drugs: Western Medicine's War Against the Natural 
World", in Plant, ed., above pp. 96-111. 
4 Andrew Dobson, 1990, Green Political Thought (London: Unwin Hyman) p. 38. (It is at this stage in 
history, the time of Bacon, Newton, and Descartes, that some greens trace the origins of the environmental 
problem. Others actually look to early Greeks for support for an environmental ethic.) 
5 Kheel, 1989, above at p. 98. 
6 Kheel, 1989, above at p. 99. 
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public sphere was sometimes quite literally a war of the sexes, though economic factors may 
have provided the immediate motive. In the male take-over of medicine, an estimated nine 
million people (mostly women) were burned as healers or 'witches' in the fifteenth through 
eighteenth centuries. Widows were easy prey for those who wanted to confiscate property or 
avoid responsibility for supporting them (often the church). 1 This activity was sometimes 
supported actively by church dogma: 
According to the church, the vital, healing force of nature resided not 
within the earth, but rather, within a male, sky God. Disease, illness, 
and even labor pains, were all expressions of God's will. Only church-
approved individuals (mostly men with university training and the 
priests with who they were obliged to consult) could work within 
God's plan.2 
The Patriarchal deity in Europe during this era was an authoritarian figure who relied on 
fear, guilt, and hate for social control. As described (somewhat facetiously) by Barbara 
Walker, He was: 
...a God who condemned all humanity to eternal torture for the sin of 
seeking enlightenment, then changed his mind and decided to forgive 
some of the sinners, provided they ate the flesh and blood of his Son, 
who was also the Divine Father in human form, sent to earth for the 
express purpose of being sacrificed to himself, an allegedly loving 
Father who decreed his Son's painful slaying, then punished those who 
carried out his order. This bloodthirsty Son-killing or self-killing 
Father, who was one but also three; who professed to want good, but 
created evil; who pretended to love his mortal children while preparing 
for them a hell sadistic beyond belief; who ordained all things in 
advance, yet held humans entirely responsible for the errors he knew 
they would make; who talked of love and ruled by fear.3 
Because of the androcentric orientation in the evolution of scientific and religious thought, 
and the fact that women were largely excluded from institutions of learning and the church, the 
values, attitudes and assumptions traditionally associated with men were taken to be 
representative of humanity as a whole. Patriarchal consciousness came to be accepted is 
coextensive with reality, while women became the generalized Other or the mere non-male. 4 
"Patriarchy is given universal status because the universe itself becomes a male ego writ large 
1 See generally, Barbara G. Walker, 1985, The Crone: Woman of Age, Wisdom, and Power (S.F.: Harper & 
Row) 
2 Kheel, 1989, above at p. 101. 
3 Barbara G. Walker, 1985, above at p; 8. 
4 For an early and comprehensive discussion, see Simone de Beauvoir, 1982, The Second Sex, trans. and ed. by 
H. M. Parshley (Harmondsworth: Penguin). Simone de Beauvior was not an ecofeminist, however, and accepted 
the nature-culture dichotomy. 
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and, therefore, .. .['his-story' is] the story of the power exploits of the male ego's search for 
domination and control." 1 
The above sketchy outline of the ecofeminist hypothesis for the evolution of Patriarchy and 
the Power Paradigm will have to suffice for personal purposes. We can begin with the modern 
era; the Age of Reason, or Enlightenment. The value system underlying the 'dominant 
paradigm' of modernity, and particularly the growth ethic, became cemented in the 
Enlightenment philosophy of the Eighteenth Century. The Enlightenment introduced concepts 
which still form the basic elements of both liberal and radical thought today. The earlier view 
of history as cyclical was supplanted by a belief in 'progress': the concept that society evolves 
in a forward progression. Progress was toward individual freedom and self-realization, which 
meant transcendence from social and natural constraints. The Enlightenment thinkers held that 
all 'men' possessed the faculty of reason. It was through this Masculinist notion of 'reason' - 
removed from emotion and intuition and disciplined by scientific method - that Man could 
ascertain the knowledge required for human progress. 
The Enlightenment celebrated those ideals that were either associated with the Masculine self 
(autonomy, individualism, freedom, transcendence) or concepts construed in Masculine terms 
(instrumental rationality, the reductionist scientific method, and progress). The elevation of 
these values has been greatly implicated in environmental problems, and has resulted in the 
imbalance between the Masculine and Feminine in our selves and society that feminism seeks 
to redress. 
The androcentric premise revisited 
The legacy of this history of male dominance, which I call the 'androcentric premise', is still 
found in virtually all modem schools of thought, even 'radical' ones as discussed in Chapter 
11. The androcentric premise is an interpretation of human nature that assumes a particular 
Masculine model of Man and its associated values have universal application. There are 
important aspects of this premise, although introduced in Part I, are provided below for 
convenience. 
(a) The polarization of Masculine and Feminine archetypes and the elevation of so-called 
Masculine traits and values. Attributes defined as Feminine, such as nurturing, caring, or 
accommodating, are seen as disadvantages for men, while those defined as Masculine 
(competitive, dominating, or calculating) are encouraged. To be Masculine, after all, is to 
dissociate oneself from Feminine attributes. 
1 Donald Davis, 1986, "Ecosophy: The Seduction of Sophia?", Environmental Ethics 8 (2) pp. 151-162 at p. 
157, quoting personal communication with Alan Drengson. 
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(b) The deep association of women, nature and earth. Because nature is identified with the 
Feminine, it exists to serve Man's physical needs (and the reverse). This association of nature 
and women in Patriarchal society has been used to underwrite instrumentalism whereby things 
are valued only to the extent that they are useful to Man. 
(c) The idea that Man is autonomous or independent from both nature and community. 
This model of Man in Western thought has been described as a "mushroom"; he springs from 
nowhere as an adult male, with neither mother, nor sister, nor wife. 1 This false sense of 
Masculine autonomy underlies the alienation and anthropocentrism to which many 
environmentalists trace the modern crisis. 
(d) The universalization of male experience and values. As we will see, the egoistic 
conception of human nature - the image of Man striving for self-realization through 
independence from necessity (nature) and freedom from social constraints (community) - 
becomes the implicit goal of humanity as a whole. Due to this egocentric projection, what men 
do not experience is regarded as somewhat unimportant, distant, or unreal. 
(e) The linkage between Masculinity and power over others. Masculinity is measured by 
power as well as distance from the 'Feminine'. And because Masculinity is powerfulness and 
autonomy, dependency and powerlessness are perceived as marks of inferiority and grounds 
for unequal treatment. In the words of Bertrand de Jouvenel: "A man feels himself more of a 
man when he is imposing himself and making others the instruments of his will", which gives 
him "incomparable pleasure". 2 
Political implications 
What, then, are the implications of the androcentric premise? A basic effect is that 
Patriarchy prevents our questioning the necessity of power relationships per se. Militarism, 
colonialism, racism, classism, sexism, capitalism and other pathological 'isms' of modernity 
obtain legitimacy from the assumption that power relations and hierarchy are inevitably a part of 
human society due to Man's 'inherent nature'. If Mankind is by nature autonomous, 
aggressive, and competitive (that is, 'Masculine'), then psychological and physical coercion or 
hierarchical structures are necessary to manage conflict and maintain social order. Likewise, 
cooperative relationships, such as those found among women or some aspects of some tribal 
1 Seyla Benhabib, 1987, "The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and 
Feminist Theory", in Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell eds., Feminism as Critique (Cambridge: Polity Press) 
pp. 77-95 at p. 85. 
2 Bertrand de Jouvenel, 1962, On Power, its Nature and the History of its Growth , trans. JF. Huntington 
(N.Y.: Beacon Press). Source: Stephen Lukes, 1986, Power (Oxford: Basil Blackwell) at p. 122. 
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cultures, appear to be, by definition, unrealistic or utopian. Thus, as Salleh has pointed out, 
alternatives to the monolithic model of Man exist, but they have been backgrounded. 1 
In authoritarian approaches, this 'essentialist' conception of Man has been used to justify 
hierarchical authority, rules, and the apparatus to enforce them. In more liberal approaches, 
these same qualities are sometimes -revered, even if distrusted. Liberal theory holds that Man's 
competitive, aggressive instincts should be allowed free rein to pursue His individual interests 
to the benefit of society. Thus, this social construction of Man serves to justify capitalism. 
In short, the dominant political ideologies, both pluralist and centralist, share the same 
Masculine archetype as representing humanity, although it is used to justify different means of 
distributing power. Now, if power relations stem from pre-political or universal truths .about 
human nature, the basis of power relations is removed from the realm of political and social 
debate. We cannot challenge the legitimating basis of the power structure because we think it 
cannot be otherwise. Since power relationships are preordained, militarism can be justified as 
unavoidable or necessary, regardless of its patent irrationality. Likewise, if humans will 
always compete for a greater share of resources, then the 'rational' attitude toward the 
environmental crisis would seem to be dog-eat-dog survivalism. This creates a chilling self- 
fulfilling prophecy in which nature and community cannot survive, and which contributes to the 
public apathy and fatalism so prevalent today. 
Ecofeminists have challenged this Patriarchal essentialism, or the idea that so-called 
Masculine traits are the essence of human nature and that power structures are a necessary 
concomitant of human society. First, of course, it would seem from human beings' relative 
physical weakness that human evolution must have depended on cooperation in its early stages. 
Second, if, on the one hand, we accept (for arguments sake) the Patriarchal conception of 
women as passive, then the idea that humans are aggressive by nature holds only if women are 
non-human. That is, if women are considered 'fully human' - then it cannot be argued that 
humans are innately aggressive. On the other hand, if we accept (again for argument's sake) 
that the power drive is intrinsic to humans, then the majority of humans, women, have largely 
been socialized to suppress it, so surely men can be too. 
Androcentrism and modern pathologies 
If we want to get to the bottom of a psychological problem we must uncover our 'blind 
spot', or what we are denying. The same is true on a social level. Today, our crucial blind 
spot - what we are trained not to see - is the pathological imbalance created by the male-centred 
1 Arid Salleh, 1984, "Deeper than Deep Ecology: The Eco-Feminist Connection", Environmental Ethics 6 
(Winter) pp. 335-341. 
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social structures and values of Patriarchy. In the rest of Part ifi, we explore how the failure to 
use androcentrism and gender as analytical categories has affected both green theory and 
strategy. Analyses that systematically ignore a universal basis of oppression cannot be 
sufficient: 
Unless we understand the interrelationships of human systems of 
oppression, and the oppression of the earth, we cannot develop a 
strategy and program of political action that makes sense. It is in the 
interests of those who rule to prevent us from seeing these connections - 
because such knowledge is power. 1 
I have suggested that the Patriarchal construction of reality is implicated in the behaviours 
and attitudes that environmentalists cite as underlying causes of the modern crisis: competitive 
individualism, capitalism, human chauvinism, classism, racism, colonialism, instrumentalism, 
hierarchy, parochialism, and the addiction to power. Androcentrism interacts with all systems 
of oppression to which environmental theorists attribute the modern crisis. The threads in the 
complex tapestry of our Patriarchal culture are, of course, inextricably interwoven, and not in a 
simple cause and effect relationship. The purpose of the following examples is therefore only 
to indicate the pervasiveness of androcentrism in problems of modernity. 
Alienation 
Our alienation or estrangement from nature, from each other and from ourselves has been 
an important theme in various diagnoses of the modern crisis. People cannot care about the 
community and environment if their lives lack a sense of meaning and belonging. Alienation is 
underwritten by hierarchical dualism on several levels: self from self, self from Other, and self 
from nature. First, is the split in the person or self. Humans are conceptually divided into 
body and spirit. One effect of this division of the self is to 'project' problems onto the 'outer' 
world, and to seek solutions outside the self (an approach which many find characteristic of 
male problem-solving processes). 
Dualistic thought has posited an infinite gap between the sacred (divine 
perfection) and the profane (human imperfection). This has forced us 
to reach outside ourselves for the source of meaning in our lives, 
whether by turning to sacred texts or to religious leaders (prophets, 
holy men, gurus), or by adhering to religious laws and doctrines. (Of 
course, in our own secularized age, scientific authority has largely 
superseded the role of religion in earlier years.)2 
Second, the dualistic construction of Patriarchy alienates Man from Other. In Patriarchy, 
one's identity depends on their autonomy and individualism. This egocentric model of Man is 
1 Starhawk, 1989, "Feminist, Earth-based Spirituality and Ecofeminism", in Judith Plant, ed., Healing the 
Wounds: The Promise of Ecofeminism (Ontario: Between the Lines) pp. 174-185 at p. 180. 
2 Marlene A. Schiwy and Steven M. Rosen, 1990, "Spinning the Web of Life: Feminism, Ecology, and 
Christ Wolf', in The Trumpeter 7 (1) (Winter) pp. 16-26 at p.17. 
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based on (men's) denial of their dependency on relationships, and distancing from the 
feminine. As Ynestra King explains: "the making of women and nature into 'others' to be 
appropriated and dominated, is based on a profound forgetting by men. They forget that they 
are born of women...". 1 
Third, this false sense of autonomy contributes to Man's alienation from nature. 	. 
Benhabib's mushroom (above) does not need nature, except as a resource. This desire to be 
free or independent of nature is reflected in our environmental design fields. Building design 
reflects the desire to separate and elevate Man from nature (for example, to replace vegetation 
with concrete, and streams with pipes). 
Instrumentalism 
Instrumentalism, the idea that nature (and Other) exists for Man's use, is a useful 
explanation of the environmental crisis. The Bible, it has often been argued, encourages the 
view that the earth exists to be exploited.2 It is less often acknowledged however, that 
instrumentalism and the major religions that supported it were embedded in an androcentric 
world-view. As Man represented humanity, and Woman was a subset of Man, it is easy to see 
how she could come to be regarded as a 'prop' to serve Man. (That is, She became 
'objectified'.) Similarly, as Man was seen as separate from nature, nature came to be regarded 
as a stage against which competing egos played out their roles. Nature became a mere 
backdrop, not subject to moral or ethical consideration, and therefore free for the taking. 
Deep ecologists argue that human-centredness leads to instrumentalism. However, 
instrumentalism and anthropocentrism may be seen as stemming from, or at least evolving 
along with, androcentrism: the egocentric universalization and elevation of male experience. 
That is, while it may be a moot point, androcentrism logically, and perhaps historically, 
preceded the objectification of nature. There is, after all, no evidence that the conception of 
nature as being only for human purposes existed prior to the development of androcentrism, or 
that anthropocentrism existed prior to androcentrism, for that matter. (It could also be argued 
that the domestication and abuse of animals could have been the model by which humans were 
late subjugated. I would conjecture that if there were an original form of domination - in itself 
a questionable proposition - it would probably stem from a more fundamental need, such as 
sex and reproduction.) 
1 Ynestra King, 1983, "Toward an Ecological Feminism and A Feminist Ecology", in Joan Rothschild, ed., 
Machina Ex Dea: Feminist Perspectives on Technology (NY: Pergamon) at p. 122. 
2 See Lynn White, 1967, "The Historical Roots of Our Environmental Crisis", in Science 155 (March) 1203- 
7. But see Passmore, John, 1974, Man's Responsibility Toward Nature: Ecological Problems and Western 
Tradition (NY: Scribners). Passmore argues that the Western attitude is not inherently destructive. 
227 
Hierarchy and bureaucracy 
Social ecologists have pointed out that hierarchical social structures, which institutionalize 
dominance relationships, are another fundamental root of the modern crisis. Hierarchies reflect 
two forms of dominance, structural and psychological. As Adair and Howell point out: 
"patterns of domination and submission reside not just in our institutions and political 
processes, but within each of us". 1 Systems of hierarchy and privilege reproduce or 
perpetuate themselves by "the creation of a mindset in which we are taught to mistrust our 
experience, to hand over our power to 'experts', technicians, and authorities". 2 Bureaucratic 
hierarchies are self-reinforcing because they reward obedience and dominant/submissive 
behaviour. "The more people internalize a Patriarchal view of the self and nature, the less 
overt force is needed to keep them in their place". 3 
The modern bureaucracy demonstrates the goal-displacing tendencies that hierarchies 
promote: 'empire building' often takes precedence over service delivery. Likewise, 
hierarchies create misplaced loyalties: 'public servants' in environmental agencies often view 
the public as the adversary and adopt the goals of the industry they are charged with regulating 
as their own. This is partly why environmental bureaucracies are so readily 'captured' by 
industry. Thus, hierarchies, even when set up with good intentions, are prone to becoming the 
adversary of the environment. 
While not minimizing the importance of bureaucracy in influencing behaviour, there is, 
however, a common tendency to adopt a position of 'institutional determinism' (below). This 
mechanistic view of institutions overlooks personal motivations that operate within and 
support hierarchical institutions. Certainly, not all people behave the same in a bureaucracy. 
It is therefore important to look at the motivation for obtaining power and status within the 
social hierarchy in the first place, such as the pressures of Masculine identity. To subsume 
power relations based on sex and gender as a mere example of hierarchy is to take an overly 
mechanistic view of bureaucratic functionaries. 
Industrialism 
Industrialism, with its attendant pollution and alienating modes of work, is another 
important cause of ecological problems. A factor enabling or fostering the rise of industrialism 
was the fixation with mechanism (above), which reflects an obsession with power and control. 
In industrialization, we see the replacement of natural processes with machines which harness 
natural power to secure Man's social power. 
1 Adair andllowell, 1989, in Plant, ed., above at p. 220. 
2 Adair and Howell, 1989, in Plant, ed., above at p. 220. 
3 Adair and Howell, 1989, in Plant, ed., above at p. 220. 
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What is played out on the psychological level as domination of the 
animus [doing; extroverted] over the anima [being; introverted] and on 
the social level as the domination of men over women, becomes on the 
political and economic level the domination of science/technology and 
capitalistic product-orientation over nature/nurture and humanistic 
process-orientation. 1 
In industrial development, as in the other roots of the environmental crisis, we see the self-
reinforcing nature of the ideology of power. Industrialism itself, which expropriates power 
and resources from nature, the working class, the colonies, and women, is used as evidence of 
Man's superiority and right to dominate and control. Also, the productivity engendered by 
industrial projects works to reinforce the illusion of white middle-class male superiority. Yet, 
in fact, the increased productivity from industrialization comes from 'slave' labour in the form 
of energy converted from the use of natural resources. 2 As Vandana Shiva points out, while 
the industrialized countries are seen as more efficient and productive, this owes much to the fact 
that, for example, the average person in the United States has 250 times more 'slaves' than the 
average Nigerian. "If Americans were short of 249 of the 250 'slaves', one wonders how 
efficient they would prove themselves to be?" 3 The same, of course, holds true for men whose 
productivity is related to being relieved of domestic duties by women. 
Industrialism has also increased the division of labour based on sex, the isolation of women 
from culture, politics and science, and the separation between the private and public life 
worlds. Women became "the degraded bystanders of a male-oriented civilization that reared 
itself up beside woman's own culture, corroded it, and established systematic ways of 
manipulating it".4 
A -morality 
Androcentrism is a factor in the marginalization or removal of morality from the public 
sphere - another major root of the modern crisis. The separation of society into public/male 
and private/female spheres not only reinforced the institutional marginalization of women, it 
also divided Masculine and Feminine conceptions of morality. Emotions, feelings, and ethical 
considerations became confined to the private sphere of the family. In Rosemary Ruether's 
words: 
1 Susan Koen, 1980, "Patriarchy and the Nuclear Mentality" in Susan Koen, Nina Swaim and Friends. Ain't No 
Where We Can Run: Handbook for Women on the Nuclear Mentality (VT: Wand) at p. 6. 
2 Vandana Shiva, 1990, Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Development (London: Zed Books) at p. 8, 
citing Amory Lovins. According to UNEP (United Nations Environmental Programme), people in high-income 
countries consume 15 times more energy than people in low-income countries. UNEP, 1992, Our Planet 4 2). 
3 Shiva, 1989, in Plant, ed., above at p. 86. 
4 Murray Bookchin, 1989, Remaking Society (Montreal: Black Rose Books) at p. 65. 
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...the male sphere of public life becomes rational in a way that is 
emptied of human values. Morality is privatized, sentimentalized, and 
identified with the "feminine" in a way that both conceals the essential 
immorality of sexism and rationalizes a value-free public world. A 
morality defined as "feminine" has no place in the "real world" of 
competitive male egoism and technological rationality. 1 
Because of the conception of Man as competitive and autonomous, morality in the public 
sphere is that of a balancing of interests, or 'justice', to be determined by an impartial, 'higher' 
authority. As discussed in Part II, these rights-based social justice concepts cannot 
comprehend an environmental Ethic, because environmental preservation cannot be 
encompassed by a system based on distributional fairness or 'rights' alone. 
Another example of the environmental consequences of this public/private split is to be 
found in the assumption that the economy can be studied independently from the family and 
'women's work 1 .2 Activities that are basic to human survival (such as child care, housework, 
nursing and other forms of social support) are excluded from economic research and policy 
making. This has contributed to the destruction of Third World environments in the name of 
progress. 3 
Capitalism 
Finally, as suggested earlier, androcentrism also underlies and legitimizes capitalism. 
Again, capitalism is supported by a Masculine conception of 'human nature': inherently 
competitive, aggressive, independent and self-interested. Moreover, capitalism has been given 
a moral tone by the ideological myths of political and market liberalism with which it has been 
associated. Liberalism is grounded in Benhabib's autonomous, independent 'mushroom', or 
in Corinne D'Souza's words, "an image of an individual who owed nothing to society". 4 
Thus, as argued above, the androcentric thought world makes modern socio-economic 
structures and concepts of ethics - even capitalism - seem universal, inevitable and 
preordained. 
Many describe capitalism, instead, as an outcome of the profit motive or greed. However, 
this is an inadequate explanation unless we understand profit or wealth as a source and symbol 
of dominance. This latter interpretation is more accurate, because, once people have a certain 
1 Ruether, 1975, New Woman: New Earth (NY: Seabury Press) above at p. 199. 
2 Linda Nicholson, 1987, "Feminism and Marx. Integrating Kinship with the Economic", in Benhabib and 
Cornell, eds., above pp. 16-30. 
3 See generally Marilyn Waring, 1988, Counting for Nothing: What Men Value and What Women are Worth 
(London: Allen & Unwin). See also section below on Third World Development!. 
4 Corinne Kumar D'Souza, 1989. "A New Movement, a New Hope: East Wind, West Wind, and the Wind 
from the South", in Plant, ed., 1989, above pp. 29-39. 
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standard of living, profit only serves to put people above others in the social hierarchy, to 
influence people, or to otherwise exercise power. That greed and profit do not suffice to 
explain the power drive is evidenced by the behaviour of corporate decision makers who 
cynically counter the fear of environmental destruction with fear of economic crises that would 
allegedly result from environmental protection, despite the fact that it can be demonstrated that 
conservation is profitable for big business.' Corporations know this, but often spend millions 
on fighting environmental referendums, legislation, and law suits rather than on improving 
their efficiency, public image, or even profits. 2 This attitude is changing, although slowly at 
best.3 
Wealth accumulation, then, is about power, and money and possessions should be 
theorized as means to acquire and demonstrate power, not the reverse. This leads to a 
discussion of technology and technocracy generally, which provides a more immediate context 
for the problems of Planning reform. 
Technological determinism 
Many green theorists have singled out technological growth with its attendant consumerism 
and waste as a major cause of the environmental crisis. Often, however, the problem has been 
treated in value-neutral terms, such as 'technological determinism'. Many writers who have 
analyzed the ramifications of technology upon society and human consciousness have simply 
tended to see technology as taking on a life of its own, divorced from its social roots in power 
struggles!' Technology has indeed had a large influence on human values and perceptions of 
nature and society. However, some writers have shown that technological change also mirrors 
prior changes in social organization.5 
1 The case is made in Amory B. Lovins, et al., 1986, Energy Unbound: A Fable for America's Future (CA: 
Siena Books). 
2 For example, in 1990, vested interests in California spent $17 million to defeat the so-called 'Big Green' 
initiative, or pro-environment referendum. 
3 Perhaps the most well know example of corporate 'greening' is the 3M corporation which has demonstrated 
the financial advantage of environmental conservation. Also, environmental audits are becoming a new 
enterprise. 
4 See Jacques Ellul, 1964, The Technological Society, trans. by John Wilkinson (NY: Vintage Books); Hans 
Jonas, 1982, The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age (IL: 
University of Chicago Press); George Grant, 1986, Technology and Justice (IN: University of Notre Dame 
Press); Langdon Winner, 1977, Autonomous Technology (MA: MIT Press) and Langdon Winner, 1986, The 
Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology (IL: University of Chicago Press). 
For an early articulation of this position, see Georg Friedrich Juenger, 1949, The Failure of Technology (IL: 
Regnery Gateway). 
5 Lewis Mwnford, 1966, The Myth of the Machine: Technics and Human Development (NY: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich). 
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Still others have added a critical dimension to the analysis of technological change, by 
showing how innovations have been partly determined by existing patterns of technology and 
power relations generally. 1 For example, automation has sometimes been introduced as a 
means of breaking unions and replacing specialists with cheaper unskilled labour (usually 
women and children). Technological innovations have also been influenced by class relations, 
not just between capitalists and labour but between factions of the working class as well. As 
Judy Wajcman shows, the character of technological change has involved an element of 
choice, and these choices have often been political. For example, decisions concerning the 
form of automation have sometimes been more to increase managerial control over production 
than to increase the degree of efficiency. 2 Thus technology reflects the relative power of 
managers over workers. 
However, many analyses of technological change as a function of social relations and 
power struggles have ignored the effect of gender relations within industry. 3 Men have used 
their monopoly on skilled trades, that resulted from the gender division already entrenched by 
industrialization, to retain a monopoly on the new skills that accompanied technological 
innovations. Furthermore, the existing gendered division of labour within the factory meant 
that machinery was designed by men with men in mind, whether the designers were capitalist 
inventors or skilled craftsmen. Thus, industrial technology from its origins has reflected male 
power as well as capitalist domination.4 
More evidence that gender divisions affect the nature of technological development is that 
technological change has been slower in industries where there is an abundant supply of cheap 
labour, and which use skills associated with women, such as sewing. Because women's work 
is underpaid in relation to the skills involved, reducing labour cost and power has not been an 
imperative in these areas. 5 Those industries where women's (cheap) labour prevails are also 
those industries that have least direct involvement in the control and exploitation of nature. 
Investment in technological change is therefore increasingly directed toward reducing the cost 
of expensive male work in, for example, road works, mining, forestry, and dam building, and 
is thus often in the service of faster, more efficient exploitation and consumerism. Investment 
1 David Noble, 1984, Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation (NY: Knopf); Murray 
Bookchin, 1980, Toward an Ecological Society (Montreal: Black Rose Books) 
2 See generally Noble, 1984, above. 
3 Judy Wajcman, 1991, Feminism Confronts Technology (Sydney: Allan & Unwin) at p. 15. She cites 
Mumford and Marcuse as examples of this approach. 
4 Wajcman, 1991, above at p. 21. 
5 Wajcman, 1991, above at pp. 48-49. Unfortunately, Wajcman mis-states the position of ecofeminism as 
maintaining that women's values have a biological basis (p.7) which may explain why she does not cite recent 
ecofeminist work in her bibliography. 
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tends not to be in technologies that promote life quality or that entail meaningful work. Thus 
the dynamics and priorities of technological development reflect the fact that the technocratic 
professions are male-dominated. 
The faith in techno-scientific methodologies, still unquestioned in some circles, is facilitated 
by the exclusion of women from the professions through sexism and/or 'self-discrimination' 
on the part of women. While sexism is sometimes indirect and difficult to identify, self-
discrimination is virtually invisible. The fear of success, which impedes many women's 
careers, is related to the polarization of male-female attributes. Women have been programmed 
to believe that they do not deserve success or that to strive for power and success is Masculine. 
To be professional and feminine, then women must choose to adopt behaviour that is 
disempowering on another leve1. 1 Conversely, those women who do enter the male-dominant 
professions must, to a large extent, adopt Patriarchal values and modes of behaviour in order 
to succeed. This has the effect of making a particular set of values seem universal and 
inevitable. 
Finally, as Marcuse has argued, technology itself is linked with the domination of nature, 
not only in application, but in its very construction. 2 In technological fields, knowledge has 
come to be almost synonymous with power, rather than wisdom. 3 To the extent that scientists 
and technocrats work in an anti-feminine and anti-natural environment with Masculinist. 
concepts and decision rules, they simply cannot be objective. 
In short, industrial technology is not value-neutral. It evolved in Patriarchal societies with
• ideologies which portrayed the domination and control of nature and society as a mandate 
rather than as part of the problem. Thus, to treat technology as an objective, gender-neutral 
concept is to ignore important biases of power and value. As argued in Part II, Patriarchal 
processes and values expressed within technocratic planning and decision-making methods 
themselves lead to policies and practices that will inevitably destroy the environment They are 
inherently biased in favour of the existing distribution of power, and against the preservation 
of such meaningful, essential aspects of life as community and wilderness. 
Technocracy 
Let us now look at a couple of examples of how the Masculine values expressed in 
technocratic environments affect actual outcomes. First, as said above, to be dependent is to 
1 Susan Koen, 1980, "Patriarchy and the Nuclear Mentality" in Susan Koen, Nina Swaim, and Friends, above, 
(citing Kate Millett, Sexual Politics p. 30, and Matina Homer in Essays in Feminism by Vivian Gornick p. 
84). See also Judy Wajcman, 1991, above at p. 19. 
2 Herbert Marcuse, 1964, One-Dimensional Man (MA: Beacon Press). 
3 See Nicolas Maxwell, 1987, From Knowledge to Wisdom: a Revolution in the Aims and Methods of 
Science (N.Y.: Basil Blackwell). 
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be unmanly, so Man tends to deny the importance of emotional needs. Only physical, 
objective needs really count. Thus, in technocratic organizations there is a tendency to define 
human needs in very limited Masculine terms that assume individual autonomy. Tangible 
economic goods and human productivity alleviate physical, impersonal needs, and are 
therefore suitable subjects for public policy. However, psychological or emotional needs 
which involve personal relationships, such as congenial work environments, recognition, and 
so forth have been given a low priority. When they are addressed by mainstream theory, it has 
been basically for manipulative or instrumental purposes, such as increasing worker 
productivity. 1 
This also partly explains why only the physical are addressed: food, medicine, clothing and 
shelter. Thus in the name of meeting human needs, even well-intended 'development' projects 
have deprived people in the Third world of community, self-reliance, and natural, sustainable 
life styles. Villagers are displaced into the consumer economy where supposedly their physical 
needs will be met. Displacing indigenous peoples or subsistence farmers into the consumer 
economy has meant the disintegration of their social and economic, as well as their life 
support, systems. Their physical needs are only met in theory, because, by destroying their 
community and environment, the villagers end up physically and economically destitute as 
well. 
Second, risk-taking and adventurism are Masculine, while caution is cowardice and 
Feminine (risk-taking is arguably an effort to control the uncontrollable). These Masculine 
values are reflected in our irresponsible scientific and research priorities. The literature of 
Planning and policy analysis often elevates risk-taking to an art form. It is said that Man seeks 
immortality through deeds of glory. Consequently: 
research resources go to the most prestigious projects, and these are 
frequently the most daring and difficult (like transplant surgery or 
space technology) and not the most useful to most people. 2 
These priorities help to explain why reckless 'escapades' (such as military adventurism, 
genetic engineering and nuclear power) are not subject to any meaningful burden of proof or 
legitimate cost-benefit analyses. Thus, for example, despite the fact that 80 percent or more of 
all cancers are attributable to environmental factors, some 500 to 1000 new chemicals are added 
each year to the over 70 thousand presently in daily use. 3 The United States produces 500 
1 Taylorism is an example of this. 
2 Penny Strange, 1989, "It'll Make a Man of You: A Feminist View of the Arms Race", in Diana E. H. 
Russell, ed., Exposing Nuclear Phallacies (NY: Pergamon Press) pp. 140-126 at p. 122. 
3 Paul Ekins, Mayer Hilhnan and Robert Hutchinson, 1992, Wealth Beyond Measure: An Atlas of New 
Economics (London: Gaia Books) at p. 17. 
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million tons of hazardous waste a year,1 and it is estimated that pesticide residues in 
domestically grown foods may result in 20,000 new cases of cancer a year.2 This is risk 
taking on a mind-boggling scale. On the other hand, conservationists must establish 'how 
dead' is an ecosystem, how near to extinction is a species, or how near to total biological 
collapse is a stream before they can argue for restricting Man's right to 'self-expression' 
through industrialism, technology, and science.3 
So far in this Chapter it has been suggested that modern pathologies, that have been 
separated out in Manstream thought to explain the origins of the environmental crisis, are not 
gender-neutral and that to ignore this is to miss important connections between systems of 
human oppression and environmental destruction. Ecofeminism also makes other links 
between systems of oppression and androcentrism (for example in the case of animal 'rights'), 4 
However, it is not my intention to reduce all problems of modernity to Patriarchy, but to 
suggest that ecofeminism is a useful prism through which to understand the logic of • 
exploitation - which otherwise defies rational analysis. Masculinity is a common thread, and 
for practical purposes could perhaps be a key piece in the 'Chinese puzzle' which holds the 
system together - if only because most choose to discuss world problems as if the Feminine 
gender were non-existent or unimportant. In Warren's words, Patriarchy is a trap from which 
both men and women must break free. Ecofeminism "encourages us to think ourselves out of 
these traps, by reconceptualizing ourselves and our relation to the non-human natural world in 
non-patriarchal ways." 5 
Gender -blindness and environmental problems 
I have suggested that the cultural pathologies of modernity have, in part, been shaped by the 
polarization of Masculine and Feminine archetypes, the universalization of Masculine 
experience, and the elevation of Masculine values (or hierarchical dualism, for short). Having 
1 Unreleased draft report of National Survey of Hazardous Waste Treatment Storage, Disposal and Recycling 
Facilities: Final Report, submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency by Research Triangle Institute 
(Durham, NC). Source: Centre for Investigative Reporting and Bill Moyers, 1990, Global Dumping Ground: 
The International Traffic in Hazardous Wastes (WA: Seven Locks Press) at p. 115. 
2 Sandra Postel, 1987, Defusing the Toxics Threat: Controlling Pesticides and Industrial Waste (Washington 
D.C.: Worldwatch Institute). 
3 Fully 25 percent of species are at risk of extinction within the next 30 years, according to the United Nations 
Environment Programme. Source: UNEP, 1992, Our Planet 4 (2) at p. 7. 
4  See for example, Susan Yeich, 1991, "Ecological Feminism: Drawing Connections between the Oppression 
of Women, Animals and Nature", The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy 8 (2) pp. 84-87. 
5 Karen J. Warren, 1990, "The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism", Environmental Ethics 12 (2) 
pp. 125-146. 
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discussed androcentrism in relation to the theoretical analysis of environmental problems, we 
now look at some practical problems for activists of a gender-neutral analysis. I argue that a 
gender-blind prism hides problems centring on power, dominance, and Masculinity, and 
consequently backgrounds certain realities that impact upon the environment. Consequently, 
the political strategies of environmentalists are often flawed. 
The use of a gender-blind prism hides problems centring on power, dominance, and 
Masculinity, and therefore backgrounds certain realities that affect the environment By not 
addressing the gendered nature of the following basic environmental issues, Manstream theory 
also fuels the criticism that the environmental movement is elitist or out of touch with every day 
problems. Perhaps one reason that Manstream thought does not concern itself with gender is 
that issues nominally concerning 'only' women do not seem 'universal (such as the 
feminization of poverty, pornography and wife abuse). At first, they appear to only concern a 
subset of humanity. This marginalization process is fundamental to the preservation of 
Patriarchy. Let us take some examples of how gender-blindness (or more specifically, an 
analysis centred on anthropocentrism) limits our understanding of pivotal environmental issues: 
Third World planning and development, decision making, population growth, international 
politics, and militarism. 
Third World Development 
The interconnection between feminist issues, institutional systems, and environmental 
desecration is illustrated by the impact of the androcentric international accounting system. The 
United Nations System of National Accounts selects which transactions count as 'production' 
for purposes of calculating Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Feminists have shown the impact 
on the environment of the fact that 'women's work' is not counted in international economic 
balance sheets. 1 For example, when women are engaged in agriculture for home consumption, 
their work is not counted. The accounting system is thus biased in favour of large-scale 
capital-intensive projects and the replacement of indigenous forests with cash crops, which in 
turn destroys the local ecology and the self-sufficiency of the population. Marilyn Waring 
establishes that there is no logical or practical reason sufficient to explain the exclusion of 
'women's work' from what is measured and therefore counted as contributing to GDP. Man's 
work that is equally difficult to measure is assessed. Only male chauvinism can fully account 
for it.2 
1 For example, see Marilyn Waring, 1988, above ; Susan George, 1988, A Fate Worse than Debt (NY: 
Grove); Hazel Henderson, 1978, Creating Alternative Futures (N.Y: Berkley); Lisa Leghorn and Katherine 
Parker, 1981,Women's Worth. Sexual Economics and the World of Women (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul). 
2 See generally Waring, 1988, above. 
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Aid and development programs in the Third World have been disastrous for similar reasons, 
including the failure to consult women when planning for development or conservation. 1 The 
problems created by not looking at the situation of women are exemplified by the failure of a 
project in Malawi recounted by Waring. In brief, agricultural demonstrations were set up to 
teach men to grow soya beans, while home economics classes were given to teach women to 
cook them. In the end, the women could not use the recipes because only women did the 
farming for home consumption and they did not know how to grow soya beans.2 The men 
knew how, but they only worked on plantations. 
Waring, George and others have shown how, as a practical matter, institutional and 
decision-making Infrastructures cannot be reformed without looking squarely at the underlying 
issues of power and androcentrism. Moreover, inequitable systems are obscured behind an 
ostensibly technical facade. For example, the loans to Third World countries benefit the 
lenders, while appearing to be 'aid'. According to a leading agency, Community Aid Abroad, 
the total flow of resources from rich countries to poor from 1982-1986 (including overseas aid) 
was $468 billion. During this same five years, the poor paid 688 billion in debt repayments. 
The lender countries gained 200 billion from the process of helping the poor get poorer. 3 Not 
only that, aid usually has strings attached. In short, "debt is acting like a pump, extracting 
wealth form the South and transferring it to the Northern Banks." 4 
Population 
Because they are gender-blind, non-feminist environmental theories offer no new insights or 
answers for the problem of the burgeoning human population. They put forth the same 
answers as the mainstream, like 'self-discipline', more economic equality, control of women's 
reproductive cycle, or naive and paternalistic policy statements like 'we must educate women to 
have fewer children'. Some 'spokesmen', after much prodding, have begun to acknowledge 
the need to empower women in the Third World but still place the responsibility for the 
population dilemma, in effect, upon women. 5 While it will certainly be necessary to 
redistribute resources and provide for birth prevention, these measures will be insufficient until 
women have real choices about procreation. 
Many leading greens still ignore the crucial fact that in most countries women are treated 
literally as chattels to be bought and sold. While it is not necessary to recite the atrocities 
1 See George, 1988, above. 
2 Waring, 1988, above at p. 190. 
3 CAA Australia information sheet, 1992. See generally George, 1988, above. 
4 Frank Barnaby, ed., 1988, The Gaia Peace Atlas (NY: Doubleday) at p. 114. 
5 For example, Paul Ehrlich, among others, now suggests the need to educate women in order to solve the 
population problem. (Richard Jones Memorial Lecture, Hobart, 1990.) 
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against women in, say, India, Pakistan, Romania, and Iran, it must be recognized that women 
in most 'developed' countries are also regarded as property to varying extents. Even in 
Australia, for example, one in four people condone violence by husbands against wives, and 
approximately half the murders of wives occur when they try to leave their 'owners'.' This is 
not 'self-determination'. It is no coincidence that the Catholic Church, a misogynist edifice, is 
a proponent of forced child bearing. 
If women had physical security (food, shelter, health care), and control over their own 
bodies, and were not subject to male-supremacist cultures, then population and child mortality 
would both decrease. Few would have large families - if only because pregnancy and childcare 
are simply too much work. Similarly, the liberation of men, an important part of the feminist 
agenda, would also help to solve the population problem. Patriarchal societies that equate 
personal worth with success, and success with Masculinity, place pressure on men to produce 
many offspring.2 
Moreover, governments use women to provide children for military strength and markets 
for growth-based development. As Starhawk notes, overpopulation is directly connected to 
war: 
Governments restrict women's control over reproduction and enforce 
childbearing to ensure national strength on the battlefield. Any 
movement truly concerned with overpopulation would therefore 
necessarily become an antimilitarist movement as well.3 
Moreover, women and_colonies are objectified as natural resources. (When in Malaysia in 
1985, for example, I heard the prime minister go on television to urge women to produce more 
children!) Anthropocentrism may help to explain why the population problem has not been 
addressed, but it cannot account for the promotion of greater population to benefit only 
business and warfare. Nor does anthropocentrism explain the current form of population 
control - mass genocide of the poor. 40,000 people, mostly children, die needlessly each day 
from preventable illness and, despite enough food in the world, starvation. 
In a sexist culture, the idea that women can reclaim their own bodies creates emotional 
reactions. Although slavery is considered immoral, feminists still have the 'burden of proof to 
show that men do not have the moral right to control women's bodies. In the real world, to the 
extent that women do not own their own bodies, men do. Although deep ecologists would 
1 National poll, 1989, reported by Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Australia, May 25. 
2 Herb Goldberg, 1987, The Inner Male: Overcoming Roadblocks to Intimacy (Ontario: New American 
Library). 
3 Starhawk, 1989, above at p. 181. 
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probably support the idea of women's autonomy, the paradigm does not provide a basis for 
this view. 1 
Decision making 
The realities of power and influence in decisions impacting upon the environment are not 
explained by the concept of anthropocentrism, nor remedied by a grander perception of self. 
For example, in many years as a student and practitioner of environmental design and planning, 
I never knew public administrators to grant permits that would contribute to the destruction of 
ecosystems and species because they cared about humans over animals. After all, if decision 
makers were concerned about humans they would not destroy their life support system and 
food chain. It cannot be argued that they are simply unaware of ecology when it is pointed out 
to them in environmental impact analyses. 
In actual practice (as the case study illustrates, Appendix 1), decision makers are usually 
more concerned with seeking social reinforcement, or with how the decision will affect their 
personal standing in a social structure. Rather than, say, balancing public costs and benefits, 
they arguably balance the costs to themselves of possible conflict or public protest against the 
benefits of being 'on side with' special interests. For example, in the Franklin Dam case (as 
recounted in Appendix 1) appearing 'decisive' (read Masculine) was "more important than 
making the right decision". 
Another example is that what is 'environmentally sound' is determined by experts - 
technocrats, decision analysts and planners. Experts, by definition, are concerned about their 
position: they would not be 'experts' without status in a social hierarchy. For example (as 
argued in Part II) because of their high stakes in credibility, environmental planners use 
methods derived from economists' models even when such models are inappropriate. 
'Economic creep', or the growing infiltration of neo-classical economic concepts into other 
fields, does not result from placing the interests of humans over nature. If anything, it reflects 
the largely unconscious desire of professionals to be relevant to the interests of the powerful 
and to be accepted by the male-dominant intelligentsia. 
Much political science still treats decision makers as if they were boxes in an office chart. 
But people are not devoid of personal insecurities, egos, or pressures to conform to the 
blueprint for Masculinity. In a system based on dominance relationships, we can expect people 
to feel insecure. However, the narrow, positivist view of decision makers as faceless, 
emotionless 'information processors' has meant that the psychological, political and cultural 
influences, particularly those related to gender and power, have been screened from view. 
1 See for example, Miss Ann Thropy, 1991„ "Overpopulation and Industrialism", in John Davis and Dave 
Foreman, eds., The Earth First Reader: Ten Years of Radical Environmentalism (UT: Gibbs Smith). 
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Therefore, personal insecurity as a factor in decision-making is not considered a problem in 
need of attention. Anthropocentrism ignores the personal dynamics of decision-making (in 
favour of a rationalist view) and therefore, in effect, does not challenge this mainstream view. 
International politics 
Anthropocentrism does little to enlighten us about international capitnlist intrigue. Cynthia 
Enloe, for one, shows how power in international politics has depended on sustaining notions 
about gender, and quite deliberately at that. She gives examples which demonstrate that the 
manipulation of concepts of Femininity and Masculinity is a deliberate tool used in colonization 
policies, trading strategies, corporate marketing and military doctrines for political purposes. 1 
While women have not been mere pawns in global politics, governments 
and companies with government backing have made explicit attempts to 
try to control and channel women's actions in order to achieve their own 
ends. Male officials who make foreign policy might prefer to think of 
themselves as dealing with high finance or military strategy, but in 
reality they have self-consciously designed immigration, labor, civil 
service, propaganda and military bases policies so as to control 
women.2 
The basic reason for the control of women by official policy, I would allege, has been to 
control men. 
Gender needs to be made visible in order to understand how and why international power 
takes the forms it does. There are, for instance, important links between the feminization of 
poverty and the impoverishment of nature in the Third World. When women are made 
invisible, or portrayed as an interest group, the interconnections between development, capital 
accumulation and colonialism are concealed. As Vandana Shiva says: 
Insufficient and inadequate 'participation' in 'development' was not the 
cause of women's increasing underdevelopment. It was, rather, their 
enforced but asymmetrical participation in it, by which they bore the 
costs but were excluded from the benefits, that was responsible.3 
When women are seen as an interest group, the problem becomes to increase their 
participation in development, but when we look at gender, or the social significance of sex 
roles, we see that women's dispossession has "aggravated and deepened the colonial processes 
of ecological degradation and the loss of political control over nature's sustenance base". 4 The 
1 Cynthia Enloe, 1989, Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics 
(Berkeley: University of California Press). 
2 Cynthia Enloe, above at p. 199. 
3 Vandana Shiva, 1989. "Development, Ecology, and Women", in Plant, ed., 1989, above at p. 86. 
4 Shiva, 1989, above at p. 81. 
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use of gender divisions, as with other social divisions, is fertile ground for manipulation in the 
interests of the powerful. 
Culture-wide blind spots such as the political significance of gender and the invisibility of 
the values and experience of women (and some aspects of some tribal cultures) serve the 
interests of the powerful in other ways as well. For example, by objectifying women and 
colonies as natural resources, their exploitation is depoliticized and separated from purely 
humanitarian concerns about poverty and hunger. By obscuring the connection between gender 
and poverty, the analysis of reformists thus remain less effective. And, again, androcentric 
analysis excludes viable common- sense choices from consideration, by making the prospect of 
a permanent and sustainable peace, environmental preservation and social justice seem 
unrealistic (given Man's supposedly aggressive, competitive and self-interested nature) : 
Militarism 
Perhaps the most important example of how gender-blindness obscures our understanding 
of environmental problems is militarism. Manstream analyses generally assume rationality and 
hence do not explain irrational and homicidal policy choices, such as war, to acquire oil or 
other resources in lieu of conservation and self-reliance, or the lack of investment in peaceful 
relationships and a safe, secure future. More importantly, however, is that they offer little 
guidance as to what to do about it. Pointing out the irrationality of warfare has not been a very 
successful strategy thus far. In chapter 11, we consider a feminist analysis of militarism; in 
Chapter 12, we examine ecofeminist strategy. Here, the discussion is limited to gender-
blindness in relation to militarism. 
As over 90 percent of violent crime is perpetrated by men, even in a stable society such as 
Australia, 1 and as nuclear weapons are a product of the male mind, a gender-blind perspective 
can only mislead us in our efforts to put an end to militarism. It is interesting to note that, 
whereas most discussions concerned with ending militarism are studiously gender-blind, the 
military itself understands and manipulates sex roles to benefit the war business, and does so 
very well indeed. Let us take some examples of how notions of Femininity and Masculinity are 
used by militarists to manipulate both soldiers and citizenry to support military interests. 
1 Heather Strang, 1991, Homicides in Australia 1990-1991 (Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology) at 
p. 30. The most statistically verifiable data in this regard are prison census figures, but these only include those 
arrested. Precise figures are impossible to obtain because a high percentage of sexual and other violent assaults 
against women are not reported, as approximately 4 out of 5 such assaults are committed by men they know. A 
survey on survivors of sexual assaults conducted in 1992 by the Australian Institute of Criminology indicates 
that only 1 out of 5 serious offenses are reported. According to Dr. P. Easteal, therefore, the actual percentage of 
violent crime committed by men would be well over 90 percent (phone interview, April 16th, 1993). 
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First, in training, men are taught to despise and distance themselves from their Feminine 
side, or their emotions and feelings. "The experience of basic training traditionally implants 
Patriarchal values by reviling women as a foul and lowly class". 1 In weapons sales, 
advertising focuses on the sexual association of weaponry and power. As Carol Cohn notes: 
"Both the military itself and the arms manufacturers are constantly exploiting the phallic 
imagery and promise of sexual domination that their weapons so conveniently suggest". 2 In 
recruitment, advertising focuses on 'making a man out of you,' and the big sexy toys the 
soldiers will learn to use. In raising armies, citizens are manipulated by conceptions of 
Masculine and Feminine stereotypes and sex role expectations. Men should be macho and 
reckless; they should go to war to prove themselves. Women should be submissive and 
unquestioning; they should raise sons to be brave soldiers. In quelling dissent, peace activists 
are characterized in derogatory (read feminine) terms such as 'wimps', 'sissies', or 'poofters'. 
In gaining public support for foreign interventions, the military has found that money, 
patriotism and self-interest are not sufficient - but challenging a nation's sense of Masculine 
pride works.3 This accounts for the many incidents that have been engineered to portray the 
prospective enemy as a bully in order to justify a military solution, such as the Gulf of Tonldn 
incident of the Vietnam War, the Belgrano incident of the Falldands War (and the widely 
alleged encouragement by the United States for Saddam Hussein to invade Kuwait in 1990). 
In the Mexican War they offered $2 a head to every young man who 
would enlist They didn't get enough takers. They offered 100 acres to 
every veteran who went down and fought. They got a few takers. 
Then they put Zakery Taylor down to parade up and down the other 
side of the internationally-recognized border, a provocation, until the 
Mexican army fired on them. Then we had the head lines, "Mexicans 
killing our boys in Texas"; and the nation got fired up and fought 
Mexico and we annexed - we stole - Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, part 
of Colorado and the state of California.4 
Finally, in strategy, Masculinity is used to manipulate the enemy for strategic purposes. For 
example, the West insulted Saddam Hussein's Masculine pride to induce him to stay in Kuwait 
apparently so they could attack: at least, it could hardly have been by accident that President 
Bush told Saddam Hussein publicly that if he did not get out by a certain date, they would 'kick 
his ass'. The militarists surely knew that this would make it impossible for Hussein to pull out. 
1 Charlene Spretnak, 1989, "Naming the Cultural Forces that Push Us Toward War", in Russell, ed., above 
pp. 53-62 at p. 57. 
2 Carol Cohn, 1989, "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals" in Russell, ed., above pp. 
127-159 at p. 134. 
3 See Howard Zinn, 1980, A People's History of the United States (N.Y.: HarperCollins). 
4 John Stockwell, a speech given at the World Affairs Conference, Boulder, Colorado (10 April 1987) audio 
tape by David Barsemian, 1825 Pearl Si, Boulder CO. Stockwell worked 13 years for the CIA. 
242 
His Masculinity was at stake, and that is often more important to power-addicted men than life 
itself or - at least the lives of others. 
Thus, there is little question that the military uses sex and gender, if only for mischievous 
purposes. In summary, then, because the Manstream is gender-blind, it (a) does not relate 
directly to third world problems, such as those caused by the androcentric international 
accounting system; (b) has no realistic or humane solution for the human population explosion; 
(c) does not account for environmental problems that result from our androcentric professional 
practices and decision-making processes; (d) is misleading with regard to the analysis of 
international politics, and finally; (e) is not helpful in analyzing militarism. Next, we turn to 
the inherent limitations of Manstream green theory. 
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CHAPTER 11: PROBLEMS OF MANSTREAM 
THEORIES 
We have looked at some examples of how political aspects of central environmental issues 
can be obscured by androcentrism and gender-blindness, with militarism perhaps the most 
profound case of this. In this Chapter, I show that some of the elements of the androcentric 
premise are found not only in the theories comprising the dominant paradigm, but in radical 
critiques of it as well. I suggest that radical environmentalism, with the exception of 
ecofeminism, still retains vestiges of male-centredness and gender-blindness, and certain 
premises of mainstream thought that work against its program for social transformation. More 
importantly, they do not adequately challenge the underlying bases of the ethic and ideology 
that they seek to change: to varying extents, they share with mainstream social and political 
theory the implicit view of humans as ideally Masculine, 'rational', and/or striving for 
emancipation from natural and social constraints. Therefore, although radical environmental 
theories contribute important insights into the multi-faceted nature of the environmental crisis, 
their usefulness is limited. To exemplify this, I compare the gender-neutral analysis of 
militarism with a feminist one. 
Some qualifications are necessary here. First, it would be well beyond the scope of the 
project to properly criticize radical theories in depth. My purpose is only to show the 
pervasiveness of the androcentric premise. Therefore, I merely point out some feminists 
critiques of these theories and show how the Patriarchal assumptions they identify reflect 
aspects of mainstream attitudes towards nature. Second, I repeat that environmentalists, being 
well-rounded people, do not fit well into square theories. Indeed, many activists are anti-
theory, which means that they are unaware of the extent to which their thinking has been 
shaped by theory. Finally, of course, this critique applies only to First World 
environmentalists. We will begin with the least 'green'. 
Vestiges of androcentrism 
Marxism 
Marxists are at the fringe of the environmental movement (at best) because many have not 
abandoned their faith in industrial technology, the implicit view of 'progress' as emancipation 
from nature, and the disbelief in essential limits to growth. However, their critique of 
capitalism is an important component of environmental theory. Marx cannot fairly be accused 
of Masculine 'essentialism' (that is, the implicit assumption that human nature is synonymous 
with characteristics attributed to men). To Marx, humans create their own nature through the 
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act of transforming and manipulating nature. While Marx did not see human nature as given, 
however, he did see human nature in terms of male norms. That is, Man's essence was in 
'doing' (Masculine) rather than in 'being' (Feminine). For Marx, to become 'free' was the 
ultimate goal of Man's existence, 1 and freedom was achieved by mastery of nature through 
labour. Self-realization, then, meant mind over nature, a legacy of Western thought dating back 
to at least Plato.2 
Also, freedom (from nature) was perceived of as an evolutionary process (based perhaps on 
Darwinism and observations of newly industrialized England). Both Marx and Engels began 
with the recognition that Man is causally interactive with the environment, but conceived this in 
terms of a linear and forward progression. In keeping with the Western tradition of valuing 
most that which distinguishes Man from nature and women, Man's dignity was held to lie in 
his ability to master nature, to plan and to make his own history. Also, in Marxism was the 
idea that reproductive labour for basic needs and sustenance (most of which is done by women) 
was a lower form of activity than 'productive' work which transforms nature according to 
conscious design. 3 The above suggests why, as Maria Mies observed, Marx failed to 
appreciate the extent to which Man's freedom through labour and technology is made possible 
by power relationships which allow the expropriation of a surplus from women and non-human 
nature.4 
Orthodox EcoMarxists have also generally assumed that scientific 'laws of nature' and 
instrumental reason would enable Man to predict and control the consequences of disrupting 
natural processes. Solutions to environmental problems are dictated by Masculinist terms, such 
as control, choice, and change, rather than the Feminist concerns of relationship, 
communication, and caring that are requisite for living in harmony with nature. Thus, 
ecoMarxists share the approach of mainstream capitalist environmental management that does 
not prevent environmental problems, but rather predicts, monitors, and mitigates them. 
Finally, while class is a feminist issue, many Marxists have attacked feminism for not 
centring on class (although ecofeminism analysis encompasses sex, race, class, and the abuse 
1 See generally Nancy Holmstrom, 1990, "A Marxist theory of Women's Nature", in Cass R. Sunstein ed., 
Feminism and Political Theory (II: University of Chicago Press). 
2 Carol C. Gould, 1978, Marx's Social Ontology: Individuality and Community in Marx's Theory of Social 
Reality (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press) at p. 108. 
3 For a feminist analysis of Marxism, see Linda Nicholson, 1987, "Feminism and Marx: Integrating Kinship 
with the Economic", in Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell, eds., Feminism as Critique (Cambridge: Polity 
Press). 
4 Maria Mies, 1986, Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale (London: Zed Books). See also Maria 
Mies, Veronilca Bennholdt-Thomsen and Claudia Von Werlhof, 1988, Women: The Last Colony (London: Zed 
Books). 
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of nature). This is because, paradoxically, ecoMarxists have resisted seeing women as a class 
or caste (partly because class is related to one's paid occupation). Just like the working class 
and members of 'minority' races, women are generally second-class citizens, although some • 
individuals can escape the discrimination and disadvantages associated with their class. If 
women are about half the world's population, perform about 66 percent of the world's work, 
get 10 percent of the world's income and own less that 1 percent of the world's property, they 
are not well off as a class. 1 (Also, even men of the lowest levels of society usually have a 
woman in a subordinate relationship to them.) 
Critical Theorists 
Critical Theorists such as Jurgen Habernias, Max Horkheimer, and Theodor Adorn° and 
Herbert Marcuse have challenged that desire to control nature and engineer society which 
characterizes both capitalism and Marxism. They were concerned that science, technology, and 
instrumental reason were not designed to help society address fundamental social goals.2 With 
the rise of industrial capitalism, they observed, the idealistic conception of 'reason' elevated by 
the Enlightenment had been replaced by a technical, calculative, and hollow rationality. In the 
technical sphere, rationality had come to mean assessing means to given ends, such as the 
production of commodities. While this technocratic style of reasoning served the needs of 
production, it came to dominate civil life as well. Over time, methods designed for controlling 
and expropriating nature had led to the control of mind and culture as well. The machine began 
to dominate the human. 
With the exception of some later works, much of critical theory has failed to appreciate that 
the reductionist scientific method, instrumental rationality and bureaucratic institutions that have 
colonized the human psyche were grounded in, and legitimized by, a Patriarchal construction of 
reality. While challenging the technocratic control and engineering of society, it took as given 
that Man's highest purpose lay in His ability to achieve progress by transforming nature. Thus 
Critical Theory essentially endorsed the Enlightenment values of reason, freedom and progress 
as conceived in Masculine terms. 
Gender-blindness is particularly notable in Habermas. He distinguishes system-integrated 
action contexts (as in the economy and administrative apparatus), as against the 'lifeworld', or 
socially-integrated action contexts (as in personal and political interaction). But Nancy Fraser 
has argued that these ostensibly gender-neutral categories, which correspond roughly to public 
and private spheres, obscured the reality of male dominance and the appropriation of women's 
1 International Labour Organisation statistics adopted by the United Nations in 1980. Source: National 
Women's Consultative Council, 1991,.A Question of Balance (Report to the Hon. Wendy Fatin, MHR) 
Appendix D p. 101. 
2 Frank Hearn, 1985, Reason and Freedom in Sociological Thought (Boston: Allen & Unwin). 
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labour in both spheres. 1 This form of 'critical' theory, then, was creating a dualism that 
inadvertently deflected analysis away from the gendered nature of power relationships, and the 
logic of domination that links the system-integrated and socially integrated action contexts 
(Patriarchy). 
Marcuse, on the other hand, called for a new kind of science that would integrate substantive 
reason with technocratic rationality, and envisaged a future Feminine society. However, Shiva 
has argued that Marcuse saw these traits as biologically created and exclusive in nature, rather 
than an outcome of an ideological construct, 2 thereby missing an important dimension of the 
maintenance of power relations. Moreover, the purpose of this new science was still to liberate 
people from nature,3 rather than to enable them to live in harmony with nature. 
Ecosocialism 
Ecosocialists4 such as Raymond Williams, Joe Weston, and Martin Ryle, focus on the 
effects of capitalist (and state communist) economic and class structures in relation to 
environmental and social problems. Quite reasonably, they locate the root of social and 
ecological problems in the control of resources and accumulation of wealth by the few. 
However, their platform is largely limited to structural change: to redistribute power to those 
who would presumably conserve and manage resources in the public interest. The implicit 
assumption is that hierarchy is necessary for society to function. "The exercise of power, the 
submission of some to the will of others, is inevitable in modern society; nothing whatever is 
accomplished without it".5 
Socialists therefore share with liberals the view of social reform as an organizational matter: 
a question of rearranging external social relations. This is because socialist (and liberal) 
critiques do not adequately theorize the personal dimension of power. They fail to link the 
Masculine psyche with the power structures themselves and to recognize that 'the personal is 
political'.6 In contrast, an ecofeminist approach would add to a structural analysis of class 
1 Nancy Fraser, 1987, "What's Critical about Critical Theory", in Benhabib and Cornell eds., above pp. 31-56 
at p. 56. 
2 Vandana Shiva, 1990, Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Development (London: Zed Books) at pp. 51-52. 
But see Ariel Salleh, 1991, "From Centre to Margin", Hypatia: a Journal of Feminist Philosophy 6, pp. 206- 
214, for a criticism of this position. 
3 See Martin Ryle, 1988, Ecology and Socialism (London: Century Hutchinson). 
4 A clear distinction between ecomarxists and ecosociafists is difficult to make. The division I make here may 
appear somewhat arbitrary, but should suffice for these limited purposes. 
5 J.K. Galbraith, 1983, The Anatomy of Power (Boston: Houghton Mifflin). Galbraith, while perhaps not in 
the same camp, has been very influential. 
6 See Andre Gorz, 1980, Ecology as Politics, trans. by P. Vigderman and J. Cloud (London: Pluto) whose 
proposals rely on the State to provide for the collective needs of the people. 
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relations one which take into account the underlying logic which legitimizes oppression - the 
Power Paradigm. Ecofeminists believe that if our societies do not move beyond power on both 
political and personal levels, reforms or revolutions will amount to no more than musical chairs 
over the long term. 1 Whoever is in power will be subject to corruptive influences because of 
the personal insecurities and need for status and power engendered by a Patriarchal culture. 
Thus, ecofeminism "challenges all relations of domination. Its goal is not just to change who 
wields power, but to transform the structure of power itself'.2 
While socialists understand the links between environmental exploitation and capitalism, 
their program for conservation is not dissimilar to that proposed by capitalists. Capitalists have 
defended their position vis- a-vis the environment by arguing that 'efficient' use of resources 
conserves them. Of course, although capitalist competition is associated with efficiency, it is 
price efficiency, not the efficient use of resources. Price efficiency has been achieved by 
externalizing the social costs of development, or passing on the health and safety costs to the 
general public wherever possible. Socialists, on the other hand, call for more equity as well as 
more efficiency, but it is nonetheless an approach that can only slow the rate of consumption, 
not preserve nature. 
Mainstream greens 
Mainstream greens, many of whom share the above blind spot, are the vast majority of 
environmental activists. The 'green movement' includes those who recognize the fundamental 
interconnections between social justice, peace, democracy, non-violence and environmental 
quality. (When referring to the political wing of the green movement, such as mainstream non-
governmental organizations and parties, I use a capital 'G'. When referring to informal grass 
roots groups, I use a small 'g'.) While socialists are less concerned with industrialism than 
who controls it, greens tend to attack industrialism itself. 3 
I shall be arguing two things in this chapter: first, that the similarities 
between these two dominant ideologies [capitalism and communism] are 
of greater significance than their differences, and that the dialectic 
between them is therefore largely superficial. If this is the case, it may 
be claimed that they are united in one, all-embracing 'super-ideology', 
which, for the sake of convenience, I intend to call industrialism. 
Secondly, that this super-ideology, in that it is conditioned to thrive on 
1 Argued thoroughly by Marilyn, French, 1985, Beyond Power: Women, Men and Morals (London: Jonathon 
Cape). 
2 Starhawk, 1889, "Power, Authority, and Mystery: Ecofeminism and Earth-based Spirituality", in Plant, ed., 
Healing the Wounds, above pp. 73-86 at p. 76. 
3 John Young, 1991, Sustaining the Earth: The Past, Present and Future of the Green Revolution (Sydney: 
NSW University Press) at p. 160. 
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the ruthless exploitation of both people and planet, is itself the greatest 
threat we face. 1 
They have developed policies and programs that would be consistent with an ecologically-
sustainable society, such as appropriate (small-scale) technologies and recycling, participatory 
democracy and decentralized communities, redefinitions of work and job sharing. However, 
the mainstream generally accepts the given political system as adequate, relying on building 
numbers to bring about better policies. In theorizing the causes of our irrational, lemming-like 
charge toward biospheric collapse, they, like Leftists, assume that Man is 'rational'. 
Therefore, they hope to achieve social change by, in essence, an appeal to reason: raising the 
level of public awareness, lobbying, and promoting an appreciation of the intrinsic value of 
nature. This strategy does not address what really motivates people, which I suggest are 
emotional needs, such as the need for love, recognition, and a sense of belonging. 
Further, this strategy tends to reinforce the credibility of the Greens who still, by and large, 
believe in a flat earth. For example, Greens implicitly credit parliamentarians with an interest 
in pushing a particular policy orientation or getting re-elected (means - ends rationality). The 
strategy does not look behind 'self-interest' to the underlying desire for (say) sex, love, and 
admiration. Thus, they fail to take into account the fact that when parliamentarians 'have the 
courage to make unpopular decisions' as dictated by corporate interests, they can escape via the 
'revolving door' between business and industry. Acceptance by the big boy's club can be 
more important than re-election. Despite voluminous tomes of mainstream theory to the 
contrary, Man does not tick by reason alone. But even were it so, numbers games cannot 
succeed in the long term in a system where the crucial decisions are made outside the political 
arena. 
Deep ecology 
Deep ecologists also credit Man with 'rationality'. However, they reason that Man's failure 
to identify and empathize with the rest of nature results from the way He experiences or 
visualizes the world, as if it were this that underlay power relations. They believe it is human-
chauvinism or anthropocentrism that has led to our separation from non-human nature. 2 
Hence, personal transformation through the cultivation of a 'biocentric' perspective - 
expanding one's identification to encompass all of nature - could eventually heal society as a 
1 Jonathon Porritt, 1984, Seeing Green: The Politics of Ecology Explained (Oxford: Basil Blackwell) at p. 44. 
2 For an introduction to deep ecology, see Warwick Fox, 1990, Toward a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing 
New Foundations for Environmentalism (Boston: Shambhala); Bill Devall, 1988, Simple in Means, Rich in 
Ends (Salt Lake: Gibbs Smith ); Arne Naess, 1989, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle trans. by David 
Rothenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Bill Devall and George Sessions, 1985, Deep Ecology: 
Living as if Nature Mattered (Salt Lake: Gibbs Smith). Reputedly the earliest expression of deep ecology was in 
1922: Martin Buber, 1958, land Thou. trans. by Ronald B. Smith, 2nd ed. (NY: Charles Scribner's Sons). 
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whole. Deep ecology also ultimately relies upon reason to persuade people to take up deep 
ecology. Rational Man, once realizing that to harm nature is to harm Himself, will change His 
ways. 
While sharing a biocentric perspective, ecofeminists have criticized deep ecology because of 
its Masculinist bias, being abstract, aloof, impersonal, gender-blind and ignoring power 
relations. 1 Under the illusion of being all-inclusive, deep ecologists still generally deny the 
significance of gender and feminist analysis and therefore, in effect, perpetuate the dualistic 
thinking that they seek to transform. 2 By subsuming women under a gender-neutral model of 
Man, they paradoxically exclude women and set them apart. A gender-blind analysis that 
centres on Man's relationship to nature also does little to explain power-relations within 
societies. Therefore, deep ecology cannot adequately theorize or remedy the abuse of power. 3 
An approach based on 'spiritual' transformation is insufficient to bring about behavioural 
change, let alone social change. I will discuss at length below this Liberalist approach to social 
transformation (the strategy that relies on changing individual values). 
Social ecology 
Social ecology, in contrast, does address the issue of dominance relationships. Social 
ecology is a school of thought that follows the work of Murray Bookchin. 4 It traces the 
origins of the exploitation of nature to hierarchical social institutions, beginning with 
gerontocracy and Patriarchy. Social ecologists reason that dominance relationships among 
humans lead to the objectification, control, and manipulation of others, and hence similar 
attitudes toward non-human nature. As with deep ecologists and ecofeminists, they advocate 
radical social transformation in the direction of non-hierarchical and more communal, 
decentralized societies. 
1 For example, see Ariel Salleh's seminal 1984, "Deeper than Deep Ecology", Environmental Ethics 6, pp. 
335-341; Val Plumwood, 1991, "Nature, Self, and Gender: Feminism, Environmental Philosophy, and the 
Critique of Rationalism", Hypatia 6 (1) pp. 3-27; Marti Kheel, 1991, "Ecofeminism and Deep Ecology: 
Reflections on Identity and Difference", The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecophilosophy 8 (2) pp. 62-72. 
2 Most books on deep ecology scarcely mention women or ecofeminism, although deep ecologists have been 
harshly criticised for being male-centred. For example, Bill Devall, 1988, Simple in Means, Rich in Ends: 
Practicing Deep Ecology (UT: Gibbs Smith). Several pages about the Chipko movement in India are focused on 
Sunderlai Bahuguma, a spokesman for the Chipko movement, rather than upon the sacrifices of the (mostly 
women and children) grass roots activists themselves (see p. 128-134). 
3 See George Bradford, 1989, How Deep is Deep Ecology? (Hadley, MA: Times Change Press). 
4 See Murray Bookchin, 1982, The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy (CA: 
Cheshire Books). 
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Fundamental to Bookchin's theory, however, is a rather Masculinist conception of 
evolution. 1 As humans are integral to nature, their conversion of the non-human world is seen 
as a natural part of an evolutionary progress toward differentiation and complexity to which all 
life forms are held to subjectively strive. From a scientific standpoint, this purposive view of 
evolution is rather dated.2 A similar Masculinist conception of evolution has led to weird but 
popular notions like "we are meant to colonize outer space when we outgrow earth". 
Also, this Masculinist notion of humans as stewards and of an inherent 'purpose' in nature 
does not sit well with deep ecologist and ecofeminist attitudes toward non-human nature. 3 
But, more importantly, giving pm-eminence and universality to Masculine forms of rationality 
and freedom reinforces the existing gendered hierarchy of the Power Paradigm, with women 
arguably fully human only to the extent they adopt to the Masculine ideal. 
Common failings 
Each of the above Manstream environmental theories had made important contributions in 
analyzing determinants of the environmental crisis. They theorize industrial technology, 
instrumental rationality, capitalism, anthropocentrism, narrow identification, class, and social 
hierarchy - which are essential components of any environmental problem analysis. They fail 
to recognize, however, what those determinants have in common: they are embedded and 
germinated in a Patriarchal construction of reality. Thus, in effect, they fail to undermine 
adequately the very pathologies they would exorcise from society. Some of these 
shortcomings of the Manstream radical theory can be summarized as follows: 
1) By not explicitly addressing the need to rebalance the Feminine and Masculine in our 
selves and society, they unconsciously perpetuate the notion of the Feminine as a subset or a 
negation of the 'real world' of men. This militates against the possibility of an alternative 
morality based on empathy and cooperation. 
2) They are partial, in that (with the exception of social ecology) they do not really explore 
or integrate both individual/perceptual and institutional/structural impediments to social 
transformation. 
3) They offer either spiritual strategies (concerned with perception and values) or 
rationalist ones (concerned with structure and process). Thus, they do not satisfy the 
(apparent) need for a 'holistic', integrated perspective. 
1 See Mary Midgely, 1985, Evolution as a Religion: Strange Hopes and Stranger Fears (London: Methuen). 
2 Stephen J. Gould, 1989, Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History (Marmondsworth: 
Penguin Books). 
3 See Murray Bookchin's response to such arguments in Murray Bookchin, 1990, "Recovering Evolution: A 
Reply to Eckersley and Fox", Environmental Ethics 12, pp. 253-74. 
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4) They fail to explore the implications of the fact that the pathologies identified as 'causes' 
of environmental problems coincide with the elevation of values that have been central to 
Masculine identity for centuries (in Western culture at least), such as competitive 
individualism, instrumentalism, and progress as increasing freedom from natural constraints. 
5) They share many androcentric assumptions with the dominant paradigm and therefore 
fail to demystify the ideological props that support the exploitation of nature, such as the idea 
that humanity is by nature Masculine. (That is, while radical theorists do not subscribe to the 
Patriarchal interpretation of human nature, they fail to adequately address its foundation.) 
6) They do not adequately theorize the false dualisms that have been used to maintain 
powerful interests, such as capitalist/communist, male/female, black/white (Chapter 12). 
These are made plausible and encoded by 'hierarchical dualism' - the organizing principle of 
Patriarchal thought. Dualisms are manipulated to conceal the exploitative nature of hierarchical 
power relationships. 
7) Their problem analyses are one-dimensional in that they reduce social and environmental 
problems to specific pathologies within Patriarchal society, while seeing Patriarchy itself as a 
marginal, coincidental phenomenon having mostly to do with only individual rights. These 
linear analyses also lead to a competition among supetficially incompatible ideas that can 
divide the environmental movement (such as friction between social versus deep ecology ). 1 
8) Because they are gender blind, and fail to acknowledge the significance of the relation 
between gender identity and view of the self (and hence personal morality), they cannot 
adequately theorize the abuse of power at either personal or political levels. 
9) They fail to recognize the practical problems of Patriarchal ambition in social 
movements, such as the systemic sexism that excludes those who are not Masculine-identified 
from meaningful participation in the environment movement or public life generally. 2 
1 See Murray Bookchin, Dave Foreman, Steve Chase, and David Levine, 1991, Defending the Earth: A 
Dialogue between Murray Bookchin and Dave Foreman (MA: South End Press) which excludes ecofeminism 
from the debate, although it could bridge the two positions. 
2 Of the top 25 environmental organizations in the US. in 1991, for example, only 3 were headed by women, 
although it is widely acknowledged that women volunteers far outnumber the men. Elizabeth Larsen, 1991, 
"Granola Boys, Eco-Dudes, and Me", Ms. Magazine (July/August) pp. 96-7 at p. 96. 
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*note: I distinguish "Green" from the general green movement 
The ecofeminist paradigm, on the other hand, helps to explain both the psychological and 
systemic manifestations of the androcentric value system and personal and political expressions 
of insecurity and dominance. It accommodates both the perceptual/spiritual and 
analytical/rational approaches, and addresses both personal and systemic barriers to social 
change (as indicated in figure 13). It therefore provides a holistic framework that can draw 
upon and integrate the insights developed by Manstream radical critiques. Diversity of theory, 
view, and approach is important to preserve, but it is also nice to have a perspective that can 
weave the threads together. Of course, other theories have the potential to do so, but they have 
resisted a gender-balanced perspective (an ecological theory which integrates feminism 
becomes an 'ecofeminist' theory). 
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The above critique of radical theories, as they pertain to the environment, is to support my 
contention that ecofeminism, at least as much as other theories, provides a comprehensive 
analysis which can contribute to everyone's understanding of the roots of the environmental 
problem. Moreover, rather than being marginal and irrelevant to the intellectual domain (as still 
conveyed by the treatment of ecofeminism in Manstream green literature), ecofeminism holds 
the potential for a truly alternative paradigm that could assist in the creation of a sustainable 
society. 
Bionomics 
It may seem harsh to criticize green thought, while leaving the lunatic mainstream 
unscathed. As indicated earlier, however, there is no need to specify the general biases against 
sustainability contained in capitalist and state socialist positions , as they have been adequately 
covered in green literature elsewhere. (As explained in Part H, I do not oppose markets, but 
contend that their application and scope should be coordinated and confined within a new 
system of governance.) Nonetheless, there is a recent development in mainstream thought that 
merits attention. New concepts in physics and biology are being appropriated to legitimize 
hierarchical, large-scale, capitalist structures and the concomitant ethic of dog-eat-dog 
survivalism. Perhaps the most cogent representation of this trend is found in Michael L. 
Rothchild's 'best-selling' Bionomics, the Inevitability of Capitalism (London: Futura: 1992). 1 
Given space limitations, I use this recent book as representative of a 'new capitalism', because 
it is comprehensively and masterfully (though speciously) argued. 
Bionomics (Rothchild's term) holds that "a parallel relationship exists between an ecosystem 
based on genetic information and an economy derived from technical information". 2 In other 
words, economic development is shaped by a society's accumulated technical knowledge, just 
as biological evolution is shaped by genes, or DNA. Capitalism, he says, is simply the process 
by which technology evolves. 3 Rothchild's (ostensible) thesis, then, is that a capitalist 
economy can best be comprehended as an evolving ecosystem. This, in itself, is merely a 
heuristic device; it is not unreasonable to apply such a model to the economy to see what new 
pathways this opens for exploration. However, he uses his analogy less as a paradigm, in the 
Kuhnsian sense, than as a foil to argue that capitalism is a natural, rather than a Man-made, 
phenomena. 
1 Michael L. Rothchild, 1992, Bionomics, the Inevitability of Capitalism (London: Futura). 
2 Rothchild, 1992, above p. 
3 Rothchild, 1992, above p. 
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Rothchild's book reflects a trend which is particularly ominous because it makes use of an 
appeal to new scientific facts and ecological insights to promote economic determinism and 
environmental fatalism. Many citizens do not have the time or energy to analyze the specious 
reasoning which supports such 'argumentation by headlines'. Let us look at some of the flaws 
in his 'oil logic'. 
Traditional forms of socialist and capitalist economic analysis have failed so tragically, 
Rothchild explains, because they are based on the concept of 'equilibrium' and the metaphor of 
the machine. The result is that conventional economic methodology relies on resources, 
population, and technology 'being fixed', which is in marked contrast with a turbulent reality. 
By drawing analogies using new concepts in evolution, chaos theory and microbiology, 
Rothchild is able to shed more light on a range of events, such as the meteoric rise of Japan in 
relation to America and the fall of the Soviet Union. He also uses analogy to provide a 
compelling rationale for his market-based policy proposals, such as de-bureaucratizing the 
education system, democratizing corporations, enacting a consumption tax (combined with a 
tax rebate) and creating a market in pollution 'rights'. 
As a descriptive framework, then, Rothchild's 'ecological' model is at least provocative. 
However, his real agenda is crassly political: he uses the analogy between genetic information 
and accumulated technological knowledge (slightly collapsing the time scale of biological 
evolution) to 'prove' the natural superiority of capitalism. Bionomics turns out to be a fancy 
rendition of the conventional argument that only capitalism can respond quickly enough to 
rapidly developing technology through competition. And, "in both realms and at all levels, 
competition is evolution's shaping force". 1 
The trick he employees is this. With one hand Rothchild takes pains to explain that he is 
only posing an 'imperfect' analogy between the capitalist's economy and nature's ecology. In 
this way, he can excuse the fact that his analogies have a certain 'selectiveness'. For example, 
'predators' in nature are deemed parallel to 'consumers' rather than, say, 'developers'. 2 If, 
however, one analogized resource extraction firms as large carnivores who pounce on public 
resources to feed themselves and their own pups, then consumers would be seen as maggots, 
wholly dependent upon the spoils of these predatory behemoths. 
Also, most of his analogies could be used to argue for cooperation as well as for 
competition. For example, the slime mould, which is used by Rothchild as somehow 
illustrative of market dynamics, has been used by the environmentalist Jonathon Porritt to argue 
for cooperation in the face of environmental catastrophe. Other analogies are of more concern 
1 Rothchild, 1992, above p. 234. 
2 Rothchild, 1992, above p. 214-215. 
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(and less droll). Take, for example, the parallel he draws between quite different kinds of 
energy sources. While sunlight powers the ecosystem, he says, human work powers the 
economic systeml - rather than, say, fuels derived from non-human resources that producers 
and workers consume. In this instance, Rothchild is treating ecology as a separate though 
parallel system, as if the economy were autonomous from nature (which, incidentally, 
contradicts his position that capitalism is natural). 
Yet, with the other hand, Rothchild maintains that his analogy dictates that capitalism is 
inevitable. Put differently, while the ecology is, in his view, only a parallel (rather than a 
foundational) system, the capitalist social order must be dictated by the same universal laws of 
evolution. This relies on an entirely new form of logic. Thus, while socialism is, he says, just 
an ideology, "capitalism is a natural phenomenon".2 And, "being for or against a natural 
phenomenon is a waste of time and mental energy". 3 
Like other economic determinists, Rothchild is also a master of presenting false choices, or 
rather, no choices at all. For example, he takes as self-evident that there are only two forms of 
social organization: state socialism or capitalism. The former is no choice at all, of course, as 
"any economy that disrupts the interplay of immutable organic forces is inherently flawed and 
doomed to failure". 4 Complex hierarchies are natural, he tells us, 5 but apparently largerscale, 
hierarchical organizations are only preordained by natural laws if they are run by capitalists and 
not by the state. Instead, capitalists hierarchies are somehow "decentralized, self-organizing 
evolutionary systems" which manage to make the most of scarce resources. 6 Rothchild does 
not, however, discuss the decentralized, self-organizing systems proposed by greens, 
preferring to paint greens as either having no political awareness at all, or as being "Red-
Greens", whose "radical totalitarian program", he says, calls for "unlimited state power".7 
While Rothchild dismisses environmentalists as 'ignorant', he fails to address several tenets 
of the capitalist faith that greens have questioned. Let us examine some of these. The first 
tenet is that there is no limit to growth. No problem, he says: "in a world of fixed resources, 
learning allows the economic pie to keep growing. Economic growth is limited only by human 
creativity".8 (But if natural resources are a product of the human imagination, does this mean 
1 Rothchild, 1992, above p. 213. 
2 Rothchild, 1992, above p. 329. 
3 Rothchild, 1992, above p. xv. 
4 Rothchild, 1992, above p. 107. 
5 Rothchild, 1992, above p. xiv. 
6 Rothchild, 1992, above p. 272. 
7 Rothchild, 1992, above p. 281. 
8 Rothchild, 1992, above p. 336. 
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that 10 billion people will be able to generate more space and amenity than 5 billion are now 
able to do?) 
The second tenet he uncritically espouses is that, since there is no limit to economic growth, 
there is no desirable limit to the size of businesses. They will not run out of resources as long 
as they can create either more demand or more consumers. (Firms, like dinosaurs, can get 
bigger and bigger, can they not?) 
In nature, the population of a species is constrained primarily by the 
availability of resources ... Ecosystems are 'resource-limited' networks 
... By contrast, an industry's size is limited by customer demand, not 
the availability of resources. Under capitalism, firms die for lack of 
paying customers, not for lack of supplies. 1 
Third, technology can solve any constraints through greater efficiency. "A firm's efficiency 
is constrained only by its technology, and its technology is limited only by its members' ability 
to work together as an intelligent, creative organization". 2 And, of course, technology can 
solve anything. (Over-consumption and over-population will thankfully never become a 
problem, then, as firms can simply develop technologies to make us smaller!) 
A fourth tenet of capitalist thought which Rothchild takes as gospel is that wealth will 'trickle 
down' to the poor. The solution to poverty is therefore simple: "an economy of abundance 
where real costs continue to decline, so that even the poorest members of society eventually gain 
access to benefits once reserved for the very rich".3 Rothchild says aggressive investment in 
technology - not redistribution - is the only solution to poverty. 4 He finds support for this in 
his patently absurd contention that the 'green revolution' (industrialized agriculture) has solved 
many of the problems of the Third World. 
In the wake of the 1960s Green Revolution, even India now exports 
food. Once commonplace, famines now are regarded as inexcusable, 
freakish tragedies. Hunger and malnutrition are still rife in the Third 
World, but widespread starvation strikes only where technology has yet 
to transform human existence.5 
In reality, the green revolution increased productivity and corporate profits, but at the 
expense of local self-sufficiency and environmental sustainability. This is explained in 
Vandana Shiva's (1991) work The Violence of the Green Revolution. Third World Agriculture, 
1 Rothchild, 1992, above p. 214. 
2 Rothchild, 1992, above p. 185. 
3 Rothchild, 1992, above p. 184. 
4 Rothchild, 1992, above p. 248. 
5 Rothchild, 1992, above p. 235. 
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Ecology and Politics which documents many of the economic, social and ecological problems 
created by the green revolution in India.' 
The logic of Rothchild's basic social position is this: equity requires unfairness (double 
speak!).2 For example, the well educated should be paid substantially more than others (at least 
if they have degrees in marketable subjects), as "income redistribution makes dollar earning 
streams more equal by making percentage returns on educational investment less equal." 3 
This is to say that the return on one's investment in higher education is diminished unless the 
less bright or educated people (or those who cannot afford an education) earn less. Therefore, 
when he later proceeds to admit that growth and fairness are inversely related, we can take 
comfort in the fact that the unfairness associated with growth is 'equitable'. While not against 
some form of social 'safety net', he says, societies must make a trade-off on the 
growth/fairness spectrum: "simply put, every nation faces an inescapable trade-off between its 
rate of long-term economic growth and the 'fairness' of its income distribution".4 
Finally, Rothchild disregards the inherent lack of life quality and political choice created by 
market totalitarianism. While conceding that a choice between 113 breakfast cereals is not 
substantive, central planning - the only other alternative he allows - means nothing at all on the 
shelves. Moreover, Rothchild suggests that the creation of diverse consumer choices in 
capitalism amounts to political choice. His reasoning: more TV channels means that political 
power cannot be concentrated in the hands of a "clique of network executives". 5 (But what it 
those network executives were themselves in the hands of a clique?) Because capitalism is not 
an ideology, but life itself, the fact that all channels support and reflect capitalism should not 
offend anyone's sense of freedom and choice. As Rothchild assures us, there is no need to 
debate the ethical implications of capitalism, as "a natural process cannot be right or wrong. A 
natural process has no moral character".6 (His definition of 'natural' is conveniently left 
unclear). 
1 Vandana Shiva, 1991, The Violence of the Green Revolution: Third World Agriculture, Ecology and Politics 
(London: Zed Books). 
2 Rothchild, 1992, above p. 248. 
3 Rothchild, 1992, above p. 240. 
4 Rothchild, 1992, above p. 246. 
5 Rothchild, 1992, above p. 219. 
6 Rothchild, 1992, above p. 341. 
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Although Rothchild distinguishes his position from that of biological determinists, 1 his 
position is based on similar assumptions about the intrinsic nature of the world and human 
character. "In a civilized world, normal human beings seek security for themselves and their 
families by accumulating power and wealth. Now, it is the survival instinct in action." 2 But it 
is one thing to theorize about human instincts, and it is another thing to suggest that those 
human instincts dictate certain (inequitable) forms of social control that favour an entrenched 
power elite. Bionomics is a chilling reminder that, only 50 years ago, Social Darwinists 
distorted concepts like 'natural selection' and 'survival of the fittest' to justify the extreme 
forms of racism and nationalism that culminated in the Nazi Holocaust. 
Rothchild is not stupid. In fact, he is a remarkably clever exponent of the capitalist faith. 
What enables such clever -people to perpetuate these wild and crazy ideas without critical 
reflection? Perhaps a desire for acceptance by the big boys accounts for his motivation, but his 
intellectual edifice ultimately relies on the Patriarchal model of Impersonal Man. Rothchild's 
reduction of Man to a node in an evolving ecological network, in this regard, is no different 
from earlier conceptions of Man as a cog in a static machine. 
But Rothchild's bionomics goes even further than traditional Patriarchal thought, which 
disassociates Man from the family, community and nature. Bionomics is the polarized 
(Masculine) model of Man taken to its conclusion: self-destruction. He goes on to suggest, 
again by analogy, that the only 'real' purpose of existence is organizational survival. Just as 
the goal of each biological organism is the survival of the genetic information it carries in order 
to reproduce itself, the goal of each human organization is the survival of its technological 
information. 3 In Rothchild's paradigm, then, one-dimensional, goal-oriented, Impersonal Man 
is being supplanted by the capitalist organization He exists to serve. (Yet is this not supposed 
to be the capitalists' main objection to communism?) 
The implications of this paradigm for non-material values, humans, and the rest of nature 
are tragic. As "the only enduring order is found in life's information", all life forms, from 
humans (or "biochemical vehicles") to mountains, are temporary: only DNA is immortal. 4 
This view only provides a way of coping or turning off to the torture and extinction of fellow 
species and the demolition of ancient forests and rivers. To stop the 'Pac Man'-like 
colonization of the natural/social world by this 'Man-made' ideology, it is necessary to 
1  Sociobiology could be considered a new form of Social Darwinism in that sociobiologists maintain that 
human culture is a product of genes. The initiator of this new field was Edward 0. Wilson through his 1975 
book Sociobiology - The New Synthesis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). 
2 Rothchild, 1992, above p. 328. 
3 Rothchild, 1992, above p. 213. 
4 Rothchild, 1992, above p. 4. 
259 
recognize that the polarized, essentialist model of Man upon which it is based is a mere 
construct of Patriarchy. 
Manstream green theory's treatment of militarism 
It was argued above that Manstream green theory, as well as economic rationalism, begins 
from an androcentric model of Man and that this limits its value as theory. In the remaihder of 
this chapter, I suggest that the androcentric perspective of Manstream greens is of limited 
analytical value as well. Because Manstream green theories do not adequately account for 
militarism, they tend to treat militarism as a separate issue, though recognizing the 
interdependence of social and environmental problems . 1 I would contend that an environmental 
theory that does not, by its basic logic, include an explanation for militarism is seriously 
flawed. My case rests on the magnitude of the environmental problems caused by military 
action and expenditure, even in peacetime. It has been estimated, for instance, that on the 
global level, the military produces about thirty percent of environmental degradation, 2 and the 
pollution it produces is of a particularly nasty and toxic kind. Nuclear and biological warfare 
testing is gradually poisoning the food chain of the entire planet, and revelations of nuclear 
waste dumping in Russia are making the inevitable seem less remote. There are up to 15,000 
sites contaminated with toxics on U.S. military bases alone. The military also consumes vast 
amounts of non-renewable and precious resources. For example, it uses about 9 percent of 
steel and iron, and 25 percent of all jet fuel world wide. 3 
The diversion of financial resources is also staggering. Worldwatch Institute estimates that 
15 percent of the amount spent on weapons in the world could eradicate most of the immediate 
causes of war and environmental destruction. 4 And, of course, military spending creates 
1 In the United States, Canada, and Australia, peace and green activists have largely remained separate 
(Greenpeace notwithstanding). German green activists have consistently maintained the connections between 
these issues, however. See for example, Roland Vogt, 1983, "Ecology and Peace: Some Experiences of the 
Green Party", in Michael Denborough, ed., Australia and Nuclear War (ACT: Croom Helm) pp. 213-220. 
2 See Michael Renner, 1991,"Asse,ssing the Military's War on the Environment", in Lester Brown et. al., State 
of the World 1991 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin) and Michael Renner, 1990, "Converting to a Peaceful Economy"; 
in Lester Brown et. al., State of the World 1990 (Sydney: Allen & Allen); Matthias Finger, 1991, "The 
Military, the Nation State and the Environment", The Ecologist 21 (5) pp. 22-23. 
3 Renner, 1991, above. 
4 See Lester R. Brown et al., 1990, State of the World: A Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Towards a 
Sustainable Society (Sydney: Allen & Unwin) at p. 96 
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devastating economic problems through inflation and employment dislocation, as well as 
through the diversion of resources. 1 
There are also environmental costs of a more indirect nature on a scale that is almost 
incomprehensible. To take some random examples: most if not all global 'trouble spots' today 
are in areas that were colonized, divided and militarized by outside powers; the United States is 
saddled with a nuclear power industry that was initially created and promoted to subsidize the 
military;2 and up to 50 countries have the ability to produce nuclear weapons, which means the 
potential for nuclear mischief in the Third World is now virtually uncontrollable, despite arms 
control among the superpowers. Western arms suppliers have provided the means to convert 
the once sustainable economies of indigenous peoples in the Third World to unstable, 
industrialized colonies that are economically dependent on transnational corporations, creating 
another kind of indirect environmental cost. 
In short, it would be hard to single out another factor with greater adverse impact on the 
environment and human welfare than militarism. Yet, despite the interconnection between the 
military and environmental destruction, military activity - even in democracies - is virtually 
exempt from Parliamentary/Congressional oversight, let alone relevant forms of cost-benefit 
analysis, environmental impact assessments, or pollution standards. Likewise, militarism is 
often put in the 'too hard' basket by many conservative greens because it entails a critical 
analysis of capitalism and imperialism: it is too 'political'. On the other hand, Leftist greens 
often treat militarism merely as a means of capitalist expansion, and fail to analyze the internal 
dynamics or personal level of militarism itself; that is, what makes military decision makers 
and soldiers 'tick'. 
I suggest that this is because the gender-blind analyses, or ones centring on human-
chauvinism, reinforce the tendency to deny or screen out the psychological and personal 
dimensions of the abuse of power. Attention to androcentrism, on the other hand, contributes 
to a better understanding of militarism. Books such as Exposing Nuclear Phallacies, Missile 
Envy and Fathering the Unthinkable make the link between militarism and polarized 
Masculinity painfully obvious. 3 This resistance to looking at the personal or non-rational must 
1 For the costs of war, see Frank Barnaby, ed., 1988, The Gaia Peace Atlas (NY: Doubleday). Also, see Paul 
Ekins, Mayer Hillman and Robert Hutchinson, 1992, Wealth Beyond Measure: An Atlas of New Economics 
(London: Gaia Books) at pp. 156-9. 
2 See John May, 1989, The Greenpeace Book of the Nuclear Age: The Hidden History, the Human Cost (NY: 
Pantheon Books) pp. 10-17. 
3 See Koen, Nina Swaim and Friends. Ain't No Where We Can Run: Handbook for Women on the Nuclear 
Mentality (VT: Wand); Helen Caldicott, 1984, Missile Envy: The Arms Race and Nuclear War (NY: Morrow); 
Diana E. H. Russell, ed., 1989, Exposing Nuclear Phallacies (NY: Pergamon Press); Brian Easlea, 1983, 
Fathering the Unthinkable: Masculinity, Scientists and the Nuclear Arms Race (London: Pluto Press). 
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be more than coincidental. Weaponry and militarism are part and parcel of the Masculine 
sphere. Yet, neither sex nor gender has been taken seriously as a category of analysis in 
militarism (at least until recently). Perhaps this is because the connection between war and the 
'blueprint for Masculinity' is too uncomfortable to wear: it suggests that the causes of war are 
'in here' as well as 'out there'. 1 
Feminist analysis of militarism 
A gender-based analysis introduces a new dimension in the explanation of militarism. In the 
following, we examine how the polarization of the Feminine and Masculine places many 
pressures on people, particularly men, that are reflected in militaristic behaviours. Specifically, 
to be Masculine is associated with (a) establishing dominance, which usually entails (b) having 
an adversary, (c) creating dependency, (d) separating and 'dehumanizing' and humiliating the 
other, and (e) the association of sex with conquest and violence. 2 The cult of Masculinity 
involves (f) suppressing emotions, (g) prevailing over others or 'winning' and, (h) sometimes, 
regarding battle as a form of initiation into manhood. In my view, none of these behaviours are 
adequately explained by human identification, but Masculine identification, on the other hand, 
is very revealing. (Again, of course, Masculinity is a social archetype to which no man or 
woman need conform, regardless of biological factors.) A sampling of some of these 
stereotypically Masculine behaviours witnessed in militarism and the arms race are now 
provided. 
(a) Perhaps the most fundamental pressure upon men in Patriarchy is the need to establish 
dominance. To the power-driven, "every sithation is perceived as hierarchical; occupying any 
position other than the pinnacle of the imagined hierarchy creates great anxiety". 3 Security has 
therefore been identified with ever more power and contro1, 4 as exemplified by the ironic 
phrase 'Peace through Strength'. This accounts for why foreign policy and foreign 'aid' is 
directed in a manner that makes other countries dependent and, consequently, powerless. 
Domination, as a means of control, tends to supplant security or peace as the policy 
objective. While not to single out the United States, it had the opportunity to end the arms race 
1 Penny Strange, 1989, "It'll Make a Man of You: A Feminist View of the Arms Race", in Russell,*ed., above 
pp. 140-126. 
2 This need to dominate appears to be linked to the sex drive. Again, I do not take a position on whether the 
origins of dominance relationships and territoriality in Patriarchal society can be traced back to the sex drive, as 
evidenced in some other mammals. I am simply suggesting that this proposition is taboo, and for that very 
reason should be looked at carefully, because intellectual taboos tend to support power relations in society. 
3 Charlene Spretnalc, 1989, "Naming the Cultural Forces that Push Us Toward War", in Russell, ed., above 
(NY: Pergamon Press) pp. 53-62, at p. 54. 
4 Starhawk, 1990, "Bending the Energy: Spirituality, Politics and Culture", in Christopher Plant & Judith 
Plant, eds., 1991, Turtle Talk: Voices for a Sustainable Future (Lillooet, BC: New Society) pp. 32-39 at p. 34. 
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while it possessed a monopoly of nuclear weapons from 1945-1949, and an overwhelming 
superiority through the mid-1960s. 1 It was incumbent upon the most powerful military nation 
on earth to either lead by example or take initiative in preventing an arms race. Instead, it took 
many unilateral actions which increased the size and speed of the arms race; it refused to agree 
to a Comprehensive Test Ban; it refused the treaty in 1963 urged by Ithruschev; it refused to 
agree in 1969 to a ban on testing of MIRVed missiles, and it refused a mutual comprehensive 
freeze and moratorium on testing. 2 
(b) There is a need for an adversary in order to display dominance. National rivalry is 
parallel to Masculine rivalry. As Penny Strange explains, "feeling a member of a superior 
group gives a sense of power; it is what men get from their treatment of women, and what 
nations get from having an enemy". 3 Both proving manhood and proving nationhood are 
based on winning power. Thus, the rise of the nation state is historically associated with a 
large permanent body of professionals, equipped with the latest technology - the military.4 
Because a sense of security is gained through a display of superior strength (rather than 
through the reflexive process of nourishing better relations and communication), Patriarchal 
values inevitably lead to an arms race. If there is always an enemy 'out there', one has to be 
ever stronger. Strength, accompanied by posturing and displaying symbols of power, in turn 
puts others under threat, encourages pre-emptive strikes or subversion, and increases the 
perceived need for a military build up. 
(c) Along with creating alliances against common enemies, another means of achieving 
dominance is through creating dependency. Protection', as offered by alliances such as NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact, reinforces relationships of dominance and co-dependency among allies. 
Weaker member nations are continually pressured into buying newer weapons systems from 
the more powerful supplier nations, to 'pull their own weight'. 
Protectionism is also parallel to that form of protection which pimps offer prostitutes. Carol 
Cohn describes an article by a retired United States Air Force General, entitled 'Nuclear 
Virginity', which discusses New Zealand's refusal to allow nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered 
warships into its ports: 
He is contemptuous of the woman's protestation that she wants to 
remain pure, innocent of nuclear weapons; her moral reluctance is a 
quaint and ridiculous throw-back. But beyond contempt, he also feels 
1 Patricia Ellsberg and Elissa Melamed, 1989, "Seeing Through the Emperor's New Clothes: Two Women 
Look at the Nuclear Issue", in Russell, ed., above pp. 84-92 at p. 90. 
2 Ellsberg and Melamed, 1989, in Russell, ed., above at p. 90 
3 Strange, 1989, in Russell, ed., above al p. 117. 
4 Strange, 1989, in Russell, ed., above at p. 117. 
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outraged - after all, this is a woman we have paid for, who still will not 
come across. He suggests that we withdraw our goods and services - 
and then we will see just how long she tries to hold onto her virtue. 1 
Indeed, as she says, "the patriarchal bargain could not be laid out more clearly". 2 
(d) Establishing and displaying dominance requires perceiving the Other as separate and 
lesser, or even as non-human. As Strange explains, the 'Masculine' way of securing peace is 
by building barriers to keep people out or isolate them. These are referred to as 'dissociative' 
peace strategies. 3 Rather than using power to develop systems of mutual support and 
cooperation, the impulse is to brandish weapons. In the recent United States/Iraq war, for 
example, it was apparently easier for President Bush to give the order to attack - which could 
literally have led to the end of the world - than to communicate face-to-face with Iraq's Saddam 
Hussein. The psychological strategies appeared to be designed not to improve communication 
and defuse the crisis, but to back Hussein into a comer. In the end, such a strategy may have 
been necessary, but we will never know. What we do know is that the path chosen cost over 
100 thousand civilian lives and did not disempower Hussein. 
Dissociative peace strategies reinforce the 'them v. us' mentality inherent in Patriarchal 
cosmology. This mentality is then exploited by the military to 'dehumanize' enemies, making 
it easier for soldiers to kill them. This has traditionally been achieved by linking the enemy 
with the Other - women and nature. For example, war propaganda has often portrayed enemies 
as rats or other animals or as being 'closer to nature'; more sensual and less rational, or less in 
the image of Rational Man. 
There is a parallel tendency, and often a deliberate policy, to humiliate the enemy by 
figuratively castrating or 'maldng a woman of him'. 4 The problem is, having been humiliated, 
so-called 'losers' (like some Germans, Israelis, Palestinians and some day perhaps Iraqis) can 
become obsessed with vindicating their national 'dignity' (read Masculinity). This is prayed 
out through aggression. 
(e) The pathological distortion of sex itself in its association with conquest and violence is 
an integral part of dominance relationships. Just as virility is associated with prowess in battle, 
sexuality is associated with violence. (This is reinforced by movies and television which often 
1 Carol Cohn, 1989, "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals" in Russell, ed., above pp. 
127-159 at p. 137 citing USAF Retired General T. E. Milton, 1985, "Nuclear Virginity" Air Force Magazine, 
Vol. 68 (5) at p. 44. 
2 Cohn, 1989, in Russell, ed., above at p. 137. 
3 Strange, 1989, in Russell, ed., above at p. 105. 
4 For example, after his first act of war against North Vietnam, U.S. President Johnson reputedly said "I didn't 
just screw Ho Chi Minh. I cut his pecker off'. 
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seem to be sex fantasies of, for and by men.) Violence is therefore linked, to varying extents, 
with the Masculine identity: "subjugating someone or something becomes the necessary proof 
of manhood, and the oppression of women perpetuates this false virility". 1 This association of 
sex and conquest partly explains why it has often been considered the prerogative of 
conquering soldiers to rape. But there are also rewards for the old males back home, who are 
pushing the buttons. 
Patriarchal civilization may be viewed as a network of defense measures 
to alleviate the fundamental insecurities of the mature 
male....Paradoxical as it may sound, one of the most effective of men's 
defense measures has always been war. War offers an excellent excuse 
for older males to bind the younger one's family to their service, and not 
incidentally, to destroy a good many of them in the process. 2 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, violence is not significantly a product of class or 
poverty (but perhaps the reverse), as the recent exposure of domestic violence and sexual 
abuse (of children and women) has shown. 3 Rather, crimes of violence among the upper 
classes are often expressed differently. The criminologist, Diana Russell, argues that while 
"physically coercive tactics are the chief tools of conquest available to lower class men" . to 
prove their manhood, upper class men can assert their Masculinity through economic and 
political conquest.4 For example, the distribution of free cigarettes with very high nicotine 
content to children,5 or free breast milk formula for mothers in Third World countries, in order 
to get them addicted, is an indirect form of violence as it leads to death. The upper class may 
not use violence directly, but historically they have had a military at their disposal, stocked 
with an over-representation of (expendable) disadvantaged and racial minorities. 
(t) Another pressure on men is to prove dominance by winning. Militarism (and 
Masculinity) seems to lead to a drive to win at any cost. If a U.S. Deputy Secretary of 
Defence could say the following - then what can we expect of our 'enemies'? 
The NATO doctrine is that we will fight with conventional weapons 
until we are losing, then we will fight with tactical nuclear weapons 
until we are losing, and then we will blow up the world.6 
1 Strange, 1989, in Russell, ed., above at p. 109. 
2 Barbara G. Walker, 1985, The Crone: Woman of Age, Wisdom, and Power (S.F.: Harper and Row) at p. 
171-2. 
3 It has been estimated that one in three women have been sexually abused and one in five reporte this to the 
police. Accurate figures are impossible to obtain, however. Dr. Patricia Easteal, 1992, Sexual Assault Survey 
(Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology). 
4 Russell, 1989, in Russell, ed., above at p. 69. 
5 Russell, 1989, in Russell, ed., above at p. 68. 
6 Former Deputy Secretary of Defense, Morton Halperin, quoted in Strange, 1989, above at p. 117. 
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The connection between winning and Masculinity leads to totally irrational policy decisions. 
For example, research by John Pilger showed that the U.S. military establishment had been 
providing Pol Pot weapons and political support even though they did not want him in power. 1 
The only conceivable reason, as far as Pilger could ascertain, was that Generals high up in the 
state Department were still fighting the Vietnam War. Having been once humiliated by North 
Vietnam, they were compelled to fight them regardless of the means or consequences. • 
Patriarchal society glorifies winners: the top ranked militarists in the United States/Iraq war 
were subsequently tipped as candidates for the White house. In contrast, "losers are buried or 
made to beg for crumbs" from the Veterans Administration.2 I would hypothesize that one of 
the reasons that Vietnam veterans were treated badly was not so much because people 
disapproved of the war, but because the soldiers were seen as 'losers'. 
(g) Another aspect of Masculine identity reflected in militarism is the pressure on men to 
suppress their emotions. Men, especially military men, are trained to be detached or deny their 
feelings. To 'be a man' is to lie tough and deny pain - to be the opposite of the Feminine 
stereotype. The obsession with 'objectivity' is, in part, another manifestation of the need to 
distance oneself from the Feminine. However, the denial of one's 'softer' emotions can lead 
to extreme imbalance, as in the documenting of wartime atrocities by their perpetrators in Japan 
and Germany during WWII. Objectivity may be a worthy, if impossible, aim in itself. In a 
Patriarchal context, however, absurd results often attend the claim of objectivity. 
Strategic military theory creates the illusion of being dispassionate or 'objective' because it 
is based on abstract thinking. Strategic theory was developed largely by people trained in 
mathematics and economics, who were mainly concerned about how the theory held together 
according to its own internal logic. 3 Real world considerations that did not fit within the 
language and theory of strategic analysis - such as human well being - were simply dismissed 
as unprofessional or irrelevant (as they still are). Thus the male military enclave is immune 
from ecological or feminist realities. 
(h) The obsession with winning, combined with suppressing feeling (and perhaps men's 
lack of experience in cleaning up after themselves) helps to explain the tendency for militarists 
to treat war as a game. The language of military experts and strategists reflects the rarefied, 
detached thinking that characterizes the arms race. It concerns the impact of actions and 
decisions on technical systems rather than upon human beings. The language puts the 
1 Weapons from France, England, the U.S. and Sweden were sent to Pol Pot via Singapore to a warehouse in 
Thailand purchased by the United Nations through a humanitarian fund and leased by the U.S. (Source: T.V. 
documentary by World Vision on Australian Public Television, March, 1991). 
2 Spretnak, 1989, in Russell, ed., above at p. 56. 
3 Cohn, 1989, in Russell, ed., above at p. 150. 
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militarists in the position of the users - not the victims - of nuclear weapons. 1 Yet, 
paradoxically, there is nothing actually objective about military language, as Cohn (who 
studied in a defence academy) points out: take for example, 'soft lay downs', 'penetration 
aids', 'protracted versus spasm attacks', and 'releasing our megatonnage in one orgasmic 
whump'. Revealingly, Cohn tells us, there is not even a word for 'peace' in strategic circles. 
As close as one can come is "strategic stability," a term that refers to a 
balance of numbers and types of weapons systems - not the political, 
social, economic, and psychological conditions implied by the word 
"peace".2 
Likewise, success in the big war game tends to be measured by who has more of what 
weapons, rather than the impact on society. As we later see, in Planning the concern of 
analysts is on balancing losses against gains. Similarly, this preoccupation with keeping score, 
tallies, and records, means that defence experts develop complex theories for nuclear arms 
'control' rather than for ending the arms race. 
(i) Our final Masculine behaviour pattern found in militarism is self-destructiveness. We 
have seen that Masculinity is defined by powerfulness and distancing from traits associated 
with Femininity. This imbalance, or striving to be more 'Manly' (read God-like) leads to 
polarized behaviour that is literally self-destructive. 
The blueprint for masculinity is a blueprint for self-destruction. It is a 
process so deeply embedded in the male consciousness, however, that 
awareness of its course and its end has been lost. The masculine 
imperative, the pressure and compulsion to perform, to prove himself, 
to dominate, to live up to the "masculine ideal" - in short, to "be a 
man" - supersedes the instinct to survive. 3 
The Masculinist culture seems to devalue life-giving activities and celebrate life-taldng.4 
Death defying or risk taking is glorified in movies, books, art, and pop music. It has been 
speculated that Man's preoccupation with death may relate to the fact that He is separated from 
the other end of the life cycle: 
Not feeling intrinsically involved in the processes of birthing and 
nurturing, nor strongly predisposed toward empathetic communion, 
men may have turned their attention, for many eras, toward the other 
aspect of the cycle, death. Certainly much of men's art and literature 
1 Cohn, 1989, in Russell, ed., above at p. 147. 
2 Cohn, 1989, in Russell, ed., above at p. 149. 
3 Herb Goldberg, 1987, The Inner Male: Overcoming Roadblocks to Intimacy (Ontario: New American 
Library) at p. 1. 
4 Ynestra King, 1983, "Toward an Ecological Feminism and A Feminist Ecology", in Joan Rothschild, ed., 
Machina Ex Dea: Feminist Perspectives on Technology (NY: Pergamon) at p. 123. 
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has shown an obsession with this theme, and the male-orchestrated 
global arms race is suicide on a grand scale. 1 
I have suggested that the behaviour of world leaders, in both personality and strategy, 
reflects all-too-familiar patterns: building barriers and distancing oneself from the enemy, 
denying the worth or humanity of the Other, attempting to establish dominance and create 
dependency, and winning at all costs. These are 'stereotypically' Masculine forms of conflict 
resolution. Preventing war by promoting world peace, rather than arms sales, subversion, and 
belligerence, has seldom been tried at the national level - as evidenced by the relative 
expenditures on militarism and peace making. Perhaps this is partly because the armed forces 
really exist as an icon: they "represent and defend the masculine ethic", rather than life. 2 
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1 Charlene Spreinak, 1989, "Toward an Ecofeminist Spirituality", in Plant, ed., 1989, above pp. 127-132 at p. 
129. 
2 Judy Wajcman, 1991, Feminism Confronts Technology (Sydney: Allen & Unwin) at p. 146. 
CHAPTER 12: STRATEGIES FOR SOCIAL CHANGE 
Having looked at some of the shortcomings of Manstream theory, we now turn to problems 
of Manstream strategy. Manstream radical environmentalism and ecofeminism find much 
common ground with regard to the sort of societies they would like to create. However, 
ecofeminism differs from Manstream theory when it comes to strategy, or how to get there. 
Although both would concur that it is necessary to work on all levels for social change and that 
there is no one correct way, underneath the Many tactical approaches of Manstream activists 
there is a similar pattern. Their strategies are generally attempts to (a) change people's 
behaviour (b) through changing values or world views (c) by appealing to their intellect or 
'rationality'. 
I believe one can discern two main orientations toward strategy among activists that 
correspond with those I distinguished among green theorists. 1 First are the Leftists, who 
invest their energy in pushing for systemic change over, say, personal transformation. Second 
are the Liberalists, whose primary focus is on changing individuals' values and perceptions, 
rather than changing institutions and social structures. 
I exclude the far left or Marxist position here, except to say that any stance that relies on 
capturing state power - which involves using violence at some stage - is inconsistent with green 
thinking altogether. This is because non-violence (and non-disturbance of the environment) is a 
central tenet of green philosophy. This is both on grounds of moral principle and for practical 
reasons. Any violence harms the Earth a well as its inhabitants, so a strategy that could lead to 
violence is counterproductive in the extreme. (Greens cannot afford to throw the baby out with 
the bath water.) Thus, while Marxism contributes to green analysis, it is not very relevant to 
green strategy. 
The appeal to reason to change people's behaviour is found across the traditional political 
spectrum. (Non-Marxist) Leftist green activists (those emphasizing systemic change) implicitly 
assume that Man is by nature rational and therefore motivated by self-interest; hence He will 
respond to rational arguments to think ecologically, end war, and create a just society. The 
problem to them is to make people see where their true interests lay. 2 
1 This is based on an affiliation with the peace, social justice, and environment movement for over two decades 
and on two continents. 
2 For example, see Joanna Macy, 1989, "Awakening to the Ecological Self', in Plant, ed., 1989, above pp. 
201- 11 at p. 210. Macy, a deep ecologist, argues that the solution is to be "more enlightened about what one's 
self-interest is". 
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Liberalist green activists (those emphasizing individual change) implicitly assume that if we 
understand ecological synergy and appreciate our Oneness with nature, we will act more 
rationally. For example, deep ecologists, in trying to make people see that to harm nature and 
others is to harm themselves, are ultimately relying on reason to persuade people to become 
deep ecologists and act rationally. Thus both Liberalist and Leftist approaches to strategy 
assume they can motivate behavioural change through intellectual means such as education. 
This chapter explores why these traditional approaches have not served to bring about social 
change. I suggest that there is a missing link that is provided by an ecofeminist analysis. 
Namely, Manstream greens have banked on 'education' in the broad sense, but have generally 
regarded gender irrelevant to that education process. Further, they have banked on motivating 
people to stop their collectively irrational behaviour through reason, generally regarding non-
rational, or emotional needs as a non-issue. Their strategies rely upon the same old Masculine 
Model of Man. An analysis and strategy based on denial cannot be sufficient. It is a case if the 
one-dimensional leading the blind. 
The ecofeminist paradigm suggests that a reflexive, deconstruction process must come first: 
we must look directly at the blind spots, the most powerful of which (at present) is arguably 
gender-blindness and androcentrism. Or as put more dramatically by Sharon Doubiago: 
Because of sexism, because of the psychotic avoidance of the issue at 
all costs, ecologists have failed to grasp the fact that at the core of our 
suicidal mission is the psychological issue of gender, the oldest war, 
the war of the sexes. 1 
I suggested earlier that people strive for and abuse power because, in Western Patriarchal 
society, emotional needs are repressed and denied, as are other things that have been associated 
with the feminine. Consequently, there has been a tendency to compensate indirectly for what 
is wanting through a non-rational drive for power and control. That is, the denial of emotional 
needs that have been repressed in our androcentric culture has contributed to displacement: an 
obsession with physical gratification and power (as a means of obtaining emotional 
gratification) which leads on a social level to hyper-competition, conflict and over-
consumption. 
In this chapter, we again use the case of militarism to examine the usefulness of the strategy 
that results from the Manstream (androcentric) analysis: the appeal to reason. (A parallel 
discussion would apply to, say, forest clear felling). The predominant Manstream approach to 
countering militarism is winning over public opinion through reason (by gaining media 
attention, lobbying politicians, letterboxing, or winning office and so on) is of little avail. By 
ignoring the personal and the non-rational, greens are indirectly supporting the status quo. This 
1 Sharon Doubiago, 1989, "Mama Coyote Talks to the Boys", in Plant, ed., above pp. 40-44, at p. 43. 
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is not of course, to argue against the use of reason. Rather, I am saying that the tendency to 
assume that relying on the rationality of decision-maldng behaviour on the part of voters, 
administrators, politicians, or generals will only work if decision-makers' motives are rational. 
And this is a one-dimensional interpretation of human behaviour based on androcentrism. 
Manstream activist orientations 
How do both ends of the spectrum of Manstream strategic orientations rely on reason to 
persuade people to behave rationally? Let us take a snapshot of the two positions regarding the 
causes of militarism and the types of solutions that stem from them. The implicit position of 
many Liberalist greens and peace workers is that the narrow self is "the cause of war and 
ecological destruction". 1 This is because an analysis that takes human-centred perception as the 
operative issue begins with the conclusion that narrow identification or nationalism underlies 
world conflict, which leads to 'them versus us' thinking and fear of others, and in turn; to 
defensive/aggressive behaviour - and hence to militarism. If the problem is human 
identification, the solution is to expand our sense of interrelatedness and see ourselves as one 
world. This perspective has found expression in, for example, the 'deep ecology', the 'One 
World or None', and the 'Beyond War' movements, and is discussed later. Of course, fear of 
Other or 'them versus us' thinldng is indeed a symptom that needs direct attention. 
This may not be a simple matter of values, however. It may have biological origins or may 
even be determined by brain functions. 2 Further, identification among people (such as religious 
groups), has not prevented fa.ctionalization. My only point is that, as a practical matter, the 
selection of this as the fundamental issue is not very useful. 'Them versus us' thinking may 
be better understood - not as narrow identification - but in terms of the false dualisms that have 
been used by powerful interests to divide and rule: such as heathen/believer, 
capitalist/communist, male/female, skilled/unskilled, white/black. 3 These divisions and their 
manipulation are made plausible and encoded by 'hierarchical dualism', as explained earlier. 
Leftist greens and peace workers, on the other hand, generally identify capitalism of 
imperialism as the force behind militarism. 4 Capitalism is, of course, integral to military 
1 Warwick Fox, 1990, Towards a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations for Environmentalism 
(MA: Shambala). 
2 See Carl Sagan, 1977, The Dragons of Eden: Speculations on the Evolution of Human Intelligence (N.Y.: 
Random House). 
3 See Cynthia Enloe, 1989, Bananas, Beaches & Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics 
(Berkeley: University of California Press), who illustrates this with specific cases. 
4 Militarism in the Third World is seen as a part of a global capitalist expansion. Thus, the 'cold war' against 
socialism has moved from the North to the South, but it serves the same ends. The explanation for militarism in 
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adventurism and the arms race. But this analysis does not go deep enough. The main value of 
Leftist green critiques of capitalism resides in its description of the 'mechanics' of militarism. 
Like sports commentators (many of whom are former players), they know the rules of the game 
and can follow the action, but they cannot really change the outcome. Thus Leftists hope the 
system will change through means that history has proven futile - pointing out the insanity and 
injustice of war. This approach - premised as it is on the ability of reason to triumph - is losing 
ground everywhere against the more 'creative' approach of the capitalist press, the intoxicants 
of the market bazaar, and the glitz of show biz. The paradox of such an approach is that, in an 
unjust system, the 'rational' will want to align themselves with the winners. (The apparent 
popularity of Hitler before he started losing is an unfortunate case in point.) 
The appeal to reason 
I suggested that both (non-Marxist) Leftist and Liberalist greens rely upon people acting 
differently once they realize that militarism, whether due to human-centredness or capitalist-
engendered factors, is not rational. Ultimately, they bank upon the majority recognizing that 
the capitalist system is bad for them, and hence changing the system through the market, the 
ballot box or the streets. 
But, if people were persuaded by reason alone, why would Militarism exist in the first 
place? The appeal to reason might work if warfare were a 'rational' means of acquiring 
resources and security. However, the fundamental irrationality of the arms race and modern 
warfare suggests this is not an adequate explanation. Militarism is not 'substantively' rational 
as it threatens all life on earth. It is not 'procedurally' rational as warfare cannot achieve 
security, whether material, ideological, or territorial. Alternatively, if militarism were indeed 
'rational', then the ends of military action would necessarily be power for the sake of power, 
rather than for the sake of resolving the problems cited as reasons for military exploits. 
Militarism, I suggest, cannot be adequately understood outside the 'non-rational' dimension. 
Further, reasoned argument is also inadequate to make militarists act rationally and abandon 
power-based modes of behaviour. Reason (alone) is also inadequate to motivate the general 
public to take action to stop military mischief. Instead, I suggest that Masculine identification 
the Third World is considered to be largely the arm of Western capitalist interests, often enforcing policies within 
host countries that are against those countries' own environments and peoples on behalf of foreign interests. (The 
poor are easily recruited for this task due to desperation and fear of starvation, lack of enough political awareness 
to know where their real interests lie, and class divisions in society which predominate over national solidarity.) 
Violence is not, therefore, always reprehensible to the left. In fact, armed struggle against capitalist interests is 
often portrayed as heroic. 
and emotional needs are more central factors to focus upon in bringing about change (than 
anthropocentrism or capitalism), as this approach works to expose more fundamental bases for 
power seeking - sex and - gender. 
The appeal to reason can be directed in two ways: toward decision makers ('top down' 
approach), or average citizens (a populist or 'bottom up' approach). We begin by looking at 
the assumption that rational arguments will change militarist policies and behaviour. The 
'rationality' of world leaders as manifested in military policy suggests that rational arguments, 
such as the costs of war to their nations, is not effective in persuading decision makers to 
behave more rationally. Then we look at the strategy of persuading people to adopt a more 
mystical or spiritual orientation to nature as a means to bring about rational behaviour. The 
implicit assumption here is that the aggregate public can be persuaded to change their way of 
thinking and then, in turn, persuade world leaders to do so through electoral, rational or 
spiritual means. I do not dispute the potential of these approaches to work some day (with a lot 
of luck), but I suggest that they cannot do so within a time frame that can save the environment. 
I argue that only an approach that addresses personal emotional needs and motivations can hope 
to change behaviour quickly enough. 
Influencing leaders 
If the causes of militarism were simply narrow, human-centred, but rational self-interest, 
then militarism would bear some rational - if misguided - relationship to defence, or economic 
or other human benefit. But it does not. Leaders already know that militarist policy does not 
make economic sense. Through the ages, it has been recognized that armaments are extremely 
wasteful and inflationary. 1 The rise in military expenditures vastly exceeds the rise of. 
economic activity needed to support it.2 In the 1980s, United States military expenditures per 
capita were more than eleven times those immediately preceding WWII (adjusted for inflation), 
or over 6.5 percent of GNP, as opposed to one percent before the war. 3 
1 As the Russian Czar reputedly said in 1898: "Since the financial means required for armaments are constantly 
rising, capital and labour are misdirected from their true uses and are devoured unproductively. Millions are spent 
on more advanced weapons which are quickly rendered obsolete by new advances in science. The acceleration in 
armaments spending therefore corresponds less and less to the purpose allotted to them by the respective 
governments". (Source: Rudolf Steiner, 1905, "War, Peace and the Science of the Spirit" ). 
2 For a discussion of the impacts of militarism from a Christian perspective, see Zelle W. Andrews, 1985, War 
in Slow Motion: The Economic and Social Impact of Militarism. A Guide to Study and Action (TX: The 
Pilgrim Press). 
3 Ruth Leger Sivard, 1987, World Military and Social Expenditures 1987-88: An Annual Report on World 
Priorities (Washington DC.: World Priorities). 
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It is common knowledge that weapons create inflation because, unlike most other products, 
once built, they do not generate further economic activity. 1 Bombs are not used twice, and 
when they are not used, they are stockpiled. In wartime, unused bombs have often been 
dumped from planes to avoid dangerous landings on return, which is highly inflationary (as 
well as ecologically disastrous). The costs of military waste, even in peace time, is beyond 
reckoning. The costs of cleaning up the activities of one arms merchant, for example (who was 
licensed to sell weapons from the U.S. State Department and trafficked in chemical wastes) cost 
the taxpayers tens of millions of dollars to clean up its chemical warehouses. 2 
Militarists may not worry about the economics of military policies, but government leaders 
who seek to retain power certainly should. Since World War II, many Western governments 
have become the marketing arm of private weapons dealers, ostensibly on economic grounds. 
However, this 'military Keynesianism' (stimulating the economy with government investment 
in arms production) has not led to rational ends. 'Developed' countries spend on average 5.4% 
of the GNP in military spending in comparison with 0.3% aid to developing countries, and 
poorer countries spend 3 times as much on arms as needed to provide health care, clean water, 
and sanitation. 3 Military spending has also taken a great toll on the relative power of nations; 
Japan's economic advance has often been widely attributed partly to its low military 
expenditure. 
From 1960-80 Japan spent 2% of government research and 
development funds on the military; her growth rate in manufacturing 
was 9%. From 1960-80 the USA spent 60% of government research 
and development funds on the military; her growth rate in 
manufacturing was 2.5%.4 
Government involvement in arms sales has not been conducted in a rational manner either. 
In Iran, for example, billions in United States arms passed to the Ayatollah's regime when it 
took over. When $12 billion worth of weapons were cancelled by the Ayatollah, the U.S. 
taxpayer had to compensate the private arms suppliers to the tune of several hundred million. 
Yet the United States later sold weapons both to the Afghans, who in turn sold them to Iran via 
Israe1,5 while supplying Iraq with weapons to fight Iran (an absurdity brought to light in the 
'Iran-Contra' Scandal). 
1 For discussion of how the military is bad for business, see Harold Willens, 1984, The Trimtab Factor: How 
Business Executives can Help Solve the Nuclear Weapons Crisis (NY: William Morrow & Co.). 
2 Centre for Investigative Reporting and Bill Moyers, 1990, Global Dumping Ground: The International 
Traffic in Hazardous Wastes (Cabin John, MD: Seven Locks Press) at p. 49. 
3 Frank Bamaby, ed., 1988, The Gaia Peace Atlas (NY: Doubleday) at p. 105. 
4 National Women's Consultative Council, 1991, A Question of Balance (Report to the Hon. Wendy Fatin, 
M.P.) Appendix D p. 105. 
5 The Australian , 21 September 1987. 
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This is not rational planning and decision making to achieve security in any sense. Apart 
from a handful of corrupt arms merchants and their puppets, everybody loses financially. 
Nonetheless, some assume that warfare is rational in spite of its costs, even if perhaps 
immoral, because it is supposedly believed by perpetrators to be a means to acquire territory 
and resources. However, the 1991 war with Iraq cost United States taxpayers not only 
countless billions but also an incomprehensible loss of non-renewable resources. Eight 
hundred oil wells burned for months in the aftermath of the war. The unwillingness to 
negotiate before that war also suggests that militarists and leaders do not worry too much about 
the rationality of warfare or the human and financial costs and resources jeopardized by war. 
Then there is the matter of the rationality of nuclear arms themselves, the climax of 
Masculinist science. Diana Russell argues that nuclear weapons are entirely a product of the 
male mind or, at least, a cult of Masculinity. 1 Nuclear weapons are 'intrinsic irrationality'. 
Like all weaponry they are wasteful and inflationary, but nuclear arms also offer no defence, 
and their possession is arguably illegal. First, while many still think of the weapons industry 
as somehow serving the national defence, there is no defence against a nuclear attack by others 
or even by ourselves. For example, a pre-emptive strike by the United States using star wars 
technology (assuming it could work and not be retaliated) could destroy the global eco-system 
beyond repair. Nuclear warfare is omnicidal, not just suicidal, as it would eliminate most life 
on earth. Many mainstream military and civilian experts recognize that nuclear bombs are also 
militarily useless.2 Generals for Peace and Disarmament, a group of former NATO generals 
and admirals, was formed in 1981 because they also felt that the concept of a limited nuclear 
war or a 'star war' defence is irrational. 3 
Second, the use of nuclear weapons is illegal, under the UN Charter, the 1907 Hague 
Convention, and the Geneva Protocols of 1977.4 Further, it has been argued that even 
possession of nuclear weapons is illegal under the 1950 Nuremberg Principles. 5 The only 
1 Diana E. H. Russell, 1989," Sexism, Violence, and the Nuclear Mentality", in Diana Russell, ed., above 
pp. 63-73 at p. 67. See also Nancy Shelley, 1983, "Women and the Prevention of Nuclear War", in Michael 
Denborough, ed., Australia and Nuclear War (Canberra: Croom Helm) pp. 228-251. 
2 One such person is Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defence under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. In 1983, 
McNamara said: "I know of no plan which gives reasonable assurance that nuclear weapons can be used 
beneficially in NATO's defense". See Robert S. McNamara, 1983, "The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: 
Perceptions and Misperceptions" Foreign Affairs 62 pp. 59-80. 
3 General Gert Bastian, et al., Dec. 1984, Generals for Peace and Disarmament: A Challenge to US/NATO 
Strategy (NY: Universe Books). 
4 Professionals for Peace, 1987, Newsletter 2 (3) September, and Bamaby, ed., above p. 69-70. 
5 "Principle VI states that 'planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war 
inviolation of international treaties, agreements or assurances" is a crime against peace, punishable in 
international law." Barnaby, eds., 1988, above at p. 70. 
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possible legal justification for having nuclear weapons, then, is that they will not be used; they 
are kept as a 'deterrent' only. As shown below, however, deterrence is a false concept, 
because deterrence has, in fact, served as a form of violence or aggression, rather than 
defence. 
In short, nuclear arms cannot defend us and are wasteful, inflationary, illegal and ecocidal. 
They are by definition substantively irrational, because they threaten life itself and therefore 
everyone's self-interest. Government and military leaders should realize this, yet they resist 
alternative means of acquiring security, access to resources and territory, or whatever ends 
militarism is supposed to serve. Virtually nothing is spent on peace making activity, or on 
eliminating the causes of war. 1 Let us now consider the stated or official reasons traditionally 
given for the necessity for possessing nuclear arms: 'deterrence' and 'containment' of anti-
capitalist ideologies. It can be shown that these stated aims are not served by a militarist 
policy. These concepts are self-contradictory rationalizations for the traditional Masculine form 
of conflict resolution - establishing dominance - which has led to organized crime on a world 
scale (more commonly called 'the arms race'). 
The 'rationale' for the arms race 
Let us begin with nuclear 'deterrence'. The term is 'doublespeak' because it implies self-
defence. It is, in fact, a euphemism for a deadly form of aggression: psychological warfare. 
To most people, deterrence' evokes the idea of (a) a willingness to make a retaliatory strike (b) 
in response to a nuclear attack (c) on one's own country. From the beginning, nuclear 
deterrence meant threatening a nuclear first strike, not retaliation. 2 Using the bomb to 'deter' 
potential Soviet aggression was in fact the United State's policy as early as 1945, four years 
before the Soviets had a bomb, and even longer before they were expected to. Later, in the 
1980s, the United States refused to say that it would not strike first, despite the Soviets' 
promise not to do so - hardly consistent with the alleged aim of deterrence. 
Deterrence was never limited to a response to a nuclear attack, but rather was to be used in 
retaliation for a Soviet encroachment using conventional weapons in Western Europe, or to 
prevent indigenous communist movements elsewhere. It was not, therefore, 'self-defence'. 
Deterrence, was a strategy - not to prevent the other side from using nuclear weapons - but to 
prevent them-from hitting back on United States soil in case of war.3 This is apparently what 
Ronald Reagan had in mind in 1981, when he said that the United States could contain a 
1 For example, the U.S. spends the equivalent of less than one percent of its military budget on peace making. 
2 See Bernard Brodie, ed., 1946, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (N.Y .: Harcourt 
Brace). 
3 The history of nuclear policy is set out in Gwyn Prins, ed., 1983, Defended to Death: A Study of the Nuclear 
Arms Race from the Cambridge University Disarmament Seminar (Harmondsworth: Penguin). 
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nuclear war outside its territory. The cold war worked so well that countries such as 
Germany, England, Holland and Australia were willing to be, in effect, nuclear targets or 
shields for the United States. The 'nuclear umbrella' was not only an ingenious protection 
racket, it was a metaphor which masked a policy based on dominance (not the personal care an 
umbrella implies). As Henry Kissinger said in 1979, the umbrella was a myth, for neither the 
U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. would risk their own cities to defend foreign territories.' 
Since World War II (at least) deterrence has really been a code word for aggressive 
containment of socialist ideology. 2 We will return to the question of whether the arms race has 
in fact been rationally directed towards this end, or whether, instead, containment has been a 
euphemism for dominance. But first, even assuming that deterrence was actually a 'defence' 
strategy, deterrence ceased to be United States policy in the 1980s. The new 'counterforce' 
capability meant a nuclear strike against the opponent's military forces and weapons, instead of 
its citizenry, wastheoretically possible through the use of more sophisticated weapons. This 
led to the idea that nuclear wars were winnable and to the strategy of limited nuclear war'. 3 
The concept of 'limited nuclear war' meant striking military targets with tactical (local) nuclear 
weapons somewhere, while holding in reserve the main strategic force to deter the enemy from 
responding with a general nuclear attack against the United States.4 If taken at face value, 
then, deterrence theory was also, it would seem, totally irrational: it meant having more 
weapons than were needed to destroy the entire planet at least twelve times over, and it meant 
frightening enemies into building up more arms. This is hardly a human-centred policy; it is, 
however, very 'macho'. 
Nonetheless, proponents of deterrence argue that it is a 'necessary evil' which has 
prevented war. In fact, however, deterrence never prevented conventional wars, it increased 
the risks of nuclear war and terrorism, and it legitimated nuclear proliferation. While it has 
been argued that there has not been a major war since 1945, there have been in fact twice as 
many wars in the 40 years since World War II than in the 40 years before the war, and there 
were something like 237 military conflicts from 1900 to 1985. 5 Also, 20 million have died in 
1 Barnaby, ed., 1988, above at p. 72. 
2 For a critique of deterrence on other grounds, see Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, 
1985, Psychology and Deterrence (MD: Johns Hopkins University Press). The case for deterrence is presented in 
George H. Quester, 1986, The Future of Nuclear Deterrence (MA: Lexington Books). 
3 Jonathon Green, 1986, The A-Z of Nuclear Jargon (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). 
4 See Gwyn Prins, ed., 1983, above pp. 102-118. 
5 Counts of the number of wars vary somewhat. For a detailed account of wars since 1945, see Tom Hartman, 
1984, World Atlas of Military Conflict 1945-1984 (London: Leo Cooper & Seeker & Warburg). 
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wars since World War II, most of whom were women and children. 1 So when it is said that 
deterrence 'works', it only means there has not been a nuclear war on Western soil (yet), 
though there have been several close calls. 2 
Also, covert operations have increased many fold since 1945, partly because militarists 
realized that open warfare could lead to nuclear war. These operations included para-military 
operations, political assassinations and domestic provocateurism. Early on, this was mostly 
'licensed terrorism', or terrorism by the superpowers. But terrorism has increased among 
'unlicensed' terrorists, such as small Arab nations, that cannot match the First World in 
conventional warfare. 3 Moreover, nuclear terrorism has also appeared among smaller nations. 
A 'terrorist' group with one atomic bomb could blackmail political concessions from an 
adversary nation, and there have been many such threats. 4 
Deterrence, by legitimizing the possession of nuclear weapons, has also worked to 
legitimize nuclear technology. This technology transfer has meant nuclear proliferation 
through reactor exports. It is not hard to build a bomb when you have nuclear technology. In 
1979, a student in the U.S. demonstrated how to build one, using public library sources. 
Many Third World countries now operate nuclear power plants, which means they also have 
the necessary fuel materia1. 5 It has been noted that if deterrence works, every country should 
have the bomb. If so, the fact that up to 50 countries either have the bomb or the capacity to 
develop one should come as a relief to those who believe in deterrence. 
But if nuclear deterrence is a tool of foreign policy, then is it a legitimate tool? Patriarchal 
societies have been authoritarian in their external affairs, using threats and punishment to get 
their way (behaviour we would disapprove of in children). All American Presidents from 
Roosevelt to Bush, with the possible exception of President Ford, have actually threatened to 
1 Bamaby, eds., 1988, above p. 99. In the 1982 Lebanese war, for example, about 90 percent of victims were 
civilians, mostly women and children (at p. 98). 
2 On 9 November 1979, the United States was 3 minutes from nuclear launch due to a computer error. David 
Hackworth, 1983, "A Soldier's Report", in Michael Denborough, ed., above at p. 211. See John May,- 1989, 
The Greenpeace Book of the Nuclear Age: The Hidden History, the Human Cost (NY: Pantheon Books) for a 
list of nuclear accidents. 
3 The bombing of the World Trade Centre on 28 February 1993 is a case in point. 
4 Between 1970 and mid-1981 there were 65 terrorist threats to use nuclear bombs in the US. See Patrick 
O'Heffernan, Amory B. Lovins, and L. Hunter Lovins, 1983, The First Nuclear World War: A Strategy for 
Preventing Nuclear Wars and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (NY: William Morrow & Co.). 
5 O'Heffernan, et al., 1983, above. 
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use the bomb. 1 This is terrorism, not diplomacy, and increases the chances of nuclear war on 
Western soil. 
If nuclear arms do not deter warfare and terrorism, do they then at least contain foreign 
fascism, communism or anti-capitalist movements? It has been widely argued that, before the 
economic collapse of the Soviet Union, nuclear deterrence simply meant that the U.S. and 
U.S.S.R. were conducting their fighting in the Third World, rather than in direct 
confrontation. This analysis, however, follows from the notion that the cold war is a product 
of inevitable East-West value differences. I would argue that military adventurism in the Third 
World has not primarily been a result of value differences, fear of communism or rational self-
interest, but of struggle to obtain power through the control resources, territory and cheap 
labour. For example, if the cold war were a product of 'them versus us' thinking, and not 
about dominance at all costs, the West would not have continually suppressed information 
indicating the Russians did not have aggressive intentions, nor would it have exaggerated their 
military capabilities and underestimated their economic weaknesses. 2 
Moreover, if containing threats to capitalism was the primary motive for military deterrence, 
why would the West sell arms and nuclear technology to China, which had nuclear weapons. 3 
Further, the West sold arms and nuclear technology to Muslim extremists such as the rulers of 
Iran, and to unstable and unpopular dictatorships knowing such countries could fall to 
communist insurgency overnight, such as the Philippines under Marcos. Peaceful allies have 
been allowed to starve while corrupt dictatorships were propped up with Western weapons. 
This is not a rational means of containment, as leaders have long realized that starving nations 
are attracted to communist ideologies, and communism is bad for Western business. 
I have suggested that nuclear weapons are not defensive, they do not fight anti-capitalist 
movements, and that they are in fact militarily useless and have no deterrent value - especially 
1 Iran (1946), Korea (1950 and 1953), China (1953), Indochina (1954), Lebanon (1958), Quemoy/Matsu 
(1958), Laos (1961), Berlin (1961), Cuba (1962), Vietnam (1968-1972). Bush also allegedly threatened a 
nuclear strike in the Iraq war. See Bamaby , eds., 1988, above at p. 129. 
2 See Jonathan Steele, 1983, "We Always Exaggerate Soviet Power", in The Washington Post B2 (25 Dec.) 
and Andrew Cockburn, 1983, The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine (NY: Random House) for a 
discussion of how the Soviet threat was deliberately exaggerated. In 1969, for instance, a CIA 'National 
Intelligence Estimate' on Soviet intentions said Russia was not seeking military superiority, nor a first strike 
capability, and did not have the technical or economic capability to seriously attempt to challenge US power. 
Had Secretary of Defence Melvin Laird not ordered CIA Director Richard Helms to delete that information from 
the estimate, the arms race could have been much cheaper. In fact, some of the most knowledgeable and 
unimpeachably patriotic sources, such as Generals for Peace, had been arguing, even before Gorbachev's arrival, 
that the Soviet Union was not a threat. Many argued that the CIA consistently exaggerated Soviet military 
spending as well. 
3 Morton H. Halperin and Dwight H. Perkins, 1965, Communist China and Arms Control (Praeger). 
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against guerrilla nuclear warfare. Deterrence has in fact increased the risks of nuclear war and 
terrorism. Nor has the arms trade been a rational tool of containment. Thus, even if we accept 
deterrence and containment as worthy or substantively rational goals (which I do not), these 
aims have not been furthered by a macho foreign policy. Yet these are the only reasons for 
possession of nuclear weapons other than for their actual use (which, as we have seen, is 
arguably illegal under international law and certainly immoral and omnicidal). By default, it 
appears that these goals have only served to maintain a position of military dominance, the only 
reward for which is eternal vigilance. 
Arguments like the fact that the military causes ozone depletion, fossil fuel consumption, 
nuclear and toxic pollution, and so forth, simply do not impress the male enclave of CIMBIs 
(corporate/industrial/military/bureaucratic interests). Militarists are not moved by reason: 
they answer every argument with cliches about how Man is essentially aggressive and that the 
dominance mode, or "peace through strength", is necessary. Nor are they moved by 'high 
brow' ideas about expanding our sense of identification to encompass all life forms, which 
they would probably only see as 'effeminate'. They are hooked on fantasies of machismo and 
power. Such a psychology can be cured neither by rational arguments nor a green superman 
fantasy. 
In fact, as militarism is irrational, it may be actually counter-productive to defer to 
proponents of militarism by 'I am right, you are wrong' arguments. Just to be right is not 
enough, given the state of the world. Such arguments give credence to the militarists' 
position, as if it were rational, but merely less enlightened. Moreover, rational arguments 
allow militarists to continue to deny their own emotional and non-rational motives. 
In developing strategies, therefore, peace activists must realize that militarists operate on an 
emotional level. This is demonstrated by the reliance on Masculine means of dealing with 
conflict - through dominance, force, aggression, threats of distancing and building barriers. 
Thus, talk of the necessity to communicate and to meet mutual needs cannot be comprehended. 
Although the arms race has its own dynamic, the massive expenditure and spillover costs of 
militarism, juxtaposed with the minimal investment in peace, suggests the apparent inability of 
military leaders to even consider alternative non-force forms of conflict resolution. 
But if, for the sake of argument, rational arguments were effective, then presumably they 
must be more logical and convincing than the militarist's rationale for warfare. The underlying 
justification for 'peace through strength' is that militarism is a necessary evil due to Man's 
'aggressive nature'. Through this line of reasoning, it follows that competition and conquest - 
winning - is the only means to secure peace. If we accept an androcentric conception of 
Mankind, it is hard to argue with this logic. However, if we question the androcentric model 
itself as a social construct, the basic axiom of the militarist's logic is undermined. 
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Influencing the populace 
The foregoing has suggested that militarism is not a 'rational' policy and that military and 
civilian leaders have ample exposure to this fact. Rational arguments have been tried for 
decades, if not centuries, and have gained little ground. Since reason does not impress those 
in power, does it influence the general populace that empower these decision makers? I 
suggest that the chances of persuading the population at large to change their values through 
reason (who would then select new leaders that reflect this change of consciousness) is both 
naive and too slow. If 'rational' arguments directed at changing public perception about 'the 
enemy' were effective, relatively democratic societies would not endure the horrific costs of 
their leader's militarist policies. Has the Manstream not noticed that decades of peace activism, 
which pointed out the irrationality of militarism, did little to alter this voter behaviour? We 
then look at some things that a feminist analysis of militarism brings to the surface. 
With regard to the efficacy of reason, it must also be remembered that the substance of an 
argument is often not what is most persuasive. It is partly 'how' it is said, but mainly 'who' 
says it that counts. Activists cannot compete with authority figures in this regard. For 
example, debates about the military are usually couched in technical and strategical terms. 
People are told 'these issues are very complex' and that therefore they should trust the 
specialists - the military experts. 
Moreover, people are conditioned to look down upon or disregard those outside the power 
structure. As long as people defer to the powerful and attribute to them knowledge and 
rationality, they will simply not listen to those who offer solutions labelled as 'fringe' or 
'radical' by the mainstream. Patriarchal conditioning must therefore be addressed directly if 
activists want people to hear. Patriarchy as a consciousness builds on and reinforces denial, 
distancing, fear, greed and delusion. It must be named if people are to learn to recognize it. 
Manstream strategies also invest a lot of energy in arguing that people have nothing to fear 
from the enemy. The position implicitly assumes fear of others is the underlying cause of 
conflict. If the problem is seen as 'them versus us' thinking or narrow identification on the 
part of militarists and/or citizens, the nature of power interests behind militarism can be 
obscured. 
I would suggest that cold war indoctrination has been a deliberate marketing strategy of the 
military/industrial complex. (By cold war, I mean a campaign of psychological warfare which 
instils the belief that only weapons and strength - threatening and aggressive posturing - can 
provide national security.) What I am suggesting is that had the Russians not existed, 
someone else would have been created to fill that essential role for political and business 
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interests. Even here, in safe, cosy Australia, for instance, the response to the easing of East-
West hostilities was to justify an increase in defence spending. 1 
The male-driven militarist complex and weapons trade - the world's largest business - has 
little to do with narrow identification or anthropocentrism; it is simply organized crime. Even 
in its public face, it operates outside the public purview. For example, in the 1988/89 fiscal 
year, 1,500 applications for anns exports were made to the Australian government and only 
five were rejected.2 Many of these sales were to regimes that violate human rights. This 
means that the weapons are used by the purchasing governments against their own people. 
There was no public debate on the issue in Australia. Moreover, public awareness of the 
potential harm to themselves and the environment was irrelevant to the outcome. 
The arms trade should be seen for what it is; for all practical purposes, it is a global 
extortion and protection racket. It operates just like that other male enclave, the illegal drug 
trade, only the damage is far greater, affecting not only immediate lives, but the entire global 
ecosystem. In fact, it is no coincidence that drug trafficking was mixed up with arms deals in 
the U.S. war against Nicaragua: it is an instance of what is known in business circles as 
'vertical integration'. (This is not a 'radical' remark if one considers the human and 
environmental costs of the arms trade.) 
It is convenient to the interests of gangsters that people believe 'fear of others' and 
nationalism is the cause of war, so people will believe it is their own collective fault: a flaw of 
human nature rather than profiteerism. Therefore, to treat fear of others or individual • 
perception alone is to treat a symptom of psychological warfare, and to protect from scrutiny 
the few who directly benefit from the weapons trade. 
Given nuclear weapons, there is no security in the existing power-based system. The only 
security is in better relations. Women have more experience in conflict resolution and 
relational ways of thinking: these are behaviour patterns and skills that are sorely needed at 
this point in history. We need to deflate the Patriarchal balloon which supports both the 
notions of 'dominate or be dominated' and 'father knows best', which allow militarist policy to 
prevail over common sense and decency. 
1 In 1986, The Dibbs Report, a Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, was attacked for its defensive - as 
opposed to offensive - approach. This was largely due to a media beat-up, as explained in Andrew Mack, 1986, 
Defence versus Offence: The Dibb Report and Its Critics working paper no. 14 (Canberra: ANU Peace Research 
Centre). The following year the Labor Government produced a White Paper on Defence, 1987, which 
emphasized the importance of the shared strategic and geopolitical interests of Indonesia and Australia and the 
advisability of increased defence spending. The media then generated much public debate over whether the 
Indonesians were themselves a threat to Australian security. 
2 Report on "60 Minutes", 9 Network Television, 24 February, 1991. 
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For the sake of argument, let us assume that the problem of the appeal to reason is 
overcome. What then is the efficacy of personal transformation as a means of social change? 
We now look at the a-structural or Liberalist strategy that seeks to change people's values 
through spirituality or personal transformation. 
Personal transformation 
Liberalist green approaches (especially deep ecology) differ from Leftist ones regarding 
their faith in the efficacy of spiritual transformation as a means to social change. However, I 
have argued that Liberalists strategies also rely on an appeal to reason by attempting to show 
that to harm nature and other people is to harm the self. They also rely upon what is esientially 
a 'conversion' to a belief system or way of seeing. While ecofeminism also contributes to the 
search for a new spirituality, its strategy is to address the abuse of power on personal as well 
as systemic levels, not merely to transcend it. Ecofeminism suggests that a deconstructive 
process is necessary to expose and deflate the ideological and psychological pressures upon the 
ego that fuel the abuse of power. We now look at how Liberalist green strategies often fail to 
deal with problems related to (a) politics-as-usual, (b) liberalism, (c) mysticism, (d) 
identification, (e) power seeking and sexism, and (f) cooptation. In the discussion below, I 
focus here on the Liberalist position, but some points apply to Leftists as well. (Again, 
Liberalist refers to strategies for social change that begin from the individual; not to be 
confused with liberal ideology.) 
Politics as usual 
Many of the Liberalist orientation stake their program on the belief that individual change, 
through a non-anthropocentric perception of reality, can bring about a new political and social 
order. Seen as a strategy, it is essentially directed at changing people's values or belief . 
systems, on the assumption that more 'aware' individuals will make better decisions, or at least 
cast better votes. This is important. However, in lieu of challenging the (male-controlled) 
system directly, deep ecologists for example, advocate developing the capacity to identify and 
integrate with non-human nature, or 'Self-realization'. 1 It has even been asserted that "ethics 
follow from how we experience the world". Systemic change will somehow follow from 
ethical change.2 However, I suggest that our gendered, behavioural programming runs far 
deeper and is much harder to change than are cerebral concepts such as anthropocentrism, or 
1 A term developed by Arne Naess. 
2 Arne Naess, quoted in Warwick Fox, 1986, Approaching Deep Ecology: A Response to Richard Sylvan's 
Critique of Deep Ecology Occasional Paper 20 (Hobart: Centre for Environmental Studies, University of 
Tasmania) p. 46. 
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transcendent concepts such as Self-realization. Also, people have to first want to change their 
beliefs and rational arguments and religious exhortations do not necessarily carry people over 
this threshold. People, for example, still have to be moved or persuaded to take up deep 
ecology or a different value system. 
This Liberalist strategy contains vestiges of the dOminant liberal political and economic 
paradigm that Liberalists would acknowledge as contributing to the environmental problem. 
Mainstream liberals assume that simply changing people's values will lead to different voting 
and/or behaviour patterns. Their reasoning is this: values make people prefer certain lifestyle 
or political alternatives; therefore, political change can be achieved by persuading others to 
adopt one's own beliefs. This logic is quite reasonable - but only in a vacuum unaffected by 
the media, corporate advertising, a liberal orthodoxy, Patriarchal social conditioning and 
linguistic patterns, and so on. This is because mainstream liberal philosophy is premised on an 
image of Man as an autonomous individual, separate from His context. Society is seen as the 
sum of individuals, a perspective which conceals how ideological and institutional structures 
function to benefit the powerful. 
In short, many Liberalist greens eschew liberalism, yet share its context-free logic, which 
does not acknowledge the full extent to which our mental processes and values are shaped by 
the Superstructure and Infrastructure of our social institutions. Thus, although many 
Liberalists are themselves political activists, the approach is essentially 'politics as usual' 
because it relies ultimately on public pressure or 'numbers' to bring about better social goals 
and policies. Unfortunately, corporate power is above governments and largely dictates who 
gets elected and what they do (discussed in Part II). This Liberalist strategy does nothing to 
undermine the ideological props, or expose the underlying emotional 'needs' that motivate the 
abuse of power. 
There is a certain irony in a position that recognizes that the competitive global economic 
system creates environmental problems but then proposes a solution that is essentially market-
based, relying on consumers to change their values and lifestyles. This is analogous to 
approaching the drug problem by persuading people to 'just say no,' when we are dealing with 
something that is profitable precisely because it operates outside the market. The resource 
extraction and pollution industries do not pay the replacement costs of public resources, and 
although enmeshed in real competition among themselves, they (like the illegal drug business) 
create their own markets. Likewise, the Green consumer or voter-based strategy encourages 
us to place a kind of moral responsibility on the victim, distracting attention from the 
profiteers. 1 Although people demand goods, they do not, for example, demand that these 
1 The adoption of this approach may relate to an implicit assumption among many liberals that institutional 
change involves either violent revolution or authoritarian repression. An example of this view is expressed in 
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goods be made with new toxic materials and processes that replace natural ones. Consumers 
have not actually made these kinds of choices. 
Recent events illustrate that educating consumers is less urgent than retooling our 
technocratic, political, and corporate decision-making arenas. Consumers would surely not 
object, for instance, if their creature comforts were provided via solar energy. In fact, public 
enthusiasm for recycling centres, environmentally-friendly products, and recycled paper has 
outstripped the supply, yet in the early 1990s, recycling centres were closing in Australia. 1 
Industry has not been buying the material simply because, in our distorted economy, live trees 
are cheaper than used ones. This phenomenon is a function of power relations that shape 
institutions, laws, and economic and Planning methods, and only partly a function of 
chauvinism toward other life forms. 
Cultivating consumer awareness through grass roots action is no big problem. It has 
proven relatively easy to legislate to change consumer habits, especially when backed by the 
ethic-building activities of a diverse environmental/peace movement. Car pools, speed limits, 
tax incentives for energy conservation, water meters, labelling laws, and litter fines are 
effective interim measures - at least when not blocked by industry lobbies. 2 Thus power, and 
not consumerism, is the crucial issue. 
Liberalism 
Much green strategic thought is still trapped in traditional liberal reformist thought idother 
ways as well. A liberal paradigm may be adequate for resolving social justice issues, but not 
preservation ones. As discussed in Part II, this is because it frames all environmental issues in 
terms of distributional claims among competing interests in resources. Liberalists tend to 
equate environmental ethics with 'egalitarianism' (perhaps because it is consistent with the 
concept of rights, the 'social contract', and 'mushroom model of Man'). In this framework, 
responsibilities are construed as merely mutual rights. If social justice is simply transposed 
onto other life forms, however, we would 'balance the interests' between humans and other 
species, which in reality means incrementally trading off nature to meet human needs. This 
limited liberal conception of ethics is still commonplace in green thinldng. 3 
William Ophuls, 1977, Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity: Prologue to a Political Theory of the Steady State 
(S. F.: W. H. Freeman). 
1 Recently, recycling centres are beginning to reopen again. 
2 Unfortunately, the packaging industry in Australia has invested vast sums in campaigns against can and bottle 
deposit legislation. 
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Similarly, as in liberalism, much green thought has often emphasized the self over 
community. Mainstream liberals devalue the idea of community as being a mere aggregate of 
individuals, whereas I use 'community' to refer to a sense of mutuality and reciprocity (rather 
than a parochial identification with a particular group.) As we say in Part II, liberalism 
excludes the idea of community from its conception of what is essential to human well-being, 
and fails to fully appreciate that we are what we are because of nature, culture, and emotional 
bonds. Thus, liberalism reflects and reinforces the estrangement of autonomous Man from the 
feminine, community and nature. Liberalist green thought does not fully escape this legacy. It 
is also two-tiered - relating to the self and the biotic community - though it seeks to bridge this 
Man-made gap. Thus even while Liberalist greens would reunite Man with nature, community 
and women's' cultures remain in the background. 
Furthermore, this Manstream emphasis on the individual 'at one with nature' again distracts 
attention from structural and systemic issues. Instittitions embody values, so they must be 
changed as well. Of course, some constructive institutional reforms have been put forth by 
green theorists, and others, including bioregionalism, decentralized and direct democracy, and 
the new economics. 1 These ideas, however, can also be supported by anthropocentric 
perspectives and, in fact, draw on the prior work of anthropocentric ecologists, social 
ecologists, and anarchists.2 Also, as Judith Plant points out, these new lifestyles and 
organizational modes require feminism - the revaluing of life-giving values, conflict resolution, 
physical work, and the reintegration of men into the home: 
One of the key ideas of bioregionalism is the decentralization of power: 
moving further and further toward self-governing forms of social 
• 	 organization. The further we move in this direction, the closer we get to 
what has traditionally been thought of as a 'woman's sphere - that is, 
home and its close surroundings... The catch is that, in practice, home, 
with all its attendant roles, will not be anything different from what it 
has been throughout recent history without the enlightened perspective 
3 See, for example, Lawrence E. Johnson, 1991, A Morally Deep World: An Essay on Moral Significance and 
Environmental Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
1 See Van Andruss, Christopher Plant, Judith Plant, and Eleanor Wright, eds., 1990, Home! A Bioregional 
Reader (Lillooet B.C.: New Society Publishers); Herman E. Daly and John B. Cobb, jr., 1989, For the 
Common Good: Redirecting the Economy Toward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future 
(Boston: Beacon Press); Paul Ekins, ed., 1986, The Living Economy: A New Economics in the Making 
(London: Routledge). Also see Marilyn Waring, 1988, Counting for Nothing: What Men Value and What 
Women are Worth (London: Allen & Unwin). 
2 For example, see Aldo Leopold, 1949, Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and There (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press); Wendell Berry, 1977, The Unsettling of America: Culture and Agriculture (San Francisco: 
Sierra Club Books); Murray Bookchin, 1964, "Ecology and Revolutionary Thought" Available from Left Green 
Network, Burlington VT, 05492; Pets 1CropotIcin, 1971, Memoirs of a Revolutionist (NY: Horizon Press); 
Emile Caponya and Keitha Tomlcins, eds., 1976, The Essential Kropotkin (London: Macmillan). 
offered by feminism. Women's valiies, centred around life-giving, 
must be revalued, elevated from their once subordinate role. 1 
Another vestige of liberalism in Manstream thought is the view of political activity as being 
exclusively a means to an end: a goal-oriented activity. However, grassroots or hands-on 
community involvement is an important means of Self-realization as well. For example, it has 
often been suggested that people 'need to save themselves before they can save the forests'. 
However, in the absence of serious personal problems, it is hard to understand how one can 
make such a separation: when part of a rainforest dies, part of us dies. Personal development, 
I believe, requires the sometimes painful process of community participation as well as 
contemplation. Furthermore, the view of politics as a means to an end is corrosive. When we 
implicitly suggest 'we need power to make change', we have already begun to compromise. 
It is certainly valuable to criticize anthropocentrism in favour of biocentrism. However, the 
significance of ignoring the very real problems of building community and restructuring 
institutions is this: an environmental ethic that does not offer a chance of saving the natural 
environment is not an environmental ethic. The relationship between social change and 
individual perception or spirituality is, therefore, crucial to the relevance of the Liberalist green 
program for social transformation. Hence we now embark upon the politics of mysticism and 
transcendence. 
Mysticism 
As Helen Forsey notes, "in certain patriarchal philosophies the concept of connectedness, 
union, nirvana, exists: but it has been narrowly conceived by men in exclusively spiritual 
terms".2 Patriarchal spirituality has been transcendent and earth-disdaining rather than earth-
honouring. In Starhawk's words, "power-from-within must be grounded, or connected to the 
earth, to the actual material conditions of life". 3 Otherwise, it cannot lead to real social change. 
First, history does not bear out the presumed causal connection between 'spiritual' change 
and behaviour. Most religions begin as spiritual movements, but they are eventually 
crystallized and institutionalized to become part of an officially-sanctioned power structure. 
For instance, Buddhism shares a spiritual base with much Manstream philosophy, and does not 
alter social structures based on dominance relationships. Consider, for example, the position 
of women and the widespread environmental destruction in Buddhist states and societies. 
1 Judith Plant, 1990, "Searching for Common Ground: Ecofeminism & Bioregionalism", in Van Andruss et 
al., eds., 1991, above pp. 79-85. 
2 Helen Forsey, 1989, "Community--Meeting Our Deepest Needs", in Plant, ed., 1989, above pp. 227-34 at p. 
231. 
3 Starhawk, 1989, "Feminist, Earth-based Spirituality and Ecofeminism", in Plant, ed., 1989, above pp. 174- 
185 at p. 177. 
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Second, spirituality, belief systems, or world views do not necessarily improve individual 
behaviour. This is because behaviour is not solely a product of either rationality or beliefs. 
Behaviour patterns are so deeply encoded that we often do not perceive them. Ways of acting 
and relating are ingrained from earliest childhood, a product of habit, role-modelling, social 
reinforcement, and institutions. This is one reason why there is often a gap between what 
people believe in and what they will do to get their own way, along the whole spectrum from 
personal to international relations. I have seen religions reinforce and rationalize prejudice and 
cruelty, but not cure them. (Spirituality does, of course, help to motivate people to save the 
planet.) 
Third, individual moral behaviour is constrained by power relationships and institutional 
corruption. We observed above that environmental and social problems are underwritten by the 
profitability of resource exploitation and the arms trade. Even if we had an ecologically-sound 
Planning system, the pressures of our militarist economy would nullify any structures, plans, 
or programs designed to conserve natural resources over the long term. 
Fourth, changing people's way of thinking through spiritual or educational persuasion does 
not reach the prime movers. Even the conversion of five billion people might not reach the top 
thousand in the transnational resource corporations and the military. There is little point in 
beseeching the godfathers to adopt a new ethic: in real life, there is always someone to take 
their place. A case in point is India today. Despite a Gandhi who inspired a mass movement 
which toppled the powerful, one power structure merely replaced another. 
Fifth, getting more leaders on one's side Would not be enough to change the rules of the 
game or the umpire's bias. (Even the omnipresent game metaphor itself reflects a Masculine 
bias: it is not a game.) More enlightened ddcision makers would only slow the rapidly 
increasing disparity between rich and poor, the plundering of the public estate, and the 
relentless drive toward market totalitarianism. 
Sixth, the insufficiency of spirituality alone to effect social change is obvious when the 
military industries and arms trade are seen for the international extortion and protection racket 
that they really are. In this context, spiritual approaches in isolation from gender and 
institutional factors merely serve the power structure. Can we really expect to prevent 
institutionalized crime by cultivating inner peace and a mystical appreciation of nature (however 
important these may be in other contexts)? 
Seventh, even if a new perception could change behaviour, it is unrealistic to expect people 
to adopt a new way of 'experiencing the world' within the given time frame. Many, for 
instance, have argued that Christianity, if actually practiced, would prevent the desecration of 
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nature. 1 Perhaps it could, but it took hundreds of years for Christianity to take hold, and it did 
not work as intended even when whole societies were Christian - and we have only a few years 
to stop the destruction of the non-human environment 
Eighth, many have invested heavily in the hope that the 'crisis of life conditions on Earth' 
could cause society to choose this new path. But crises cannot be relied upon as a catalyst to 
positive change, as we saw with the oil crisis of the early 1970s and the U.S.-Iraq crisis of 
1991. Crises are, moreover, subject to manipulation, as when the nuclear industry uses its vast 
resources to promote fear of ozone depletion for the wrong reasons. In addition, as those in 
the peace movement know all too well, crises create fear and denial, which militate against the 
cooperation and planning that are necessary to save the planet 
Finally, despite their good intentions, spiritual movements set up a 'them versus us' 
relationship between the believers and the less enlightened, and a conviction that there is one 
right orientation toward experiencing reality, however personalized it may be. Such 
movements run the risk of creating a hierarchy of beliefs. For instance, some have suggested 
that it is somehow 'deeper' to perceive nature as an extension of the self, rather than, say, as a 
cathedral or an art gallery.2 As has been the case with some religions, we may begin to judge 
others by their beliefs, rather than by their deeds. However, we are what we do about the 
desecration of human and non-human nature, not what we believe in. In short, personal 
transformation may be necessary, but it is an insufficient condition for social change. 
Identification 
Deep personal and social change require self-criticism. Deep ecologists, however, focus on 
'identification', reasoning that if people learned to expand their sense of identity to encompass 
all of nature, they would realize that to harm nature is to harm themselves. Paradoxically, as 
noted above, this relies on a person's sense of 'self-interest', as opposed to a sense of intrinsic 
value: 
Altruism implies that ego sacrifices its interests in favor of the other, the 
alter.... The motivation is primarily that of duty.... It is unfortunately 
very limited what people are capable to love from mere duty or more 
generally from moral exhortation. Unhappily the extensive moralizing 
from environmentalists has given the public the false impression that 
we primarily ask them to sacrifice to show more responsibility, more 
concern, better morals... .The requisite care flows naturally if the self is 
1 See for example, Robin Attfield, 1983, The Ethics of Environmental Concern (NY: Columbia Press) and 
HJ. McCloskey, 1983, Ecological Ethics and Politics (N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield) who argue that 
traditional ethical precepts, Christian and utilitarian, are sufficient for dealing with environmental problems. For 
an opposing view, see Henlee Barnette, 1972, The Church and the Ecological Crisis (MI: Eerdmans). 
2 For example, see William Godfrey-Smith, 1980, "Environmental Philosophy", Habitat Australia (June) pp. 
24-25. 
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widened and deepened so that protection of nature is felt and perceived 
as protection of ourselves.' 
Altruism is a difficult concept for the Manstream to deal with because altruism cannot be 
squeezed into the Masculine model of Man. Patriarchal ideology sees altruism in terms of a 
negation of self-interested Man, just as it defines women's feelings and experience as the 
absence of real thought and knowledge. Altruism is therefore denied or redefined in 
Manstream theory as self-interest that benefits others. There is altruism all around, for 
example, in the work of greens and women who put their own interests behind those of their 
families, children and the environment That energy and good will could be affirmed and 
nurtured, rather than exploited and co-opted. 
Deep ecologists are correct in appreciating that people do not change through reason alone. 
But would it not be more Ethical to develop our faculty of caring for other life forms for their 
own sake, rather than because we identify with them? Morality and gender are social 
constructions; if women can be socialized to take pleasure in the happiness of others, surely 
Mankind can be as well. 
One does not need a new philosophy to realize that self-interest and the well-being of the 
planet are inseparable. Common sense indicates this, whether one is anthropocentric or not 
Some deep ecologists have argued that anthropocentric arguments are self-defeating, since they 
reinforce human identification and therefore could cause people to eliminate species that are not 
'useful'.2 This wrongly assumes, however, that some creatures have no survival value to the 
ecosystems upon which humans depend, a position inconsistent with a biocentric perspective. 
And, unfortunately, those yet unsympathetic to a biocentric vision are unlikely to be moved by 
abstract, elitist arguments that pretend sex and power do not exist. 
In fact, the environmentally concerned citizenry are being persuaded that the disruptions to 
natural systems to date have been so catastrophic that any further tinkering with ecosystems is 
life-threatening. The problem is that they are psychologically disempowered, so that many 
practice denial. It has become obvious that to fool around with the integrity of the food chain, 
genetic engineering, and radioactive waste is extremely risky and self-destructive - yet Mankind 
does it. Self-interest has not prevented Mankind from harming people or nature so far, so it is 
unlikely that a change in our human identification would lead to a cessation of violence against 
nature. After all, if 'homocentric Man' is bent on homicide (40 thousand children die 
1 Arne Naess, the "father" of deep ecology, quoted in Joanna Macy, 1989, "Awakening to the Ecological Self', 
in Plant, ed., above pp. 201-11 at p. 209. 
2 See for example, Warwick Fox, 1990, Toward a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations for 
Environmentalism (Boston: Shambhala) at p. 186, and Robyn Eckersley, 1990, "The Ecocentric Perspective", in 
Cassandra Pybus and Richard Flanagan, ed., The Rest of the World is Watching (Sydney: Pan Macmillan) pp. 
68-78. 
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needlessly each day), then why - in the real world - would the new 'biocentric Man' not commit 
biocide? 
Of course, it would be desirable if we all could work toward Self-realization through a 
process of expanding our sense of self, but it is doubtful that real personal change can occur 
without the conscious and painful process of self-criticism that is required to reject power and 
ego. In short, gender identification is more central to human behaviour than human 
identification, and the focus on anthropocentrism protects the Masculine ego from scrutiny. 
There is another issue raised by identification as a means of change. We must ask ourselves if 
we are really identifying with nature or with an intellectual club. Self-realization or an 
expanded sense of self may, in real life, be a projecting of the ego rather than a transcending of 
anthropocentrism. Our tendency to project our egos upon the cosmos is, after all, a time-
honoured androcentric trait. 1 
Finally, rather than all-encompassing; the vision of deep ecology is a detached world view. 
To 'transcend' is to put oneself above: to separate the self and world problems. There is a 
tendency to try to transcend our egos, privilege, and dominance relationships by simply 
'overlooking' them. Anyone who would be reading this (as well as I myself) benefits from and 
thus perpetuates past exploitative relationships on a personal, class, or national level. So do 
environmental gurus. One cannot claim to transcend the Power Paradigm while benefiting from 
Patriarchy. It is not enough to give up materialism: if we do not deal with personal power and 
dominance relationships, we are part of the problem, regardless of our degree of empathy, 
political awareness, and transcendental purity. 
Power seeking and sexism 
The green movement must be able to set an example if it wishes to claim that better societies 
are possible. A major impediment to social change is an old source of friction found within the 
green movement itself: Patriarchy within its own ranks. This is revealed in the movement's 
backgrounding of women, the grass roots and racial 'minorities'. 
Some men and Masculine-identified women expect to be 'spokesmen' and will not lick 
envelopes, learn from others 'beneath' themselves, or share information. Sexism also excludes 
many selfless volunteers from meaningful participation. A majority of green activists (as 
opposed to 'spokesmen') are women, yet a significant percentage eventually leave the 
movement because they find that it is a microcosm of Patriarchal society at large. 2 Very often 
those women who are 'threatening' or who question processes are simply eased out by indirect 
means. This exclusion is seldom executed in full consciousness, but, again, gender-blindness 
1 See Marilyn, French, 1985, Beyond Power: Women, Men and Morals (London: Jonathon Cape) at p.210. 
2 See Jane Elix, 1990, "Green Girls and Ecoogical Housewives", Refractory Girl 35, pp. 11-14. 
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is power-blindness. If men are sincere about saving the earth, they should be willing to 
relinquish personal privileges based on sex, and begin listening to women. 
There is a related tendency among greens to become estranged from the genuine grassroots 
and to begin to see themselves as the grassroots instead. Movements that begin through 
knocking on doors and face-to-face contact with the average citizen often become 
bureaucratized and hierarchical. Information and assistance tend to flow into environmental 
organizations, rather than out into the community in Ways that can empower people at the 
periphery. This means losing sight of the essential need for community building. Until the 
green movement addresses Patriarchal attitudes in its own backyard, it will not serve as a 
reliable basis upon which to work for social transformation. 
None of these problems of sexism and elitism that are sometimes found in the movement are 
really corrected by a biocentric vision. Self-realization is no substitute for self-reflexive 
learning: when we stop asking questions, we become part of the problem. One learns about 
oneself by being in the movement - by taking responsibility and working collectively with 
others - not by contributing as an expert or leader. 
Cooptation 
If people see the environmental movement as a platform for personal and professional 
advancement, and if they cannot assume leadership roles, they will move on to another forum. 
Patriarchy thus creates fertile ground for cooptation, which affects both the credibility and the 
long-term effectiveness of the movement. As long as the green movement remains Patriarchal, 
government and industry will be able to set the agenda and rules of the game. The unconscious 
desire to be accepted by the powerful, or within society at large, means activists can bebought 
off by giving them a stake in the power structure. This is why new forms of 'conflict 
resolution' have been means of reducing conflict, rather than resolving the problem. 
A case in point, as we have seen, is the recent trend in Australia toward negotiation and 
mediation between industry and environmental 'spokesmen', which has really been a form of 
'corporatization' (again, the process in which resources are allocated via negotiated 
arrangements between government and powerful special interest groups.) For conservation 
groups to be included in this process at first blush appears a major victory - the legitimation of 
environmental concern.. However, conflict resolution conducted by power brokers is not a real 
departure from business-as-usual. In the long term, the corporatization of the environment 
movement is no answer. The process is reminiscent of a board game devised in the United 
States. 'Blacks and Whites' was designed so that the black pieces had all kinds of strategies 
and manoeuvres available to them but they could never win. Although the 'playing field' may 
be level, the powerful can move the goal posts. Moreover, industry can always counter public 
demand for wilderness by (say) creating a greater public demand for consumable goods or 
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frightening them into depression. The best way to close people's minds is to tighten their belts. 
(This, of course, often occurs not as a deliberate conspiracy, but as part of the dynamics of 
politics: "do whatever seems to help one's position at any given time".) 
Feminist strategy 
I have suggested that problems created by power relations cannot be resolved by 
transcendence, 'monkey wrenching', 1 or pressure politics alone. Manstream environmentalism 
is bringing about ecological awareness but not basic social change. To change our way of 
thinking, relating, and acting requires more than a new self-image, metaphysics, policies, or 
structures. People will not want to abandon personal and political power simply because 
cooperative, reciprocal relationships are more ecologically sensible or 'spiritually sound'. 
Rationalist approaches which appeal to intellect, and religious approaches which appeal.to  
spirituality have proven inadequate. Due to the realities of power relationships in Patriarchal 
society, we must recognize that policies will not change until people with power in the military, 
corporate and bureaucratic establishments cooperate of their own accord. The trick is how to 
motivate power-driven men and women to change their behaviour at personal, social and 
institutional levels. To supplement this brief treatment of ecofeminism practice, I provide a 
concrete example in Appendix 2. 
The personal 
I have tried to show that, despite the diversity of strategies and approaches developed by 
Manstream greens, many have unwittingly been thinking, working, and relating at one level - 
the impersonal. Although 'transcendent' approaches (those that appeal to the rational or 
spiritual) have value, we must also begin to look at personal motivations for power-seeking. 
What motivates people in real life? I have suggested that we examine the centrality of the 
need for love, sex, and gender identification in behaviour at the political as well as personal 
level. For example the sex drive is a motivating force which Manstream theories prudi shly 
avoid. (Among many mammals, for example, the male instinctive drive for dominance and 
territory is a means to obtain sexual privilege and hence reproduction of the species.) Power 
has often been called the greatest aphrodisiac, and power is obtained through the control and 
exploitation of social and natural resources. Whether the drive for power and control in 
humans is socially or biologically constructed, it should not be ignored. While the denial and 
1 This refers to 'macho' forms of direct action like tinkering with machinery, removing survey stakes, or tree 
spiking associated with Earth First! See-Dave Foreman and Bill Haywood, eds., 1989, Ecodefense: A Field 
Guide to Mortkeywrenching , 2nd ed. (AZ: Ned Ludd Books) and Edward Abbey, 1990, The Monkey Wrench 
Gang (UT: Dream Garden Press). 
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repression of the irrational, personal, and feminine as a factor in the abuse of power may seem 
obvious, it is difficult to find any recognition of this in Manstream theory, either mainstream or 
radical. 
I have also argued that, due to the omnipresence of Patriarchy and the Power Paradigm in 
Western culture, fundamental change can only come about when those in command get 
personal satisfaction and security from devolving power to others. This can begin to happen 
when we recognize that a spade is just a 'bloody shovel', and that power and territoriality are 
merely manifestations of unrequited needs for sex, security and recognition that could be 
acquired in more satisfactory, mature ways. To move beyond power-based relationships, then, 
we need to expose and redress the personal insecurities and unconscious motives underlying 
the power drive and demystify the social conception of Masculinity as power. 
We should work to dissociate Masculinity from the images of heroism, conquest, and death-
defiance so familiar in militaristic fantasies; from the images of competitiveness, individualism, 
and aggression glorified in sport; from the images of objectivity, linearity, and reductionism 
exalted by science; and from the images of hierarchy, progress, and control entrenched in the 
technocracy. If polarized Masculinity were revealed in its true form, extreme egocentrism, it 
might cease to be so 'sexy' to both men and women. No heroic social agency is needed to 
'take power', we can withdraw the power, energy, and deference we unwittingly give to the 
powerful and the ideology of Masculinity that supports them. 
With regard to the dominant males, or megalomaniacs, the advice of Barbara Walker is 
relevant, if excessively colourful. 
Men do not voluntarily relinquish their ego trips, war toys and money 
games. Like spoiled children, many men push selfish behaviour as far 
as they can, perhaps secretly trying to reach the point where Mother 
will clamp down and say "No more", and mean it ... When many 
women together say no and mean it, the whole structure can collapse. 1 
With regard to those who blindly follow, we should appreciate that they see themselves as 
failures because they do not 'measure up' to the Masculine stereotype and yet are afraid to deal 
with their feelings and insecurities for fear of 'exposing themselves' as possibly unMasculine. 2 
If they were affirmed in terms of a different concept of Masculinity or humanity, they would be 
more reluctant to blindly follow megalomaniac leaders for reflected glory. 
1 Barbara G. Walker 1985, The Crone: Woman of Age, Wisdom, and Power (S.F.: Harper & Row) at pp. 175- 
6. 
2 Heather Formaini, 1990, Men: The Darker Continent (London: Mandarin) at p. 8. 
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The social 
Second, ecofeminism suggests new forms of activism and strategy. Masculine-identified 
people in the environment movement often get caught up in winning the game (or even just 
getting on the media), rather than saving the forest. The obsession with scoring points is goal 
displacement It makes green strategy predictable and therefore easy for the powerful to 
outfox. In my experience, the greatest successes and failures of the Tasmanian green 
movement have been directly related to the sense of community, love, and support that has 
existed within the campaigns at a given time. When relations become Patriarchal, or when self-
appointed leaders take charge, the workers seem gradually to lose heart. 
Feminist process is direct, hands-on, and face-to-face. Perhaps because women have 
generally been marginalized by the Power Paradigm, they have been able to pioneer creative 
forms of direct action. Feminists strategies tend to circumvent the hierarchy and rules of the 
game. Being more direct, they place problems face-to-face with solutions. For example, 
Greenham Common and similar actions brought soldiers face-to-face with the fact that their 
individual participation in the system had immediate, personal impacts. Women in the Third 
World have led the way in designing creative and community-building ways of protecting 
themselves and their environment, such as the Chipko (hug-the-trees) movement and the 
women of Bhopal in India. 1 
More recently, however, grassroots groups fighting toxics in the west have also set a new 
direction. These groups are largely composed of women and this is reflected in strategy. 2 
They are no longer abiding by the hierarchical rules behind which hide those in authority. At 
the same time, they are avoiding the use of Masculinist power-based modes, such as sabotage. 
Rather than playing the games of the politicians or bureaucrats - the gatekeepers of industry - 
they have gone directly to the managers of business and industry, insisting that the industrial 
processes or products themselves be changed. The approach is face-to-face and 
communicative, reminding the decision makers of their personal responsibilities as members of 
the human and biotic community. 3 
In my view, ecofeminist consciousness, analyses, and strategies offer real grounds for hope 
at this point in time. Women are dispersed throughout societies and have potential influence 
1 See Radha Bhatt, 1989, "Lakshmi Ashram: A Gandhian Perspective in the Himalayan Foothills", in Plant, 
ed., above pp. 168-73, and Pamela Philipose, 1989, "Women Act: Women and Environmental Protection in 
India", in Plant, ed., above pp. 67-75. 
2 Kate Short, 1992, "The Australian Toxics Network: Why Women Do It", in Ronnie Harding, ed., 
Ecopolitics V: Proceedings (Sydney: University of NSW ) pp. 506-508. 
3 See Gary Cohen and John O'Connor, 1990, Fighting Toxics: A Manual for Protecting your Family, 
Community and Workplace (Washington D.C.: Island Press). 
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everywhere and, in my experience, women are generally able to listen. The danger, of course, 
is the tendency toward cooptation of women into the Patriarchal value system. But men in 
Western societies are increasingly seeking liberation from their Patriarchal programing. All 
sexes can work to affirm the feminine values of caring, openness, nurturing, and non-
defensiveness and the possibility of creating societies in harmony with all living beings. 
The institutional 
Third, feminists are realizing that it is also necessary to dismantle and redesign of the Man-
made conceptual and institutional frameworks that reinforce and legitimize power-based 
relationships. 1 Having come to realize that they cannot rely on officials, experts or politicians 
to implement green/feminist ideas, more and more women are trying to reform the system 
themselves - not because it is their destiny to clean up after others, but because only they, it 
seems, can. Nurturing Patriarchs into doing the job is futile. Feminists have been working at 
all levels to deconstruct the Masculinist theories, structures, attitudes, and behaviour that 
militate against the environment (as I attempted to do in Part II). Unfortunately, mainstream 
and radical greens alike have not availed themselves of feminist theory. We need to deconstruct 
the existing institutional systems to expose the biases which work against environmental 
protection and social justice. This entails de-mystifying our social conception of Masculinity 
and power, and exposing the insecurities and pressures reinforced by Patriarchal culture and 
reflected in decision-making theories, processes, methods, and structures. We also need to 
develop new social forms for decision making that affirm a Feminine conception of Ethics, and 
move beyond the constraints of Masculine, rights-based norms. 
I have tried to demonstrate that feminist approaches to the fundamental restructuring of 
society are not marginal, irrational and insubstantial, contrary to the way they are consistently 
portrayed (to the extent feminists are not entirely ignored). My contention has been that 
ecofeminism provides a complete and useful paradigm to guide personal, socio-cultural and 
institutional transformation. If given affirmation, it would offer fertile ground for new. 
analytical and strategic insights in Manstream theories as well. 
Ecofeminism makes the links between human oppression and environmental exploitation, 
and between the personal/psychological and political/institutional dimensions of the modern 
crisis, by showing that the abuse of political power is inseparable from the abuse of personal 
power. In so doing, it validates the idea that everyone can make a difference. The social 
'elevation' at which one works is not important. One need not obtain professional or political 
'credibility', the first refuge of sycophants and cowards. As a society, we still defer to the 
powerful, but it only takes a (proverbial) child to point out that the Emperor has no clothes. 
1 See, for example, Evelyn Reed, 1978, Sexism and Science (NY: Pathfinder), 1Cathryne A. Mackinnon,1989, 
Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press). 
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To where from here? 
In summary, I would like to offer suggestions as to many directions for further exploration 
that have been suggested by a feminist analysis of the Planning system: 
(a) a deconstruction of social decision-making institutions to reveal the centrality of gender-
blindness, androcentrism, and hierarchical dualism, and the bias these create against social 
justice, peace and environmental protection (the prerequisites to sustainability). 
(b) a redefinition of human 'needs' to include emotional (as opposed to merely social and 
material needs) such as caring relationships, a sense of community, and contact with 
wilderness. 
(c) a reinterpretation of human behaviour that considers non-rational motives (such as the 
drive for dominance and territoriality) through which emotional needs are presently obtained 
(or displaced) in Patriarchal society. 
(d) a new framework of analysis that allows us to understand the environmental problem in 
terms of the abuse of power (as opposed to, say, inadequate knowledge and control). • 
Diminishing land and resources result more from the diversion of undervalued public resources 
to special interests than from a lack of technological advancement or good policies. 
(e) a redefinition of environmental conflict as a 'symptom' of Manstream thought- rather 
than as a natural form of pluralist social inteiaction in a rational resource distribution system to 
be resolved through trade-offs between economic and environmental considerations. 
(f) a recognition that the standard 'solution' - the so-called balance between society and 
nature, between competing values and interests, or between progress and preservation - is an 
ideologically-biased norm which contributes to non-sustainable decision making. 
(g) a reconception of the institution of Planning as an 'environmental conflict resolution' 
system, instead of a narrow dispute settlement system. (While adversarial processes have their 
place early in the decision-making process, they are now central.) 
(h) a redefinition of the activity of planning to refer to a community-based process of 
determining social, economic, and environmental goals in the long term public interest rather 
than to a means of resolving individual conflicts or choices among present options. 
(i) a new ecological goal for all Planning activity: prevention as opposed to cure. This 
means certain ecological criteria would be paramount, such as restoring the life support system, 
preserving biological and cultural diversity, avoiding risk and keeping social options open. 
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(j) a new (tri-partite) Constitution for environmental governance that institutionalizes a 
separate Ethics-based Planning sphere for determining and prioritizing basic needs and the 
means to achieve them. 
(k) a rationalization of existing practices to encompass what is now top down and bottom 
up Planning in one arena, such that problems of production and consumption can be 
considered and mediated together. 
(1) a new constitutional basis for Planning that will enable the redesign of Planning methods 
and processes to allow us to determine the substantive ethical issues that underlie 
environmental preservation. 
(m) new democratic and administrative processes to reduce the potential abuse of power 
and empower the general public, and new types of criteria by which to consider development 
proposals. 
(n) a reconception of regulations as explicitly adjusting externalities rather than constraining 
development or, more generally, a recognition that 'freedom from' the abuse of power is at 
least an equally important right as 'freedom to'. 
It is time to enter uncharted territory. Taking an entirely new direction is no easy matter, but 
going in circles is becoming wholly unviable. Whether or not the particular ideas that have 
emerged in this initial exploration prove useful, I hope that they generate some debate on what I 
consider to be the present blind spots and taboos in our culture that are blocking a better 
understanding of the environmental crisis and the means to social and institutional 
transformation. 
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APPENDIX 1: CASE STUDY 
A brief history of environmental conflict in Tasmania 
This capsule history is a case study of environmental governance and decision making in 
Tasmania. It does not pretend to be non-partisan or objective, but represents the greens' point 
of view generally, based on extensive informal interviews and first-hand knowledge, 
supplemented by newspaper articles and other sources. Many people generously vetted the 
facts and observations. 
The reasons for this approach are several: (a) to exemplify statements in the text about the 
nature of environmental decision making which mainstream theory ignores, (b) to support my 
case that greens recognize that politicians are not moved by rational arguments, yet persist in 
strategies that rely upon the rationality or politicians and voters, and (c) to illustrate the 
importance of Masculine pride in decision making. As to the moral, perhaps the words of 
Hesba Brinsmead Hungerford sum it up best, in writing of the Premier and leader of the 
Opposition: 
It is irony that the Earth and its future should rest in the chubby hands 
of such as Tweedledum and Tweedledee, nursery figures, surely. In 
the vastness of time and space, we are of course all nursery figures. 
Yet the planet Earth is ours to destroy. 1 
Lake Pedder 
The story begins on the shores Lake Pedder, a pristine mountain lake set among mountain 
ranges 800 million years old. Lake Pedder had been declared part of a (59,000 acre) National 
Park in 1955. In 1961 the South-West Committee was formed to lobby for the protection of 
the South West Wilderness by joining it to Lake Pedder Park. 2 In October 1968, this plan was 
realized. However, the Hydro-Electric Commission (HEC), had already secretly decided to 
flood Lake Pedder, on the assumption that a use for the energy would appear. 3 There were 
hints as early as 1962 that the Lake would be smodified',4 but it was not until 1967 that the 
1 Hesba Brinsmead Hungerford, 1983, I Will Not Say the Day is Done (Sydney: Alternative Publishing 
Cooperative). 
2 Hungerford, 1983, above at pp. 45-49. 
3 Evidence of this is presented by Kevin Kiernan, 1985, "I Saw My Temple Ransacked", in Bob Brown, Kevin 
Kiernan, Ralph and Elspeth Hope-Johnstone, and Geoff Parr, Lake Pedzler (Hobart: The Wilderness Society) pp. 
18-23 at p. 18. 
4 Hungerford, 1983, above at p. 51. 
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project was announced officially to the press. The HEC apparently felt that drowning the Lake 
under 50 feet of water would not have an impact on the park. 
The first committee to save Lake Pedder was organized that same year. Opposition grew. 
The first petition was signed by 10,000 people. 1 A bus circulated Tasmania to spread word of 
what was to be destroyed. The photographer Olegas Truchanas presented slide shows and later 
a movie of Lake Pedder to packed crowds. In 1969, Brenda Hean, a highly respected and 
respectable 'society lady' and now leading advocate for the Lake's preservation, discovered to 
her dismay that the newly elected Liberal Premier had ordered her exhibition of colour slides on 
Lake Pedder closed.2 
The Pedder people called for a referendum, but the government rejected the request in 1970 
before a packed public gallery of Lake supporters 3 (perhaps because a large majority of those 
responding to a newspaper poll opposed the drowning). The rejection of the referendum led to 
the formation of the Lake Pedder Action Committee that same year, the members of which 
came to be labelled the 'ratbag fringe'. The HEC was sufficiently impressed by public opinion 
to hire a public relations person however.4 
In 1971, the Pedder people organized a symposium to present the scientific and social 
values of the lake and invited all the key politicians and proponents of the dam. None came. 
At the end of that year, the dam closed on the Serpentine River. Soon the Lake would begin to 
drown. The Pedder people kept a silent vigil at the Lake as it slowly filled. A bust of 
Truganini, the last of the full-blooded Tasmanian aborigines, stood waiting on top of a pedestal 
at the Lake shore, as a poignant reminder that it was victim to the same forces that had wrested 
her people so violently from her. 
Having lost most of his photographs in the horrific Hobart bush fire of 1967, Olegas 
Truchanas took off on another expedition to record for posterity areas that would soon be 
destroyed for about 40 years of electric power. His accidental death on that trip was only one 
of several tragedies that beset the Pedder people. 
In 1972, an anonymous call from a HEC worker tipped off the greens that their employer, 
the HEC, had told them to come to the greens big public meeting in Hobart to break it up. 
When the greens arrived at the locked hall, every seat had a leaflet headed "Why Lake Pedder is 
1 Hungerford, 1983, above at p. 66. 
2 Hungerford, 1983, above at p. 88. 
3 Hungerford, 1983, above at p. 93. 
4 Hungerford, 1983, above at p. 98 
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Being Enlarged". 1 Despite the disruption, the meeting of march 23, 1972, chaired by the (late 
and) fearless Dr. Richard (Dick) Jones, witnessed the formation of world's first green party. 
The United Tasmania Group, or UTG, would contest the coming election in just three weeks. 
In the ensuing election campaign, the HEC, using public funds, fought the UTG in an 
expensive and scandalous advertising blitz. Although two green candidates almost got elected, 
the UTG failed to win a seat in Parliament, despite a proportional voting system that favours 
minority representation. Labor got back in power. 
The greens had an information stall at Salamanca Place, an open market in Hobart where 
thousands of citizens come on a Saturday morning. It was ordered closed by Parliament. 2 No 
worries; the Women's Wilderness Walkers' womazied the stall with a new name. 
As the road to the site had already been built, at Commonwealth expense, the state 
government said it was too late to stop. So the greens (as they later came to be known) decided 
to ask the federal government for an equal grant to build an alternate scheme. A canal and road 
could provide the same amount of energy, but the environmental damage would be minimal. 
When society came to its senses, they reckoned, nature could reclaim the land. What could be 
more reasonable? All the Premier had to do was sign his name to the request. He refused. 
1972 was the year of the first International Convention on the Environment. The greens 
secured a petition signed by 187 scientists at the Stockholm convention, humbling requesting 
no more than an inquiry into a possible delay of the flooding. When the petition was presented 
to Parliament by Labor M.P. Michael Hodgman, the Parliament refused to look at it. 
The Commonwealth promised the money to build the alternate scheme, but it was now the 
Labor Premier's turn to refuse Commonwealth largess. 3 Hesba Brinsmead Hungerford 
explained his reasoning thus: 
All Dum [Tweedledum] need do was sign a paper accepting the federal 
grant. Surely that would cost him nothing. But it seemed it would. It 
would cost him his pride. That was too high a price to pay.4 
Dick Jones received anonymous phone calls which led to the discovery that the flooding 
was illegal because it was in a National Park yet lacked a management plan. 5 Without the 
1 Hungerford, 1983, above at p. 111. 
2 Hungerford, 1983, above at p. 88. 
3 Hungerford, 1983, above at p. 127. 
4 Hungerford, 1983, above at p. 127. 
5 Hungerford, 1983, above at p. 131. 
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standing to sue in their own name, those opposing the dam needed the Attorney-General to sue 
or grant permission for them to bring the action. But Labor Premier Reece, known as 'Electric 
Eric', demanded that the Attorney-General, Mervyn Everett not do so, and the latter resigned in 
protest. Reece then appointed himself Attorney-General and introduced a bill to retroactively 
legalize the flooding of the lake. 1 
Defeated at state level, it was necessary for the greens to take the cause to the nation. 
Consequently, two activists, Brenda Hean and Max Price, set off in a World War I Tiger Moth 
to sky write over the Nation's Capital on the mainland. Before the flight, Brenda Hean had 
told friends of anonymous and ominous phone threats referring to her "going for a swim": 
"Would you like to go for a swim?", the voice kept repeating. 2 Brenda and Max took off one 
fateful morning for the mainland, but they never arrived. It was later discovered that the door 
of the hangar had been tampered with the night before the flight and navigation equipment had 
been removed from the plane. The government refused to appoint a Royal Commission and all 
evidence of foul play was officially ignored. 
Meanwhile, in 1972, an academic, who had obtained access to the HEC files, published the 
Pedder Papers which revealed that deceits and dishonesties were commonplace within the 
powerful Hydro-Electric Commission. 3 It also revealed that the HEC had plans which would 
destroy the magnificent Franklin River (more about that later). 
Downstream the dam was filling up. Then, at the eleventh hour, hope appeared in the form 
of a new left-wing federal Government, led by Gough Whitlam. The Whitlam Government set 
up a National Inquiry.4 Its recommendation was for a moratorium on the drowning and, 
further, that the Commonwealth pick up the bill for all costs. It is uncertain whether that offer 
was in fact formally communicated to Premier Reece, but if so, it was refused. In 1972, Lake 
Pedder was drowned to produce only 170 megawatts (less than that used by Tasmania's one 
aluminium smelter).5 It was later learned that the electricity was not needed. The HEC secretly 
arranged to sell power to the smelter at below cost. 6 Only the top 15 percent of the new lake 
would be used at all. (The flooding could have been avoided by a smaller storage area and 
tunnel upstream.) The drowning of Lake Pedder was a tragedy felt very deeply by all sentient 
Tasmanians. Some lives were changed forever. 
1 Kiernan, 1985, above at p. 21. 
2 Hungerford, 1983, above at p. 140-141; Kiernan, above at p. 21 
3 Keith McKenry, 1972, The Pedder Papers (Melbourne: ACF). 
4 Lake Pedder Committee of Enquiry, 1974, Final Report (Canberra: Australian Government Publisher). 
5 Bob Brown, 1985, "Crucible of the Elements", in Bob Brown et al., Lake Pedder, above at p. 13. 
6 Bob Brown, 1985, above at p. 13. 
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The Franklin 
The greens, determined that Lake Pedder would not be lost in vain, began digging in for the 
fight to save the Franklin River. In 1976, years after the scheme was hatched, the HEC 
publicly revealed two alternative proposals, one of which would flood the Franklin while the 
other (the Olga scheme) would flood the Denison Valley and the Gordon Splits. As far as the 
burgeoning green movement was concerned, the Olga scheme was the 'bad' option, and the 
Franklin scheme was even worse. 
The odds of stopping a dam seemed impossible. The HEC's power was enormous and had 
always prevailed in the past When the Labor Party of Doug Lowe came to power, it tried to 
institute administrative and bureaucratic reform, central to which was the bringing of the HEC 
under direct ministerial control. The attempt failed. When Andrew Lohrey, the new Minister 
of Resources and Energy was deposed, he complained he had been actively undermined and 
'disinformed' by the HEC. 1 
The prevailing attitude of the HEC bureaucracy was such that when a poll in 1980 showed 
that 46 percent of Tasmanians opposed the flooding of the Franklin, the Commissioner 
remarked on television: "If the Parliament tries to work through popular decisions, we're 
doomed in the state and doomed everywhere". The HEC was a government instrumentality 
fighting the decisions of the government, its employer, and using public money to do so. 
Despite HEC and union opposition, threats of power rationing and economic ruin, the 
Lowe Labor Government tried to compromise by rejecting the 'Franklin' scheme for the 
compromise 'Olga' one. But the highly conservative Upper House then voted to amend the 
Olga bill in favour of the Franklin scheme. The Labor Government refused to reconsider. 
There was a stalemate. The dominant concern at the time was not environmental or economic 
considerations - but the desire on the part of the government to be seen as decisive, masculine 
and in control. As several community leaders were heard (by the writer) to say: "a bad decision 
is better than no decision at all". 
Finally, the Government decided to escape the impasse by holding a public referendum, but 
it was to have only two options: the Franklin or the Olga scheme. Premier Lowe then stated he 
would include a 'no dam' option. However, he lost a no confidence motion and resigned from 
the Party to sit on the cross bench with lone Australian Democrat Norm Sanders. They were 
joined by Party Whip, Mary Wiley, who also resigned. Remarkably, the ensuing 1981 
referendum had a 33 percent write in for 'No Dams' and a total of 45 percent invalidated votes. 
Such was without precedent in Australian history. 
1 Personal communication. See Douglas Ackley Lowe, 1984, The Price of Power: The Politics behind the 
Tasmanian Dams Case (Melbourne: MacMillan) pp.86-8. 
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In March 1982, the cross bench brought a no-confidence motion against the new Labor 
Premier, Harry Holgate, over the dams issue, precipitating an election that saw the pro-HEC 
Liberals, led by Robin Gray, elected in a landslide. The new Liberal Government proceeded to 
revoke part of the Wild Rivers National Park that the Lowe government had declared, and 
vested it in the HEC. They then started a national advertizing campaign in support of the dam, 
and skilfully transformed the issue into one of 'state's rights'. 
Although the federal Government, also Liberal, had nominated the South West Wilderness 
area for the World Heritage List, and despite the discovery of ancient Aboriginal cave sites, it 
refused to stop the dam. There was no state or federal option left. The Wilderness Society 
launched the non-violent river blockade. This gradually drew ever more widespread 
community support. In total, it involved 4,000 participants and over 1,200 were arrested, 
including celebrities like television personality David Bellamy from the United Kingdom. In 
early 1983, with the acknowledged aid of the green movement, the Labor Party won the federal 
election. Prime Minister Hawke then prohibited HEC activities in the World Heritage Area - a 
decision upheld by the High Court of Australia on July 1st, 1983. 
The FIEC later admitted its demand projections had been hugely inflated and that and the 
Franklin dam had not been needed when predicted. Today the HEC has lost both its credibility 
and hegemony. But that was not the happy ending. That was only the happy beginning. In 
1983, the spokesperson of the Franklin campaign, and now international figure, Dr. Bob 
Brown, had gotten into state Parliament by filling a casual vacancy caused by the resignation of 
Australian Democrat Norm Sanders. (Dr. Sanders later became a federal Senator). When they 
had the recount to determine Sanders' successor, Bob Brown was in gaol, having been arrested 
at the blockade. In 1986, Dr. Brown was joined in Parliament by another Green, 1 Dr. Gerry 
Bates, a lecturer in environmental law. 
That battle of the Franklin ended, attention turned to the destruction caused by the 
woodchip industry. In 1986 peaceful protests in defence of native forests resulted in arrests 
when protesters blocked two large excavators from crossing Farmhouse Creek in the south of 
Tasmania, while in the north others blocked a bulldozer in the Lemonthyme forest. Rallies, 
petitions and blockades were filially heard by the federal government, and Prime Minister 
Hawke moved to protect National Estate forests. A Helsham Inquiry was established by the 
Commonwealth to determine which areas should be protected pursuant to an international 
Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. When the report 
came down in May 1988, two of the three commissioners sided with the forest industry. 
Nonetheless, Hawke moved to protect about half of the disputed forests. 
1 I capitalize 'Green' when referring to the mainstream political or parliamentary wing of the movement, staff 
and entourage, as distinguished from the amorphous, grassroots movement. 
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The temporary defence of the Lemonthyme and part of the Southern Forests imparted a 
sense of optimism. Another threat was looming however. In 1988 came the Wesley Vale Pulp 
Mill proposal by the mainland company North Broken Hill (NBH) and its venture partner from 
Canada, Noranda. 
Wesley Vale 
The greens had bested the Tasmanian HEC, but were they ready for transnational 
corporations? The outcome of the Wesley Vale project was crucial to both green and 
development interests because it would be the test case that could set the environmental control 
standards for 16 other mills in various stages of planning for Australia. But the greens were 
caught unawares. They had been arguing for down-stream processing for years, and the 
proposal was for a one billion dollar pulp mill that would allegedly create 400 permanent jobs. 
Consequently, the alarm was first raised by a local group called CROPS, led by Christine 
Milne, whose initial aim was only to prevent it from being located in prime agricultural land - 
their back yard. 
CROP'S opposition may have been greater, had they not been misled by the company into 
believing the site had not yet been decided. Gradually, issues other than the loss of prime farm 
land became apparent, such as the $45 million infrastructure to be paid by taxpayers, the 60 
million litres daily of polluting effluent, and royalties of $11 million as compared to predicted 
profits of up to $150 million to be taken out of the state annually. Also, the adequacy of the 
timber resource base and impact on the forest ecology was unclear, yet all too clear. The 
greens soon began to see the pulp mill as a giant, fuming, tree-gorging dragon. In 1988, the 
Gray Government formally announced support for the site at Wesley Vale, subject to certain 
conditions concerning environmental standards, royalties and so forth. Noranda of Canada 
was to be the venture partner of NBH, and a customer for the pulp. 
Throughout the unfolding saga the company would insist that chlorine bleaching was 
necessary for the world market And throughout, the state Government would assure everyone 
the project would bring jobs, and that environmental standards would be the most stringent in 
the world. This created a dilemma that greens often face. One cannot 'prove' government and 
industry promises about the future are false. Gradually, however, both government and 
industry lost credibility. Let us see why. 
First, ironically, North Broken Hill's Environmental Impact Statement, or EIS, although 
clearly intended as a promotional document, was so inadequate and misleading that it raised 
more questions than it answered. For example, it scarcely mentioned dioxins, which had been 
the major issue surrounding pulp mills overseas. The greens exploited this by finding many 
overseas and local experts to attest to its inadequacies. The company found a scientific expert 
from Sweden to support the project, but it was discovered that he had a pecuniary interest 
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Considerable disquiet was caused by the portrayal of Noranda's environmental record in 
Canada; the greens were cheered by letters of support from Canadian fishermen. And, a report 
by the state Government's own Department of Seas and Inland Fisheries blasting the EIS was 
conveniently leaked. 
The Government's claims that the mill would bring 400 permanent jobs and 1,500 during 
construction also lacked credibility. After all, similar promises concerning job creation (and 
pollution control) that had been made in respect of the Electrona Silicon Smelter in southern 
Tasmania had since proven untrue. (It was later to close, having cost millions in public 
subsidies.) In response to public concern, the government prepared guidelines for 
environmental controls - but these guidelines were wide open to 'interpretation' and were 
published only two days before the parliamentary sitting, so there was no time for public 
comment. 
• In November, 1988, Green Independent Parliamentarian Dr. Gerry Bates pointed out that 
the developers were ignoring an international agreement banning the dumping of chlorine at sea 
with a pipeline. The state Parliament had passed the Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) 
Act 1987, absolutely prohibiting the dumping of organohologen compounds (which include 
organochlorine wastes), cadmium and mercury. The new pulp mill would send 1.3 tonnes of 
prohibited chemicals each day into Bass Strait. NBA countered that it did not violate the 
agreement because a pipeline is not a "vessel, aircraft, platform or other man-made structure" as 
the legislation specifies.' 
About this time an interesting thing began to happen. The growing lack of credibility, and 
growing public concern over pollution, began to drive a wedge between the developer and state 
Government. The Government had to look tough on pollution because it appeared to many that 
the company was dictating the terms. On the other hand, NBH had thought that the politics of 
the matter had ended with the Agreement of 1988, and that other issues, such as royalties and 
environmental standards, would be routine. Also, NBH was under pressure from Noranda 
and other overseas pulp manufacturers to keep the lid on the environmental standards for future 
investment and their impact on other governments, such as Canada's. 
With both parties having to look tough, they began public posturing. NBH kept 
threatening to pull out. Premier Gray issued a statement saying he would not be 'intimidated' 
by the company into accepting its terms. NBH complained the guidelines were impossible to 
meet. The state Minister for the Environment locked himself in by saying that the company 
must accept the guidelines 'as is' or scrap the project. Then, right in the midst of this crisis, 
government and developer went off to a resort together for a week of steamy, torrid, 
1 Examiner , 29 Nov. 1988. 
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'negotiations'. After a week, they emerged looking very satisfied, saying that a good deal had 
been 'consummated'. That deal was a document 'interpreting' the guidelines of 1988. 
Parliament was recalled to give legislative status to the interpretative document. 
(Incidentally, the announcement to recall Parliament was made - not by the Premier - but on 
company stationary by the company's public relations adviser, who had previously been the 
Director of the Premier's private office: a mistake the mill's opponents did not fail to exploit.) 
The Premier gave Parliament an ultimatum: Parliament, he declared, could 'consider' the 
document, but not change it. Dissent was loud and immediate, with the federal Minister for 
the Environment claiming a backdown over the guidelines. This was clearly the case. There 
were many changes which would, among other things, have effectively removed liability for 
any resulting environmental damage from the company. 
With the new state/company Agreement of 1989, conflict now moved to the national level. 
Because of Noranda of Canada's investment, the final decision rested with the Foreign 
Investment Review Board. But this was a big problem, because the project would mean $300 
million in earned income to assist the massive overseas trade deficit. In fact, the project was 
worth more financially to the Commonwealth than to the state. A showdown was looming. It 
now became clear that the Commonwealth could not let political considerations 'be seen to' 
affect their decision, as this would jeopardize the 16 other possible pulp mill projects. 
Moreover, the Government could not 'be seen to' be courting green votes. There was Only one 
way the proposal could be rejected - on scientific grounds. 
Meanwhile, back at the ranch, a group called USERP (United Scientists for Environmental 
Responsibility and Protection) was being formed as a conduit for scientists who felt they could 
not speak out publicly, or needed support if they did. John Kerin, the federal Minister for 
Primary Industries, could not ignore the concerns of gainfully employed scientists. He 
announced he would conduct a scientific evaluation to ensure there would be no damage to the 
marine environment, nor risk to Australian exports from chemical discharges. (Many existing 
large industries, municipalities and government departments in Tasmania were exceeding 
allowable pollution standards under state Ministerial exemptions)! That evaluation found the 
EIS to be distorted and grossly inadequate to predict environmental impacts. In the event, the 
Commonwealth decided that the conditions of the 1989 Act were not tough enough, and NBH 
pulled out. It was argued at the time that this was probably due to extraneous market reasons. 
Shortly thereafter, in May 1989, Three additional Green Independents (Di Hollister, 
Christine Milne and Lance Armstrong) obtained seats in state Parliament. Neither Liberal nor 
Labor Party had a majority, so the Greens began to negotiate with both parties about forming a 
1 Examiner, 12 Sept. 1991. 
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government. Then the Liberals, who had more members in Parliament, suddenly refused to 
negotiate with the Greens, under pressure from their implacably anti-green backbench. 
In the event, the Green Independents signed an 'Accord' with Labor. This was a unique 
agreement by which Labor would hold power (though having only 33 percent of the vote), 
provided certain policy proposals were adopted. But defeated Premier Gray refused to resign, 
postponing the opening of Parliament as long as possible (about a month). Coincidentally, 
someone was arranging for a Labor backbencher to cross the floor and join the Liberals so that 
the Greens and Labor would not have the numbers to form a government. As it turned out, the 
failed bribe attempt was masterminded by the media mogul, Edmund Rouse (once quoted as 
having said Tasmania is a "great place to rape"). 1 Rouse served about 18 months of a 3 year 
sentence. Robin Gray, as it later emerged, was considered by the Commission to be "evasive 
and dishonest" with police, 2 and to have probably been a party to the bribery attempt, though it 
felt there was insufficient evidence to warrant a tiaL 3 
Alas, those were the good old days. June 30, 1988 had marked the end of an eight year 
moratorium on logging rainforests; it was now time to decide how to divide them up. This 
meant trouble, and trouble could no longer be avoided by porkbarreling through secret 
negotiations with industry. Any environmental decisions would upset both industry and 
greens. Thus, when conflict emerged once more over the forests, the new Labor Government 
arranged for the representatives of industry and environmental groups to meet around the same 
table, in the absence of politicians. 
The issue was a saw log shortage resulting from a lack of roads. This came about because 
the Forestry Commission had a priority on building roads to areas with high national estate 
values. These areas had been withdrawn from timber production following the Helsham 
Inquiry (established by the Commonwealth to determine which areas should be protected 
pursuant to an international Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage). In these negotiations, greens identified accessible short-term supplies of logs for 
sawmills from degraded National Estate forests in return for the inclusion of more wilderness 
on the World Heritage List. This settlement was called the 'Salamanca Agreement', after the 
historic setting (the Salamanca Inn in Hobart) where the negotiations took place. 
1 Reported by Bob Burton, research officer for the Wilderness Society, who heard Rouse say this in a public 
forum. 
2 Examiner, 6 November 1991, p.l. 
3 Carter, W. J. 1991, Report of the Royal Commission into an Attempt to Bribe a Member of the House of 
Assembly; and Other Matters (Hobart: Government Printers). 
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Resource Security Legislation 
The apparent success of this Salamanca dispute management process led to the formation of 
a Forest and Forest Industry Council, or FFIC, composed of representatives of the same 
groups that had been involved at Salamanca Place. The FFIC set up a joint problem-solving 
process to develop a strategy for the future of Tasmania's forests. At the cost of about $10 
million in (federal) taxpayers' funds, the greens thought they had made the big league. In 
particular, the FFIC was to determine which areas cOuld be logged during the transition to full 
reliance on plantations and regrowth forests. The only catch was that the greens' estimate of 
how long this transition should take was 5 years while industry wanted at least 20, which 
would allow for the consumption of virtually all unprotected old growth forests. 
Similarly to the Helsham inquiry, a community consultation process (called RAGs) was set 
up to recommend areas of state-owned forests for protection. Many of these areas were found 
to be of high conservation value by the FFIC's "balanced panel of experts", but the findings 
were ignored in the Forest strategy, and many smaller areas were not even looked at. The 
participatory process managed to by-pass what industry saw as the green leadership, though it 
also began to empower numerous other greens at the periphery. 
But while the greens were laying their cards on the table, the deck was being stacked. The 
Forestry Commission and industry were formulating the draconian 'Resource Security 
Legislation', or RSL, which would come to be known in some circles as 'Resource Robbery 
Legislation'. This scheme would place 1.4 million hectares of Tasmanian forests irretrievably 
into an industrial zone for "mixed use" logging (the greens were told 1.1). 
The greens negotiated for many months until, at the last minute and despite the agreement to 
use consensus decision making, the surprise industry package was put on the table and ratified 
by majority vote. It would increase the woodchip export quota. Thereupon, the green 
negotiators refused to sign, but were deliberate about 'not walking out'. In the months to 
come, this would serve as 'proof that greens did not believe in consensus and cooperation. 
The greens were also accused of being unreasonable when they 'broke the Accord' after the 
Labor Government violated its terms by, among other things, raising the export quota on 
woodchips. Keeping royalties low and raising the export quota meant the big companies 
would not move to plantations, as native forests were plentiful and cheap. It also meant NBH 
through its local arm APPM would not buy the small sawmillers' waste wood, although the 
main argument for woodchipping had always been precisely to prevent such waste. According 
to one sawmiller, APPM kept telling them to bulldoze and burn their scrap wood. 1 
1 Examiner, 30 Sept. 1991. Letter to the editor by local sawmiller, Geoff Head, complaining that for 10 
years, in response to their attempts to sell-APPM their waste wood, sawmillers have been told to "bulldoze this 
waste timber into heaps and burn it". 
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The RSL was designed to "strike a balance between conservation and development" and 
resolve environmental conflict in Tasmania once and for all. How could any reasonable person 
oppose it? In fact, the balanced approach was taken quite literally: roughly half the public 
forests were to be privatized. (But then again, since almost half the state's forests have. 
disappeared since settlement, perhaps by that logic Tasmania has been sufficiently 'balanced' 
already?) Tasmania's rainforests were also to be thrown into the balance, with the unlucky half 
going to the chainsaws. (Tasmania's rainforests are about a third of Australia's total.) 
Moreover, the definition of rainforest is highly exclusive, so that rainforests with a small 
percentage of gums (over 5 percent) are called 'mixed forests' and receive less protection. 
With the industrial zones non-negotiable, it came to light that almost 10 percent of the 
forests earmarked for industrial use had been recommended for World Heritage listing by the 
state's own Department of Parks, Wildlife and Heritage, but the report recommending this was 
suppressed for six months while the boundaries of the so-called 'wood production zones' were 
being drawn up. 
The RSL was really the old concession system, 1 but in a new comprehensive scheme. 
Traditionally, zoning has been a means of protecting public amenities, health and safety, and 
other local property interests. In Tasmania's Crown forests, zoning was now given a new 
meaning: giving public resources to offshore interests. The property rights would be for ever. 
The RSL, as then proposed, would prevent rezoning forest areas from wood production to 
other uses by requiring approval of both Houses of Parliament. But, as everyone knew, the 
Upper House, the infamous Legislative Council, would never side with forest protection, if 
only because the hated greens were for it. 
The Green parliamentarians were caught between a rock and a hard place. Over the 
following months they repeatedly stated that they would, with the Liberals' undoubted support, 
bring about an election if the RSL gave the Legislative Council veto power over national parks 
or put 1.1 million hectares of forest into a wood production zone. But the Greens knew a 
Liberal Government could do even worse, and certainly hoped to. 
On top of this, the state government and industry were pushing the Commonwealth to fetter 
its powers over World Heritage, foreign investment, export duties and so forth (which enable 
the Commonwealth to influence land use in the states) by enacting a federal RSL. In February, 
1991, Prime Minister Hawke announced that RSL on the part of the Commonwealth was 
unnecessary, in an apparent attempt to highjack federal Cabinet debate on the issue which was 
scheduled for March. The Cabinet nonetheless approved a limited RSL scheme which would 
guarantee resources for individual projects based on volume, rather than particular forests. The 
1 Under the concession system, resource extractors were given the rights to the forests on a given area of land 
by Act of Parliament. 
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stated objective was to phase out export woodchips by allowing pulp mills. Hawke's 
following industry statement also promised not to use federal powers over export licenses to 
stop a pulp mill or -other politically sensitive resource development. This was called the 'new 
federalism'. 
Later that same month, the Saddler Report into the economics of the forest industry was 
published. 1 It confirmed that the industry was inefficient, heavily subsidized and provided few 
benefits to Tasmanians in comparison with other investments. It also confirmed that the 
royalties on wood did not cover the operating cost of the Forestry Commission. Along with 
other experts, such as Mary O'Brien of Canada, and Randal O'Toole of the United States, 
Saddler had showed that Tasmanians were paying the Forest Industry to cart away their 
forests. Each Tasmanian on average pays $177 per year in subsidies to the forest industry, 
largely to service the Forestry Commission debt incurred by successive Governments - now 
$500 million and rising by $80 million per year.2 The Government had placed the Forestry 
Commission's debt into consolidated revenue, thereby making the problem disappear. 
Subsidizing big industry has always been a way of life in Tasmania. The Electrona 
Smelter, for example, was subsidized by an incredible $19 million over 70 years (not counting 
untold environmental costs), and yet was to close its doors. 3 Paying people to lean on shovels 
would be a lot cheaper. But the pulp mill would be different! Premier Field assured everyone 
his Government would not subsidize the promised pulp mill. Unlike the previous Gray 
Government and the Commonwealth - each of which had offered $25 million in roads and 
other subsidies the pulp mill developers4 - Field would just incorporate those infrastructure 
costs into the state's normal road building priorities or build "tourist roads for a pulp mill", as 
Oreen Independent Christine Milne put it. 5 
The dilemma for the greens was that most people did not want to know what the RSL was 
about. This time 'to dam or not to dam' was not the question. The forestry issue was complex 
and confusing; the local press was not much help. With the recession growing in 1991, it was 
easy to feed the mythical behemoth of trees versus people, Or forests versus jobs. Since the 
1970s, 100 small sawmills had closed and 5,000 jobs in the forest industries had been lost due 
to the policies of the big companies.6 Yet, even as 1800 workers were being retrenched by 
1 Hugh Saddler, 1991, Forestry as if Economics Mattered. A Study of the Economics of the Tamanian Forestry 
Industry (Hobart: Goshawk Publications). 
2 Saddler, 1991, above at p. 101. 
3 "7:30" report, ABC-TV, 24 February, 1992. 
4 Bob Brown, by letter. The press reported $23 million. 
5 Examiner, 9 May 1991. 
6 See generally, Hugh Saddler, 1991, above. 
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APPM due to a slump in the world paper market, the only solution presented was to chop 
down more forests to supply a pulp mill which would mean a net loss of 800 jobs (as the old 
labour-intensive mill would close). 
Another promise of the RSL was emploYment security, although this was to be resolved 
later in case-by-case negotiations, not by legislation. As if this did not offer enough security 
from employees, APPM began to rationalize the industry to enhance their bargaining position 
before the legislation passed. First, they tried to reduce the truckers' cartage rates. This 
precipitated a blockade of the Triabunna woodchip mill by log trucks. Since logs could not be 
processed, 220 bush and mill workers were subsequently stood down by the company. The 
strike ended three weeks later when APPM agreed to drop threatened legal action which the 
union and drivers could not afford. Nothing could deter union loyalty in their co-dependent 
relationship with industry, however. They continued to reiterate their faith in the company's 
RSL, in hopes that the company would provide jobs until the cheap forests were gone. tittle 
did they know that the following year, the company would launch a full-scale assault on the 
union. 
Throughout 1991, the introduction of the legislation into Parliament seemed to stall in 
unison with postponements in the publication of the one million dollar Rouse Royal 
Commission Report. (Rouse's fine was $4 thousand). The RSL was now due in the October 
1991 session of Parliament. Signs of a breakthrough occurred in August, when Labor 
proposed an independent commission to decide on rezoning forests, which would effectively 
by-pass the Legislative Council. This was seen by the press as appeasement of 
conservationists, or weakness. 
Shortly after, the Greens published an alternative RSL. Under this scheme, sawmillers 
would sell to the highest bidder: tenders would be based on volume with a reserve price; mills 
would be limited to a maximum of 20 percent of sustainable yield; and pulpmills would have to 
buy residue from sawmills. The press dismissed the legislation as an ambit claim for 
negotiations with government and a means to attain pre-election publicity. There was no 
serious response to the proposal. Alternatives, such as using hemp for paper instead of wood 
were not even allowed on the political agenda. 
About this time also, a federal Resource Assessment Commission report came out, 
recommending an increased export tax on woodchips because, in the words of one of the 
authors, Japanese buyers had been getting woodchips too cheap for too long. 1 But along with 
the many previous expert reports, this too was ignored. After all, the point of the RSL was 
only to allow investment in a local export pulp mill for 'downstream processing' by offshore 
1 Mercury, 13 September, 1991. 
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interests, and, if Tasmanians were going to continue to pay these interests to take their wood, 
why should the rate or cost of forest depletion concern them? 
Then the greens prayers were answered, or so they thought. On September 9th, thellead 
of Noranda (NBH's venture partner from Canada), admitted publicly that a pulp mill in 
Tasmania was unlikely, because the world market situation was "absolutely awful". He added 
it would be "a matter of years, a considerable number of years, before the situation improves". 1 
The lack of a mill could have given Premier Field a way to wiggle out of an election over the 
RSL but it was not to be. Field adamantly reasserted the need for the RSL, saying it was not 
about a pulp mill but about encouraging investment in the state. It is difficult to follow this 
reasoning. After all, the previous concession system, or other resource guarantees on a case-
by-case basis, already provided investment security. As a source close to the Government 
revealed, the real reason was a desire to win back the hardhat, 'anti-greenie' vote. RSL would 
also make it difficult to reclassify state forests as National Parks and World Heritage areas. 
As the showdown drew near, the Greens offered a compromise. They would allow Labor 
to stay in power if the RSL did not contain the 200,000 hectares that the panel of experts had 
found to be of high conservation value; if the guarantied wood supply was based on area, not 
volume; it did not give the Legislative Council power over which forests were to be axed; and 
the Government made NBH guarantee a pulp mill before they were given forests. But to no 
avail. Then, on September 17th, 1991, Cabinet approved the RSL package, giving the Greens 
a copy just one hour before making it public. Field said the RSL was non-negotiable and 
would be introduced when Parliament resumed in October. The parliamentary opposition, 
being gifted speed readers came out the next day with strong support for the RSL. The 
Greens, on the other hand, spent weeks studying it and conferring with local support groups. 
With a heavy heart, they again renewed their promise to "take the government to the people". 
High noon was upon the forests. 
Was it worth such a gamble? Let us review some of the things the RSL would do. 
Essentially, it allows Tasmanian native forests to be chipped before Third World plantations are 
ready to "harvest". The RSL would create industrials zones containing now 1.4 million 
hectares forests with another 350,000 deferred forests; 20 percent of Tasmania, or 1.7 million 
hectares, would go to the chainsaws. Endangered species, tourist potential and aboriginal sites 
would be lost forever. 22 percent of Tasmania would remain protected until resource scarcity 
drove up their 'productive' value (whereupon they will again most probably be balanced in 
half). 
1 Mercury, 7 September, 1991. 
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To remove forests from these zones, the Cabinet would have to refer the issue to an 
advisory body, the Public Land Use Commission, or PLUC, (to be set up under separate 
legislation) and then accept its recommendation. Public input into the PLUC processes would 
be limited, and its terms of reference would be set in legislation based on the FFIC guidelines 
rather than by, say, the Environment Minister. Parliament could reject the Commission's 
reports, but the federal Government could then override the state and implement the 
Commission's proposals. However, the PLUC could only initiate an inquiry into forest 
allocation if "new facts" were discovered. This meant that 200,000 hectares of forest that the 
FF1C's panel of experts' found had high conservation value could not be taken out of the 
industrial zone, as their findings would be "old facts". Under RSL, the mechanism for 
removing forests from the extermination camps was complex and full of pitfalls. In fact, to 
save forests the public would probably have to pay compensation to the private companies for 
land the companies got for free - as had happened in Canada. 
Some further problems. The much touted employment provisions would require the 
Forestry Commission to consider employment when deciding between competing claims for 
Crown wood, which the RSL would not enforce. All forested public lands not in reserves 
would become state forests under the control of the Forestry Commission. It would have 
increased police powers to forcibly remove the public from their former forests. Wood supply 
agreements would still be negotiated in secret between the major companies and the Forestry 
Commission (300,000 cubic metres of sawlogs and veneer logs) which, according to USERP 
scientists, was highly unsustainable. Tasmania's old growth forests would be completely gone 
in 10 years. In sum, the RSL meant that, by law, Tasmania's wonderful native forests were 
doomed. 
All in all, the gamble seemed worth it - at the time. The Liberal Party could win an election 
and they promised to do worse. (During their seven years in office in the 1980s, the Liberals 
had reduced the amount of protected forests by 18,000 hectares.) They would give the 
Legislative Council veto power over any future national parks, and would amend the National 
Parks and Wildlife Act to make it harder to allocate land for conservation than for mineral or 
timber extraction. However, the timely report of the Carter Commission, implicating the 
Liberal leader in the bribery scandal, gave some hope. The Greens were at a loss, and were 
being pulled apart by internal grass-roots dissent. Choosing principle over pragmatism, on 
October 3rd the Greens reiterated their threat to bring a no-confidence motion. But the 
Government 'stood tall', and ruled out any compromise. 
Labor and Greens decided to allow debate on the bill, to put the Liberals in the position of 
hypocrites: supporting a no-confidence motion based on legislation they endorsed. Labor also 
needed time for the $50,000 forest publicity campaign to take effect, as their own coffers were 
almost empty, and there had been another delay in the Carter Royal Commission's bribery 
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inquiry. The Greens likewise decided to allow debate on the bill before the no-confidence 
motion to put the Liberals in the position of supporting the Bill. But as Liberal Leader Robin 
Gray had easily survived allegations of boozing, womanizing, lying and thieving, trying to 
expose Liberals on the finer points of scruples was, in retrospect, perhaps a bit optimistic. 
To the general public, the obscurity of the forestry issue meant that the Liberals could make 
stable government the key issue. Premier Field, on the other hand, insisted that those who 
opposed the RSL were simply against 'balance'. After all, the delirium with which industry 
groups greeted the legislation was certainly equalled by the horror expressed among 
environmentalists. 
The day came. On October 31, 1991, the RSL was introduced. The Greens had indicated 
to Field that their no-confidence motion would be phrased in such a way as to give him a way 
out. After an exchange of notes between Field and Brown, Field left Parliament to advise the 
Governor of the new ball game. The no-confidence motion was based on RSL only , and since 
he withdrew the legislation, the Greens allowed Labor to finish out the remaining 18 month 
term. 
The Greens could not contain their glee and made the mistake of appearing too pleased. 
The Forest Industry came down hard on Field and he caved. Within the fortnight, Field 
reintroduced the RSL attached to another bill, thereby making it the required 50 percent 
different from the original (to qualify as a different bill). This, of course, was portrayed as 
outfoxing the Greens, not breaking their word. The Liberals then agreed to pass the 'new' 
legislation and to not support a no-confidence motion until after December 25th. It was done. 
The RSL passed on the 13th of November. 
Meanwhile, the Royal Commission's adverse findings about opposition Leader Robin Gray 
came down, but the Liberal MPs stood faithfully behind him; that is, until Gray went on 
holiday in December. He was then replaced by Ray Groom, a well-mannered and plausible 
individual, but whose record as Minister for Forests under a previous Government was, in the 
greens' view, deplorable. On the last day of Parliament in December, Field stated that 
Parliament would not resume for several months. Just after the holidays, however, he called 
an election for February 1st, 1992. The Government was defeated emphatically, while the 
Greens lost votes but not seats. There are now only 11 Labor and 5 Greens as against 19 
Liberals, and the transnational woodchip companies rule. 
Postscript 
For about three months in early 1992, the greens prevented the construction of a road in 
native forest that had once been protected as a National Park. During the blockade, local 
rednecks fire-bombed two of the protester's cars. The police apparently knew who had done 
it, but did not press charges. In response to the peaceful protest, legislation recently passed 
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through the Tasmanian House of Assembly and Legislative Council that will mean anyone 
protesting the destruction of Tasmania's forests (and economy) on Crown land can be fined up 
to twenty thousand dollars or serve up to 12 months in gaol. 
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APPENDIX 2: ECOFEMINIST PRAXIS 
'A guide to growing greenies organically' 
Ecofeminist praxis is a matter of individual choice. The following is a specific example. 
Home-grown, organic playgardens integrate structures designed to facilitate exploratory, 
imaginative, and interactive play with plants, trees, and the natural features of the site. This 
encourages children to develop positive early experiences in nature, even though they may be 
confmed to urban settings. Such botanical exploratoriwns encourage the appreciation of nature, 
and stand in stark contrast to traditional Patriarchal playgrounds which mould children (like the 
corporate system moulds adult society) into relationships that are competitive, non-self reliant, 
and disconnected from nature. 
This essay answers the question: why it is that when a group of parents, motivated only by 
concern for child development and a sense of community, join together to build an innocuous 
little community play environment, they are so often met with derision, hostility, and 
occasionally even blatant sabotage from officials, bureaucrats, and businessmen who seem bent 
on proving "it can't be done"? One might expect these people to take a paternalistic or helpful 
attitude toward women and children. In my experience, however, it is those who harbour the 
most Patriarchal attitudes that oppose play environments most virulently. 
After years of doggedly bearing witness to the tribulations of community-built playgrounds, 
I believe I know why. Creative play environments symbolize all that is devalued in a 
Patriarchal/capitalist culture. They speak to: women's and children's (non-material) needs; 
unstructured learning and unsupervised play; shared public open space and a sense of 
community; and art and nature that is not partitioned-off from community life. Thus, creative 
play environments, and what I consider to be their pure form, 'playgardens', can be seen as 
metaphors for the feminine principle. 
Moreover, the process of building them can itself be a community-building activity which 
promotes local self-reliance, group decision-making, and personal empowerment among the 
parents who build them. In both content and process, therefore, a little playgarden project can 
strike at the very heart of Patriarchy, which is based on dominance relationships and control 
over nature and Other. In fact, the local playgarden project can be a veritable 'Trojan Horse' 
for challenging the dominant, anti-environment paradigm. 
It may seem fanciful to suggest that playgardens could be a vehicle for social change. After 
all, in a time of global catastrophe, building play environments in the comforts of Australia, 
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Canada, or the United States pales somewhat in comparison to the suffering of men and 
women of the Third World - some of whom have even been murdered in their attempts to 
defend the natural environment But it is here where the sources of their problems are to be 
found; it is here where things must be put right. And nowhere does merely 'talking' open the 
closed Patriarchal consciousness that permits the systemic abuse of power. 
Changing that mentality requires direct action on all levels, the personal and political. 
Contrary to appearances, home-grown playgardens and similar community-based projects can 
be a form of direct action that has more potency and depth than 'radical' demonstrations or 
marches. A few blades of grass can sometimes do more to dislodge concrete than a thousand 
marching feet. Compare, for example, a small community-based project with a protest at a 
military base. The protest brings media attention to the issue and confronts the soldiers 
themselves; it is symbolic, educative, and enables the participants to make a personal 
statement. But while play environment projects do not make sensational media events, they, in 
contrast, enter deep into the very fabric of the community. They reach people that can still 
'turn off the news. The difficult reality is that true social change cannot happen without face-
to-face communication within the community. 
In this essay I will show that there is opposition to play environments (and it is greater in a 
place where Patriarchy rules); that the reasons given for opposing play environments, such as 
legal liability and cost, do not stand up to fact or reason; and that the reasons for this 
opposition are non-rational, and relate to the male-dominated system of social relations and 
values. I will also suggest why such community-based projects represent a genuine threat to 
Patriarchy. But the value of playgardens is not just as a locus for community activism. They 
are also a breeding ground for the next generation of 'greenies' and, potentially, a model for a 
community environment that is in harmony with non-human nature and the 'feminine 
principle'. 
Patriarchal attitudes toward creative play environments and playgardens become more 
awesome if we compare their benefits to the community with their relative cost - that is, by 
using Patriarchal standards of measurement Let us first look at the importance of free play in 
the social development of the child and community. 
The importance of play 
It is necessary to distinguish three types of play environments which I will call 
playgrounds, creative play environments, and playgardens. By 'playgrounds', I mean the 
traditional slides, swings, forts, and multi-functional playstructures. 'Creative play 
environments' include all outdoor -environments designed to facilitate 'free' (or exploratory and 
imaginative) play. 'Playgardens' are creative play environments that are functionally integrated 
with the landscape and vegetation. In a playgarden, structures serve as inconspicuous props 
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for children in their explorations of nature and of their capabilities in relation to the 
environment. 
Although creative play environments and playgardens are quite different from traditional 
playgrounds, androcentric (male-centred) bureaucracies are often categorically against all three. 
This is partly because they cannot distinguish between them anyway. For example, I once read 
the results of a research project which observed children's preference for playing on traditional 
playgrounds (eg. swings and slides) as compared to the so-called 'modern' multi-function 
playstructure. From this, they concluded that the traditional equipment was 'preferred' over 
more 'progressive' designs. But the multi-functional playstructure is usually, in fact, the 
traditional playground concept with only a slight structural modification. These structures 
merely connect different items of traditional equipment onto one climbing framework - the 
activity itself is not integrated. To put it another way, if something is categorized as a 
progressive playground it must be different than a traditional one, despite the play patterns and 
relationships dictated by the design. 
Similarly, problems experienced with commercial equipment or badly-designed play 
environments are attributed categorically to all play environments, including custom-deSigned 
ones. Remarkably, however, I have found most mothers, and parenting fathers, do not have 
this perceptual handicap. Perhaps it is because they are able to empathize, or to imagine how 
children would behave in different physical contexts. During their parenting years at least, they 
see the world from the wide eyes of the child, rather than the linear vision of the adult. 
Of course, despite the presumed 'worthlessness' of play, traditional and commercial 
playgrounds do continue to get built with some regularity. In my experience, however, the 
reason men's service clubs build playgrounds is because they get continual requests, and 
because they are an inexpensive way of showing tangible evidence of their activity in the 
community. Likewise, the reason municipal bureaucrats build playgrounds is because parents 
and large playground companies lobby for them. 
But while traditional playgrounds continue to be built, they do not reflect our knowledge of 
the importance of play in child, family, and community development. Look at traditional 
Patriarchal playgrounds in the context of human development. Their design bears little relation 
to the needs of children, parents, or community. These playgrounds are not environments to 
explore, but a mere catalogue of equipment, such as bars, seesaws and slides, scattered around 
at random with no relationship between them or the site. The pattern is the same throughout 
the world. Whether of wood or metal, such playgrounds are invariably cold, barren and 
isolated. Beyond this, they shape a play experience that is one-dimensional: the resultant 
activity is constricted and segregated from other activities, from other children, from non-
human nature, and from the broader community. In short, playgrounds reflect the 19th 
Century view that play is a separate, isolated activity with no social relevance or value. 
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Playgardens and their benefits 
In our Western culture, vegetation and landscaping is generally perceived of as a 
meaningless 'backdrop' for human activity. This disassociation of nature and humans is 
reversed in an organic playgarden. Playgardens not only bring nature back into the human 
habitat, they situate child development back where it belongs - in the natural environment. 
Organic playgardens can establish a 'natural' play environment where before there was only 
paving or left-over space. There is a complex of structures and spaces to explore, creating an 
efficient use of land (which is increasingly scarce in developed areas). 
Although playgardens may have decks, posts, and equipment as required to promote 
physical exercise and social interaction, the structures are made inconspicuous to blend in with 
the plants and landscaping. In contrast, hard-edged Patriarchal architecture symbolizes Man's 
aspiration to distance himself from nature and the feminine. Playgardens are a small symbol of 
what a 'femininist' environment would be - one physically and aesthetically integrated with the 
living environment. Playgardens potentially help to reintroduce children and play back into the 
social life of the community as well. Creative work is play. 
Patriarchy is stuffy: imagine a living environment where opportunities for spontaneity and 
fun are functionally integrated with structures for daily living. Although perhaps too literal an 
example, I have a 90 foot long slide (made from two parallel water pipes) for quick access 
from my house to the garden below. It serves the additional purpose of getting my children 
down into the garden more often. We could do far more to develop public places (bus stops, 
airports, nature strips and street furniture) for dual social uses, such as exercise circuits for -- 
kids and parents. But so much for futurism; let us look at some of the immediate benefits of 
playgardens. 
Most of the time, children are confined in artificial, highly structured environments which 
constrain their natural curiosity and freedom. Traditional playgrounds are user-un friendly: the 
accident rate in them is unacceptable. Risk taking is an important part of physical development, 
yet the consequence of failing in a 'hard' environment is serious injury, or at least punishment 
for damage to property caused by the children. Natural playgardens, in contrast, provide 
positive outlets for physical challenge with far less risk. Bushes and natural groundcover 
generally prevent serious injury to kids, while damaged plants usually recover without much 
drama. Also, vegetation can be placed so as to slow children down and therefore reduce 
collisions. 
But organic play environments also liberate parents. In a conventional playground, a 
mother must constantly be on her toes: "Watch me", "Push me", "Help me". When my 
children were small, I would avoid traditional playgrounds because the 'passive' equipment, 
like round-abouts or swings, required me to do most of the work. For example, I would have 
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to check a slide for cuts in the sheet metal, then stand underneath while the children climbed up 
the potentially lethal ladder that invariably protruded from a jagged concrete footing, and then 
run like heck to catch them before they landed in the mud puddle at the bottom of the slide - 
again, and again, and again. In a playgarden, the equipment is designed for the children to do 
the work, giving mothers a chance to relax, socialize, and perhaps plot the overthrow of 
Patriarchy. Also, playgardens provide a sanctuary where we can all seek respite from our 
primary role as a segment of the market. 
Sometimes residents oppose playgrounds in their immediate vicinity because they are 
unsightly and attract vandals (even children, heaven forbid). These people may seem petty, but 
they have a valid point. Most traditional playgrounds are ugly. They tend to detract visually 
from the surrounding natural and built environment. Some playground advocates argue that 
this does not matter as "playgrounds are for kids". Kids are apparently not supposed to have 
taste. I do not believe this is so. While children may enjoy exploring a junk yard or alley, 
there is no reason to design play environments to replicate them, if only because our urban 
environments already offer those experiences. Playgardens, however, do not conflict with the 
surrounding architectural setting because they blend into the landscaping and thus complement 
the built environment. 
There are also benefits from the process of building community playgardens. For instance, 
a home-grown playgarden is something constructive (literally and figuratively) that any and 
every parent can do, while directly providing and caring for their own children. It has to help 
childrens' self-esteem to see their parents involved in a community-building activity meant for 
especially for therm Home-grown playgarden projects also set an example of self-reliance, and 
of taking responsibility for the community and the shared public environment. Finally, they 
demonstrate a creative approach to environmental design. Children and their parents can, and 
often do, participate in the design process, as well as in construction. 
The importance of free play 
There is a substantial body of literature on the importance of free or exploratory play to the 
child's cognitive and physical development (beginning with such people as Piaget, Montessori 
and Steiner). Therefore, I will discuss only how play environments affect social development. 
A child's self esteem is in part shaped by experiences at play. Organized sports are 
necessarily competitive, which reinforces a 'them versus us' attitude and a judgmental social 
milieu. Only the few most physically assertive individuals can excel in a particular event. 
Childrens' ability and ranking in a sport can affect their confidence and give them a sense that 
they belong in a certain stratum on a scale of worth. Also, sports do not encourage us to 
appreciate the range of different kinds of abilities which children have. 
321 
I do not oppose competitive sports per se ; that would not be realistic. Despite their 
tendency to promote tribalism, aggression, commercialism, and social hierarchy, they also 
have positive benefits, perhaps. However, as a society, we have a right to alternatives that 
nurture cooperative play and self expression, foster self-esteem, and recognize the diversity of 
ability among individuals. Children play: that is their job. That is how they learn. When we 
provide play environments for children, we are telling them they are important for being what 
they are, not for how they score. 
Another social attribute of playgardens is that, unlike most toys and commercial recreation, 
they bring whole families and different age groups together. This is especially so where the 
play space is within the neighborhood itself. In contrast, the objective of most recreation 
planning by the private sector is to divide the market. Ever more specialized equipment and 
accessories are marketed, usually by associating athletic achievement with sexual and social 
success. 
But play experiences not only affect self-esteem, they affect children's social development 
and attitudes. Studies have corroborated what is obvious to any interested observor: • 
childrens' ways of interacting with one another vary with the design of the play environment. 
In traditional playgrounds, I have observed my own, as well as other children wanting to use a 
certain item of equipment, only if and when other children were on it. They can hardly be 
blamed for this when one considers the typical layout of the equipment. The design guidelines 
in former literature called for setting play equipment apart to avoid confict; but in fact, 
segregating the equipment seems to generate conflict, as children must take turns to use it. 
By contrast, in an organic playgarden, where children explore a network of structures 
among the bushes and trees that facilitate interconnected play activity, children begin to create 
games with others they have never met before, actively seeking out the involvement of others 
in cooperative games. I am sure the difference is measurable, were empiricists interested in 
studying real life. There are several factors which alter the way children relate in a playgarden. 
First, the equipment is that which requires the children to do the moving, rather than to be 
entertained. Second, integrating vegetation multiplies the ways in which the network of 
activities can be used; for example, a play circuit can also become a maze. Third, a playgarden 
is a complex environment, rather than a set of isolated items of equipment. Because of these 
factors, cooperative games such as hide and seek, nature observation, or creating cubbies occur 
naturally. 
Another factor affecting social relationships is that the equivalent of 'equipment' in a 
playgarden is designed to be used by different children in different ways as they grow in size 
and ability. This means all ages can play together. Further, because playgardens are 
botanically complex, they are interesting enough for adults to explore. By 'inviting' parents to 
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play with children, playgardens can bring families together in fun. This encourages maximum 
usage, activity, and security. 
By now one must be asking "what does socialization in playgardens have to do with 
environmentalism?" Well, no matter how effective we may be, it is our children who will be 
deciding the fate of the last remnants of the natural world, assuming we can slow down the rate 
of destruction sufficiently. The importance of children's well being to the future cultural and 
natural environment is something which mainstream environmental theory and practice has not 
yet fully taken on board. Children's emotional security and affinity with the natural 
environment is perhaps more important in shaping their disposition towards nature than their 
intellectual understanding of the environmental crisis, or the place of nature in their little 
cosmological frameworks. 
Although it would be difficult to prove, I personally believe that when children are denied 
meaningful early experiences in nature, it is crippling to their personal development - 
comparable to being deprived of physical affection early in life. No amount of intellectual or 
metaphysical teaching can inculcate a caring identification with nature in children: it must be 
felt. For instance, we all know many adults who understand the environmental crisis 
intellectually, but do nothing. In fact, some green scholars or experts, while capitalizing on the 
current interest in the environment, are not willing to put themselves or their professional 
reputation on the front line. This is because there is no direct correlation between 
comprehending a problem and acting to resolve it. But while there is no correlation between 
knowing and acting, there is a correlation between caring and acting. And research has 
established a link between the child's early experience of the natural environment and a caring 
and responsible attitude toward nature. 1 
The opposition to play environments 
Having hopefully established the virtues of creative play environments - and especially 
playgardens - over traditional playgrounds, I would like to substantiate the link between 
androcentrism, or our over-masculinized culture, and opposition to play environments. In a 
more gender-balanced world, the process of building a little local play environment would 
surely be a simple, straightforward activity. However, in a Patriarchy, it is not so easy. In 
fact, I have found it harder to implement a small community playgarden than a residential or 
commercial structure. 
To take just one among myriad examples, the local education department sat on a set of 
construction drawings for six months and (allegedly) told the school principal they had."28 
1 See Louise Chawla, 1988, "Children's Concern for the Natural Environment", Children's Environments 
Quarterly 6 (3) pp. 13-20. 
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queries and safety concerns" about the project. To interfere in the contractual relations of an 
architect and a client is a serious matter, yet the superintendent refused to communicate with me 
on the matter and merely answered my letters with a curt note saying they were giving the 
school "expert professional" advice. However, when I went in person to the department to 
find out what these problems were, I discovered that no one there had even reviewed the plans 
yet. Six months later, they had still not reviewed the plans. Finally, and after much time 
invested by the parents inquiring as to the status of the plans, they were approved and released 
without any criticisms and perhaps without anyone having examined them. (I suspect that no 
one in the Department had either the ability or interest to evaluate the plans.) The delay was 
simply to discourage the parents from building any play environment, under the unfounded 
presumption that playgrounds of any sort mean trouble. 
Similarly, on other projects, parents have had to contend with rumours to the effect that it 
"would never be built". I even overheard someone say this about a project I designed some 
weeks after it was completed! Such derision (usually by men) can undermine the group's 
confidence (usually nearly all women), especially when they lack experience in construction. 
One could argue that the undermining of playground projects has to do with either my 
personal inadequacies, or even with plain old sexism - as opposed to Patriarchy. But if that 
were so, I would have had similar difficulties in positions I have held as an attorney, artist, 
architect or city planner. 1 I have found it far more difficult to get builders to follow 
playstructure plans than building plans, though my playgarden drawings are much more 
explicit and include step-by-step instructions. 
Let me convey an idea of the frustrations involved in getting play structures built to plan. I 
have often come to inspect a play environment project and found serious and dangerous errors 
in construction. Queries as to why the builders have not followed the plans have generally 
been met with most peculiar excuses, like in one case: "Well this guy came along and said the 
way you had it was wrong. He suggested it would be better this way". When I looked 
quizzical, he added, "He seemed to know what he Was talking about, he was some kind of 
engineer or something". Or, once I discovered that the roof of a gazebo-like play structure was 
built entirely wrong, even though I had explained the plans to the builder beforehand and he 
had understood. His response was: "Well, that's not the way we build rooves here, we do it 
like this". 
My point is that the real problem is not sexism per se. It is that in Patriarchal society such 
projects and their proponents (male or female) are simply not taken seriously. Another 
example illustrates this well. A community arts officer obtained a grant for me to work as 
1 That is not to say that sexism is passe. To take one of many examples, I was once asked not to talk to 
council workers as they would "resent taking instruction from a woman". 
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'artist in residence' for a community-participation in design project. She made arrangements 
with a small town which promised to fund the materials in exchange for free design services 
and other benefits from the grant. A site was agreed upon. A few months later, when the 
project was scheduled to begin, we arrived to discover some expensive equipment had been 
purchased and placed smack in the middle of the site - the only suitable site in town. Far more 
money was spent on that equipment than the Council was willing to allocate to the local 
community for building materials, even though the residents agreed to provide the labor free . 
Half way into the three month project, the Council was still unable to agree to provide an 
alternative site. Two sites that were later picked were rescinded by the Council after I had 
designed play environments for them. 
As far as we could tell, the Town Clerk and Council simply refused to take the playground 
project seriously because it was seen as of, for, and by women, even though some of the 
women had enlisted their husband's participation. These officials wasted our time and energy 
with that cold, mindless, disinterest with which a cat toys with a mouse. (A far cry from the 
way such Patriarchs purred at me when I was in charge of major project review in a large City 
Planning Department and empowered to stop projects!) 
Home-grown play environments are always underfunded, and this promotes a self-fulfilling 
prophesy. School department policy, at least here in Tasmania, is generally to let 
parent/teacher organizations raise money for play equipment; after all, "it keeps them out of 
mischief'. When a self-help project is permitted, they will not contribute the amount of funds 
they sometimes allocate for commercial equipment. (It is a situation parallel to that of 
decentralized solar energy applications, which have hadto compete with energy sources that 
have enormous subsidies on all levels of production and distribution.) Because creative play 
environments have to operate on a shoestring with volunteer labor, problems inevitably arise 
due to, for example, the most interested participants moving on to new jobs or new places. 
The fact that playgrounds are not taken seriously, however, does not explain why Patriarchs 
so often oppose creative play environments that are good value economically. I will now 
explain why the 'reasons' generally given for opposing such projects do not stand up to 
common sense. This being the case, I submit that only an emotional, subconscious, reaction 
(largely centred upon gender identification) can explain the extreme disinterest or overt 
opposition of so many Patriarchs to play environments. We will now look at the reasons for 
not building playgrounds that I have most often encountered. 
The reasons given for opposing creative play environments 
Safety and liability  
It is not necessarily the case, as many officials contend, that play environments are 
inherently unsafe.and therefore undesirable from a public policy standpoint. Soccer fields 
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often have far more serious injuries than creative play environments, yet they are made of a soft 
grass carpet upon soil. Still, you never hear of the construction of soccer fields (which 
invariably cost more than playgardens) being opposed on grounds of safety. But creative play 
environments and playgardens are tarred with the bad record of traditional playgrounds and 
commercial equipment. 
Play environments custom-designed by specialists have a safer track record than these. 
Nonetheless, many officials argue against creative play environments in favor of conventional 
equipment, on grounds that the latter are more 'maintenance free'. Concrete at the base of 
equipment, splintered logs, torn sheet metal, and worn bearings belie this view. Any mother 
who has visited a public playground can see they are unsafe and in need of maintenance. In 
fact, any outdoor public environment needs a regular schedule of maintenance and budgets 
always include maintenance costs for other forms of equipment. To avoid the idea of 
conforming management practices to that reality is to sit in a corner and try not to think of a 
white elephant. 
Liability is also used as an excuse for not replacing dangerous traditional playgrounds with 
far safer play environments. Of course, any public place can host a serious accident; there 
have likewise been law suits by ladies who have caught high heels in sidewalk cracks. But that 
does not mean, as a Tasmanian parks and recreation official declared at a conference on 
playgrounds, that the threat of law suits prevents public servants from "getting on with their 
job". Law suits generally concern injuries due to demonstrable negligence such as concrete 
under swings, which is still a common feature here in Tasmania. In fact, it seems to be often 
only law suits that force some officials to do their job - which is after the requisite human 
sacrifice has occurred. When an official argued that he could not afford funds for a program to 
remove the concrete under swings, I suggested the prdessional staff could roll up their shirt 
sleeves, rent jack hammers, and fix the problem in a day themselves. But concrete was still to 
be found under swings many years later, perhaps because of a dearth of law suits. The law is 
not, in reality, the problem: liability in playgrounds can be avoided by professional design, 
and a systematic schedule of maintenance which demonstrate 'due care', rather than by 
inaction. 
Lack of demand 
There is constant demand from mothers for new, well-designed, play environments. On 
several occasions, however, school principals or local officials took up my time to discuss a 
possible project, only (I later discovered) to get "all those mothers" off their backs. They 
considered themselves to have performed their duty of 'considering' a play environment, while 
actually 'listening' was not seen as part of their obligation. 
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By Patriarchal logic, there is no demand for play environments because traditional 
playgrounds are not very well used. But it should be asked: "why not?". Mothers have 
known for years that these playgrounds are dangerous (concrete under swings), unpleasant 
(metal slides in direct sun), dreary (a penitentiary of bars) and boring (about four things to do 
on average). Traditional playgrounds are not interesting; they insult the intelligence of 
children. But it has apparently not occurred to most officials that low usage is the outcome of 
poor design. 
A city official once said to me: "who needs a playground? Children are like dogs, you 
throw a ball, they chase it". Because the developmental and social aspects of play have, been 
undervalued, design for play has not been taken seriously either. Hence little thought, money, 
or energy has been invested in the design of play environments. To many, keeping kids off the 
street is still their only purpose, and if kids do not like playgrounds, or if they get hurt on 
them, the problem is taken to be a design flaw in children, not in the design of the 
playgrounds. 
Vandalism 
I had designed some wood playstructures in the heart of low-income communities in 
California that were not appreciably vandalized. Although designed as temporary structures for 
temporary daycare centres in rented properties, they far outlived their life expectancies. When I 
moved to Tasmania, someone therefore suggested I call the local housing department, because 
they were having trouble with vandalism and might appreciate some advice. I phoned and 
asked for an appointment, but when I told them I was a playground designer, they literally 
laughed in my face and refused to give me an appointment. 
One of the gentlemen said they were greatly impressed with a play environment I had 
designed locally, but that they dealt with 'tough' neighborhoods, where vandalism was a 
serious problem. Therefore, he said, they were only interested in 'durable' commercial 
equipment from interstate sources. When I responded that I had heard their equipment had 
been continuously vandalized, he said "yes, but they used blow-torches, wenches, and 
explosives". But if vandals rise to any challenge, it is perhaps not the strength of materials that 
count in reducing vandalism. Ease of repair and cost of replacement materials are also 
important. Similarly, prisons designed to be vandal proof have been torn apart and even 
abandoned, such as the Jika Jika prison in Australia. (But then, if we want to develop 
resourceful prisoners, the traditional playground may be an appropriate training ground, after 
all.) 
Value 
Some bureaucrats seem to assume that commercial playgrounds are better value for money. 
But commercial multi-function playstructures do not really offer much to do. They only 
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facilitate physical development. Also, they are materials-intensive and generate little 
employment. If you compare creative play environments and playgrounds by the amount of 
play activity per unit of money, the former would win hands down anytime. 
But cost is not the real issue. Councils and bureaucrats do not hesitate to spend hundreds 
of thousands of dollars on other forms of recreation. Certainly, other projects, such as sport 
fields, generate revenue. However, while these turn money over and therefore increase 
'GDP', 1 they do not produce goods or services as such, other than entertainment. Though 
children are-our most important product, they must compete for crumbs. I remember a TV 
news item in which much civic pride was evinced in spending literally millions of dollars fixing 
a dangerous curb on a racetrack. This was back-to-back with an item about a playground 
which cost ten thousand dollars, a fact presented with a clear tone of disapproval. In a 
Patriarchy, 'toys for the boys' take precedence over living, breathing children. 
Playgrounds can be very expensive when they are designed for the prestige of sculptors, 
craftsmen, or civic officials, or to enhance the appearance of a housing project Playgrounds 
seem to need to justify their existence on grounds having little to do with children, and thus 
often fail to take into account the needs of children as well. 
The real reasons for opposing play environments 
I have suggested that the arguments given by bureaucrats and officials for not building 
creative play environments do not stand up to scrutiny. There is, I believe, an unconscious 
factor in operation that is preventing a rational, objective consideration of the subject by so 
many of the Patriarchs I have encountered in my forays into officialdoom. Allow me to 
suggest some of the underlying reasons for the subconscious opposition to community-built 
play environments - reasons which all relate back to those 'masculine' attributes we are taught 
to admire in a Western society. 
Separation of people and nature 
Many in the construction profession have been molded into an engineering mentality. They 
think society can be shaped to fit efficient, functional spaces devoid of messy, uncontrollable, 
living things. Designing urban play environments that incorporate nature seems like the 
obvious thing to do, but there is an entrenched belief that plants and people do not mix. The 
false Western view of Man as autonomous and independent of nature, is reinforced by an 
image of nature as scenery or a mere stage set for human activity. 
1 See Helen Henderson, 1978, Creating Alternative Futures (NY: Berkeley) and Marilyn Waring, 1988, 
Counting for nothing: What Men Value and What Women are Worth (London: Allen & Unwin). 
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Also, there persists the sentiment that unkempt nature in our very midsts is somehow 
dangerous. An official who was afraid children could trip on ivy seemed oblivious to the 
danger of concrete slabs. Another government playground official, who had not bothered to 
visit a local, organic play environment I had designed several years earlier, said quite . 
confidently that the project proved the idea of mixing plants and children could not work. In 
fact, the planting had thrived (at least the plant survival rate was far higher than that of my own 
garden). The project had become a 'play-jurigle' according to design. 
Being aloof from their own children and forgetting their own childhoods, many officials fail 
to realize that if a kid is swinging on a monkey bar or balancing on a beam over sticky bushes, 
the game naturally becomes to avoid falling on the plants. Bushes on an empty field, in 
contrast, can be a fun 'obstacle course' to slalom over on bikes. The two contexts are simply 
quite different. 
Linear thinldng 
Because playgrounds have been poorly designed, they are not used or appreciated much; 
therefore, they are not given much thought, time, or money. We do not ask the right questions 
- mother's questions. I often use the following example of how intellectual numbness can be 
caused by excessive Patriarchy. A play environment project in San Francisco was resisted by 
the Parks and Recreation Department because the existing one was "safer" and they "had to 
worry about complex problems like liability". However, the records at the Department showed 
the accident rate there was very high, especially considering there was hardly any equipment; a 
set of four swings took up most of the space. According to the files, the children were injured 
simply because "they fell off'. However, my interviews with children suggested there were 
two main causes of falls from swings; they "fell asleep" or "jumped off because they were 
bored". The official cause of injury was falls, the question of what caused the fall was not 
even asked. 
Appeal of authority 
Officials and bureaucrats tend to believe what men representing big companies say over 
those who have studied children at play, such as mothers. I have often heard government 
officials repeating the sales line of company spokesmen verbatim. The companies have been 
quite aggressive in attacking community-built play environments. For example, they have been 
lobbying against the use of old tyres in playgrounds on the grounds that they can burn. 
Insurance companies, they say, will not ensure playgrounds that have tyres because of the fire 
hazard (or is it because of lobbying). Strangely enough, however, they do ensure parking lots. 
It is true, of course, that all equipment can become dangerous if not regularly inspected, as is 
the case of commercial equipment as well. 
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Self-interest 
I have designed playgrounds that literally cost a fraction of commercial equipment per unit 
of play activity. But value for money is not really the issue for officials, probably because it is 
not their money. Instead, they use money according to how it will enhance their own position 
in the Patriarchy, and getting along with the boys from the big companies is 'where it is at'. 
In all fairness, there is one good reason for officials to avoid creative play environments: it 
is that playgrounds take more thought and energy on their part. It is easier to pull a catalogue 
off a shelf. It is also easy to obstruct a home-grown play environment and then say "that 
proves communities should not get involved" in the official's territory. Of course, insecurity 
and power cannot account for all the antics that our little friends get up to, but the drive for 
control and territory is no small part of it. 
Play environments as a threat 
You must be asking, "but can play environments seriously be a threat to the Patriarchy? 
Surely they cannot bring about social change?" It is true, certainly, that proponents of play do 
not have the redistribution of power foremost in their minds. It is the process wherein the 
significance of home-grown play environments lies. Community self-help projects politicize 
and empower those who might not otherwise question Patriarchal structures, values, and life 
quality issues. 
The innocent process of building a little community play environment works to educate, 
politicize and empower women. First, such projects educate women by direct exposure to 
androcentric thinldng. Many entrapped 'housewives', after all, have formed their impressions 
about the public sphere through the heroic myths their husbands and fathers have brought 
home from the office. In implementing community projects, they encounter many hidden 
assumptions, for example: anything proposed by mothers is not to be taken seriously in the 
'real world'; all childrens' and mothers' legitimate needs can be met by commercial products; 
public open space and art which does not generate income has no value; family activities that 
cannot be segregated into markets are frivolous. 
Second, such projects politicize women by exposing them to the patent foolishness of 
Patriarchal officialdom. As I said, local bureaucrats who do not blink at spending hundreds of 
thousands of dollars on men's play environments, such as race tracks, stadiums, and casinos, 
will disdainfully ignore requests for a few hundred dollars for children who have nowhere to 
go and no way to get there. In short, the process of building home-grown playgardens 
exposes women to the contradictions of the Patriarchal psyche which militates against a 
humane and natural environment. 
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In nearly every project in which I have been involved, some mothers have indicated their 
dismay at the personal politics of Patriarchy. Those people previously assumed to be 
professional, mature decision makers, having regard to sound, reasoned analyses, were later 
seen as people motivated largely by personal insecurity and unmet emotional needs. One group 
was so disappointed at the shabby emotional and behavioural standards of the local officials 
that they stood candidates and won a seat on the Council! 
Sometimes, of course, Patriarchs usurp the community design process, and when that 
happens the nature of the project changes. Suddenly the group transforms into key players and 
passive supporters. These leaders begin to relate defensively and competitively and the process 
ceases to be fun. 
Third, the community-building process also empowers women, because such projects 
necessarily involve face-to-face democracy and skill sharing. Home-grown play environment 
projects empower women by allowing those who would not ordinarily play the games required 
to ascend in large organizations to develop skills and confidence. The process encourages 
cooperative actions and communal attitudes, and reduces dependency on service 'providers'. 
Although they may try, the male chauvinist cannot demonstrate superior knowledge regarding a 
mother's own needs that are to be accommodated in a family play environment. 
What I have tried to show is something that is incapable of 'scientific' proof because it is a 
subject that is of little interest to those in the dominant paradigm and does not lend itself well to 
empirical research methodology. However, I suspect, it conforms to many parent's personal 
experience. Something that contributes to community and life quality, and has clear value in 
relation to cost, is nonetheless opposed quite irrationally by Patriarchs who are closed to other 
points of view and would rather exercise power than accommodate community needs. Home-
grown playgarden projects are one form of direct action that provides for community building 
and creates a vehicle for face-to-face relationships between parents and those in the power 
structure. 
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